Scales of Law: Rethinking Climate Change Governance by Osofsky, Hari
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCALES OF LAW: RETHINKING CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
HARI M. OSOFSKY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
Presented to the Department of Geography 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
June 2013 
 ii 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Hari M. Osofsky 
 
Title: Scales of Law: Rethinking Climate Change Governance 
 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Geography by: 
 
Alexander B. Murphy  Chair 
Susan W. Hardwick  Core Member 
W. Andrew Marcus  Core Member 
Kyu Ho Youm  Institutional Representative 
 
and 
 
Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research and Innovation; 
    Dean of the Graduate School 
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded June 2013. 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 Hari M. Osofsky 
 iv 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Hari M. Osofsky 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Geography 
 
June 2013 
 
Title: Scales of Law: Rethinking Climate Change Governance 
 
 
 The international treaty regime on climate change is failing to address this 
problem adequately and cannot fully capture the scales of the problem or of efforts to 
address it.  This dissertation draws from geographic conceptions of scale and legal 
governance theory to: (1) argue for the value of polycentric, multi-scalar approaches to 
climate change governance, (2) explore the nuances of what such approaches entail, and 
(3) propose strategies for improving their effectiveness.  It does so by applying these 
theoretical approaches to three case studies: climate change litigation, federal climate 
change regulation, and suburban action on climate change.  For each of these case studies, 
it demonstrates the complexity of defining scales and scalar dynamics and considers how 
the activity being described does and should fit into multi-scalar governance approaches.     
It concludes by reflecting upon the lessons from the case studies for how to understand 
the geography of multi-level governance approaches and to approach its core principles 
of hybridity, multi-scalar, and inclusion.  
This dissertation includes previously published material. 
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 1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: WHY THE GEOGRAPHY OF SCALE MATTERS TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change and Crises of 
International Law: Possibilities for Geographic Reenvisioning, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L.  423 (2011). 
 
Climate change is one of the most vexing problems facing the United States and 
the world today.  This problem’s human and physical geography is an important part of 
what makes it so hard to solve.  Climate change interacts with multiple levels of 
governance, from the international to the sublocal.  It involves a wide range of 
governmental and nongovernmental participants at those different levels with geographic 
ties to a variety of places around the United States and world.  The applicable legal 
frameworks constitute and are constituted by cultural, economic, political, and social 
conditions in those places.  
This dissertation argues that the primary approach to addressing climate change 
through law fails to engage its complex, multi-scalar geography.  Rather, it tries to match 
the scale of law to what is viewed as the primary scale of the problem. Specifically, 
because climate change clearly has global dimensions, nation-states have tried to solve it 
through international law.  The dominant multilateral climate change regime consists of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1  and 
agreements negotiated under that convention. The UNFCCC provides general 
                                                
1 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC NO. 102–
38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC], available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/unfccc_eng.pdf. 
 
 2 
commitments and a structure for achieving more specific targets and timetables.2  Parties 
to the UNFCCC meet regularly in conferences under its auspices, most recently in Doha in 
2012, to attempt to negotiate additional agreements.  The 2011 Conference of the Parties 
(COP) in Durban resulted in an agreement to reach a universal agreement by 2015 and 
established an “Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” to 
begin negotiating towards this 2015 goal.3  These efforts are complemented by the 
December 2012 decision of thirty-seven of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol4—the only 
agreement negotiated under the UNFCCC which provides binding targets and 
timetables—to extend that Protocol to a second commitment period running from 2013–
2020.5   
 The dominant international-law-focused approach to climate change faces two 
difficult geographical challenges that undergird this dissertation’s analysis.  First, and least 
problematically for an account in which we solve “global” problems through international 
treaties, this scale-matching approach is not adequate on its own to solve the problem.  
The existing regime and negotiations are struggling to achieve their goals.6  The Kyoto 
                                                
2 Id. 
 
3  See Draft decision -/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (Advance unedited version), Nov./Dec., 2011, 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_durbanplatform.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2011).   
 
4 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 
I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
 
5 Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol, 8 December 2012, Draft Decision -/CMP.8, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9, available at  
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/eng/l09.pdf.  
 
6 I have explored these failures in my prior scholarship, some of which is reproduced in this dissertation. 
See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 
49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009).  
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Protocol’s first period commitments were not enough to close the emissions gap and some 
parties failed to meet even those limited commitments. Moreover, participation by 
important developed country emitters in the Kyoto regime is declining.  Despite its active 
role in initial negotiations, the United States, the largest total developed country emitter, 
never joined.7  Key emitters that participated in the first commitment period—most 
notably, Canada, Japan, and Russia—are not making second period commitments.8 Even 
if nation-states successfully negotiate a rigorous universal agreement under the Durban 
Platform process, which seems unlikely, such an agreement will not come into effect until 
we are even further down the path of inadequate mitigation.9 
 These difficulties do not necessarily suggest the need for innovative geographical 
theorizing about climate change governance. A Westphalian10 narrative of addressing this 
vexing problem, which focuses on international law arising from the consent of sovereign 
and equal nation-states, would likely acknowledge the regime as creating limited 
international legal obligations and assess it as not entirely successful in achieving its 
                                                
7 LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK (David 
Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2005); RUSSIA AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES (Anna Korppoo et al. eds., 2006); Alastair R. Lucas, Mythology, Fantasy and Federalism: 
Canadian Climate Change Policy and Law, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 41, 52–56 
(2007). 
 
8 Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol, 8 December 2012, Draft Decision -/CMP.8, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9, available at  
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/eng/l09.pdf. 
 
9 Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 15 Mar., 2012, 
Decision 1/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf. 
 
10 By “Westphalian,” I mean guided by the core notions of nation states as primary subjects and objects of 
international law and of international law being created through the consent of sovereign and equal nation-
states. For expositions of Westphalian understandings of international law, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287–88 (6th ed. 2003); Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of 
Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to 
Rule by the Great Powers, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 383 (2005). 
 
 4 
goals. 11  However, the substantive problem of addressing climate change effectively 
through international law at that scale would remain. A core question that this dissertation 
asks is whether current international legal efforts should focus primarily on achieving 
better agreements in negotiations among nation-state parties, or whether more inclusive 
geographic conceptions of climate change governance which shift that focus somewhat 
might actually serve as a tool in addressing this problem. 
 Second and more fundamentally, there is a great deal of activity with legal 
significance on climate change outside of the UNFCCC structure.  Some of this activity 
includes a wide range of additional formal international legal agreements among nation-
states, which, for completeness, should be included in even a traditional account of 
international law creation.12  For example, the Montreal Protocol’s13 efforts to address 
ozone have a significant impact on greenhouse gas emissions.14  In addition, and less 
acknowledged in most of the commentary on the UNFCCC, nation-states have crafted 
many bilateral and multilateral agreements (with fewer parties) on relevant issues such as 
alternative/renewable energy.15  These agreements arguably should also be included in 
almost any account of problem solving relevant to climate change.  
                                                
11 For an in-depth discussion of a Westphalian approach compared to other approaches, see infra Chapter 
XIV. 
 
12 I have discussed some of this activity in Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: 
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALABAMA L. REV. 237 (2011). 
 
13 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 5, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550. 
 
14 For an analysis of the relationship between the Montreal Protocol and climate change and a proposal for 
the future, see Mark W. Roberts & Peter M. Grabiel, A Window of Opportunity: Combating Climate 
Change by Amending the Montreal Protocol to Regulate the Production and Consumption of HFCs and 
ODS Banks, 22 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 99 (2009). 
 
15 See, e.g., Press Release, White House, U.S.-Mexico Announce Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and 
Climate Change (April 16, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/US-Mexico-
 5 
 The conceptual conundrum comes not from these additional formal agreements 
among nation-states, though they contribute to the simultaneous overlap and 
fragmentation of international law. Rather, the complexity arises from the geography of 
the many less formally binding agreements and interactions among nation-states and 
among a broader range of other governmental and nongovernmental entities. This 
dissertation focuses in particular on multi-level interactions about climate change taking 
place through litigation, the formulation of the Obama Administration’s approach to 
reducing greenhouse gases, and efforts by cities.  As relevant entities and individuals help 
to constitute, and are influenced by, multiple levels of governance, they help to shape 
climate change mitigation and adaptation in fundamental ways that an analysis focused 
only on the treaty regime cannot fully capture.   
 As with the first problem of insufficient formal international law, one could use a 
traditional, Westphalian approach to global problem solving with its focus on 
international-scale decisiomaking through national-scale actors to describe these complex 
interactions. The lawsuits, policies, and agreements that are the focus of this dissertation 
have no formal international legal significance under traditional notions of international 
law. They involve many subnational and nongovernmental actors who, as a matter of 
international law, are not subjects and objects of international law and could rescind their 
commitments at any time. With the exception of formally unsuccessful petitions to the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the World Heritage Commission, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Announce-Bilateral-Framework-on-Clean-Energy-and-Climate-Change; International Council on Clean 
Transportation, Athens Resolution (2010), 
http://www.transport2012.org/bridging/ressources/files/1/1138,ICCT-Athens-Resolution.PDF; Press 
Release, White House, U.S.-China Energy Announcements (Nov. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-clean-energy-announcements. 
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lawsuits are in national-level and sub-national-level courts.  Similarly, the Obama 
Administration’s decisions about how to structure its approach to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions take place within the U.S. nation-state. Commitments in the agreements by 
cities to reduce climate change likewise involve subnational, not international, legal 
action. Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice, agreements among cities 
and states would not serve as sources of international law. They are not treaties, and are 
unlikely to be treated as evidence of nation-states’ customary international law obligations 
or of the general legal principles that they recognize.16  Moreover, the lawsuits, policies, 
and subnational agreements and actions do not need formal international legal significance 
to help supplement the international legal efforts by nation-states under the UNFCCC.  
They all can be treated as part of the nation-state meeting its commitments.   
However, such a description captures the transnational, multi-level geography of 
these national and subnational activities in a limited fashion that this dissertation argues is 
inadequate.  In this description, the lawsuits, policies, and agreements among localities are 
legally insignificant. Their actions only matter to international law-making to the extent 
that they influence nation-states’ behavior in the UNFCCC meetings or help them to meet 
their commitments.17   
This dissertation analyzes how the geography literature’s nuanced engagement of 
scale can help to provide a needed fuller understanding.  The dissertation represents the 
culmination of several years of work on multi-level climate change governance and 
contains edited portions of several solo-authored articles and book chapters that I have 
                                                
16 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 
17 For further discussion of local participation in international climate change negotiations, see Chapter XIII. 
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permission/authority to reproduce here.  By chapter in the dissertation, these articles and 
book chapters include: Chapter I: Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change and Crises of 
International Law: Possibilities for Geographic Reenvisioning, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L.  
423 (2011); Chapter II: Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: 
Dilemmas from Property and Criminal Law, 53 Villanova L. Rev. 117 (2008), and Hari 
M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 
Florida L. Rev 1077 (2011); Chapter III: Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change 
“International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 585 (2009); 
Chapter IV: Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 Oregon R. Int’l L. 233 (2007); Chapter V: Hari M. Osofsky, Is 
Climate Change “International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 Va. J. Int’l 
L. 585 (2009); Chapter VI: Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?: 
Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 585 (2009); Chapter VII: Hari M. 
Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 
Va. J. Int’l L. 585 (2009); Chapter VIII: Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and 
Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Alabama L. Rev. 237 
(2011); Chapter IX: Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: 
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Alabama L. Rev. 237 (2011); Chapter X: 
Hari M. Osofsky, Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: 
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Alabama L. Rev. 237 (2011), and Hari M. 
Osofsky, Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation: 
Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 447 (2012); Chapter XI: 
Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts: Possibilities for Small and Nimble 
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Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and International Networks, 22 Cornell 
J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 35 (2012); Chapter XII: Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change 
Efforts: Possibilities for Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, 
National, and International Networks, 22 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 35 (2012); Chapter 
XIII: Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts: Possibilities for Small and 
Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and International Networks, 22 
Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 35 (2012); Chapter XIV: Hari M. Osofsky, The Creation of the 
International Law of Climate Change Complexities of Sub-State Actors, in Non State 
Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes 355 (Cecilia M. Bailliet, ed.) (2012, Cambridge 
University Press), and Hari M. Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: 
Reflections on the Role of States and Cities at Copenhagen, 25 Maryland J. Int’l L. 64 
(2010). 
Over the past two decades, an extensive body of work has emerged in geography 
that asks basic questions about what scale is and how it interacts with society.18  Yet this 
scholarship’s analysis of law is often quite limited and legal commentators’ rarely grapple 
significantly with this literature or engage explicitly the issues raised by it.  Even the 
developing law and geography scholarship tends to focus more on space and place than on 
scale.19  This dissertation fills that gap by showing how the geography scale literature 
could be intertwined with theoretical work in law and other disciplines on scale to inform 
                                                
18 For a discussion of that literature, see infra Chapter II. 
 
19 For example, neither of the broad anthologies on law and geography has scale as a central focus.  See 
LAW AND GEOGRAPHY (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003); THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: 
LAW, POWER AND SPACE (Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney & Richard T. Ford eds., 2001).  Similarly, 
leading law and geography scholar David Delaney’s most recent book, which attempts to create a new 
vision for law and geography, focuses on spatiality and law without significant discussion of scale. DAVID 
DELANEY, NOMOSPHERIC INVESTIGATION: THE SPATIAL, THE LEGAL AND THE PRAGMATICS OF WORLD-
MAKING 31–33 (2010). 
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more “polycentric” 20  approaches to climate change governance. The rest of this 
introductory part frames the remainder of the dissertation by providing an in-depth 
discussion of these scholarly literatures in Chapter II and the multi-scalar nature of climate 
change and regulation of it in Chapter III.   
 Building on that conceptual base, the dissertation provides three in-depth case 
studies of multi-scalar dynamics in U.S. efforts to address climate change in order to 
explore this geography and consider its governance implications.  First, as discussed in 
Chapter IV through VII of the dissertation, many key actors in the international 
negotiations interact with a wide variety of public and private entities and individuals 
through litigation over climate change.  Second, as explored in Chapters VIII through X, 
U.S. national approaches to climate change, which influence international negotiations, 
involve complex multi-scalar interactions and choices about how to include key actors at 
multiple levels. Third, the agreements to mitigate emissions reached among cities, states, 
and provinces during negotiations parallel to the last several COPs—discussed in Chapter 
XI through XIII—include significant emissions reduction pledges from subnational 
governments located within nation-states that are making much more limited national-
level commitments.  At a local level, these leader cities vary in their characteristics, needs, 
and participation in multi-level networks; suburban mitigation plays a critical role in 
reducing metropolitan emissions.21  
                                                
20 Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change, Background Paper, World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2010: Development in a Changing Climate (2009). 
 
21  I have previously analyzed these agreements and the dilemmas that they pose for international 
lawmaking in Hari M. Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of 
States and Cities at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. Int’l L. 64 (2010).  
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While acknowledging that an analysis focused on the United States is incomplete 
and often not generalizable, the dissertation chooses to base its three case studies within 
one nation-state in order to achieve greater depth of analysis.  Each nation-state has a 
distinct physical geography, political and legal system and tradition, and social and 
cultural context.  Within a large state like the United States, there is substantial internal 
variation.  By looking at three different variations of multi-scalar climate change 
governance that have their primary place-based ties to the United States, the dissertation is 
able to interconnect the case studies and their significance for governance more clearly. 
The dissertation chooses the United States in particular as its area of focus because 
of that nation-state’s status as a major developed country greenhouse gas emitter that has 
made comparatively limited international- and national-level commitments.  The United 
States has the second largest total emissions in the world, surpassed only by China. 
Moreover, its per capita emissions are far higher than China’s, the seventeenth highest in 
the world as of 2009.22  Its greenhouse emissions, including carbon dioxide emissions 
from fossil fuels, have been consistently increasing over time, including during the past 
decade.23  It also is one of the largest producers in the world of oil, coal, and natural gas. 24  
The dissertation provides extensive consideration of electricity generation and 
                                                
22 LARRY PARKER & JOHN BLODGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL32721, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE TOP 20 EMITTERS AND DEVELOPED VERSUS DEVELOPING NATIONS (2010); Mark 
McCormick & Paul Scruton, World Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data by Country, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 31 
2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/31/world-carbon-dioxide-emissions-
country-data-co2?intcmp=239.  
 
23 E.P.A., DRAFT INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990 – 2010 (2012). 
 
24 WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, SURVEY OF ENERGY RESOURCES 2010 (World Energy Council 22d ed. 2010). 
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transportation in its three case studies because those two sectors together comprised 61 
percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2010.25   
Despite the significant U.S. contribution to the problem of climate change through 
these comparatively high emissions levels, the United States, as discussed in depth in 
Chapter VIII, has not joined the Kyoto Protocol or passed comprehensive climate change 
legislation.26  This failure to act at larger scales—particularly under President George W. 
Bush’s administration—paired with its democratic, federalist, common-law-based legal 
system has made the United States a particularly ripe environment for litigation and 
subnational action.  Although each of the dissertation’s three examples centers around 
distinct legal interactions and particular types of law, they share core similarities. They all 
reflect the U.S. legal system’s delineation of levels of governance—local, state, national, 
regional, international—and the ways in which action at one level interacts with multiple 
levels. With the rapid pace of globalization, the intertwining of law, society, culture, and 
economy at different levels of governance has only become more marked.27  These case 
studies also illustrate the immense complexity involved in addressing problems similar to 
climate change, which are so hard to solve that they could accurately be described as 
“wicked,” and maybe even “super wicked.”28   
                                                
25 E.P.A., DRAFT INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, supra note 23. 
 
26 See infra Chapter VIII. 
 
27 An extensive scholarly debate exists over what globalization means and what its implications should be. 
For a useful summary of that discourse, see David Held & Andrew McGrew, The Great Globalization 
Debate: An Introduction, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 1 (David Held & Andrew McGrew, eds., 2d ed., 2003); see also Terence C. 
Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law 32 ANNUAL REV. SOCIOLOGY 447 (2006). 
 
28 Richard Lazarus has argued that climate change is not simply a wicked problem, but a super wicked one 
because it becomes harder to solve over time, those who have the power to address it have conflicting 
incentives, and there is not an adequate institutional framework to address it. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super 
 12 
The dynamics explored in the case studies infuse climate change governance, 
which makes the application of geography’s richer understanding of scale particularly 
relevant to this context.  As described in more depth in Chapter III, regulatory efforts 
simultaneously involve individual choices, local land use planning, state land use 
planning and energy law, regional efforts and markets, federal legislation (mostly the 
Clean Air Act due to the stalled efforts at comprehensive climate change legislation) and 
financial incentives, and treaty negotiations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).29  These different regulatory pieces are not 
simply discrete interactions happening at multiple levels; many interactions cross-cut 
levels, such as climate change lawsuits involving states on both sides of the dispute, as 
well as the federal government and nongovernmental coalitions of NGOs and 
corporations.30  Geographical approaches to scale help to provide a richer understanding 
of these dynamics, and the ways in which they are both constitutive of and constituted by 
different scales and their interaction. 
As explored in more depth in Chapter II, this dissertation interweaves geographic 
conceptions of scale with multiple other types of theory: dynamic and intersystemic 
                                                                                                                                            
Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1153 (2009). 
 
29 For a discussion of these multi-level aspects of climate change governance, see Hari M. Osofsky, Is 
Climate Change “International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009); 
Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change, Background Paper, World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2010: Development in a Changing Climate (2009). 
 
30 For example, twelve states, three cities, a U.S. territory, and thirteen nongovernmental organizations 
brought the petition in Massachusetts v. EPA.  Ten other states, nineteen industry and utility groups 
organized into six conglomerate entities, and the U.S. EPA served as respondents. A complete list of parties 
in Massachusetts v. EPA is available at International Center for Technology Assessment (ICTA), Global 
Warming Petitioners, http://www.icta.org/doc/global%20warming%20petitioners%20final.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2011). 
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federalism, the New Haven School, global legal pluralism, transnational legal process, 
new governance, regulatory institutions theory, polycentric governance theory, adaptive 
management, and work on the law-science-politics interface.  In so doing, it focuses on 
what these conceptual strands have in common: a belief that governance approaches must 
acknowledge the complicated relationships of diverse actors across multiple levels.  The 
following excerpt from Elinor Ostrom’s 2009 World Bank Research Working Paper 
captures this dissertation’s challenge to a governance approach to climate change that 
focuses primarily on the international level through scale-matching: 
Given the complexity and changing nature of the problems involved 
in coping with climate change, there are no “optimal” solutions that can be 
used to make substantial reductions in the level of greenhouse gases 
emitted into the atmosphere.  A major reduction in emissions is, however, 
needed.  The advantage of a polycentric approach is that it encourages 
experimental efforts at multiple levels, as well as the development of 
methods for assessing the benefits and costs of particular strategies 
adopted in one type of ecosystem and comparing these with results 
obtained in other ecosystems.  A strong commitment to finding ways of 
reducing individual emissions is an important element for coping with 
climate change.  Building such a commitment, and the trust that others are 
also taking responsibility, can be more effectively undertaken in small- to 
medium-scale governance units that are linked through information 
networks and monitoring at all levels.31  
 
The dissertation draws from these diverse, but conceptually related approaches to argue 
for geographically aware governance approaches that incorporate hybridity, multi-scalar 
inclusion, and regulatory responsiveness. 
The dissertation’s three case examples are pieces of such a polycentric approach 
and highlight the nuanced multi-scalar dynamics taking place within each piece of the 
climate change puzzle. These examples demonstrate the ways in which geographic 
assumptions about the scale of the problem and applicable regulation define and constrain 
                                                
31 Ostrom, supra note 20, at 39. 
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options. The dissertation argues that acknowledging and evaluating these scalar 
assumptions provide the basis for more effective multi-level regulatory approaches to 
complex problems.  
Using climate change governance as an example, the dissertation not only 
describes complexity, but also explores what geographically-aware governance might 
look like and proposes strategies for improvement.  It recommends four core steps for 
rethinking governance in these contexts: (1) analyzing the multi-level aspects of and 
geographic presumptions regarding complex problems; (2) matching levels of 
government to what they do best; (3) structuring cross-cutting approaches that 
incorporate the dynamic intertwinement among levels of government; and (4) embracing 
its three core principles of hybridity, multi-scalar inclusion, and responsiveness in 
institutional design.  Its three case studies provide such a rethinking of U.S. climate 
change governance in the context of litigation, federal policy, and local action. 
In so doing, the dissertation also fills an important gap in the burgeoning law and 
geography literature32 by bringing together two important streams of that literature, the 
critical and the environmental.33  Although the critical law and geography literature of the 
                                                
32 Although a significant law and geography literature predates the last two decades, this book focuses 
primarily on the more recent literature because of its greater relevance for its approach to multi-level 
governance.  Examples of that earlier literature include JOHN H. WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD’S 
LEGAL SYSTEMS (1928); HANS WEIGERT, GENERALS AND GEOGRAPHERS: THE TWILIGHT OF GEOPOLITICS 
(1942); GILBERT F. WHITE, HUMAN ADJUSTMENT TO FLOODS (1945); John Henry Wigmore, A Map of the 
World’s Law, 19 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 114 (1929); FRANCIS C. MURPHY, REGULATING FLOOD-PLAIN 
DEVELOPMENT (1958); RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND-USE CONTROLS: INTERFACE OF LAW AND 
GEOGRAPHY (1976).   
 
33 A number of important contributions to the law and geography literature do not fall primarily into these 
categories. For example, scholarship using GIS technology in numerous substantive legal contexts, such as 
redistricting and desegregation (See, e.g., Munroe Eagles, Richard S. Katz & David Mark, GIS and 
Redistricting: Emergent Technologies, Social Geography, and Political Sensibilities, 17 SOC. SC. 
COMPUTER REV. (1999); Benjamin Forest, Information Sovereignty and GIS: The Evolution of 
“Communities of Interest” in Political Redistricting, 23 POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 425 (2004); Institute on 
Race and Poverty, University of Minnesota Law School, A Comprehensive Strategy to Integrate Twin 
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last twenty years often gets more attention in law and geography anthologies and critical 
geographers have played a lead public role in, for example, establishing a Legal 
Geography collaborative research network with the Law and Society Association,34 the 
first acceleration in law and geography scholarship came in the 1980s from those 
interested in environmental and land use issues.35 This initial growth in scholarship 
followed a period of massive development in federal environmental law and state 
environmental and land use law in the United States.36 The scholarship has flourished 
since, aided by the increase of people interested in these issues in geography departments 
                                                                                                                                            
Cities Schools and Neighborhoods (2009), 
http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/Regional_Integration_Draft_3_-_Long_Version.pdf (last 
visited May 30, 2011).); criminal law creation and enforcement (See, e.g., GIS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT: 
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND CASE STUDIES (M.R. Leipnik &  D.P. Albert eds., 2003); Cecil E. Greek, 
Tracking Probationers in Space and Time: The Convergence of GIS and GPS Systems, 66-JUN FED. 
PROBATION 51 (2002); Tony Grubesic & Alan Murray, Methods to Support Policy Evaluation of Sex 
Offender Laws, 89 PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE 669 (2010).); and environmental regulation (See, e.g., 
Cinderby & Forrester, Facilitating Local Governance of Air Pollution Using GIS for Participation, infra 
note 37; Matthews, Scuderi, Brookshire, Gregory, Snell, Krause, Chermak, Cullen & Campana, Marketing 
Western Water, infra note 37; Matthews & Pease, The Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and 
Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, infra note 37; Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, 
infra note 37; Salkin, GIS in an Age of Homeland Security infra note 37; Flannery, Notes and Comments, 
How to Pry with Maps, infra note 37.) overlaps with these two scholarly streams but has a distinct focus. 
Law and geography literature has also emerged on a wide range of other substantive topics, particularly 
property arrangements and geopolitics. Frode Flemsaeter, Holding Property in Trust: Kinship, Law, and 
Property Enactment on Norwegian Smallholdings, 41 ENV’T & PLANNING A 2261 (2009); Geremy Forman, 
A Tale of Two Regions: Diffusion of the Israeli “50 Percent Rule” from Galilee to the Occupied Weest 
Bank, 34 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 671 (2009);  Geremy Forman & Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, From Arab 
Land to “Israel Lands”: The Legal Dispossession of the Palestinians Displaced by Israel in the Wake of 
1948, 22 ENV’T & PLANNING D: SOCIETY & SPACE 809 (2004); Alexander B. Murphy, Territoriality, 
Morality, and International Law: Thoughts on Hendrix’s “Moral Theory of State Territory,” 6 
GEOPOLITICS 163 (2001). 
 
34  See Law and Society Association, Collaborative Research Networks, 
http://www.lawandsociety.org/CRN/crn5.htm#35 (last visited May 25, 2011). 
 
35 The law and geography scholarship of the 1980s focused on environmental and land use concerns, see, 
e.g., OLEN PAUL MATTHEWS, WATER RESOURCES: GEOGRAPHY AND LAW (1984); JAMES L. WESCOAT, 
INTEGRATED WATER DEVELOPMENT: WATER USE AND CONSERVATION PRACTICE IN WESTERN COLORADO 
(1984); judges and cities, see, e.g., GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL 
AUTONOMY (1985); and questions of governmental structure, see, e.g., GORDON L. CLARK & MICHAEL 
DEAR, STATE APPARATUS: STRUCTURES AND LANGUAGE OF LEGITIMACY (1984).   
 
36 For an overview of these regulatory developments, see DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION (2006). 
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and in law departments, many of whom also bring other disciplines such as ecology into 
their work.  It largely focuses on relationships among physical and social spatial 
arrangements and law, with a sub-group of pieces on physical, social, and legal scale.  
Substantively, topics range from land use to water law to biodiversity to climate 
change.37  At recent Association of American Geographer meetings, multiple panels 
including law professors, geography professors, and geography graduate students have 
                                                
37 See, e.g., IRUS BRAVERMAN, PLANTED FLAGS: TREES, LAND, AND LAW IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE (2009); 
GEOGRAPHY, ENVIRONMENT, AND AMERICAN LAW (Gary L. Thompson, Fred M. Shelley & Chand Wije, 
eds. 1997); RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1996); Matthew R. Auer, Geography, Domestic Politics and Environmental Diplomacy: A Case from the 
Baltic Sea Region, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 77 (1998); Peter J. Atkins, M. Manzurul Hassan & 
Christine E. Dunn, Toxic Torts: Arsenic Poisoning in Bangladesh and the Legal Geographies of 
Responsibility, 31 TRANS. INST. BR. GEOGR. 272 (2006); Carl J. Bauer, In the Image of the Market: The 
Chilean Model of Water Resources Management, 3 INT. J. WATER 146 (2005); Carl J. Bauer, Results of 
Chilean Water Markets: Empirical Research Since 1990, 40 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 1 (2004); 
Melinda Harm Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas Development: Existing 
Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10962 (2009); Melinda Harm Benson, 
Adaptive Management Approaches by Resource Management Agencies in the United States: Implications 
for Energy Development in the Interior West, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT’L RESOURCES L. 87 (2010); Melinda 
Harm Benson, Regional Initiatives: Scaling the Climate Response and Responding to Conceptions of Scale, 
100 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOG. 1025, 1028 (2010); Nicholas Blomley, Simplification is Complicated: 
Property, Nature, and the Rivers of Law, 40 ENV. & PLANNING A 1825 (2008); Steve Cinderby & John 
Forrester, Facilitating Local Governance of Air Pollution Using GIS for Participation, 25 APPLIED 
GEOGRAPHY 143 (2005); Olen Paul Matthews, Louis Scuderi, David Brookshire, Kirk Gregory, Seth Snell, 
Kate Krause, Janie Chermak, Bradley Cullen & Michael Campana, Marketing Western Water: Can a 
Process Based Geographic Information System Improve Reallocation Decisions, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
329 (2001); Olen Paul Matthews & Michael Pease, The Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and 
Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601 (2006); Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal 
Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALABAMA L. REV. 237 
(2011); Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 
VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009); Hari M Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II: 
Narratives of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 573 (2008); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography 
of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1789 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and Federal Public Lands, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 275 
(2010); J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 18 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31 (1999); Patricia E. Salkin, GIS in an Age of Homeland Security: Accessing Public 
Information to Ensure a Sustainable Environment, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 55 (2005); 
Robert R.M. Verchick, Critical Space Theory: Keeping Local Geography in American and European 
Environmental Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 739 (1999); Robert R.M. Verchick, Feathers or Gold? A Civic 
Economics for Environmental Law, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 95 (2001); Peter M. Flannery, Notes and 
Comments, How to Pry with Maps: The Fourth Amendment Privacy Implications of Governmental 
Wetlands Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 447 (2003). 
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focused on law, geography, and environmental concerns, which suggests potential for 
continued growth.38 
Parallel to this environmental/land-use stream, a critical stream of legal 
geography scholarship developed significantly on both the geography and law side in the 
early to mid-1990s of which key works included geographer Nicholas Blomley’s 1994 
book, Law, Space and the Geographies of Power; Richard Ford’s 1994 article, The 
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis; a 1996 Stanford Law Review 
symposium spearheaded by law professor Richard Ford on Surveying Law and Borders; 
and David Delaney’s 1998 book Race, Place, and the Law, 1836-1948.39 Since then, 
there has been an explosion of critical legal geography scholarship from both legal and 
geography scholars, often drawing from this earlier work. Critical perspectives, drawing 
out of both the critical geography and critical legal literature, often have dominated 
                                                
38 Association of American Geographers, 2011 Annual Meeting Preliminary Program, Paper Session: 1681 
Regulatory Geographies: State Action and the Role of Law, 
http://meridian.aag.org/callforpapers/program/SessionDetail.cfm?SessionID=11667 (last visited May 25, 
2011); Association of American Geographers, 2011 Annual Meeting Preliminary Program, Paper Session: 
2111 Geographies of Law and Environmental Regulation I, 
http://meridian.aag.org/callforpapers/program/SessionDetail.cfm?SessionID=12134 (last visited May 25, 
2011); Association of American Geographers, 2011 Annual Meeting Preliminary Program, Paper Session: 
2211 Geographies of Law and Environmental Regulation II, 
http://meridian.aag.org/callforpapers/program/SessionDetail.cfm?SessionID=12135 (last visited May 25, 
2011); Association of American Geographers, 2010 Annual Meeting Preliminary Program, Paper Session: 
2426 Geography, Law, and Environmental Policy, 
http://meridian.aag.org/callforpapers/program/SessionDetail.cfm?SessionID=8904 (last visited May 25, 
2011); Association of American Geographers, 2010 Annual Meeting Preliminary Program, Panel Session: 
2526 Law and Geography: Examining Intersections of Theory and Application within Legal Geography, 
http://meridian.aag.org/callforpapers/program/SessionDetail.cfm?SessionID=8700 (last visited May 25, 
2011) (comprised largely of scholars engaged in environmentally-focused law and geography scholarship); 
Association of American Geographers, 2010 Annual Meeting Preliminary Program, Paper Session: 2626 
Ecosystem Management: Facing the Complexity of Ecological and Political Boundaries, 
http://meridian.aag.org/callforpapers/program/SessionDetail.cfm?SessionID=8736 (last visited May 25, 
2011). 
 
39 NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER (1994); DAVID DELANEY, 
RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW, 1836-1948 (1998); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: 
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1857-60, 1887-92 (1994); Symposium, 
Surveying Law and Borders, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1037 (1996). 
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descriptions of law and geography in this growth period.40  For example, in The Legal 
Geographies Reader, one of two broad edited volumes on law and geography published 
in the early 2000s that covers a range of substantive areas, a preface by Delaney, Ford, 
and Blomley introduce the rest of the book by saying: “What follows then is a set of 
provocative explorations into the intersections of meaning and world, power and 
experience, imaginary and positivity brought together under the rubric of Law and 
Geography.”41  The other broad edited volume has similarly diverse substantive coverage 
                                                
40  See, e.g., DAVID DELANEY, NOMOSPHERIC INVESTIGATION: THE SPATIAL, THE LEGAL AND THE 
PRAGMATICS OF WORLD-MAKING 31–33 (2010); DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE 
AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC SPACE (2003); Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the “Third 
World” in International Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000); Paul Schiff Berman, 
The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Sarah Blandy & David Sibley, Law, 
Boundaries and the Production of Space, 19 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 275 (2010); Nicholas Blomley, 
How to Turn an Beggar into a Bus Stop: Law, Traffic, and the “Function of Place”, 44 URBAN STUDIES 
1697 (2007); Nicholas Blomley, Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, 
and the Grid, 93 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOG 121 (2003); Nicholas Blomley, The Borrowed View: Privacy, 
Propriety, and the Entanglements of Property, 30 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 617 (2005); Nicholas Blomley, 
Un-Real Estate: Proprietary Space and Public Gardening, 36 ANTIPODE 614 (2004); Chris Butler, Critical 
Legal Studies and the Politics of Space, 18 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 313 (2009); David Delaney, 
Geographies of Judgment: The Doctrine of Changed Conditions and the Geopolitics of Race, 83 ANNALS 
ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 48 (1993); David Delaney, Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a Site of 
(Cultural) Production, 91 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 487 (2001); David Delaney, Trading 
Displacements: Or Evictions in the Nomosphere, 22 ENV. & PLANNING D: SOC’Y & SPACE 847 (2004); 
Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168 (2011); Richard Thompson Ford, Geography 
and Sovereignty: Jurisdiction Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1997); Richard 
T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999); Benjamin Forest, The 
Legal (De)Construction of Geography: Race and Political Community in Supreme Court Redistricting 
Decisions, 5 SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 55 (2004); Nicolas Howe, Thou Shalt Not Misinterpret: 
Landscape as Legal Performance, 98 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 435 (2008); Ron Levi, Gated 
Communities in Law’s Gaze: Material Forms and the Protection of a Social Body in Legal Adjudication, 
34 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 635 (2009); Deborah G. Martin, Alexander W. Scherr & Christopher City, 
Making Law, Making Place: Lawyers and the Production of Space, 34 PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
175 (2010); Reginald Oh, Re-Mapping Equal Protection Jurisprudence: A Legal Geography of Race and 
Affirmative Action, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1305 (2004); A. White, Geographies of Asylum, Legal Knowledge 
and Legal Practices, 21 POLIT. GEOG. 1055 (2002).  Some of the above-cited work on geography, land-use, 
and the environment is also grounded in critical geography theory.  See, e.g., Blomley, Simplification is 
Complicated, supra note 37; Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 37; Osofsky, 
Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 37; Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change 
Litigation Part II, supra note 37; Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation, supra note 37; 
Verchick, Critical Space Theory, supra note 37; Verchick, Feathers or Gold?, supra note 37. 
 
41 David Delaney, Richard T. Ford & Nicholas Blomley, Preface: Where is Law?, in THE LEGAL 
GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 19. Another edited volume on law and geography was published in 
2006, but it includes only one geographer and one law professor among its contributors and focuses 
narrowly on issues of landscape, identity, and regulation, so I am not addressing it in depth in this brief 
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paired with a critical orientation.42  This dominance of critical legal geography in 
representations of the law and geography intersection at times has resulted in a feeling of 
marginalization among non-critical legal geographers.  These disparate streams also raise 
hard questions about whether a unified vision of law and geography is possible and, if so, 
what it might look like; these ongoing discussions lack an easy resolution.43 
Through focusing on the geography of legal scale and its impact on multi-level 
climate change governance, the dissertation cross-cuts these areas of law and geography 
analysis and adds to them.  It draws from both the critical human geography literature 
interrogating what scale is and how it connects to power, and from the cross-cutting 
human, GIS, and physical geography literatures44 that analyze the relationships among 
                                                                                                                                            
essay.  See THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAW: LANDSCAPE, IDENTITY, AND REGULATION (William Taylor, ed., 
2006). 
 
42 LAW AND GEOGRAPHY, supra note 19. 
 
43 I have been told stories of marginalization and exclusion by non-critical legal geographers that I omit the 
details of from this document out of respect for confidentiality. 
 
44 For examples of the physical geography literature on scale, see Peter M. Atkinson & Nicholas J. Tate, 
Spatial Scale Problem and Geostatistical Solutions: A Review, 54 PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 607 (2000); 
L. H. Cammeraat, A Review of Two Strongly Contrasting Geomorphological Systems Within the Context of 
Scale, 27 EARTH SURFACE PROCESSES & LANDFORMS 1201 (2002); Jérôme Chave & Simon Levin, Scale 
and Scaling in Ecological and Economic Systems, 26 ENVT’L & RESOURCE ECON. 527 (2003); B. Dixon, H. 
D. Scott, J. C. Dixon & K. F. Steele, Prediction of Aquifer Vulnerability to Pesticides Using Fuzzy Rule-
Based Models at the Regional Scale, 23 PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 130 (2002); Peter Döll & Sara Vassolo, 
Global-scale v. Regional-scale Scenario Assumptions: Implications for Estimating Future Water 
Withdrawals in the Elbe River Basin, 4 REG. ENVIRON. CHANGE 169 (2004); Prakash Loungani, Ashoka 
Mody & Assaf Razin, The Global Disconnect: The Role of Transactional Distance and the Scale of 
Economies in Gravity Equations, 49 SCOTTISH J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 526 (2002); Miska Luoto & Jan 
Hjort, Scales Matters—A Multi-resolution Study of the Determinants of Patterned Ground Activity in 
Subarctic Finland, 80 GEOMORPHOLOGY 282 (2006); M. D. Newson & C. L. Newson, Geomorphology, 
Ecology, and River Channel Habitat: Mesoscale Approaches to Basin-Scale Challenges, 24 PROGRESS IN 
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 195 (2000); Malcolm Newson, Time, Scale and Change in River Landscapes: The 
Jerky Conveyer Belt, 22 LANDSCAPE RESEARCH 13 (1997); Maxim Ogurtsov, Hogne Junger & Markus 
Lindhom, A Potential Century-Scale Rhythm in Six Major Paleoclimatic Records in the Northern 
Hemisphere, 89 GEOGR. ANN. 129 (2007); Kathleen C. Parker, Albert J. Parker & Thomas R. Vale, 
Vertebrate Feeding Guilds in California’s Sierra Nevada: Relations to Environmental Condition and 
Change in Spatial Scale, 91 ANNALS OF THE ASSOC. OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 245 (2001); John D. Phillips, 
Entropy Analysis of Multiple Scale Causality and Qualitative Causal Shifts in Spatial Systems, 57 THE 
PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 83 (2005); Katrina Richards, A Review of Scaling Theory for Hardware 
Models and Application to an Urban Dew Model, 23 PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 212 (2002); Colin R. 
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physical and social spatial arrangements and law. In so doing, the dissertation creates a 
bridge between law and geography approaches and contributes to them. 
This dissertation is not the first attempt to address the legal dimensions of 
complex, multi-level governance in these contexts or others. Each of the strands that this 
dissertation interweaves with geographic conceptions of scale has made important 
contributions to thinking about multi-level governance.  For example, beginning before 
this country was established, the U.S. federalism discourse has debated many aspects of 
federal-state-local regulatory dynamics; different streams of this scholarship explore 
which levels of government can and should address particular regulatory needs45 and how 
dynamic, multi-level approaches should be structured.46  New governance adherents work 
                                                                                                                                            
Townsend, Sylvain Dolédec, Richard Norris, Kathi Peacock & Chris Arbuckle, The Influence of Scale and 
Geography on Relationships Between Stream Community Composition and Landscape Variables: 
Description and Prediction, 48 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 768 (2003); Robert J. Whittaker, Katherine J. Willis 
& Richard Field, Scale and Species Richness: Towards a General, Hierarchical Theory of Species 
Diversity, 28 J. BIOGEOGRAPHY 453 (2001). 
 
45 For a discussion of the traditional focus in environmental federalism scholarship on state versus federal, 
see Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1141 (1995). For example, an extensive environmental federalism dialogue in the mid-1990s focused 
on whether federal or state environmental regulation was more likely to lead to a race to the bottom. 
Compare Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the 
Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (arguing for federal environmental regulation as valuable), Daniel 
C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) (same), Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
The Continuing Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 
7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997) (same), and Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to 
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 67 (1996) (same), with Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the 
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 23 (1996) (presenting the downside of extensive federal environmental regulation), Richard L. Revesz, 
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (same), Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the 
Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) (same), 
and Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 
(1993) (same). 
 
46  For a discussion of the dynamic federalism literature in an environmental context, see Kirsten H. Engel, 
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006). 
For an earlier exploration of dynamic federalism in a corporate law context, see Renee M. Jones, Dynamic 
Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (2004). For 
additional examples of this burgeoning literature, see ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR 
WITHIN (2011); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
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to structure governance arrangements that are inclusive and decentralized,47 while the 
adaptive management literature considers how to make regulation more responsive.48 The 
Regulatory Institutions network in Australia similarly explores ways in which regulatory 
choices could more effectively incorporate a multiplicity of actors in formal and informal 
interactions.49 In international legal scholarship, the New Haven School views law as 
authoritative decisionmaking grounded in effective power50 and global legal pluralism 
                                                                                                                                            
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 879–83 
(2006); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 49–56 (2003); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1097 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to 
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1328–32 (2004); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American 
Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); 
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative 
State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2010). 
 
47 For examples of new governance scholarship beyond the above-cited piece by Ruhl and Salzman (see 
Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 46), see generally LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US (Gráinne 
de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., Hart Publ’g 2006); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply,“New Governance” in 
Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
471, 471–75 (2004); Orly Lobel, Surreply, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 498, 498 (2004); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). 
 
48 For examples of the interdisciplinary adaptive management scholarship, see Alejandro E. Camacho, 
Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON 
REG. 171 (2010); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles 
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 60–61 (2010); C.S. Holling, Lance H. 
Hunderson & Donald Ludwig, In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 5 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 
2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 
884–88 (2006); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
424 (2010); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 46; Sandra Zellmer, Essay, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: 
Reflections from a Post-Katrina World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599 (2007).  
 
49 For examples of scholarship from the Regulatory Institutions Network at Australia National University, 
see Valerie Braithwaite, Ten Things You Need to Know About Regulation and Never Wanted to Ask, 
RegNet Occasional Paper No. 10 (2006), available at 
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/occasionalpapers.htm; Charlotte Wood, Mary Ivec, Jenny Job & Valerie 
Braithwaite, Applications of Responsive Regulatory Theory in Australia and Overseas, RegNet Occasional 
Paper No. 15 (2010), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/occasionalpapers.htm. 
 
50 For an explanation of the New Haven School approach, see 1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY xxix (1992); 
Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1991 
(1995); Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of 
Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1959); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael 
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acknowledges multiple normative communities relevant to decisionmaking; 51  both 
approaches thus present a model of global-level governance that includes the potential for 
hybrid arrangements of formal law and informal relationships across scales.  
Rather, this dissertation’s unique contribution stems from its intertwining of the 
geography scale literature with these theories to create a richer, contextualized approach 
to multi-level governance.  It explores the ways in which different assumptions about the 
geography of scale infuse contrasting approaches to these problems and argues for the 
importance of lawyers and policymakers understanding those assumptions.  The 
dissertation shows how more effective multi-level governance can emerge from 
conscious decisionmaking that reflects such an understanding.  
Over the course of its analysis, the dissertation aims to accomplish two primary 
goals.  First, it tries to make a practical difference in law and policy approaches to climate 
change. It seeks to raise awareness about the ways in which geographic assumptions 
often unconsciously shape people’s assumptions about regulatory options in these 
contexts and, in the process, to create more openness to responsive, multi-level 
governance. Second, the dissertation contributes to a richer exploration of the law and 
                                                                                                                                            
Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1967); Myres 
S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The World Community: A Planetary Social 
Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807 (1988); W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of 
Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101 (1981). 
 
51 For examples of global legal pluralism scholarship, see generally Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra 
note 9; Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005); Diane Marie Amann, Calling 
Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. 
L. REV. 167 (2001); Elena A. Baylis, Parallel Courts in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2007); 
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); William W. Burke-White, 
International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2004); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach 
to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005); 
Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from 
Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005). 
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geography intersection and its potential role in rethinking governance.  It models how the 
sometimes disconnected streams of the law and geography literature and additional 
scholarly literatures could come together in the context of multi-scalar governance 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER II 
INSIGHTS FROM THE GEOGRAPHY SCALE LITERATURE FOR 
MULTISCALAR LEGAL APPROACHES 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Justice 
Wormholes: Dilemmas from Property and Criminal Law, 53 VILLANOVA L. REV. 117 
(2008), and Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLORIDA L. REV 1077 (2011). 
 
The geography literature on scale provides important insights for how to structure 
multi-level legal approaches to complex problems because it interrogates the nature of 
scales that legal scholarship often treats as inert categories.  Many of the U.S. federalism 
debates, including those over climate change and clean energy, center on questions of 
which level of government most appropriately matches a problem or how those levels 
could work together to address a problem.  These debates generally assume that each 
scale is a space clearly defined by the level of governance involved.  “International,” 
“federal,” “state,” and “local” refer to jurisdictional levels delineated by the legal system 
without further interrogation of what each category means.52   
This chapter provides the theoretical underpinnings for the dissertation by bringing 
together the geography scale literature with legal and other literatures that help to frame 
dynamic, multi-actor approaches to multi-level climate change governance.  It 
demonstrates how geographic understandings of scale can inform emerging dialogues 
                                                
52 For example, a 2010 volume of the Connecticut Law Review contained several articles analyzing the 
benefits, limitations, and political viability of a national renewable portfolio standard.  See, e.g., Lincoln L. 
Davis, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1339 (2010); Joshua P. 
Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy Based on a National RPS, 
42 Conn. L. Rev. 1405 (2010); Lynn M. Fountain, Johnny-Come-Lately: Practical Considerations of a 
National RPS, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1475 (2010); Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1425 (2010); David B. Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, 42 
Conn. L. Rev. 1451 (2010). 
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about polycentric approaches to climate change governance.  Section 1 provides an 
overview of the relevant geography literature on scale, with a particular focus on 
scholarship that (1) provides overall framing of geography’s contribution to 
conceptualizing scale, (2) brings together geographic and ecological conceptions of scale, 
(3) debates the nature of scale, (4) analyzes the origins of and continued emphasis on 
Westphalian presumptions in problem-solving, and (5) peers inside activity at levels of 
governance to identify key actors and interactions.  Section 2 highlights a set of 
predominantly legal interdisciplinary scholarship that helps to form the dissertation’s 
approach to (1) hybridity, (2) multi-scalar inclusion, and (3) regulatory responsiveness, 
and explores how the geography scale literature might interact with it. The chapter 
concludes by explaining how its conceptual approach will be used to frame the case 
studies and their exploration of multi-scalar climate change governance throughout the 
rest of the dissertation. 
 
1. The Relevance of Geographic Conceptions of Scale for Multi-Level Climate Change 
Governance 
 
The key insight of geography scholarship for conceptualizing multi-level governance 
is that “scale” emerges from an ever-shifting social and cultural terrain, which makes 
understanding particular scales and their relationships more complicated than the 
traditional federalism debates suggest.  As McMaster and Sheppard summarize, 
[a]lthough the relative merits of, and relations among . . . different perspectives of 
the construction of scale are still the subject of lively debate . . . , there is 
consensus on the need to move away from thinking about geographic scales as 
pregiven dimensions of society, to thinking about their social construction.53 
                                                
53 Robert B. McMaster & Eric Sheppard, Introduction: Scale and Geographic Inquiry, in SCALE AND 
GEOGRAPHIC INQUIRY:  NATURE, SOCIETY AND METHOD 1, 18-19 (Eric Sheppard & Robert B. McMaster 
eds., 2004). 
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While geographers disagree substantially on (1) how scales are constructed and in turn 
construct social and legal conditions, (2) what should be included in the category of scale, 
and (3) how different scales interact, they have in common a richer analysis of scale than 
the relevant legal literature generally provides.  Even the more dynamic federalism 
scholarship that considers complex, multi-actor relationships across scales tends to treat 
the individual scales as predetermined levels that interact in complex ways.54  
Moreover, when the geography and ecology literatures on scale are brought together, 
as geographer Nathan Sayre has done in his work, further possibilities for contributing to 
legal analysis exist.  Both the geography and the ecology literatures, which engage 
scientific issues interconnected with climate change, have their own distinct discourses 
about scale. Sayre’s article, Ecological and Geographical Scale: Parallels and Potential 
for Integration, attempts to interweave the two debates. He explains that: 
 In both ecology and human geography, the adequacy of research at any 
single scale is clearly in question, but the concept of scale itself remains 
unclear. Most participants in the debates acknowledge the need for studies 
that span multiple scales, and most conceive of different scales as being 
organized in some sort of hierarchical fashion. Within human geography, 
recent contributions have established several further points of general 
agreement: that scale is socially constructed and thus historically 
contingent, that it is politically contested, and that it is centrally important 
to understanding a variety of political, sociocultural, economic and 
environmental phenomenon. The debate has foundered on basic conceptual 
and methodological questions, however. What exactly is scale? How 
should researchers theorize and use it?55 
 
He goes on to argue that human geographers should draw three primary lessons from the 
                                                
54 For a discussion of dynamic federalism scholarship, see infra Section 2. 
 
55 Sayre, supra note 4, at 277–78. 
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ecologists’ work on scale: that it is critical to distinguish between scale and level,56 that 
rescaling processes are about “shift[ing] the level at which some process occurs” within 
“an existing structure of social organization,”57 and that hierarchical models of scale can 
be misleading at times.58  These insights are important to understanding rescaling 
dynamics in the context of climate change governance, particularly in the first case study 
on litigation, in which people use courts to fight out differences about the appropriate 
level for regulating climate change. 
In contrast to the scalar presumptions of the relevant legal literature, then, the 
geography and ecology literatures contain multiple possibilities for understanding these 
scales and their interaction with one another. Neil Brenner has summarized a number of 
the definitions of scale which geographers use: (1) “a nested hierarchy of bounded spaces 
of differing size;” (2) “the level of geographical resolution at which a given phenomenon 
is thought of, acted on or studied;” (3) “the geographical organizer and expression of 
collective social action;” and (4) “the geographical resolution of contradictory processes 
of competition and cooperation.”59  Nathan Sayre has highlighted additional concepts that 
ecologists bring to an understanding of scale. They often define the two core components 
of scale as grain, “the finest level of spatial or temporal resolution available within a 
given data set,” and extent, “the size of the study area or the duration of the study.”60 
                                                
56 See id. at 283–85. 
 
57 See id. at 285. 
 
58 See id. at 286. 
 
59 NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATES SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD 9 
(2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
60 Nathan F. Sayre, Ecological and Geographical Scale: Parallels and Potential for Integration, 29 (3) 
PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 276, 281 (2005). 
 28 
Current environmental and energy federalism analyses relevant to climate change, 
however, generally focus on Brenner’s first definition and do not acknowledge the 
ecological complexities that Nathan Sayre highlights; the scholarship maps the levels 
interacting as enclosed spaces and describes and prescribes their dynamic interactions.61 
The existence of these many alternative possibilities to the limited understanding of scale 
in the legal literature opens interesting questions about how different definitions might 
change the current scholarly debates and policy decisions, questions that this dissertation 
engages throughout its case studies.  
What makes the geography literature’s analysis of scale helpful is not simply its 
agreement over the need to treat scale as a social phenomenon and the many new 
analytical approaches to such treatment that it provides, but also its debates over what 
should be included in the category of “scale.”  An interchange among leading 
geographers Sally Marston, Neil Brenner, Neil Smith and Mark Purcell is emblematic of 
the issues raised.  Marston wrote an article in 2000 that criticizes scholarship on scale for 
“ignoring social reproduction and consumption.”62  Brenner replied in 2001 by raising a 
concern about the “the analytical blunting of the concept of geographical scale as it is 
applied, often rather indeterminately, to an expanding range of sociospatial phenomena, 
relations and processes.” 63  His piece accuses Marston, among other things, of 
“overstretching of the concept of geographical scale”64 and argues that scale analysis 
                                                
61 For an example, see supra note 52. 
 
62 Sallie A. Marston, The Social Construction of Scale, 24 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 219, 219 (2000). 
 
63 Neil Brenner, The Limits to Scale? Methodological Reflections on Scalar Structuration, 25 PROGRESS IN 
HUM. GEOGRAPHY 591, 592 (2001). 
 
64 Id. at 598. 
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should focus only on what he terms “plural” conceptions of the politics of scale, which 
focus on interactions among levels rather than within a level.65 Marston, together with 
Smith, replied in 2001.66 Most notably, for the purposes of this discussion, they criticize 
Brenner for “the same slippage between scale and space that he rejects”67 in his analysis 
and of being unreflective in his categorizing of her analysis as not about scale.68 Purcell 
commented on this exchange in 2003 as an example of what he terms “islands of 
practice”; he argues that each scholar makes important points, but fails to engage with the 
other’s ideas.69 In 2007, Marston, together with John Paul Jones III and Keith Woodward, 
responded to the ongoing debate by writing a controversial piece arguing for the 
abandonment of the idea of scale in favor of a “flat ontology.”70 
While Purcell arguably is right that Marston and Brenner insufficiently engage one 
another’s ideas in this particular interchange—though I have argued elsewhere that he 
overstates this somewhat—these debates are emblematic of the contribution that the 
geography literature can make to legal analysis of scalar issues.  Namely, this literature 
asks basic questions, often underexplored in the legal discourse, about what we should be 
including when we delineate a scale or describe multiscalar dynamics.  For example, it 
provides the basis for exploring more deeply the extent to which the levels of governance 
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69 Mark Purcell, Islands of Practice and the Marston/Brenner Debate: Towards a More Synthetic Critical 
Human Geography, 27 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 317 (2003). 
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that law delineates are fixed or fluid.71  Most critical for an analysis of multi-level climate 
change governance, the geography scale literature considers the nature of the rescaling 
processes that take place in the creation, implementation, and interpretation of law.72 
Erik Swyngedouw’s scholarship on “glocalization” processes has particular salience 
in analyzing scalar fixity and fluidity in this context because of the ways it brings 
together the international with the local, an intertwining explored in each of the three case 
studies and particularly the third one.  Swyngedouw explains:  
[R]ecent political-economic transformations are characterized by a 
parallel and simultaneous movement to the smaller and the larger scale, to 
the local and the global (a “glocalization” process).  This process does not 
in itself assign greater validity to a global or local perspective, but alters us 
to a series of sociospatial processes that changes the importance and role 
of certain geographical scales, re-asserts the importance of others, and 
sometimes creates entirely new significant scales.  More importantly, 
however, these scale redefinitions alter and express changes in the 
geometry of social power by strengthening the power and the control of 
some while disempowering others....These scales are, of course not 
operating hierarchically but simultaneously, and the relationships between 
different scales are “nested”.  Clearly, social power along gender, class, 
ethnic, or ecological lines refers to the scale capabilities of individuals and 
social groups.  As power shifts, scale configurations change both in terms 
of their nesting and interrelations and in terms of their spatial extent.73 
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This concept of “glocalization” processes helps to characterize the dynamic nature of 
scalar interactions over climate change.  Swyngedouw’s approach further illuminates 
why treating scales as inert jurisdictional levels, as much of legal analysis does, misses 
key attributes of complex interactions. 
Geographic conceptions of scale also assist with an analysis of how the territorial 
extent of a legal entity does and should compare to the scale of the problems that it 
considers.74  For instance, a substantial number of these geography scholars have 
analyzed how the nation-state as a scale and as a space fits within the changing structure 
of transnational governance.75  Alexander Murphy’s recent work is particularly relevant 
to understanding how the Westphalian presumptions that dominate treaty-centric 
approaches to climate change have emerged and continue to endure through modernist 
territorial presumptions.  Murphy argues that even though the preexisting spatial order 
has been undermined through material and functional shifts, “the territorial norms of the 
modern state system continue to exert a powerful hold on the identities, ideologies, and 
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geopolitical aspirations around the world.”76  The dominant focus on the solving climate 
change through treaties reflects these norms. 
 While the geography scale literature has much to add to analyses of multi-level 
governance, characterizing this literature as a coherent whole is difficult beyond the kinds 
of broad descriptions that McMaster and Sheppard, Brenner, and Sayre have given.  As 
this section illuminates, each individual contribution to this literature provides specific 
insights, which at times conflict with the ideas in other pieces and at times simply do not 
discuss them.  Moreover, as the Brenner and Marston debate illustrates, even conflicts 
among scholars may not always include full, direct engagement of each other’s ideas.  
Given the diversity of this literature, this dissertation does not simply draw from it 
holistically.  Rather, the dissertation draws particularly heavily not only from the above-
described work, but also from scholarship by Julie Cidell and Kevin Cox in its 
application the geography scale literature to multi-level climate change governance 
because they provide nuanced discussion of how key actors at multiple levels help to 
constitute both scale at each level and multi-scalar interactions.  Their approaches show 
in specific ways the incompleteness of legal analysis that simply treats each level as a 
contained space.  The case studies in Chapters IV through XIII follow the model of their 
approach by tracing the many key actors with ties to multiple scales that help constitute 
and are constituted by efforts in the context of litigation, federal policy, and local action 
at multi-level climate change governance. 
Specifically, Cidell’s work shows that governmental and other key entities in the 
climate change governance are ever-evolving because they are all composed of many 
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individuals.  Those individuals shape both the space that each entity occupies and the 
scale at which it operates.  As part of her analysis, Cidell has explored the many ways in 
which individuals help to scale institutions.  She notes: 
In the literature on the politics of scale, the individual has largely been 
treated as a separate scale: the site of multiple and conflicting identities, a 
locus of struggle for political power and control, or an entry point into the 
sphere of social reproduction.  However, jurisdictions and organizations at 
higher scales are themselves composed of individuals, and therefore 
consideration needs to be made of the role that individuals play within the 
politics of scale . . . .  In multi-scalar conflicts . . . individuals as scales are 
not politically powerful . . . .  Because individuals are themselves the sites 
of multiple scales, they can be torn between those scalar identities, 
sometimes expressed as keeping the professional separate from the 
personal . . . .  Finally, there is the question of individuals within scales.  
The conflation of the identities of individuals with the identities of their 
jurisdiction is a common practice.77 
 
Through the individuals that comprise it, the governmental and nongovernmental entities 
involved in climate change governance have “multiple and conflicting identities.”  As 
people move in and out of key actors and evolve over time, the nature of and possibilities 
each scale shift.   
 In each of the three case studies in this dissertation, individuals play a crucial role in 
the scalar dynamics relevant to multi-level governance.  For example, particular 
individuals are triggering litigation, either through their regulatory opposition or their 
lead role in bringing suits.  However, the key individuals within governmental and 
nongovernmental entities change over time, which then reconstitutes the level and its 
potential role in climate change governance.  The transition from the Bush to the Obama 
Administration, for instance, brought a new EPA Administrator with a commitment to 
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regulating greenhouse gas emissions and reaching a compromise with California and the 
automobile industry.78  Similarly, interviews with a variety of people involved with local 
decisions to regulate climate change in the Twin Cities area made clear that motivated 
individuals are particularly powerful drivers in smaller urban environments.79 
Kevin Cox’s approach to scale in his article Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of 
Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking for Local Politics complements the 
insights that Cidell brings through its focus on the dynamics and networks among key 
actors that constitute scalar levels and their interaction.  Cox’s conception of scale 
provides a particularly helpful lens through which to view climate change governance 
because of its unpacking of intra- and inter-level spatial networks. Specifically, his article 
envisions core local functions interacting across multiscalar networks by introducing 
what he terms “spaces of dependence” and “spaces of engagement.”80  
Cox views “[s]paces of dependence [as] defined by those more-or-less localized 
social relations upon which we depend for the realization of essential interests and for 
which there are no substitutes elsewhere; they define place-specific conditions for our 
material well being and sense of significance.”81  In the context of climate change 
governance, as discussed in more depth in Chapter III, such spaces include the way in 
which we structure our personal and professional lives on a day-to-day basis.  For 
example, how far do members of our household drive to work, child care, the grocery 
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store, and entertainment?  How does the regulatory structure where we live impact those 
choices?82 
Spaces of engagement, on the other hand, are “the space[s] in which the politics 
of securing a space of dependence unfolds.”83 These are multiscalar spaces that in the 
context of debates over climate regulation might include political institutions, courts, the 
popular press, and community gatherings. Cox describes the dynamic interaction among 
spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement by noting that “[p]eople, firms, state 
agencies, etc., organize in order to secure the conditions for the continued existence of 
their spaces of dependence but in so doing they have to engage with other centers of 
social power: local government, the national press, perhaps the international press, for 
example.”84  This organizing and use of polycentric power sources is evident throughout 
the dissertation’s three case studies. 
Network dynamics, in particular, play a crucial role throughout each of the case 
studies, and Cox’s work provides a helpful way to envision complex scalar dynamics in 
network terms.  Cox argues that scale can be more aptly described by thinking about 
networks than through the traditional “areal” approach, which focuses on specific 
territory like the United States.  He explains: 
Networks signify unevenness in the penetration of areal forms.  They 
are also rarely entirely contained by areal forms; boundaries tend to be 
porous.  The territorial reach of state agencies is imperfect.  Even in the 
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case of the most totalitarian of states, there are always spaces of resistance.  
The same applies to other agents with territorially defined powers like the 
utilities, political parties and labor unions.  To be sure, they all enjoy 
power, in the sense of rights, with respect to particular bounded areas or 
enclosures, but it is a formal power which is affected in its actual 
application by contingent conditions.  Conversely, agents, in the 
associations that they can form and indeed do form, are by no means 
limited by particular enclosures.  Local government policies can be 
appealed to higher levels of authority.  Networks of association are created 
across national boundaries, as in the fight against apartheid.85 
 
Seen in these terms, the case studies involve a constant push and pull between formal and 
informal associational networks within and across scales.  Cox’s work helps to illuminate 
the complexity of each scale and interactions across them in each of the specific contexts 
that this dissertation examines. 
 Together, then, these articles by Cox, Cidell, and others exemplify how considering 
the geography of scale can help more informed approaches to multi-level governance.  
Their looking within each level and considering the multi-scalar ties through individual 
and entities that constitute it models the kind of analysis needed in the climate change 
context.  However, Cidell and Cox are not alone in identifying the need for nuanced, 
multi-actor analysis.  Outside of the geography literature, numerous streams of 
scholarship consider how a variety of governmental and nongovernmental entities and 
individuals interact to address complex challenges like climate change.  The following 
section highlights that scholarship and how geographic conceptions of scale could help 
deepen its multi-scalar analysis. 
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2. Interweaving Geographic Conceptions of Scale with Legal Theory 
Many thoughtful scholars, often in clusters isolated from one another, have 
grappled with the complexity of structuring law and institutions to achieve appropriate 
and effective governance strategies across jurisdictional levels.  While a comprehensive 
assessment of all potentially applicable scholarship across disciplines is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, an exploration of multiple interrelated approaches helps to inform a 
richer conceptualization of multiscalar climate change governance.  
Interweaving multiple scholarly literatures across disciplines is a daunting task,86 
but these interconnections among ideas are important to explore because complex 
governance problems such as climate change are so challenging. In order to address these 
problems most effectively, we need to break down the walls that separate disciplines and 
substantive areas within them and consider the interrelated ideas that these literatures 
produce. While many more than the ten streams of ideas paired with the geography scale 
literature in this section are potentially relevant, this dissertation focuses on this set 
because of their insights into issues of scale, substantive overlap, and multiplicity of 
actors that are critical to crafting better regulatory approaches to climate change. The 
dissertation has mentioned these diverse conceptual streams in the introductory chapter, 
but this section focuses on how they fit together with each other and with the geography 
scale literature to provide interwoven ideas for multidimensional governance.  
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More specifically, this section builds from these literatures in tandem with the 
geography scale literature to suggest three key principles for framing effective regulatory 
solutions in the face of geographic complexity that underlie the rest of the dissertation’s 
analysis. First, both the New Haven School and global legal pluralism scholarship 
suggest the need to identify the various overlapping formal and informal regulatory 
vehicles.  When paired with polycentric and new governance and regulatory institutions 
theory, they provide frameworks for crafting polycentric approaches and hybrid 
structures.  The geography literature on scale can help to ensure that these hybrid 
approaches are responsive to the complexities of each level and actor.  Second, dynamic 
federalism, intersystemic governance, and transnational legal process analyses, when 
combined with the geography literature on scale, help to develop strategies that allow key 
actors at each level to interact meaningfully and effectively. Finally, the adaptive 
management literature and work on the law-science-politics interface, especially when it 
draws from dynamic federalism and nuanced geographic understandings of scale, 
indicates that these hybrid multiscalar structures need to be systematically aware of and 
responsive to change.  
As the analysis below details, while each of these conceptual streams represent 
distinct ideas that undergird the three principles, these ideas overlap, and several scholars 
have made contributions to more than one grouping.  Moreover, the nuanced conceptions 
of scale discussed in the previous section should be brought to bear on this intertwining. 
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a.  Legal Hybridity 
The foundation of this dissertation’s polycentric governance model involves an 
embrace of legal hybridity—that is, the simultaneous and often interacting legal and 
quasi-legal structures addressing climate change. Hybridity is more than just the overlap 
that results from the crosscutting nature of this problem. Rather, this approach, at its best, 
involves intentional overlap that incorporates key actors and their interactions into the 
governance process. Four of the ten streams of scholarship—together with the insights 
from geographic conceptions of scale—help to shape this dissertation’s conception of 
hybridity. 
First, the New Haven School provides a vision of lawmaking that helps to open 
up the possibilities for hybridity. To New Haven School scholars, law is “a process of 
authoritative decision by which the members of a community clarify and secure their 
common interests” in multiple arenas.87  In an international law context, the School 
represents a significant shift from the traditional state-centric view of lawmaking.88 For 
the purposes of this dissertation’s analysis, the New Haven School’s importance is not so 
much its implications for international law, but rather its broader implications for how 
regulatory behavior relevant to climate change might be conceptualized. The New Haven 
School helps to shape an understanding of relevant law as encompassing a variety of 
                                                
87  1 HAROLD  D. LASSWELL  & MYRES  S. MC DOUGAL , JURISPRUDENCE FOR A  FREE  SOCIETY : STUDIES 
IN  LAW , SCIENCE AND  POLICY  xxi (1992); accord  Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew 
R. Willard, The World Community: A Planetary Social Process , 21 U.C. DAVIS  L. REV. 807 (1988). For a 
discussion of the New Haven School’s goals, see LASSWELL  & MC DOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE  
SOCIETY, supra at xxix. 
 
88 For further explanation of the New Haven School approach, see LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 87; 
Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1991 
(1995); Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of 
Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1959); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael 
Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1967); W. 
Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
101 (1981). 
 
 40 
informal and formal arrangements, which allows for a more inclusive view of how to 
approach governance more effectively in this context. 
Global legal pluralism, which owes an intellectual debt to the New Haven School 
but is distinct from it, explicitly acknowledges existing hybridity and provides models for 
new arrangements.89  This approach is one piece of a broader literature on legal pluralism, 
an approach that emerges from the intersection of law and anthropology—and at times 
builds on the work of Professor Robert M. Cover—to argue that law is constituted by 
multiple normative communities that have shared social and legal space.90 Global legal 
pluralism focuses, in particular, on transnational intersections of these normative 
communities, and views lawmaking at a global scale as taking place through these 
communities’ often parallel but sometimes conflicting interactions. Thus, like the New 
Haven School, it has a vision of lawmaking that is broader than the traditional 
Westphalian (nation-state-centric) account and argues for the importance of including a 
diverse set of formal and informal interactions in lawmaking accounts. Most relevant to 
this dissertation’s focus, these scholars have considered how to create hybrid legal 
structures that accommodate this overlap, a key issue in the context of regulating climate 
change.91  
Elinor Ostrom’s work on common pool resource management and the approach that 
she and her many co-researchers have developed (called a Social-Ecological Systems 
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(SES) framework) include polycentric governance as a critical component.  As quoted in 
the introduction, Ostrom specifically considered the need for polycentric governance in 
the climate change context, arguing for the importance of a diversity of formal and 
informal approaches at multiple scales.92   Ostrom’s work adds to the dissertation’s 
approach to legal hybridity through its conceptualization of polycentricity in the context of 
climate change and its focus on the constructive role of informal, community-based 
arrangements in addressing complex environmental resource problems. 
New governance scholars’ focus on integrating actors and formal and informal 
law into regulatory approaches provides helpful models for what hybridity might look 
like in this context. Professors Kenneth W. Abbot and Duncan Snidal have identified the 
four core attributes of new governance strategies: (1) state-orchestrated rather than state-
centered; (2) decentralized rather than centralized; (3) based on dispersed rather than 
bureaucratic expertise; and (4) integrating a mix of hard and soft law rather than focusing 
solely on mandatory rules.93 These strategies help to ground the kind of innovative 
partnerships needed to address climate change. For example, Professor Bradley C. 
Karkkainen has used new governance theory to propose new institutional arrangements in 
the context of Great Lakes management,94 and Professors J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman 
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have paired new governance with other theories to propose a typology for addressing 
complex environmental problems more effectively.95 
The final strand undergirding the dissertation’s conception of legal hybridity 
emerges from a group of scholars collaborating through the Regulatory Institutions 
Network at Australian National University. Like many of the other scholars described 
above, these scholars believe in the importance of integrating formal and informal 
regulatory behavior. They focus on doing so through crafting responsive regulatory 
models that: (1) consider context, and the range of informal and formal options that 
interact and might create change; (2) order options from least to most intrusive, to limit 
regulatory overreaction; and (3) create dialogue about the necessity of regulation and 
elicit voluntary commitments to comply.96 This strand complements the other approaches 
because it shares their broader view of regulatory behavior and pairs that view with 
concrete strategies for navigating the resulting morass, a critical need in the climate 
change context. 
Together, these scholarly approaches provide insights into both how to 
conceptualize the multiplicity of interactions taking place in this context as legal and how 
to structure regulation that embraces the complexity of scales and interactions across 
them articulated in the geography scale literature. In so doing, they set the stage for the 
dissertation’s two primary strategies for implementing hybridity which follow: inclusivity 
across scales and responsiveness. The types of solutions that emerge from these 
                                                
95 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 6, at 102–08 (2010). For broader new governance analyses, see generally 
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Lobel, 
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 
supra note 132; Karkkainen, Reply, supra note 132; Lobel, Surreply, supra note 132.  
 
96 Braithwaite, supra note 132; see also Wood, Ivec, Job & Braithwaite, supra note 132. 
 
 43 
literatures model how conceptualizing what matters in law more broadly allows for 
needed creative configurations. 
 
b.  Multiscalar Inclusion 
As described throughout this introductory part, scale forms a critical element of 
the governance complexities in this context; polycentric governance proposals 
consistently call for better inclusion of smaller scales in the top-down international treaty 
approach that dominates regulation in the climate change context. While the above 
literatures often model multi-level inclusion, three additional streams of scholarship that 
focus on multiscalar dynamics further undergird this Article’s conceptual approach to 
integration across scales. First, at a primarily U.S. domestic level, dynamic federalism 
scholars—at times also drawing from new governance scholarship—have grappled with 
what more inclusive multiscalar governance should look like. The dynamic federalism 
scholars focus on the many areas of law in which some form of concurrent state and 
federal (and sometimes local or regional) jurisdiction exists and consider how to structure 
regulation most effectively in that context. Many of them have developed creative models 
for multiscalar interaction that do not simply involve complex cooperative approaches, 
but also integrate conflict as a regulatory tool. For example, Professors William Buzbee, 
Ann Carlson, Robert Glicksman, Alexandra Klass, and Benjamin Sovakool have 
considered instances in which floor preemption allowed leader states to push the federal 
government’s regulatory approach.97 Professor Robert Schapiro has explored how to 
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create workable governance from “polyphony.”98 Professor Erin Ryan has analyzed the 
complex ways in which state and federal governments negotiate with one another through 
various federalism devices.99 This scholarship is helpful in the context of climate change 
because it suggests ways in which concurrent authority across and within levels can be 
organized effectively, a key issue in integrating the multi-level conflict and cooperation 
taking place into a governance model. 
A subset of these dynamic federalism scholars are part of a group at Emory Law 
School working on federalism and intersystemic governance. 100  Both the above-
mentioned Buzbee and Schapiro are two of the three directors of this group, and 
Professor Robert Ahdieh is the third director, though a number of other faculty members 
are affiliated with the group.101 This Section separates out the intersystemic governance 
group as a second strand, rather than simply lumping them in with dynamic federalism, 
because of the ways in which some of them are bringing both international legal theory 
and conflict into their approach to multilevel governance. This combination makes their 
work particularly helpful for this context, as they suggest potentially useful mechanisms 
for inclusion of many scales in structures that allow for both cooperation and conflict. For 
example, Schapiro has considered the value of recognizing multiple regulatory nodes in 
                                                
98 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 129, at 7–9. For other analyses of uncooperative federalism, see Bridges, 
supra note 72, at 133–34; Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 72, at 1258–60; Junker, supra note 72, at 
94–95. 
 
99 See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) (analyzing methods, tools, and 
procedural constraints of negotiated state/federal governance). 
 
100 See Center on Federalism and Intersystemic Governance, EMORY LAW, 
http://www.law.emory.edu/centers-clinics/cfig.html (last visited July 10, 2011). 
 
101 See Faculty: Center on Federalism and Intersystemic Governance, EMORY LAW, 
http://www.law.emory.edu/centers-clinics/cfig/faculty.html (last visited July 10, 2011). 
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intersystemic interactions that span from the local to the international.102 Ahdieh has 
provided a schema for structuring “dialectical” interactions in which regulatory overlap 
and interaction improve regulation.103 
Third, transnational legal process provides another important way in which to 
connect the international and transnational with activity happening at other levels.  This 
approach, developed by Harold Koh, analyzes the way in which transnational norms 
emerge from diverse, multi-level behavior. In particular, it focuses on the way in which a 
range of actors in a variety of interactions helps internalize norms transnationally. Koh 
argues that transnational norms emerge and have effect through a process of 
interpretation, internalization, and enforcement.  Such an analysis fits together well with 
both new governance and dynamic and inter-systemic federalism approaches because it 
recognizes the nuanced interactions among a range of actors at different levels of 
government.104 
The geography literature on scale, through its interrogation of what constitutes 
scales and how movement between levels takes place, complements these four literatures’ 
conceptual framing of multiscalar inclusivity. It helps to identify, in a more nuanced 
manner, the pieces of the regulatory puzzle being crafted by the above streams and ways 
in which they might fit together. Several pieces that I have highlighted in section 1 are 
particularly illuminating in this context. Sayre’s work on scale at the intersection of 
geography and ecology could help to identify the implications of different choices about 
                                                
102 See Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post-Westphalian 
World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115, 121 (2007). 
 
103 See Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 9, at 914–26. 
 
104 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745 (2006); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 
106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). 
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mitigation and adaptation and the scales at which ecological and human concerns are 
considered.105 Professor Kevin Cox’s network conception of scale, which elucidates the 
way in which interactions at a certain level and between that level and other levels 
constitute a scale, helps to frame the multiscalar, multiactor interactions taking place in 
proposed regulatory solutions.106 Julie Cidell’s work serves as a reminder to those 
crafting regulatory strategies of the key role that individuals play in each institution and 
level.107 Finally, the debate between Professors Neil Brenner and Sallie Marston (with the 
support of Neil Smith), which Professor Mark Purcell has further characterized, provides 
an important exposition of the contested terrain in which the key actors and their 
interactions are being determined and how characterization of those interactions matters. 
Marston’s call for greater consideration of social reproduction and consumption, in 
particular, highlights the need for a more inclusive picture of the people and activities 
that matter; the case studies highlight the complexity of governance strategies reflecting 
an understanding of the larger social and political picture.108 
Together, these three streams of scholarship, paired with the geography scale 
literature, help to demonstrate how the hybrid structures described above might be 
inclusive across scales, and in the process, help to foster broad buy-in and to encourage 
learning from smaller scale knowledge. These scholarly approaches explore how 
regulatory strategies could encompass the nuances of interactions across governmental 
levels and by so doing provide the foundation for the case studies’ more detailed analysis. 
                                                
105 See Sayre, supra note 119, at 276–78.  
 
106 See Cox, Spaces of Dependence, supra note 139 and accompanying text.  
 
107 See Cidell, supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 
108 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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c.  Regulatory Responsiveness 
The prior eight streams of scholarship all provide the basis for creative 
governance forms, but the adaptive management literature and Holly Doremus’s work on 
the scientization of politics brings the concept of regulatory responsiveness in more 
clearly. Adaptive management informs a growing body of legal scholarly analysis of 
environmental regulatory approaches. Most relevant to this dissertation, a number of 
scholars, such as Professors J.B. Ruhl (often in collaboration with Professor James 
Salzman), Robin Craig, 109 Alejandro E. Camacho, 110  and Brad Karkkainen,111  have 
analyzed adaptive management in a multilevel governance context. Ruhl, Craig, and 
Camacho have combined adaptive management with dynamic federalism to propose 
strategies for approaching climate change adaptation more effectively. In so doing, Ruhl 
and Camacho both draw from Professors C.S. Holling and Lance Gunderson’s theory of 
panarchy, a “cross-scale, interdisciplinary, and dynamic” approach to conceptualizing 
global change that integrates “economic, ecological, and institutional systems.” 112 
Karkkainen, Ruhl, and Salzman combine new governance and adaptive management 
approaches in their innovative environmental regulatory proposals.113  
                                                
109 See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for 
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 60–61 (2010); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 
6, at 97–98, 103–06. 
 
110Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law Under 
Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (2010). 
 
111 See Karkkainen, supra note 72.  
 
112 C.S. Holling, Lance H. Hunderson & Donald Ludwig, In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in 
PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 5 (Lance H. 
Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002). For examples of Ruhl using panarchy in his approach, see J.B. Ruhl 
& Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424 (2010), and Ruhl & 
Salzman, supra note 6. 
  
113 See Karkkainen, supra note 72; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 6. Sandra Zellmer also has made an 
interesting proposal for an Interior Rivers Management Act that would integrate adaptive management 
principles into post-Katrina management of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers.  See Sandra Zellmer, 
Essay, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599 (2007). 
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Holly Doremus’s scholarship on the interface of science and politics provides 
important insights into the difficulties of regulatory responsiveness in contexts like 
climate change where there is contestation over complex science.  She argues that both 
sides in natural resource debates attempt to leverage science in what she calls the 
scientizing of politics.114  She explains that due to actual uncertainties and public 
expectations around certainty, science can be used both offensively and defensively in a 
regulatory context.115  These insights pair well with the geography scale literature as a 
tool for exploring how complex, multi-level contestation, such as in litigation, form part 
of climate change regulation. 
These two streams of scholarship have special salience for addressing the 
complexity posed by climate change because they provide models for creating dynamic, 
integrative regulatory approaches that can change over time and for understanding the 
barriers to such approaches. A core problem in regulating climate change effectively is 
the difficulty of creating a regime that can respond to the ecological and technological 
uncertainty and change. The case studies draw from adaptive management and 
Doremus’s work on the law-science-politics interface to explore how the multiscalar 
                                                
114 See Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 
32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249 (2005) [hereinafter Science Plays Defense]; Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, 
Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 
1 (2005); Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best 
Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the 
Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997). 
For additional analyses of the intersection between law and science in public policymaking, see ADAPTIVE 
GOVERNANCE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE, POLICY, AND DECISION MAKING (Ronald D. Brunner et al. eds., 
2005); RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
(Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006); Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The 
Independence of Public Research in the New, Subterranean Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 227 (2003). 
 
115 Id. at 266–95. 
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dynamics in the context of litigation, federal regulation, and local action can help foster 
that needed evolution.  
 
3. The Dissertation’s Conceptual Approach 
 The wealth of potentially applicable conceptual approaches from geography, law, 
and other disciplines poses a problem.  On the one hand, intellectual completeness 
suggests the importance of acknowledging these diverse set of interrelated approaches 
that are rarely treated together.  On the other hand, each approach has a good deal of 
nuance, which is lost in lumping them together in broad categories.   
This dissertation attempts to strike a balance by both drawing from all of these 
streams as part of its overall approach, and by highlighting individual pairings in its 
particular chapters throughout the case studies.  This chapter provides an overall context, 
so that when terms like hybridity, polycentricity, multiscalar inclusion, or regulatory 
responsiveness are used, the rich conceptual context underlying those terms is clear.  
Individual chapters refer back to this overall conceptual picture throughout the 
dissertation. 
However, the dissertation also aims to demonstrate in a detailed fashion how 
geographic conceptions of scale might be brought together with legal and other relevant 
interdisciplinary theory.  To that end, individual chapters interweave specific theories 
introduced in this chapter in more depth.  For example, Chapter IV brings together the 
work of Holly Doremus and Nathan Sayre, and Chapter VII integrates Harold Koh’s 
theory of transnational process with Kevin Cox’s network approach to scale. 
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Through this paired approach, the dissertation aims to provide a cohesive account 
of a polycentric regulatory landscape that acknowledges the complexity and richness of 
the scales that comprise it.  It argues that an understanding of detailed interactions that 
comprise scale, which the geographers help provide, is critical to making progress on this 
super-wicked problem. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE MULTI-LEVEL GEOGRAPHY OF CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change 
“International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 585 (2009). 
 
This final introductory chapter focuses on describing the geography of climate 
change and efforts to address it.  It explains some of the ways in which mitigation, 
impacts, and adaptation interact with multiple levels of government, and current failures 
of regulation at any level to address the problem adequately.  In so doing, it provides the 
overall context in which the case studies take place and frames why the kind of 
conceptual analysis that Chapter II introduces is necessary.    
Even the most diehard climate skeptics generally acknowledge the global 
dimensions of the carbon cycle.116 Greenhouse gases and their impacts involve complex 
interactions among the atmosphere, ocean, and terrestrial forms that interconnect the 
entire planet.117 Given the international dimensions of the problem of anthropogenic 
climate change, only a few outliers would contest the value of creating an effective treaty 
regime to address emissions.118 Rather, as demonstrated repeatedly in the recent and 
pending litigation over climate change discussed in Chapters IV through VII, the debate 
                                                
116 See, e.g., Richard S. Lindzen, Op-Ed., There Is No ‘Consensus’ on Global Warming, WALL ST. J., June 
26, 2006, at A14. For a discussion of the broad scientific consensus on climate change, even before the 
latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, see Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory 
Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCI. 1686 (2004).  
 
117 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL 
SCIENCE BASIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
ipccreports/ar4-wg1.htm. 
 
118 Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, for example, acknowledge: “It is increasingly clear that an international 
agreement to control climate change would be in the world’s interest.” Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1611 (2008). The difficulty from their perspective is that such 
an agreement may not be in the United States’ interest and that it thus raises complex justice issues about 
the best way to address climate change.  
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often centers at a smaller scale. Namely, regulatory opponents use the large temporal and 
spatial scale of climate change to fight against national and subnational regulation.119 
This dissertation supports a rigorous international treaty regime, but contends that 
the nature of climate change regulation necessitates multiscalar legal approaches—that is, 
ones that simultaneously engage more than one level of governance. Climate change is an 
individual, local, state, national, regional, and international problem.120 Because carbon is 
so deeply embedded in the global economy and its impacts manifest in specific ways in 
different places, emissions and impacts occur at multiple levels simultaneously.121 This 
dissertation argues that the valorization of the “international” in the climate change 
debate, which likely results at least in part due to the modernist territorial presumptions 
that Alexander Murphy has analyzed,122 serves as an impediment to such cross-cutting 
efforts. If regulatory strategies focus only on top-down, international-level approaches 
grounded in nation-state consent, we will miss opportunities for much needed innovation 
and emissions reduction.  
Although questions of the appropriate scale of climate change regulation are 
particularly salient in this country as President Obama’s administration crafts major 
                                                
119 I examine this phenomenon across multiple cases infra Chapters IV–VII.  
 
120 See Commission Report on the Impacts and Costs of Climate Change (Sept. 2005) (prepared by Paul 
Watkiss et al.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/ 
final_report2.pdf; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2; NICHOLAS STERN, 
THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm. 
 
121 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, available at 
http://www.mnp.nl/ipcc/pages_media/AR4-chapters.html [hereinafter IPCC, MITIGATION]. 
 
122  Alexander B. Murphy, Territory’s Continuing Allure, __ ANNALS. ASSOC GEOG. 1, 2 (2012) 
(forthcoming). 
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initiatives in the face of Congressional inaction,123 efforts to engage climate change at 
smaller scales in the United States are not new. In the early to mid-1990s, Minnesota 
courts upheld the inclusion of carbon dioxide in environmental cost valuation,124 and 
Portland, Oregon joined international climate initiatives.125 But the growth in U.S. state 
and local activity on climate change over the past several years has been staggering.126 
With over one thousand mayors pledging to meet the Kyoto standards and a host of states 
attempting to exceed federal regulatory standards, smaller-scale emissions efforts make 
                                                
123 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks of President Barack Obama—As Prepared for 
Delivery, State of the Union Address, Feb. 21, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address; U.S. EPA, Climate Change, Regulatory 
Initiatives, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html; John M. Broder & 
Andrew C. Revkin, Hard Task for New Team on Energy and Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A24, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/us/politics/ 
16energy.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=Salazar&st=cse; John Vidal, Obama Victory Signals Rebirth of US 
Environmental Policy, GUARDIAN, Nov. 5, 2008, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2008/nov/05/climatechange-carbonemissions; President Barack Obama, Address to Joint 
Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-
Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress/; Obama for America, Barack Obama and Joe Biden: 
New Energy for America, at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/ 
factsheet_energy_speech_080308.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2008). 
 
124 In re Quantification of Environmental Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. App. 1998). For analyses 
of this case, see Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational Corporate Responsibility: Mapping 
the Role of Sub-National Climate Change Litigation, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 143 
(2007) and Stephanie Stern, State Action as Political Voice in Global Climate Change Policy: The 
Minnesota Environmental Cost Valuation Regulation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: SUB-
NATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 
forthcoming 2009). 
 
125 Using bottom-up lawmaking and law and geography, Janet Koven Levit and I have focused on the 
significance of cities’ climate initiatives for multiscalar regulation. See Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven 
Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409 (2008). 
 
126 See Kevin McCarty, Bloomberg, Palmer Lead USA and World Mayors on Climate Protection: US 
Mayors Climate Agreement Hits 500 Milestone, U.S. MAYOR NEWSPAPER, May 21, 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.usmayors.org/USCM/us_mayor_newspaper/documents/05_21_07/pg1_NYC_climate.asp; 
Mayors Climate Protection Center, About the Mayors Climate Protection Center, at 
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/about.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009); U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, The U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (2005), available at 
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf.  
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an important impact even as the U.S. federal government reengages opportunities for 
greater national and international action.127 
In this context, courtroom battles over the scale of climate regulation in the 
United States are particularly salient. When opponents to stronger regulation at state and 
local levels repeatedly argue that climate change is “too big” or that emissions and 
impacts are “too uncertain” at smaller levels, they potentially block needed action.128 At a 
moment in which the scientific evidence regarding anthropogenic climate change is 
becoming ever more alarming,129 each lost opportunity to limit emissions and respond 
constructively to this problem increases the risks. Because the litigation and policy 
debates are deeply intertwined, this “scaling up” thus poses both practical and normative 
concerns.130 
Moreover, battles over scale are not unique to the problem of climate change. In 
controversies over topics as diverse as the use of the Internet, immigration policy, 
terrorism, and the current financial crisis, policymakers struggle with the appropriate role 
of multiple levels of government. Similarly, new governance and “dynamic” federalism 
approaches, to name two examples among a burgeoning literature described in Chapter II, 
engage complexities of regulatory scale, as well as the appropriateness of top-down and 
                                                
127  List of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., 
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2012); About the Mayors Climate 
Protection Center, MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/about.htm 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
 
128 As discussed in more depth infra Chapters IV–VII, often at stake in this litigation are emissions that 
constitute a significant percentage of the U.S. contribution. 
 
129 See sources cited supra note 6.  
 
130 For a discussion of the strategy of “scaling up,” see Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate 
Change Litigation Part II: Narratives of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573 (2008) and Osofsky, 
supra note 4. 
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bottom-up approaches.131 This dissertation’s law and geography analysis of multiscalar 
regulatory strategies in the climate context, therefore, forms part of a broader dialogue 
about how to scale law, a topic that I plan to explore in more depth in future work. 
This chapter’s overview focuses in particular on the scale of the problem and 
regulatory efforts to address it. Using the recent fourth report by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),132 the chapter argues that climate change is not solely 
an international problem, but rather a multiscalar one. Moreover, the regulatory 
difficulties to date reflect the fact that carbon and other greenhouse gases are deeply 
embedded in our economy and way of life at multiple levels. Our demarcation of law into 
distinct levels of governance and the overlapping sovereignty that accompanies it make 
engagement of multiple scales simultaneously very challenging. 
The structure of law poses a fundamental difficulty for effective regulation of 
multiscalar problems like climate change. Namely, law’s scales are sticky despite the 
fluid scalar nature of greenhouse gas emissions and impacts. In other words, we have 
subdivided law into levels of governance—a sensible idea for creating order and 
administrability—and formal regulation tends to happen within the fixed frames of those 
structures. As a result, we generally approach regulation as choosing or coordinating 
among those levels.133 
                                                
131 For further discussion of the new governance scholarship and other literature engaging local-
international dynamics, see infra notes 74–75. For examples of the “dynamic” federalism scholarship, see 
infra note 128. 
 
132 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2. 
 
133 For discussion of questions of scalar fixity and fluidity in the geography literature, see Neil Brenner, 
Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial Organization and the Historical Geography of 
Spatial Scales, 16 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 459, 461 (1998); Cox, Spaces of Dependence, supra 
note 19, at 20–21; David Delaney & Helga Leitner, The Political Construction of Scale, 16 POL. 
GEOGRAPHY 93, 93 (1997); Andrew Herod, Scale: The Local and the Global, in KEY CONCEPTS IN 
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The current dilemmas over climate regulation reflect those constraints. This 
chapter analyzes climate change as an example of a multiscalar problem that law 
struggles to address effectively. It begins by examining the multiscalar nature of 
emissions and impacts, and then turns to the barriers to an effective regulatory regime. 
 
1. The Nature of the Problem 
This section describes the ways in which climate change interacts simultaneously 
with many jurisdictional levels and spatial and temporal scales.  It begins with an analysis 
of emissions and then turns to impacts and adaptation. 
 
a. Emissions 
Greenhouse gas emissions result from individual, local, state, national, regional, 
and international decisions.134 At an individual level, each person, within parameters, 
makes choices about what his or her carbon footprint will be. Regarding transportation, 
for example, people decide whether to walk or to rely upon a bike or motor vehicle; if a 
motor vehicle, whether to use public, carpool, or individual options; and, if individual 
options, whether to use high or low emissions cars. Although each individual’s choices 
                                                                                                                                            
GEOGRAPHY 229, 234, 242 (Sarah L. Holloway, Stephen P. Rice & Gill Valentine eds., 2003); Deborah G. 
Martin, Transcending the Fixity of Jurisdictional Scale, 18 POL. GEOGRAPHY 33, 35 (1999); Anssi Paasi, 
Place and Region: Looking through the Prism of Scale, 28 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 536, 542–43 
(2004); Erik Swyngedouw, Excluding the Other: The Production of Scale and Scaled Politics, in 
GEOGRAPHIES OF ECONOMIES 167, 169 (Roger Lee & Jane Wills eds., 1997); and Erik Swyngedouw, 
Neither Global nor Local: “Globalization” and the Politics of Scale, in SPACES OF GLOBALIZATION: 
REASSERTING THE POWER OF THE LOCAL 137, 141 (Kevin R. Cox ed., 1997). 
 
134 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2. For a discussion of the 
multiscalar dimensions of land use regulation, see Craig Anthony Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use 
Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441 (2007) (analyzing the structure of 
the land use regulatory system and possibilities for incorporating considerations of ecosystem services). 
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have a minor impact on total greenhouse gas emissions, trends in personal decisions add 
up, even at the global scale. 
Those individual choices occur not simply in a sociocultural context—the past 
couple of years, for instance, have seen a significant shifts back-and-forth in public 
opinion about climate change135—but also in a multiscalar legal one. As explored in 
litigation between California and San Bernardino County described in Chapter VI, urban 
growth plans significantly impact emissions trajectories.136 Many studies have shown, for 
example, the ways in which suburban zoning and planning—with large individual lots, 
separation between residential and commercial uses, and limited public transportation—
increase vehicle miles traveled and, as a result, overall emissions from that locality.137  
                                                
135 See The Chicago Council on Public Affairs, Poll Finds Worldwide Agreement that Climate Change is a 
Threat (Mar. 2007), at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar07/ 
CCGA-ClimateChange_article.pdf; see also Juliet Eilperin & Jon Cohen, Growing Number of Americans 
See Warming as Leading Threat, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2007, at A20, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/19/AR2007041902527.html; cf. Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
503 (2007) (comparing reactions to terrorism and climate change). 
 
136 See Confidential Settlement Agreement, People v. County of San Bernardino, No. 07 Civ. 329 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/press/ 
2007-08-21_San_Bernardino_settlement_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Confidential Settlement Agreement]. 
This case is discussed in depth infra Chapter VI. 
 
137 See REID EWING, ROLF PENDALL & DON CHEN, MEASURING SPRAWL AND ITS IMPACT (2002), available 
at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/sprawlindex/MeasuringSprawl.PDF; JIANGUO WU & DOUGLAS 
GREEN, A HIERARCHICAL PATCH DYNAMICS APPROACH TO REGIONAL MODELING AND SCALING (2002), at 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncer_abstracts/index.cfm/fuseaction/display.abstractDetail/abstract/457/report/F; 
Molly O’Meara Sheehan, City Limits: Putting the Brakes on Sprawl (Worldwatch, Paper No. 156, 2001). 
But see Ronald D. Utt & Wendell Cox, City Limits: Putting the Brakes on Sprawl: A Contrary View (June 
29, 2001), at http://www.heritage.org/Research/SmartGrowth/WM20.cfm. For broader discussions of 
urbanization and environmental management, see Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White, Transportation 
Congestion and Growth Management: Comprehensive Approaches to Resolving America’s Major Quality 
of Life Crisis, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 915 (1991); G.S. Kleppel, Urbanization and Environmental Quality: 
Implications of Alternative Development Scenarios, 8 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 37 (2002); Edward H. 
Ziegler, China’s Cities, Globalization, and Sustainable Development: Comparative Thoughts on Urban 
Planning, Energy, and Environmental Policy, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 295 (2006). 
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Chapters XI through XIII explore the panoply suburban efforts on climate change and 
their interaction with multi-level networks in more depth.138  
State-level decisionmaking further impacts those individual transportation choices, 
as discussed in Chapter V. Following California’s lead, a number of states attempted to 
exceed federal limitations on motor vehicle emissions by enacting more stringent 
regulations.139 Cases challenging and supporting these efforts wound their way through 
state and federal courts and interacted with the Bush administration Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision to deny California’s waiver request and the Obama 
administration EPA’s reconsideration of it.140 The Obama Administration EPA, upon 
completing its reconsideration, reached a historic compromise with California and the 
recently bailed-out automobile industry to have escalating national standards for motor 
vehicles emissions that would harmonize with California standards.  Moreover, it brought 
together energy and environmental law and agencies for the first time through joint rule 
making that regulated motor vehicle fuel efficiency together with tailpipe emissions.141 
                                                
138 See infra Chapters XI–XIII. 
 
139 For example, prior to the EPA’s waiver denial and the California suit over it, a district court in Vermont 
upheld that state’s heightened emissions standards for new motor vehicles subject to EPA’s waiver grant. 
See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007). 
 
140 For the U.S. EPA’s waiver denial, see Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1514_epa-letter.pdf [hereinafter Waiver Denial]. For 
California’s Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, see Petition for Review of 
Decision of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, California v. EPA, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. 
Jan. 2, 2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/ 
n1514_epapetition-1.pdf [hereinafter Petition for Review]. For the Obama Administration’s reconsideration, 
see sources infra note 125. 
 
141  U.S. EPA, Climate Change, Regulatory Initiatives, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html. 
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As the disputes over these state laws make clear, the federal government also 
regulates individual transportation decisions through each of its three branches. Congress 
has passed several statutes regulating vehicle emissions—which the executive branch 
then implements—and is considering additional legislation targeted at climate change.142 
The judicial branch evaluates agency choices about whether and how those statutes 
should be used to regulate vehicle emissions.143 These standards drive what options 
consumers have and how expensive they will be.144 
In the globalized economy and its web of legal interconnections, these 
interactions do not stop at U.S. borders. Regional and international trade agreements 
determine which vehicles we import and export and how expensive they will be, again 
impacting what options are available to consumers.145 U.S. participation in international 
negotiations—as well as formal and informal agreements—regarding climate change puts 
                                                
142 For example, some of these statutes have been the basis of the preemption suits discussed supra notes 
27–28. For a discussion of possible statutory approaches, see Victor Flatt, Taking the Legislative 
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 123 (2007). 
 
143 Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, focused on the extent to which provisions in the Clean Air Act 
regarding pollution encompassed greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles. See Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
 
144 Arguments about consumer choices have weighed heavily in the arguments in Central Valley Chrysler-
Jeep v. Witherspoon. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 41, 
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (No. 04 Civ. 6663), 
available at 2004 WL 5001055 (“Manufacturers manage their fleet average by controlling production, 
supply, and price in response to market demands. For example, if consumer demand for larger, less fuel-
efficient vehicles increases, a manufacturer might be forced to limit supply or raise prices for those vehicles. 
The fuel economy regulations thus can have significant effects on the supply of vehicles available to 
consumers.”). 
 
145 For an example of a bilateral agreement on motor vehicles, see Memorandum of Understanding 
Regarding Foreign Motor Vehicles, U.S.-S. Korea, Oct. 20, 1998, available at 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005688.asp. 
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pressure on our national policies, which influence the price and availability of high and 
low emissions vehicles.146 
This type of analysis does not simply apply to vehicles, of course, but to the broad 
panoply of emissions decisions that individuals and governmental and nongovernmental 
entities make. From the multiscalar energy industry147 to the emergence of complex 
transnational coalitions on climate change,148 current and future emissions are shaped 
through multiscalar regulatory dynamics.   
                                                
146 For example, in her speech at the UN General Assembly High-Level Event on Climate Technology 
Session, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice specifically referenced hybrid vehicles. Condoleezza 
Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Event on Climate 
Technology Session (Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/09/92662.htm. 
 
147 For a discussion of complex regulatory interactions governing the transnational energy industry, see 
Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory 
Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789, 1795–97 (2005). 
 
148 For a discussion of climate networks in a local context, for example, see Carolyn Kousky & Stephen H. 
Schneider, Global Climate Policy: Will Cities Lead the Way?, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 11 (2003); Janet Koven 
Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of International Law, 32 
YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 402–05 (2007); and Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, 
Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1627–33 (2006). See 
generally Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal 
Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369 (2006); 
Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental 
Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels 
in the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175 (1996); Ann E. Carlson, Implementing Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Caps: A Case Study of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1479 (2008); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and 
Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and 
Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006); Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and 
Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253 (2008); Laura Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: 
Think Locally, Act Globally, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 46 (2004); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., 
Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing 
Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004); 
Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 181 & 
43A STAN. J. INT’L L. 181 (2007); Osofsky, supra note 8; Osofsky & Levit, supra note 9; Resnik et al., 
supra note 20; Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. 
Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008); Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land 
Use, and the Global Commons: Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE: SUB-NATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 8, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/  
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1267314; William Andreen et al., Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: 
Why Federal, State, and Local Governments Must Continue to Partner (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White 
Paper No. 803, 2008), available at http://progressiveregulation.org/articles/  
Cooperative_Federalism_and_Climate_Change.pdf. 
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The Fourth IPCC Report’s volume on mitigation reinforces this point; it relies on 
a mix of what it calls bottom-up and top-down economic studies to assess emissions 
reduction scenarios.149 The bottom-up studies consider specific options, generally with an 
unchanged macroeconomy, whereas the top-down studies engage economy-wide options. 
The IPCC summary for policymakers reports: 
Bottom-up and top-down models have become more similar since 
the TAR [Third Assessment Report] as top-down models have 
incorporated more technological mitigation options and bottom-up models 
have incorporated more macroeconomic and market feedbacks as well as 
adopting barrier analysis into their model structures. Bottom-up studies in 
particular are useful for the assessment of specific policy options at [the] 
sectoral level, e.g. options for improving energy efficiency, while top-
down studies are useful for assessing cross-sectoral and economy-wide 
climate change policies, such as carbon taxes and stabilization policies. 
However, current bottom-up and top-down studies of economic potential 
have limitations in considering life-style choices, and in including all 
externalities such as local air pollution. They have limited representation 
of some regions, countries, sectors, gases, and barriers. The projected 
mitigation costs do not take into account potential benefits of avoided 
climate change.150  
 
This consensus analysis suggests that in order to regulate emissions most efficiently, we 
must consider strategies at multiple levels, as well as find ways of incorporating cultural 
questions into economic models. 
In addition, the mitigation volume makes clear how difficult the multiple 
geographic and time scales make this project. For example, the chapter entitled 
“Transport and Its Infrastructure” covers transportation issues in mostly sweeping terms 
and does not have the space to delve into the nuances of how its approach can be applied 
                                                
149 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Summary for Policymakers, in 
IPCC, MITIGATION, supra note 6, at 8, available at http://www.mnp.nl/ 
ipcc/pages_media/FAR4docs/final_pdfs_ar4/SPM.pdf. 
 
150 Id. 
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within specific contexts.151 More generally, the introduction to the volume explains that 
inertia in both climate and socioeconomic systems, combined with the multiple time 
scales involved regarding the problem and responses to it, pose serious challenges.152 Not 
only will many measures need to be taken in the short term in order to prevent medium- 
and long-term issues, but policymakers also will have to navigate the fact that the same 
radiative forcing may cause the atmosphere to respond in decades as the ocean changes 
over centuries.153 Effective legal regulation somehow must bridge these complexities of 
how emissions and their interaction with the physical environment are scaled and of the 
greater scientific uncertainty that currently exists at smaller scales.154 
 
b. Impacts and Adaptation 
These complexities of scale are not limited to emissions, but also span issues of 
mitigation and adaptation. The Fourth IPCC Report makes clear that we have passed the 
                                                
151 Suzana Kahn Riberios et al., Transport and its Infrastructure, in IPCC, MITIGATION, supra note 6, at 
324, available at http://www.mnp.nl/ipcc/pages_media/FAR4docs/final_pdfs_ar4/ 
Chapter05.pdf. 
 
152 H-Holdger Rogner et al., Introduction, in IPCC, MITIGATION, supra note 6, at 101. 
 
153 Id. 
 
154 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING PROGRESS OF THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE 
PROGRAM: METHODS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 5 (2007), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309108268 (“Information at regional and local scales is most 
relevant for state and local resource managers and policy makers, as well as for the general population, but 
progress on these smaller spatial scales has been inadequate. Improving understanding of regional-scale 
climate processes and their impacts in North America, for example, would require improved integrated 
modeling, regional-scale observations, and the development of scenarios of climate change and impacts.”); 
Patrick J. Bartlein, Professor, Dep’t of Geography, Univ. of Or., Remarks at Seminar on Reading the 
Fourth IPCC Assessment Report 2007 (Oct. 17, 2007) (author’s notes, on file with author). For an 
interesting exploration of an integrative theory of resource management, see C.S. Holling, Lance H. 
Gunderson & Donald Ludwig, In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN SYSTEMS 3 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002) (introducing 
the term “panarchy” to describe their “cross-scale, interdisciplinary, and dynamic” theory of global change 
that integrates “economic, ecological, and institutional systems”). 
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point at which prevention of impacts is possible.155 Rather, a host of impacts already have 
been felt, and scientific consensus suggests that they will only get worse as time 
passes.156 The explosion of climate change litigation over the past few years, and its 
increasing viability in courts around the world, reflects this reality.157 
Just as the extent of emissions interacts with multiscalar regulatory behavior, 
mitigation and adaptation present quandaries at every level of governance. As a physical 
matter, climate change manifests uniquely in each specific place, and the likelihood of 
severe impacts are not distributed equally.158 Unfortunately, current predictions suggest 
that the places with the least economic and political resources often will bear the brunt of 
these physical changes.159 
At an individual level, people must make hard choices in response to the changes 
in their physical environment. As glacial lakes loom above them or risks from coastal 
storms grow more severe, should individuals leave their communities? Are they able to 
do so? What steps are realistic options to limit the damages that they will suffer from the 
changing climate where they live? These are not just decisions facing the very poor; 
European ski resorts have begun wrapping their glaciers, and wine growers try to take 
                                                
155 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2; IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 6; 
IPCC, MITIGATION, supra note 6. 
 
156 See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 6. 
 
157 For example, the discussion of harms underlying the nuisance claims in Connecticut v. American 
Electric Power and People v. General Motors describes a set of present harms and future risks. Complaint 
at 30–55, California v. General Motors Corp., No. 06 Civ. 5755, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. 2007), 
available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms06/06-082_0a.pdf; Complaint at 53–64, Connecticut v. Am. 
Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 104 Civ. 5670). Because that set of harms and 
risks will likely worsen without significant policy intervention, litigation over harms will probably become 
more viable over time. See IPCC, MITIGATION, supra note 6; STERN, supra note 5.  
 
158 See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 6. 
 
159 Id. 
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climate change into account when planting new grapes.160 But the choices are often more 
fundamental for those who have few resources and live in close connection with the land.  
Major climate change scenarios include troubling projections of displaced people, armed 
conflict, and economic loss in some of the poorest places in the world. 
As with emissions, these individual choices occur within a multiscalar regulatory 
framework. Localities, states, and national governments decide what their plans will be in 
response to these changes and the extent to which they want to and are able to support the 
individuals making those hard decisions.161 From the details of land use planning to the 
availability of federal disaster relief, governmental decision makers help to structure how 
palatable life will be in particular places as climates change.  
Moreover, these policy decisions have impacts at multiple time scales. As time 
passes, impacts evolve and, in many places, according to consistent scientific data, likely 
will worsen.162 In addition, as we load the atmosphere with more and more greenhouse 
gases, the risks of a sudden catastrophic event—such as ice sheet collapse—increase.163 
Decisionmaking on impacts thus has to grapple with current and predicted future issues. 
Together, the multiscalar dimensions of both emissions and impacts suggest that 
climate change will be very difficult to regulate effectively at any one scale. Local action 
must be tied to larger-scale decision making, whereas international action must make 
room for the nuances of smaller-scale variation. Moreover, because the substances being 
                                                
160 See Cloak Protects Glacier from Sun, BBC NEWS, May 10, 2005, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4533945.stm. 
 
161 Id. 
  
162 Id. 
  
163 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2; IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 6. 
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regulated are so deeply embedded in economies and cultures, political complexities 
abound that likely will manifest differently at each level of governance.164 
 
3. Current Regulatory Failures 
The need to cross cut levels of governance is, of course, not lost on those 
attempting to address climate change at any particular level. The major treaties on climate 
change build in flexibility mechanisms to allow for the nation-state parties to address 
emissions in ways that work for their particular contexts.165 Local efforts often use 
international standards as a benchmark, such as in cities’ pledges to comply with the 
Kyoto Protocol’s emissions reductions.166 Moreover, a wide range of actors at different 
levels of governance—including governmental entities, nongovernmental and 
quasigovernmental organizations, corporations, and individuals—are working 
collaboratively on crafting better regulatory strategies. 
But even with this recognition, multiscalar efforts on climate change at this point 
are falling short. As described in Chapter I, the international legal regime suffers from 
both a lack of political will and the complexities of national implementation. Once one 
gets below the international level, however, policy efforts on climate change become 
more piecemeal, which is a persistent issue in discussions of the appropriate role of 
                                                
164 IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 6. I plan to explore some of these issues of culture and identity in a future 
article, tentatively entitled The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part III: Issues of Culture and 
Identity. 
 
165  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 
I.L.M. 22, 33, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/kyoto-en.htm [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164, 166, 170, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/unfccc_eng.pdf. 
 
166 See sources cited supra note 10. 
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smaller-scale regulation and the difficulties of leakage at the subnational level.167 The 
national and international coalitions of cities, for example, continue to grow—and at this 
point these cities represent a significant percentage of global emissions—but they do not 
yet come close to including all cities around the world.168 Those that join these coalitions 
also tend to be more amenable to taking needed regulatory steps than those that do not 
join. Moreover, many cities still face major internal political battles as they try to 
navigate the practical effect of meeting those obligations on their other goals.169 
Furthermore, as a formal matter, multiscalar regulatory approaches not only have 
to deal with specific barriers at each level of governance, but also have to bridge the way 
in which we categorize and cabin law. For example, treaties and customary international 
law—the bulwarks of international legal regulation—are based on the nation-state as the 
key decision maker. Under current legal models, international law can only be created 
through the consent of sovereign and equal nation-states.170 With such an approach, the 
ability of subnational governments to interact with international law is limited; even if 
their participatory role increases, the structure of how formal international law is created 
                                                
167 See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007) (“[S]ubnational state-level action is not the best way to combat global climate 
change.”). See generally Abate, supra note 37. 
 
168 See ICLEI Global, How it started?, at http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=811 (last visited Nov. 8, 2008). 
 
169 Janet Koven Levit and I have explored these complexities in the context of Portland and Tulsa. See 
Osofsky & Levit, supra note 9. Although our analysis of cities focuses primarily on the emissions 
reduction/economic growth tension, multiple conceptual balances need to be struck in environmental 
regulation. For an exploration of the complexities of navigating conservation and preservation, see 
generally Louise A. Halper, The Adirondack Park and the Northern Forest: An Essay on Preservation and 
Conservation, 19 VT. L. REV. 335 (1995). 
 
170 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287–88 (6th ed. 2003); Michael J. 
Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”—Revolutionary 
International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 
361, 383 (2005). 
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prevents entities other than nation-states from being treated as full subjects and objects of 
international law.171 
Formal barriers occur at the other end of the scale spectrum as well. Localities are 
constituted through a combination of state and local law and entities. When localities 
choose to make Kyoto Protocol commitments, they are not binding themselves to the 
treaty but rather incorporating its terms into local law. In fact, if they tried to do more, 
national and state governments might attempt to intervene on the basis that the localities 
are overstepping their boundaries.172 Similarly, their freedom to revise their greenhouse 
gas policies and commitments over time stems from the fact that international entities 
have no binding authority over them. As discussed in Chapter VI, some of the primary 
efforts to push localities on emissions policies that have showed some teeth are those 
undertaken by states in the context of direct litigation, such as the suit by the State of 
California against San Bernardino County, which resulted in a settlement agreement.173  
In addition, as explored in depth in Chapters XI through XIII, initiatives by major 
cities—which are often the focus of the scholarly literature—capture only a small portion 
of metropolitan regional emissions because of the substantial percentage of population 
based in smaller suburban cities. 
                                                
171 For an exploration of greater inclusion of individuals in the customary international law formation 
process, see Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 119, 143 (2007). I have explored the possibilities for more pluralist approaches in the climate 
change context in other work. See Osofsky, supra note 14, at 592–93, 604. See generally Osofsky, supra 
note 37. 
 
172 See Resnik, supra note 37, at 1627–33. For a discussion of some of these dynamics in a more general 
context, see generally Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 URB. 
LAW. 1 (2006). 
 
173 See generally Confidential Settlement Agreement, supra note 24. 
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The combination of regulatory barriers at each level of governance and structural 
constraints on meaningful multiscalar regulation poses a formidable obstacle to 
addressing climate change. Despite determined advocacy by numerous committed entities, 
the world is still far from adequately addressing emissions and their looming impacts at 
any level of governance. Although particular localities certainly have shown leadership, 
even those at the forefront of emissions control are not reducing them at the rate scientists 
say are needed, and regulatory failures elsewhere are dwarfing their efforts. 
These regulatory failures and complexities make it critical to consider the role of 
litigation and of national and subnational action in multi-level climate change governance.  
Chapters IV through XIII provide detailed case studies of these developments and their 
scalar dynamics in the United States.  Chapter XIV then locates these case studies in 
possibilities for reenvisioning multi-level climate change governance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEBATES OVER SCIENCE, SCALE, AND LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, 
Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OREGON R. INT’L L. 233 (2007). 
 
 Justice Scalia: But I always thought an air pollutant was something 
different from a stratospheric pollutant, and your claim here is not that the 
pollution of what we normally call “air” is endangering health [Y]our assertion is 
that after the pollution leaves the air and goes up into the stratosphere it is 
contributing to global warming. 
 Mr. Milkey: Respectfully, Your Honor, it is not the stratosphere. It’s the 
troposphere. 
 Justice Scalia: Troposphere, whatever. I told you before I’m not a 
scientist. 
 (Laughter). 
 Justice Scalia: That’s why I don’t want to deal with global warming, to 
tell you the truth.174 
 
The above exchange occurred between Justice Scalia and James Milkey, Assistant 
Attorney General of Massachusetts, during the oral argument in Massachusetts v. EPA,175 
the first case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on governmental regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions. It not only illustrates the complexities of judicial engagement with the 
climate change science, but provides a window into one of the greatest obstacles to 
effective regulatory approaches to the problem of climate change. Namely, as discussed 
in depth in Chapter III, greenhouse gas emissions and their impacts are foundationally 
multiscalar; they range from the most individual to global levels. 
Referencing climate change as a multiscalar problem, however, only serves as a 
starting point for further discussion.  As described in more depth in Chapter II, “scale” is 
                                                
174 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 
2006 WL 3431932 at 22–23. 
 
175 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
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a complex and contested concept in both the geography and ecology literatures.176  
Moreover, a wide range of interrelated but largely non-interacting scholarship explores 
the polycentric possibilities for regulatory interaction.   
This part of the dissertation—comprised of Chapters IV through VII—draws from 
the geography scale literature and that interdisciplinary scholarship on hybridity, multi-
scalar inclusion, and regulatory responsiveness to explore the role of climate change 
litigation in debates over regulatory scale and their resolution.   It demonstrates that on 
the surface of these disputes, in their official documents and arguments, pro- and anti-
regulatory forces contest the appropriate scale of climate change regulation.  But the part 
also looks below that surface to the complexity of scalar dynamics in these lawsuits.  It 
reveals the panoply of public and private actors interacting across levels, and the multi-
scalar character of many of the actors and scales. In so doing, it demonstrates the ways in 
which this litigation exemplifies and embodies the nuances of scale definition and 
rescaling as part of polycentric governance.  
The part explores these issues of scale through a multi-scalar organization.  Its 
first three chapters focus primarily on national, state, and local regulation respectively.  
Each chapter considers an exemplar dispute that has played a significant role in shaping 
U.S. climate change regulation at those levels.  However, for each conflict over the 
appropriate role of a particular type of regulation at a specific level of governance, the 
part reveals complex multi-scalar dynamics and interweaves theoretical approaches from 
Chapter II.   
                                                
176 NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATES SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD 9 
(2004) (internal quotations omitted); Nathan F. Sayre, Ecological and Geographical Scale: Parallels and 
Potential for Integration, 29 (3) PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 276, 281 (2005). 
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The final chapter of this part draws in depth from two of the conceptual streams 
described in Chapter II, geographer Kevin Cox’s network-based conceptualization of 
scale and legal scholar Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process, to argue for 
the diagonal—across vertical and horizontal—character of multi-scalar interactions 
taking place throughout litigation and to explore the regulatory role of those interactions.  
In so doing, it shows a deeper interweaving of geographic and legal conceptual 
approaches can help inform an understanding of litigation’s governance role. 
This first chapter of the part begins with the case that has had the most significant 
regulatory impact of any of the lawsuits over climate change, Massachusetts v. EPA.  
This case challenged the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s decision not to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act, and the opinion in this case 
has been used by the Obama Administration as the basis for its regulation of motor 
vehicle and power plant emissions.  The case is important not only for its major 
regulatory and public impact, but also for the way in which it became a site for dialogue 
over how the science of climate change affects the appropriate scale for regulation.  This 
chapter brings together the work of two of the scholars highlighted in Chapter II, 
geographer Nathan Sayre and legal scholar Holly Doremus with a detailed examination 
of the scientific-scalar dynamics in this case to illustrate how interconnecting particular 
geographical and legal approaches can inform regulatory approaches.  
Specifically, this chapter analyzes the interaction of scale (in its many guises), 
science, and law in the Supreme Court briefs, oral argument, opinion, and dissents in 
Massachusetts as a window into the complex dynamics at play in climate change 
litigation. Formally, the case primarily occurs at a national level; the parties dispute the 
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interpretation of federal law in an action that was heard by federal courts at every level. It 
is precisely this apparently “national” character of the case, however, that makes it a good 
example of the multiscalar dynamics of international decisionmaking. Despite the formal 
federal level of this case, both its actors and arguments have subnational and 
supranational dimensions that are deeply intertwined with the science of climate change. 
Section 1 delves more deeply into Holly Doremus’ work on the use of science as 
a tool in, and an obstacle to, regulatory approaches and into Nathan Sayre’s analysis of 
the concept of scale to consider the particular challenges posed by the multiscalar context 
of climate change. The section intertwines their theories to argue that both sides in 
Massachusetts v. EPA use scientific uncertainty together with the scale of the problem to 
forward their version of appropriate regulation. Section 2 then supports this argument 
through a detailed analysis of the interaction of scale, science, and law in the briefs and 
opinions. Section 3 examines the implications of that interaction for how this case should 
be fit into a model of international legal decision making with respect to climate change. 
The chapter concludes with broader reflections on strategies for improving the way in 
which courts engage the scale-science confluence. 
 
1. The Science-Scale Intersection as an Argumentative Tool 
This section interweaves the work of two California-based academics whose work 
was highlighted in Chapter II: (1) Holly Doremus, a law professor whose scholarship 
explores the way in which science is used in natural resource regulation,177 and (2) 
                                                
177 See Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 
32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249 (2005) [hereinafter Science Plays Defense]; Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, 
Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 
1 (2005); Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best 
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Nathan F. Sayre, a geographer whose recent scholarship has compared the analysis of 
scale in geography and ecology literatures. 178 This Part summarizes each of their 
approaches and then connects them in the context of Massachusetts v. EPA. 
 
a. Defensive Uses of Scientific Uncertainty 
Holly Doremus’ article, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in 
the Bush Administration, explains that the biggest difficulty regarding science and 
politics in natural resources management is not the politicization of science, but rather the 
scientizing of politics. Both conservationists and those who seek to block regulation can 
use science as a tool. Doremus notes: “The combination of actual uncertainty and public 
expectations of certainty makes the rhetoric of science equally available to the regulatory 
offense and defense.”179 She traces offensive and defensive uses of science and then 
explores four main ways in which the Bush Administration has used science defensively: 
                                                                                                                                            
Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the 
Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997). 
For additional analyses of the intersection between law and science in public policymaking, see ADAPTIVE 
GOVERNANCE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE, POLICY, AND DECISION MAKING (Ronald D. Brunner et al. eds., 
2005); RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
(Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006); Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The 
Independence of Public Research in the New, Subterranean Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 227 (2003). 
 
178 See Sayre, supra note 176. A substantial geography literature engages these questions of scale and 
science. See, e.g., Louis Lebel, Po Garden & Masao Imamura, The Politics of Scale, Position, and Place in 
the Governance of Water Resources in the Mekong Region, 10(2) ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY 18 (2005); James 
McCarthy, Scale, Sovereignty, and Strategy in Environmental Governance, 37(4) ANTIPODE 731 (2005); 
Erik Swyngedouw, Scaled Geographies: Nature, Place, and the Politics of Scale, in SCALE AND 
GEOGRAPHIC INQUIRY: NATURE, SOCIETY, AND METHOD 129 (Eric Shepard & Robert B. McMaster eds. 
2004). I choose to focus on Nathan Sayre’s approach here, however, because of the particular way in which 
he interweaves ecological and scalar issues. 
 
179 Doremus, Science Plays Defense, supra note 5, at 258. 
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high burden of proof, value choices in the face of ambiguity, resolution of scientific 
certainty issues at the agency level, and limits to information gathering.180 
These offensive and defensive strategies around science are apparent in the 
debates over climate change regulation in the United States. In fact, Doremus even quotes 
a memorandum from communication professional Frank Luntz on the topic to illustrate 
the defensive approach: 
 The most important principle in any discussion of global warming 
is your commitment to sound science. Americans unanimously believe all 
environmental rules and regulations should be based on sound science and 
common sense. Similarly, our confidence in the ability of science and 
technology to solve our nation’s ills is second to none. Both perceptions 
will work in your favor if properly cultivated.181 
 
If Luntz is correct, a reinforcement of current scientific uncertainty and of the 
importance of waiting for future technological and scientific developments can serve as a 
powerful tool in blocking more stringent regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Moreover, as Doremus has explained, in judicial decision making, the framing of 
science is often outcome-determinative.182 The climate change context is no exception. 
The regulatory debates at the core of the arguments in Massachusetts v. EPA, discussed 
in detail in Part 2, exemplify the offensive and defensive uses of science that she has 
highlighted. 
 
                                                
180 Id. at 266–95. 
 
181 Id. at 255 (quoting The Luntz Research Companies, Straight Talk, The Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, 
Healthier America 138, available at http://www.luntzspeak.com/graphics/LuntzResearch.Memo.pdf (last 
visited June 16, 2008)). 
 
182 Doremus, Science Plays Defense, supra note 5. 
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b.  Debates over Scale 
The arguments over science in Massachusetts v. EPA, however, consistently have 
a particular geographic dimension to them: scale. As described in Chapter II, Nathan 
Sayre’s work has considered the ways in which the geography and ecology literatures 
have treated scale in contexts particularly relevant to the interface of science with 
regulation. His article, Ecological and Geographical Scale: Parallels and Potential for 
Integration, explores what these literatures have in common and can learn from one 
another. He explains that both geography and ecology struggle with adequately 
researching issues at a particular scale and with defining what scale is.  He notes that 
even if accepting geographers’ main areas of agreement—that scale is socially 
constructed, politically contested, and critically important—key questions remain about 
the nature of scale and how it should be conceptualized.183  This lack of agreement and 
clear coherence about important questions in the geography literature is an important 
reason, as noted in Chapter II, that the dissertation chooses to both look at the literature as 
a whole but also focus on specific interconnections between particular geography scale 
scholarship and particular legal scholarship. 
Sayre’s insights about what human geographers should draw from ecological 
work on scale is particularly helpful in the context of Massachusetts v. EPA and climate 
change litigation more generally.  First, he emphasizes the important of distinguishing 
between scale and level. 184  This distinction becomes important in climate change 
litigation as actors with ties to multiple levels make arguments about the appropriate level 
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184 See id. at 283–85. 
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for regulation that often miss the fuller nuance of scale beyond regulatory level.  Second, 
he argues that rescaling processes involve efforts to shift the level of particular processes 
within existing social organizational structures.185  Climate change litigation focuses in 
particular on the organizational structures provided by courts and existing governmental 
divisions as it serves as a site for scalar claims.  Third, he contends that hierarchically 
ordered models of scale can be misleading at times.186  This misleading quality of 
hierarchy becomes particular clear litigation throughout this part, as multi-scalar sets of 
actors attempt to construct a more simplistic hierarchical ordering. 
For the purposes of this chapter, Sayre’s analysis of scale, like Doremus’ 
discussion of the scientizing of politics, is reflected most clearly in the arguments of 
Massachusetts v. EPA in two ways. As discussed in detail in Part 2, both sides 
consistently try to (1) rescale, i.e., change the relevant level for the argument, and (2) 
create hierarchies among levels – i.e., assert the primacy of a particular level – in order to 
accomplish their goal of proving the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the EPA 
exercising its discretion to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions. 
  
c. Scale as a Lens on Science and the Law 
The key point of this chapter is not simply that both scientizing and rescaling 
occur in this case, but rather that they are being used together to accomplish litigative 
goals. The large scale – both spatially and temporally – of climate change, and the 
resulting scientific uncertainties about subnational contributions to it and impacts from it, 
                                                
185 See id. at 285. 
 
186 See id. at 286. 
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are combined by the respondents in an attempt to block regulatory behavior. In contrast, 
petitioners assert the appropriateness of nation-level regulation of supranational 
phenomenon and certainty around subnational contributions and effects to try to push for 
EPA action.187 
These dynamics suggest that offensive and defensive strategies around science 
have particular nuances in multiscalar contexts in which relevant levels range from the 
individual to the global. Namely, the existence of multiple levels to jump and many 
possible arrangements of hierarchy allows for intersecting efforts at rescaling that place 
judges in a particularly difficult decision-making position. Moreover, the nexus of 
uncertainty around both science and scale creates additional judicial discretion and 
opportunities for litigants to attempt to manipulate the outcome.188 
 
2. The Collision of Scale and Science in Massachusetts v. EPA 
Massachusetts v. EPA involves the appropriateness of the U.S. EPA’s denial of a 
petition requesting that it regulate motor vehicles’ greenhouse gas emissions under 
section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.189 The case is just one of many petitions and 
lawsuits related to global climate change that have been filed around the world in 
                                                
187 See infra Chapters IV–VII. As Holly Doremus has noted, the dynamics of this case represent only one 
variation of the intersection of scale, science, and regulation. In other contexts, such as debates over critical 
habitat, scaling down also can be an anti-regulatory strategy because scientific uncertainty is often 
magnified at smaller scales. Email from Holly Doremus, Professor, UC Davis School of Law, to Hari 
Osofsky, Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law (Mar. 20, 2007) (on file with author). 
 
188 Frederic Kirgis has explored similar issues in the context of legal formulas that contain two elements. In 
particular, he notes that courts and other decision makers are often unaware, or at least do not articulate an 
awareness, that they are using a sliding scale – “[t]he greater the degree to which one element is satisfied, 
the lesser the degree to which the other need be” – in such situations. Frederic L. Kirgis, Fuzzy Logic and 
the Sliding Scale Theorem, 53 ALA. L. REV. 421, 422–23 (2002). 
 
189 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
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subnational, national, and supranational fora. These litigative efforts tend to take two 
main approaches: (1) claims against governmental entities to force or limit regulatory 
behavior and (2) claims against corporate emitters to limit emissions directly. 
Massachusetts v. EPA falls into the first category. In both forms, the cases serve as part 
of state-corporate regulatory interactions around climate change.190 
This section explores the dynamics among scale, science, and law in the case. It 
considers the scales represented by the petitioners and respondents in the case, the use of 
science and scale in the claims by petitioners and respondents, and the implications of 
these approaches for efforts to use science as a tool for and against regulation. 
 
a. Actors 
The parties to Massachusetts v. EPA constitute a diverse group that cuts across 
scales. Figures 1 and 2 portray the governmental and nongovernmental petitioners; 
twelve states, three cities, a U.S. territory, and thirteen nongovernmental organizations 
brought the lawsuit.   
                                                
190 For a discussion of the geography of many of these suits, see Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of 
Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1789 (2005) [hereinafter Geography of Climate Change Litigation]. For other analyses of climate change 
litigation, see, for example, JOSEPH SMITH & DAVID SHEARMAN, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: 
ANALYSING THE LAW, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE & IMPACTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH & PROPERTY 
(2006); RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, PREVENTION DUTIES 
AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2005); William C.G. Burns, The Exigencies that Drive Potential Causes of 
Action for Climate Change Damages at the International Level, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 223 (2004); 
Richard W. Thackeray, Jr., Note, Struggling for Air: The Kyoto Protocol, Citizens’ Suits Under the Clean 
Air Act, and the United States’ Options for Addressing Global Climate Change, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 855, 884–98 (2004). 
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Figure 1. Governmental petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
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Figure 2. Nongovernmental petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
 
Ten other states and nineteen industry and utility groups – organized into six 
conglomerate entities – and the U.S. EPA served as respondents. Figures 3 and 4 portray 
the governmental and nongovernmental respondents.191 
                                                
191 A complete list of parties is available at International Center for Technology Assessment (ICTA), 
Global Warming Petitioners, http://www.icta.org/doc/global%20warming%20petitioners%20final.pdf (last 
visited June 16, 2008) [hereinafter ICTA Parties Listing]. 
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Figure 3. Governmental respondents in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
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Figure 4. Nongovernmental respondents in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
 
These petitioners and respondents span numerous geographic regions at multiple 
levels of governance. The state and local level governmental petitioners tend to be 
located toward the coasts and respondents mostly are based in the middle of the country. 
The national level governmental respondent, the U.S. EPA, is based in Washington, D.C., 
but has ten regional offices located in major cities throughout the country; it thus engages 
national policy issues through interacting in multiple places with various levels of 
government.192 The nongovernmental entities similarly have a mix of local, state, national, 
                                                
192 EPA Organizational Chart, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/organization.htm (last visited June 16, 2008). 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
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and international ties.193 And the above lists do not even include the many who filed 
amicus briefs or other actors engaged in responding to the Supreme Court’s ruling. 
From a scalar perspective, then, this case interacts with far more than simply the 
federal level at which it occurs. The actors reveal Massachusetts v. EPA as a situs for 
contestation across levels of governance between a wide variety of interested actors. As I 
have analyzed elsewhere, these dynamics pose difficult questions about how to locate this 
case in an analysis of transnational regulatory governance of climate change.194 
 
b. Claims 
The facts in this case involve the U.S. EPA’s denial of a national-level 
rulemaking petition under a national-level law, the Clean Air Act, to address emissions 
by vehicles in places around the United States. These localized emissions contribute to 
the supranational phenomenon of climate change, which produces varying specific 
effects in particular places at a subnational level. The substantive and procedural claims 
made by the petitioners rely upon national-level statutes to address a situation that occurs 
across spatial and temporal scales. Moreover, this intersection of scalar issues and 
scientific data was at the core of both the standing and substantive issues debated in the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  Figure 5 portrays efforts by petitioners to scale down and by 
respondents to scale up. 
                                                
193 For an in-depth discussion of those ties, see Geography of Climate Change Litigation, supra note 190, at 
1830–34. 
 
194  See Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II: Narratives of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 573 (2008); Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as 
Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 26 STANFORD ENVTL. L.J. & 43 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 181 (2007) (Joint Issue). 
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Figure 5. Scaling down by petitioners and scaling up by respondents. 
 
(1) Standing 
Although standing was not one of the issues initially before the court,195 the 
respondents raised it in their briefing and the Supreme Court justices discussed it 
extensively in oral argument. The Brief of the Federal Respondent claimed that the 
supranational and extended time scales of climate change limited the impact of national-
level decisions to limit reductions: 
 Global climate change is, by definition, a global phenomenon. The 
greenhouse gases at issue here are “fairly consistent in concentration, 
everywhere along the surface of the earth.” The vast majority – as much as 
80 percent – of all greenhouse gas emissions emanate from countries other 
than the United States. For that reason, reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
within the United States is unlikely, as a general matter, to have a 
                                                
195 The questions presented in the petition for writ of certiorari were: “1. Whether the EPA Administrator 
may decline to issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy considerations not enumerated 
in section 202(a)(1). 2. Whether the EPA Administrator has authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other 
air pollutants associated with climate change under section 202(a)(1).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 558353 at i. 
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significant long-term impact on climatic conditions in this country without 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in other parts of the world.196 
 
The respondents further argue with respect to standing that the impacts at state 
and local levels are too speculative because of the extent of both the space and time 
involved. As the Brief for Respondents Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Engine 
Manufacturers Association, National Automobile Dealers Association, and the Truck 
Manufacturers Association (Brief for Respondents AAA) put it: 
 [B]ecause they do not face any imminent injury, petitioners are 
forced to rely on predictions of harm decades in the future, the occurrence 
of which is largely (if not entirely) dependent on actions other nations take 
in their own regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Petitioners’ 
hypotheses, each of which is the subject of an active scientific debate, are 
reduced to conjecture by the inherent uncertainty of global events that will 
unfold between now and the time of the predicted injury.197 
 
These claims by respondents thus use scientific uncertainty together with the 
alleged global scale of the problem to argue against the appropriateness of the petitioners 
being allowed to be before the Supreme Court. 
The petitioners’ reply to the standing argument rescales the issue back to the state 
and local levels and the present time. They note: 
 Rising temperatures have injured petitioners in the following 
specific and concrete ways: coastal States have lost and are losing land to 
rising sea levels; ground-level ozone (smog) is exacerbated by rising 
temperatures, leading to adverse health effects and costly efforts on the 
part of States to address the problem; glaciers are melting, causing distinct 
injuries to particular individuals. These injuries span a broad range, from 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts losing coastal land to Frank Keim no 
longer being able to hike on the Alaskan glaciers he used to enjoy. 
                                                
196 Brief for Federal Respondent at 13, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05–1120), 2006 WL 
3043970, at *13 (citation omitted). 
 
197 Brief for Respondents Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Engine Manufacturers Ass’n, Nat’l 
Automobile Dealers Ass’n, Truck Manufacturers Ass’n at 13, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 
05–1120), 2006 WL 3023028 at *13 (citations omitted). 
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 Petitioners’ injuries are not “some day” injuries, as respondents 
contend; they are injuries in the here and now. Nor do petitioners’ 
declarations describe mere “generalized grievances”; they attest to harms 
being visited – right now – upon particular individuals and particular 
States.198 
 
This reply relies on the same scientific data set, but by scaling down the argument, 
engages the alleged injuries in ways that tie them more easily to legal standing 
requirements. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion sides with the petitioners and indicates that the 
“widely shared” character of climate-change risks does not prevent Massachusetts from 
having an interest in the case’s outcome.199 It concludes the standing analysis: 
 In sum – at least according to petitioners’ uncontested affidavits – 
the rise in sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed 
and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of catastrophic harm, 
though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to some 
extent if petitioners received the relief they seek. We therefore hold that 
petitioners have standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of their 
rulemaking petition.200 
 
Although the Court’s holding on standing narrowly focuses on the interests of 
state parties, its approach to them scales down the problem of climate change and its 
regulation; this “global” phenomenon can cause harm at a state level and choices at a 
federal level influence the risks faced by states. 
The dissenters, unsurprisingly, side with the respondents. Chief Justice Robert’s 
dissent, for example, explains how, in his view, the multiscalar nature of the problem 
defeats standing. 
                                                
198 Reply, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05–1120), 2006 WL 3367871, at *2-*3 (citations 
omitted). 
 
199 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1456 (2007). 
 
200 Id. at 1458. 
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 The Court’s sleight-of-hand is in failing to link up the different 
elements of the three-part standing test. What must be likely to be 
redressed is the particular injury in fact. The injury the Court looks to is 
the asserted loss of land. The Court contends that regulating domestic 
motor vehicle emissions will reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
and therefore redress Massachusetts’s injury. But even if regulation does 
reduce emissions – to some indeterminate degree, given events elsewhere 
in the world – the Court never explains why that makes it likely that the 
injury in fact – the loss of land – will be redressed.201 
 
In so doing, Chief Justice Roberts articulates his concerns about whether the 
occurrence of emissions around the world (essentially, local emissions taking place at a 
global scale) makes the impact of U.S. national-level regulatory behavior less clear at a 
subnational scale. 
At the core of this battle over standing lies scientific data. Both sides 
acknowledge the problem of climate change, but they part ways in how to map the 
scientific information, and its uncertainties, onto existing legal structures. As emissions 
and their impacts connect to multiple levels of governance, the parties and Court are 
forced to grapple with how to apply the more-simply structured standing doctrine to this 
problem. 
 
(2) Substantive Claims 
The substantive arguments reveal a similar dynamic of scaling climate change and 
regulatory authority over it up and down. For example, the respondents claim that states 
cannot implement National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) in this context 
because their regulatory level fails to match the global level at which the problem was 
occurring. The brief of respondent CO2 litigation group argues: 
                                                
201 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470. 
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 None of these regulatory authorities makes sense if the “air 
pollutant” to which they are applied is CO2 or another greenhouse gas 
being regulated for the purpose of mitigating potential global climate 
change. Since the projected effect of greenhouse gas emissions is a 
function of changes in the global atmosphere, rather than local or regional 
air quality, and it is the aggregate contribution of all greenhouse gas 
emissions around the world to global atmospheric greenhouse gas 
contributions that is believed by many to cause global climate change, 
notions of attaining or not attaining an ambient air quality standard within 
a state or air quality control region are inapplicable.202 
 
The theme of scientific uncertainty is intertwined with the claim of scalar 
mismatch, as represented in language like “believed by many” in that statement. As with 
the standing argument, respondents are portraying climate change as something occurring 
at a supranational level and over a long period of time with substantial deficits in current 
understanding about how anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions fit into that model. 
The petitioners’ argument on this point, in contrast, relies upon the various levels 
at which the Clean Air Act provides regulatory authority. They note in their opening brief: 
 Whatever question exists about the applicability of the NAAQS 
program to the air pollutants at issue here cannot excuse the failure to 
adopt emission standards under section 202. Section 202 does provide a 
perfectly feasible mechanism for regulating emission of these pollutants 
from motor vehicles: the establishment of the same sort of limits on these 
pollutants that EPA has already imposed on pollutants such as carbon 
monoxide and hydrocarbons.203 
 
In other words, regulation can work according to the petitioners if one changes 
levels – to the national one – and type of regulatory approach. 
                                                
202 Brief for Respondent CO2 Litigation Group at 20, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05–1120), 
2006 WL 3043971, at *20 (citation omitted). 
 
203 Brief for Petitioners, Massachusetts v. EPA (No. 05–1120), 2006 WL 2563378, at *29 (emphasis 
original). 
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A similar debate among the parties takes place over whether Congress’ specific 
action with respect to ozone limits EPA’s ability to regulate prior to a similar type of 
action regarding global climate change. The Brief for Respondents AAA argues: 
 Congress has previously dealt with emissions issues relating to 
non-localized gases that implicate global environmental concerns. For 
example, when Congress addressed stratospheric ozone depletion it used 
an express delegation under a new regulatory framework: Title VI of the 
Clean Air Act. The addition of Title VI to address global issues reflects 
Congress’s views about the regulatory limits of Titles I and II of the Act. 
 Much like carbon dioxide, anthropogenic substances that deplete 
ozone are emitted around the world and are very long-lived. Their upper-
atmosphere ozone depleting effects – and the consequences of those 
effects – occur on a global scale.204 
 
This approach indicates a presumption that similarities in the scale and time frame 
of two problems, as described in the existing scientific literature, means that a 
Congressional approach to one of them limits regulatory discretion with respect to 
another. 
The petitioners, unsurprisingly, resist such an interpretation of the ozone 
legislation. Beyond arguing that the ozone provisions have been used to regulate “air 
pollutants associated with climate change,” they note: 
 EPA cannot seriously maintain that “coordination with the 
international community” is a prerequisite for regulating pollutants that 
“are emitted around the world and are very long-lived,” the consequences 
of which “occur on a global scale.” Congress directed EPA to regulate 
ozone-depleting substances themselves without awaiting such 
coordination.205 
 
                                                
204 Brief for Respondents Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Engine Manufacturers Ass’n, Nat’l 
Automobile Dealers Ass’n, Truck Manufacturers Ass’n, supra note 197, at 38–39 (emphasis and citation 
omitted); accord Brief for Federal Respondent, supra note 196, at 27–30. 
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The petitioners thus use the same analogy between ozone and global climate 
change to indicate that national-level regulation of multiscalar problems is appropriate. 
As with the standing issue, the majority opinion substantively sides with the 
petitioners over a vigorous dissent. It holds that Clean Air Act section 202(a)(1), read 
together with the Act’s broad definition of “air pollutant,” gives the EPA statutory 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.206 Moreover, the 
Court rejects the EPA’s alternative argument that even if it has statutory authority, it 
should not exercise it.207 In so doing, the opinion notes that the agency cannot avoid its 
regulatory responsibilities simply by invoking scientific uncertainty. Rather, the EPA 
must address the statutory question of whether “sufficient information exists to make an 
endangerment finding.”208 
Although Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent engages only the standing question, 
Justice Scalia’s dissent – joined by the other three dissenting judges – addresses the 
merits. Justice Scalia’s dissent begins by arguing that EPA’s discretion is broader than 
the majority holds,209 but then further indicates that the majority is wrong on its own 
terms because of the EPA’s statements on scientific uncertainty.210 Its final argument 
addresses scale even more clearly through arguing against the majority’s broad 
interpretation of “air pollutant.”211 In particular, the dissent focuses quite literally on the 
                                                
206 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct., at 1459–62. 
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question of the part of the atmosphere in which “pollution” resides. Because greenhouse 
gases build up in the upper atmosphere, the dissent claims that the EPA’s exclusion of 
them through focusing on “ambient air at ground level or near the surface of the earth” is 
statutorily consistent.212 
Together, the actors and arguments in this case demonstrate the judicial challenge 
that the collision of scientific uncertainty and multiscalar regulatory problems poses. 
Although the parties used particular perspectives of that intersection in their argument, 
the briefs and arguments were not explicit about the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
selection of scalar perspective would influence how the scientific data should be viewed. 
Similarly, even though choices about the scale of climate change and its regulation run 
through the discourse among the majority and dissenting opinions, those decisions are 
often buried in the legal analysis. 
 
3. Implications for International Legal Decisionmaking 
The strategic use of science with scale in Massachusetts v. EPA, especially when 
not explicit, suggests dangers for the way in which decisionmaking that has supranational 
dimensions tends to be dichotomized. In particular, the balkanization of both scalar and 
identity categories allows for distorting efforts at rescaling. This section focuses on three 
types of divisions that are not only inaccurate descriptors in a multiscalar, multi-actor 
framework, but also provide the basis for the political games being played in the case and 
in the other two cases analyzed in Chapters V and VI. 
 
                                                
212 Id. at 1477 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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a. Domestic vs. International 
Is Massachusetts v. EPA domestic or international?213 The case clearly was 
brought under domestic law and many of the petitioners are domestic governmental 
actors, but simply characterizing it as a domestic case does not encompass all of the 
scales involved. As was repeatedly expressed by parties on both sides of the litigation, the 
case involves a problem and broader law and policy discourse that have international 
dimensions.214 
Neither “domestic” nor “international” conveys fully the multiscalar character of 
the case, and a notion that there is an appropriate regulatory level, either domestic or 
international, fails to capture the many levels at which climate change must be regulated. 
Moreover, the domestic/international distinction privileges the national level at which the 
case is taking place by using it as the fulcrum point between relevant categories. Using 
this dichotomy as a frame thus plays a distorting role in a discourse over problems like 
climate change, a problem in both this dispute and the other two disputes highlighted in 
the chapters that follow.215 
                                                
213 For an explication of the traditional Westphalian perspective on international law, see IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287–88 (6th ed. 2003); see also Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at 
the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver,” Revolutionary International Legal Theory 
or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361 (2005). 
 
214 For an interesting analysis of the increasingly blurry boundaries between domestic and international, see 
Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple 
Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006). 
 
215 See infra Chapters V & VI. 
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b. Local vs. State vs. Federal 
Similarly, if domestic, is Massachusetts v. EPA simply federal?216 The case was 
brought in a federal court and involved the regulatory discretion of a federal actor, but in 
both its actors and claims, it involved many other scales and places associated with them 
in the United States.217 After all, a good portion of the above-described debate involved 
state and local actors, regulatory decisions, and impacts. Moreover, the distinction—local 
vs. state vs. federal—fails to capture the nuances of the levels involved or the fact that 
multiple levels are involved in every aspect of the discourse. 
This point becomes even clearer if this case is viewed in the broader context of 
climate change litigation and policy. For example, as Chapters V and VI further illustrate, 
California is not simply a plaintiff in Massachusetts v. EPA; the state is and has also been 
a plaintiff or defendant in several other cases involving climate change, some of which 
specifically focus on motor vehicle emissions.218 Moreover, California’s representatives 
                                                
216 For examples of broader federalism debates in the context of environmental regulations, see Kirsten H. 
Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and is it “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS 
L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); 
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective) for Federal 
Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity 
and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental 
Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching 
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 & 
14 YALE J. ON REG. 23 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); 
Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 
82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International 
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993). 
 
217 For an interesting analysis of the complexities of regulation at multiple scales, see William W. Buzbee, 
Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 
218 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Cen. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. 
Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006), 2004 WL 5001055; Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. 
Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Nos. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP), 04 Civ. 5670(LAP)), 
available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2004/04-076.pdf; Complaint for Damages and Declaratory 
Judgment, People of the State of California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 
2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms06/06-082_0a.pdf (last visited June 17, 2008); Petition 
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in Congress are playing leadership roles in efforts to regulate emissions more 
aggressively,219 and its cities are both engaging in litigation220 and their own regulatory 
efforts. 221  Divorcing Massachusetts v. EPA from that multiscalar context de-
contextualizes the case in ways that portray its significance inaccurately. 
                                                                                                                                            
for Review, People of the State of California v. NHTSA, No. 06-2654 SC (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2007), 
available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms06/06-046_0a.pdf (May 2, 2006) (last visited June 17, 2008); 
Non-Binding Statement of Issues of Petitioners, Coke Oven Envtl. Task Force v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Case No. 06-1131 (Sept. 3, 2003); See Osofsky, Climate Change as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, supra note 
194. 
 
219 See, e.g., Press Release, Pelosi and Reid: We Should Work Together to Take American in a New 
Direction (Jan. 27, 2007), available at http://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/pressreleases?id=0047 (last 
visited June 17, 2008); NPR Talk of the Nation: Is U.S. Energy Independence a Pipe Dream? (Jan. 24, 
2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7002504 (last visited June 17, 
2008) (“Today Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi upped the ante and called for energy independence 
within 10 years.”); Press Release, Boxer, Bingaman and Lieberman Ask President to Commit to Working 
with Congress to Fight Global Warming (Nov. 15, 2006), available at 
http://boxer.senate.gov/news/releases/record.cfm?id=265906&& (last visited June 17, 2008). 
 
220 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. 
Watson, No. 02–4106 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2002), available at 
http://www.climatelawsuit.org/documents/Complaint_2Amended_Declr_Inj_Relief.pdf (last visited June 7, 
2008). 
 
221  See ICLEI Website, Regional Membership Lists by Country, 
http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=1387&region=NA (last visited June 17, 2008); ICLEI Website, CCP: 
Participants, http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=1121 (last visited June 17, 2008); Fact Sheet, California 
Climate Activities, http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/factsheets/2005-06_CLIMATE-
ACTIVITIES_FS.PDF (last visited June 17, 2008); City of Los Angeles Webpage, Council Actions, 
http://www.lacity.org/ead/EADWeb-AQD/council_actions.htm (last visited June 17, 2008); City of Los 
Angeles Webpage, Awards Received, http://www.lacity.org/ead/EADWeb-AQD/awards_received.htm (last 
visited June 17, 2008); Tomas Alex Tizon, Mayor Is on a Mission to Warm U.S. Cities to the Kyoto 
Protocol, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, at A15. For scholarly analysis of the state and local dimensions of 
climate change regulation, see BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS 
OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004); Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: 
The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable 
Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 175 
(1996); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
281 (2003); David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think 
Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53 (2003); Laura Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State 
Climate Change Initiatives: Think Locally, Act Globally, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 46 (Winter 2004); 
Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private 
Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004); Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational Corporate Responsibility: 
Mapping the Role of Subnational Climate Change Litigation, 20 PACIFIC MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. 
L.J. 143 (2007); Barry G. Rabe, North American Federalism and Climate Change Policy: American State 
and Canadian Provincial Policy Development, 14 WIDENER L.J. 121 (2004); Resnik, supra note 214, at 
1643–47. 
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c. Public vs. Private 
Finally, is this litigation about public or private decision-making?222 Because this 
case involves the behavior of a federal regulator, one could argue that it is a public law 
case. But such a view of the case would suffer from some of the same flaws as the other 
two efforts to categorize it. 
A mix of public and private actors appears on both sides of the lawsuit in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.  This pattern repeats in other litigation explored over the course of 
the chapters that follow. Moreover, some of the cases over vehicle emissions focus on 
governmental regulatory decisions, and others focus on emissions decisions of private 
actors directly. 223 To fail to see these cases as involving a state-corporate regulatory 
dynamic would be just as flawed as ignoring California’s critical role in the multiscalar 
dialogue about climate change. 
As a wide range of actors operates across scales and plays multidimensional roles 
in the policy and law-making debate, Massachusetts v. EPA becomes one step in a 
complex dance. This reality creates a risk that traditional ways of categorizing the case —
which might focus on it as simply a public environmental regulatory dispute over federal 
                                                                                                                                            
 
222 For a historical perspective on the evolution of the public/private distinction in a local government 
context, see Gerald Frug, A Legal History of Cities, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER 154 (Nicholas 
Blomley, David Delany & Richard T. Ford eds., 2001). 
 
223 I have discussed this dynamic in depth in Osofsky, supra note 190, at 1796–97; see also Robert 
Dufresne, The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, and International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 331 (2004). For an interesting analysis of corporate responsibility in the context of 
indigenous peoples’ land rights, see Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Hybrid State-Corporate Enterprise and 
Violations of Indigenous Land Rights: Theorizing Corporate Responsibility and Accountability under 
International Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 135 (2007); see also Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from 
Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 STANFORD ENVTL. L.J. 71, 
72–76 (2005). 
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regulation—will miss critical elements of what it is.  The disputes in Chapter V and VI, 
ostensibly over state and local regulation, further illustrate the scalar complexity and its 
regulatory implications. 
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CHAPTER V 
STATE MOTOR VEHICLES EMISSIONS REGULATION: CALIFORNIA V. EPA 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change 
“International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 585 (2009). 
 
The relationship between the state and federal levels of government is the most 
widely discussed scalar intersection in U.S. law. Because the U.S. Constitution and its 
amendments create a federalist regulatory structure, debates have raged since before its 
ratification about the appropriate relationship between the state and federal 
governments.224 As a result, litigation over state versus federal roles in the context of the 
Clean Air Act not only reflects the complex geography of the scalar dynamics of climate 
change regulation highlighted in the previous two chapters, but also has been explicitly 
analyzed in the legal federalism literature described in Chapter II.  
This chapter uses the dispute over the Bush administration EPA’s denial of a 
Clean Air Act waiver to California, in which the State requested to regulate motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions more stringently than the federal government, to explore the 
way in which regulatory dynamics among states and the federal government play out in 
the climate change litigation context. As with other examples of what I term “litigation,” 
the lawsuit forms one piece of a broader policy dispute. President Obama ordered the 
EPA to reconsider the Bush administration’s denial of the waiver request, which the EPA 
then granted.  This waiver, together with the endangerment finding flowing out of the 
Massachusetts v. EPA case discussed in Chapter IV, helped provide the basis for the 
collaboration between California, the EPA, and the automobile industry on motor vehicle 
                                                
224 See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 1–62 (examining arguments over the form of government in the 
U.S. Constitution). 
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emissions.225 However, even with this shift from the Bush Administration’s approach, the 
positions on the scale of climate regulation articulated in the filings elucidate core 
dilemmas for future policy efforts. 
The chapter begins by considering in more depth the ways in which the dynamic 
federalism literature introduced in Chapter II has been applied to California’s efforts to 
exceed federal standards under the Clean Air Act. The chapter then discusses the role that 
states play in climate regulation as a backdrop to an in-depth scalar analysis of the state 
waiver dispute which complements Chapter IV’s analysis of Massachusetts v. EPA. The 
chapter concludes by examining transnational regulatory governance questions raised by 
this dispute and their implications for the three false dichotomies highlighted in Chapter 4. 
As with the preceding chapter and the one that follows, the focus here is not on 
the general significance of the state waiver dispute. Rather, the chapter focuses on how 
disagreements over the appropriate regulatory level are negotiated through this conflict 
and the implications of these scalar dynamics for governance of climate change. This 
dispute not only displays a complicated interaction among many different actors, but also 
provides an opportunity for reflection upon the role of states like California in the 
transnational regulatory order. 
 
                                                
225 California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Greenhouse Gas Regulations; 
Reconsideration of Previous Denial of a Waiver of Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 7040 (Feb. 12, 2009); 
Memorandum on the State of California Request for Waiver Under 42 U.S.C. 7543(b), the Clean Air Act, 
74 Fed. Reg. 4905 (Jan. 28, 2009),  available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/ 
2009/pdf/E9-1939.pdf. 
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1. Scaling Federalism Debates 
As noted in Chapters I and II, debates over federalism represent the area of U.S. 
legal scholarship in which theories of scale are most fully developed. At its core, 
federalism scholarship grapples with a dilemma highlighted repeatedly in disagreements 
over climate regulation: Given the existence of multiple levels of regulatory authority, 
and particularly the state and federal ones, how should decision making be structured?226 
Climate change is necessarily implicated in these debates because of its multiscalar 
regulatory dimensions, which are analyzed in Chapter 3.227 Moreover, addressing the 
problem of climate change poses particularly difficult structuring concerns because of its 
intertwinement with so many different substantive areas of law and the social order.  
An increasingly well-developed stream of federalism scholarship proposes 
regulatory models that aim to avoid what it views as the pitfalls of dualist conceptions, 
that is, ones that delineate distinct state and federal spheres. Rather, these “dynamic” 
approaches introduced in Chapter II—which come under multiple labels and have 
nuanced differences among them—treat federal and subnational governments as having 
overlapping spheres of authority that sometimes cooperate and sometimes compete. They 
reject ideas of exclusive spheres of authority, but also at times question cooperative 
models based predominantly on collaborative interaction among levels of government.228 
                                                
226 This dilemma has permeated constitutional discourse since the Constitution’s framing. See THE 
FEDERALIST NOS. 1–62, supra note 124. For an interesting dialogue about how to understand federalism in 
light of recent Supreme Court opinions, see Randall P. Bezanson & Steven C. Moeller, The Foundations of 
Federalism: An Exchange, 7 J. PHIL. SCI. & L. (2007). 
 
227 See supra Chapters I–III. 
 
228 Kirsten Engel has termed this collection of theories “dynamic federalism.” Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing 
the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006); see also 
ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009); Robert 
B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 879–83 (2006); William W. Buzbee, 
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Robert Schapiro borrows the term “polyphony” from the context of music to represent 
this regulatory dance.229 Although some of these analyses focus exclusively or primarily 
on federal and state governments, others incorporate transnational, regional, and local 
actors into their discussions.  
California’s efforts at climate regulation and, more specifically, its attempts to 
regulate motor vehicle emissions have been used repeatedly as an example in this 
discourse.230 Because the Clean Air Act’s 1967 amendments allow California to set its 
own tailpipe emissions standards231 and the Act’s 1977 amendments permit other states to 
choose to follow California,232 that state’s vehicle emissions choices have long created 
complex state-federal regulatory dynamics. Differences between California and the 
federal government over how strict such standards should be in practice often implicate 
                                                                                                                                            
Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 
1549–50 (2007); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 
89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49–51 (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different 
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1328–32 (2004); Resnik, supra note 37; Ruhl & 
Salzman, supra note 75, at 3. See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 
91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005). The Emory Law Journal recently held a series of symposia exploring these 
themes, one of which includes the above Engel essay. See Symposium, Interactive Federalism: Filling the 
Gaps?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1 (2006); Symposium, The New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decentered 
World, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007). 
 
229 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 128. 
 
230 For instance, Arizona Law Review’s 2008 symposium issue focused on federalism and climate change. 
See Carol M. Rose, Federalism and Climate Change: The Role of States in a Future Federal Regime—An 
Introduction, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 673 (2008) (introducing the three themes of the symposium as whether state 
and local actors will impact global climate change, practical constraints on subnational actors’ effectiveness 
in addressing climate change, and normative and legal limits on their activities). One of the articles in 
UCLA Law Review’s 2008 symposium issue on climate change also highlighted governance issues posed 
by California. See Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621 
(2008). 
 
231 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–
7671 (2004)). 
 
232 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 129(b), Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 750 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 7507 (2000)) (“[A]ny State . . . may adopt and enforce for any model year standards relating to 
control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines . . . if—(1) such standards are 
identical to the California standards for which a waiver has been granted for such model year . . . .”). 
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not just one state versus the federal government, but multiple states desiring to regulate 
more stringently than the “national” standard.233 The federalism questions thus involve 
not simply how the state and federal governments interact, but also the formal and 
informal legal relationships that states have with one another.234 
The dispute over the EPA’s denial of California’s waiver request for its climate 
change-oriented vehicle emissions regulations follows this pattern of multiple states 
wanting to exceed federal standards by following a consistent “California” standard.  
                                                
233 For example, Engel has detailed this phenomenon in the context of the California Low Emission Vehicle 
standards of the 1990s as part of her argument for dynamic approaches to federalism in the environmental 
context. Engel, supra note 128, at 170–72; cf. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State 
Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835 (2008) (contending that 
states can play a key role in inducing technological change needed to address climate change and that a 
state-federal regulatory scheme should reflect that role for states); Holly Doremus & W. Michael 
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework is 
Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 (2008) (arguing that a cap-and-trade regime 
will be insufficient to control climate change on its own and that the federal government should also adopt 
a climate law modeled on the Clean Air Act’s cooperative federalism approach); Daniel A. Farber, Climate 
Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879 (2008) (proposing a bifurcated approach to 
the constitutionality of state efforts to address climate change); Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and 
the Executive Branches, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2008) (proposing an approach to preemption based on 
Chevron terms that considers whether the federal or state executive has comparatively more political 
accountability and technical expertise); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate 
Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791 (2008) 
(proposing a cooperative federalism approach to climate change legislation that includes federal minimum 
standards which states can exceed and the particularities of delegating program implementation); Alice 
Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation 
Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (2007) (exploring jurisdiction overlaps in the climate change context and 
arguing for the importance of state efforts and lawsuits) [hereinafter Kaswan, The Domestic Response to 
Global Climate Change]; Kysar & Meyler, supra note 130 (examining U.S. constitutional limitations on 
California’s efforts to integrate transnationally with greenhouse gas emissions trading systems); Resnik et 
al., supra note 20 (exploring the appropriate legal status of efforts by translocal organizations of 
government actors to regulate climate change); Stewart, supra note 148 (arguing for the value of a plural 
model of climate regulation that allows subnational governments to continue to act even after federal 
legislation); Andreen et al., supra note 148 (arguing that federal climate legislation should allow states and 
localities to exceed federal standards and exploring options for cooperation among national, state, and local 
government). 
 
234 Cf. Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the Great 
Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006) (analyzing water management in the Great Lakes region as 
an example of cooperative horizontal federalism and arguing for cooperative horizontal federalism as an 
alternative to the federal versus state regulatory dichotomy). 
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Map 1 below illustrates the states that passed legislation adopting California’s standards 
as of June 2008, layered over road density in the United States. 
 
 
Map 1. States Attempting to Follow California’s Vehicle Emissions Standards. 
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As indicated on the map, primarily northeastern and western states were attempting to 
follow California’s heightened greenhouse gas motor vehicle standards—although states 
from other regions not included on this map were considering such legislation and 
intervened on California’s side in the state waiver dispute—whereas other states are 
opting for the less restrictive federal standards.235 
This pattern reinforces a difficulty for both federalism and broader scalar analyses 
of climate regulation that surfaced in the Massachusetts v. EPA dispute described in 
Chapter IV.  Because states do not function in a unified fashion—only some states, 
tracking a clear geographic pattern, consistently seek to exceed the federal government in 
climate regulation—disputes between states and the federal government often also reflect 
disagreements among states. As described in the preceding chapter, in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, states joined both sides of the lawsuit.236 And, as illustrated in the San Bernardino 
County example in the next chapter, localities within states may diverge significantly 
                                                
235 For examples of state regulations attempting to follow the California approach, see CONN. AGENCIES 
REGS. § 22a-174-36b (2008) (adopting CARB’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction standards for 
vehicles manufactured in the model years (MYs) 2009–2016); 06-096-127 ME. CODE R. §§ 4–8 (Weil 
2008) (adopting CARB’s GHG emission reduction standards for vehicles manufactured in the MYs 2009–
2016); MD. CODE REGS. 26.11.34.02 (2008); 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.40 (2008) (adopting CARB’s GHG 
emission reduction standards for vehicles manufactured in the MYs 2009–2016); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 
7:27-29.13 (2008) (adopting CARB’s GHG emissions-reduction standards); N.M. CODE R. § 20.2.88.1–
.112 (Weil 2008) (adopting CARB’s GHG emission reduction standards for vehicles manufactured in the 
MY 2011); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 218-8.2 (2008) (adopting CARB’s GHG emission 
reduction standards for vehicles manufactured in the MYs 2009–2016); OR. ADMIN. R. 340-257-0050 
(2008); 25 PA. CODE §§ 126.401, 126.411, 126.431, 126.451 (2008); 12-031-037 R.I. CODE R. § 37.2 (Weil 
2008), available at http://www.dem.ri.gov/pubs/regs/regs/air/air37_07.pdf; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-
423-050 (2008); 12-03-001 VT. CODE R. §§ 5-1101 to -1109 (2008), available at 
http://www.anr.state.vt.us/air/docs/apcregs.pdf; and Paul Davenport, Arizona panel clears new rules on 
auto emissions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 6, 2008. Other states, such as Florida, Iowa, and Illinois are in the 
process of adopting the California standards. See Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction—Adoption of California Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards, at 
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/air/rules/ghg/california.htm; Motion for Leave to Intervene as Petitioners, 
California v. EPA, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.iowa.gov/ 
government/ag/latest_news/releases/feb_2008/EPA_regulation.pdf [hereinafter Motion to Intervene].   
 
236 For a discussion of these dynamics in Massachusetts v. EPA, see Chapter IV. 
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from one another and from the state itself.237 Thus, although the state waiver dispute 
superficially represents a battle between California and the federal government, its scalar 
characteristics and broader context make it hard to capture fully without resort to a very 
dynamic model of federalism.   
 
2. The Contours of State-Level Climate Regulation 
The limited U.S. federal response to the problem of climate change, which 
predated President George W. Bush’s administration but worsened during it, helped to 
highlight and sometimes to drive state action. States—like cities—play crucial roles in 
scalar contestation over climate change for structural and substantive reasons that go 
beyond the particular regulatory climate in Washington, D.C. As the Obama 
Administration moves forward with international and national-level climate regulation, it 
must grapple with how states fit into its scheme.  
Substantively, states control a myriad of policy decisions that affect emissions 
greatly.238 They also vary substantially in their inclinations with respect to those policy 
decisions. These differences matter because they often not only represent divergent 
policy approaches, but also translate into gaps in effectiveness at regulating emissions. 
Because some U.S. states produce more greenhouse gases than many countries—Texas, 
                                                
237 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 
238 For analyses of state-level initiatives on climate change, see BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND 
GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 1–37 (2004); Brown, 
supra note 37, at 205–08; Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 290–92 (2003); David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It 
Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 53–65 (2003); Kosloff & 
Trexler, supra note 37, at 47–48; McKinstry, supra note 37, at 26–54; Barry G. Rabe, North American 
Federalism and Climate Change Policy: American State and Canadian Provincial Policy Development, 14 
WIDENER L.J. 121, 128–51 (2004). 
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California, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Florida, for example, would all rank among 
the top thirty emitting countries—state choices impact overall global emissions 
significantly.239 
This combination of emissions impact, divergence in views, and federal policy 
that lags behind that of some states makes state-level emissions a crucial battleground in 
regulatory disputes. The state waivers dispute embodies all three of these issues and 
reinforces how complex states’ roles and dynamics are. Its resolution affects not just how 
the EPA under President Bush or Obama interprets the Clean Air Act’s waiver for 
California, but which states’ vision of climate change will hold sway and, as a result, the 
extent to which individual states’ and U.S. motor vehicle emissions will decline.  
Structurally, states’ intermediate position in the U.S. scalar hierarchy allows them 
to serve as a fulcrum point in disputes over regulatory level. Their administrative 
relationship with local government, as explored in depth in the San Bernardino County 
example in Chapter VI, gives states the capacity to influence smaller-scale decision 
making greatly. States can make municipal greenhouse gas regulation more or less likely 
by their statewide policies and their relationship with local policies.240 
In the other scalar direction, states’ interactions with larger-scale levels of 
government, and most notably the federal level, often influence policy at that level. States 
can exert positive or negative regulatory pressure on the federal government depending 
on how their policies diverge. Moreover, states’ horizontal interactions with one 
                                                
239 See Leading Gas Spewers, 313 SCI. 1549 (2006), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/313/5793/1549d.pdf; Sightline Institute, Equivalent greenhouse gas 
emissions from energy use, at http://www.sightline.org:80/images/ 
blog-2007/us%20map%207.gif (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).  
 
240 See infra Chapter VI. 
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another—such as using other states’ climate policies as models or disputing competing 
conceptions of other states—influences decisionmaking at both state and federal levels, 
which in turn influences state-local dynamics.241 
As with localities, the substantive and structural dynamics combine to make state 
decision making a key node in U.S. climate regulation. The substantial disagreement 
among decision makers in states and at levels above and below them continues to make 
litigation a key locus for scalar conflict.  
 
3. Scalar Contestation over California’s Emissions Regulation 
The road to California’s dispute with the EPA began in July 2002, with the 
passage of AB 1493, which requires the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to 
promulgate vehicle emissions regulations that maximize greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions.242 CARB created such regulations in 2004,243 and pursuant to Section 209(b) 
of the Clean Air Act, petitioned the EPA in 2005 for a waiver of preemption for these 
standards.244 Although all of California’s previous waiver requests had been granted at 
least in part through a deferential review process,245 EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson 
                                                
241 The EPA even acknowledged this dynamic in its denial of California’s waiver request. See infra note 
162 and accompanying text. 
 
242 See Vehicular emissions: greenhouse gases, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. 696–701 (West) (codified as CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2003)). 
 
243 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1 (2008).  
 
244 See Clean Air Act § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2008); EPA Notice of Opportunity for Public Hearing 
and Comment, 72 Fed. Reg. 21,260 (Apr. 30, 2007). 
 
245 See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CALIFORNIA’S WAIVER REQUEST TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT 11–12 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL 34099, Aug. 
20, 2007), available at http://www.azclimatechange.gov/ 
download/082007.pdf. For an example of the deferential approach the EPA has taken in granting previous 
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denied California’s waiver request in December 2007,246 with a formal denial following 
in March 2008.247  
In January 2008, California—with eighteen other states ultimately moving to 
intervene in support—petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to overturn 
the waiver denial.248 California also petitioned the District Court for the Northern District 
of California to obtain records regarding the denial decision.249 Simultaneously, on the 
congressional front, seventeen senators—including then-Senator Obama—co-sponsored a 
bill introduced by California Senator Barbara Boxer to overturn the decision, with similar 
legislation soon following in the House of Representatives.250  
In May 2008, California filed a protective petition in the D.C. Circuit challenging 
the waiver denial,251 and the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration’s 
                                                                                                                                            
waiver requests, see California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 18,887, 
18,890 (May 13, 1984). 
 
246 See Waiver Denial, supra note 28. 
 
247 See EPA Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and 
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 
12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
 
248 See Petition for Review, supra note 28; see also Office of the Attorney General, State of California, 
California’s Motor Vehicle Global Warming Regulations, at 
http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/motorvehicle.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Motion to Intervene, supra 
note 135.  
 
249 Complaint for Injunctive Relief Under the Freedom of Information Act, California v. EPA, No. 08-
00735 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/ 
EPA_FOIA_complaint.pdf [hereinafter FOIA Complaint]. 
 
250 Reducing Global Warming Pollution from Vehicles Act of 2008, S. 2555, 110th Cong. (2008), available 
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ 
getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s2555rs.txt.pdf; Right to Clean Vehicles Act, H.R. 5560, 
110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=h110-5560; Richard Simon, Hearing Grows Warm for EPA Chief, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2008, at A13. 
 
251 See Protective Petition for Review, California v. EPA, No. 08-1178 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 2008), available 
at http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/legal/docs/ 
petition_08-1178.pdf. 
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proposed new Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards that would preempt 
states from adopting their own carbon dioxide regulations.252 Shortly thereafter, the 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform issued a memorandum based on 
its investigation of the EPA’s denial, which found that Administrator Johnson reversed 
the EPA staff’s recommendation to grant the waiver following communications with the 
White House.253  
Following the Ninth Circuit’s July 2008 dismissal of California’s waiver petition, 
the courtroom battle focused on the still pending D.C. Circuit case.254 Meanwhile, 
throughout this period, lawsuits in state courts challenged the California standards, and 
those courts found them acceptable pending an EPA waiver grant.255 
President Obama’s election changed the executive branch’s approach to the 
waiver request substantially.  Within a week of assuming office, he ordered the EPA to 
reconsider the waiver denial.256  In his remarks accompanying that order, President 
Obama noted that “California has shown bold and bipartisan leadership through its effort 
                                                
252 Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Years 2011–2015, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 24,352, 24,478 (May 2, 2008), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/ 
portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.43ac99aefa80569eea57529cdba046a0/. 
 
253 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 110TH CONG., MEMORANDUM ON 
EPA’S DENIAL OF THE CALIFORNIA WAIVER (2008), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080519131253.pdf. 
 
254 Order, California v. EPA, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. July 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/legal/docs/order-appeal-denied.pdf. For example, 
numerous associations of state and local governments filed an amicus brief in support of California in 
November 2008. Joint Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures et al., as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, California v. EPA, No. 08-1178 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/legal/docs/08-1178_GovtAmiciBrief_11-24-08-1.pdf 
[hereinafter Joint Brief]. 
 
255 See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2007); 
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 344 (D. Vt. 2007). 
 
256 See sources supra note 125. 
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to forge 21st century standards, and over a dozen states have followed its lead.  But 
instead of serving as a partner, Washington stood in their way.”257  When the Obama 
Administration EPA granted the waiver, this grant resolved, as a formal matter, most 
aspects of the dispute. 
This section focuses on a particular aspect of this conflict that spans multiple 
branches and levels of government; it considers the scalar arguments being made by each 
side. Throughout CARB’s attempt to obtain a waiver and the EPA’s denial, both sides 
have engaged in rescaling efforts similar to those described with respect the 
Massachusetts v. EPA case in Chapter IV. Namely, California scaled down climate 
change generally, and motor vehicle emissions in particular, as appropriate for state 
regulation, while the EPA scaled up, deeming the emissions a federal regulatory issue. 
California’s November 2007 complaint to the D.C. District Court seeking to 
compel the EPA either to grant or to deny its waiver request after a long delay in 
responding lays out the “scaling down” argument clearly. The complaint details climate 
change as a problem that impacts California, stating: “The effect of global warming on 
California’s population, economy and environment has been extensively demonstrated 
both during CARB’s and USEPA’s administrative proceedings on the GHG [Greenhouse 
Gas] Regulation and in other public forums and scientific proceedings.”258 California 
then links the state-level regulation to the problem, explaining: “Motor vehicles are a 
major source of greenhouse gases, particularly in California. Automotive emissions of 
                                                
257 The White House Blog, From peril to progress (Update 1: Full Remarks), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/Fromperiltoprogress/ (Jan. 26, 2009, 16:35 EST).. 
 
258 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 6, California v. EPA, No. 07-2024 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 
2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/ 
n1490_complaint_for_unreason_11-5-07.pdf. 
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greenhouse gases are increasing more rapidly than any other source. The longer the delay 
in reducing these emissions, the more costly and harmful will be the impact on 
California.”259 The arguments throughout the complaint reinforce these two statements, 
making the case for climate change as a state-level problem demanding state-level 
regulatory action.260 
In contrast, Administrator Johnson’s December 2007 letter to Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger denying the waiver is explicit in its claim that the large scale of climate 
change drives the decision. The letter notes: 
Unlike other air pollutants covered by previous waivers, 
greenhouse gases are fundamentally global in nature. Greenhouse gases 
contribute to the problem of global climate change, a problem that poses 
challenges for the entire nation and indeed the world. Unlike pollutants 
covered by other waivers, greenhouse gas emissions harm the environment 
in California and elsewhere regardless of where the emissions occur. In 
other words, this challenge is not exclusive or unique to California and 
differs in a basic way from the previous local and regional pollution 
problems addressed in prior waivers.261 
 
The letter is using the large spatial scale of the problem to contrast greenhouse gas 
emissions with other types of emissions, and thus declare these vehicle emissions 
inappropriate for state regulation.  
Interestingly, at the same time as the letter deems vehicle emissions of greenhouse 
gases inappropriate for state-level regulation, it acknowledges California’s influence on 
national-level regulations. The Administrator concludes: 
Finally, I want to acknowledge the leadership that you and your 
state have shown to increase vehicle fuel economy, to address energy 
                                                
259 Id. ¶ 8. 
 
260 See id. 
 
261 Waiver Denial, supra note 28, at 1. 
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security, and to reduce greenhouse gases. I agree that increased vehicle 
standards can be a win-win for the environment and the economy. I have 
no doubt that the national standards Congress adopted and the President 
signed into law this week were enacted, in part, because of your efforts.262 
 
This acknowledgment appears to frame California’s appropriate regulatory role 
regarding greenhouse gases as influencing national policy, rather than creating state 
policy. An ambiguity in this statement, however, potentially cuts against the 
Administrator’s earlier claim. Namely, if some of California’s leadership has been 
involved in nonpreempted state regulation in addition to its influencing of the national 
government, how would such efforts be commendable with respect to such a large scale 
problem? 
As noted above, California pushed back against Administrator Johnson’s framing 
with two January 2008 filings, a petition to the Ninth Circuit for review of EPA’s waiver 
denial263 and a petition to the Northern District of California under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) to obtain records regarding the denial decision.264 The Ninth 
Circuit petition criticizes the Administrator’s letter, stating: “The document did not make 
a finding of ‘nationwide scope or effect’ as provided for in the third sentence of section 
307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).”265 In so doing, the petition 
challenges such “scaling up” without adequate justification.  
Similarly, the FOIA petition, relying on language much like that of the complaint 
seeking to compel the EPA to act on its waiver request, indicates: 
                                                
262 Id. at 2. 
 
263 Petition for Review, supra note 28. 
 
264 FOIA Complaint, supra note 149. 
 
265 Petition for Review, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
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Even though the effect of global warming on California’s 
population, economy, and environment were extensively demonstrated 
during CARB’s and EPA’s administrative proceedings on the GHG 
Regulations, as well as in other public fora and scientific proceedings, 
EPA failed to take action on the waiver request for two years. On 
December 19, 2007, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson rejected 
California’s request to implement regulations on tailpipe emissions of 
greenhouse gases, principally carbon dioxide. As many as 16 other states 
would have been free to implement such regulations if California had 
received approval from EPA. The decision, memorialized in a letter to 
Governor Schwarzenegger . . . represents the first time EPA has denied a 
request by California to impose its own pollution rules: it previously has 
granted the state approximately 50 waivers.266 
 
This statement not only argues for the state-level scale of the problem, but also 
highlights the fact that the waiver denial affects multiple states’ ability to regulate 
emissions. In so doing, it reinforces the complex federalism questions embodied in this 
dispute and discussed previously. Even as the petition scales the problem down as a state 
regulatory issue, it also creates upward vertical pressure through the horizontal coalition 
of states trying to act with California, which, in the process, highlights the differing 
approaches of states.267  
The dynamics represented in these documents reinforce the scalar nature of the 
regulatory battles taking place in climate change litigation. As in the Massachusetts v. 
EPA example in the previous chapter and the People v. San Bernardino County case 
discussed in the next chapter, the primary dispute centers on what level of regulatory 
action is appropriate rather than whether climate change should be regulated. The scalar 
contestation, and the “too big” arguments in particular, become a proxy for limiting 
                                                
266 FOIA Complaint, supra note 149, ¶ 6. 
 
267 These dynamics are reinforced by the recent amicus brief by state and local governments in the still 
pending D.C. Circuit action. See Joint Brief, supra note 154, at 2 (“The history of environmental innovation 
in the United States, and the current efforts of states and localities here and in other countries, belie EPA’s 
assertion that state and local entities should not address global problems like climate change.”). 
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regulation. The blocked regulation—whether by the smaller-scale government in the first 
example or by the larger-scale government in this one—means a continuation of a higher 
emissions status quo during the period in which the smaller scale efforts do not move 
forward.  
 
4. Implications of State-Federal Scalar Contestation 
The state waiver dispute raises complex issues about what multiscalar governance 
of climate change should look like. In contrast to the San Bernardino County settlement 
discussed in the next chapter, which has helped to spur regulation that otherwise would 
not have occurred, the EPA’s waiver denial had the opposite result under the Bush 
Administration. That administration did not promulgate motor vehicle GHG emissions 
regulations that go as far as those of California. As a result, emissions were higher than 
they would have been if California and the other states had been allowed to go 
forward.268 Even though the waiver was ultimately granted and the federal government 
passed more stringent regulations in collaboration with California under the Obama 
Administration, the period from the 2005 waiver request until that point was one of 
greater emissions than it could have been. 
However, the disputes among states and the federal government do not always 
produce the outcome generated in the waiver case. For instance, Massachusetts v. EPA, 
rather than blocking state regulatory efforts, produced a U.S. Supreme Court decision 
forcing the EPA to reassess its treatment of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions 
                                                
268 California advanced a variation on this argument in its action under FOIA. See FOIA Complaint, supra 
note 149, ¶ 6.  
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under the Clean Air Act.269  This decision helped undergird the Obama Administration’s 
extensive regulation of emissions by motor vehicles and stationary sources.  If our goal 
should not simply be to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as quickly as possible, but to 
develop an appropriate and effective regulatory scheme that acknowledges the 
multiscalar nature of climate change, the state waiver dispute and other state-federal—
mixed with state-state—variations on climate change litigation raise important questions. 
Namely, if we accept the complex geography of scale, science, and law highlighted in 
Chapter IV and the salience of dynamic federalist models, as well as the argument that 
states are substantively and structurally important in the overall regulatory picture, we 
still are left with uncertainty about when state action, whether individual or in coalitions, 
is appropriate.270  
Just as most commentators seem to accept the need for a more effective treaty 
regime, they also likely would not dispute the claim that states make decisions within 
their regulatory authority that affect emissions. The harder terrain is where federal and 
state efforts intersect. Even if neither a dualist nor a cooperative model adequately 
captures the complex dynamics represented in the state waiver dispute,271 there are no 
easy answers about when a group of states, which disagrees with other states, should be 
allowed to regulate emissions more stringently than the federal government. 
Although the Obama Administration displays a drastically different approach to 
climate change than the most recent Bush Administration did, and resolved this particular 
                                                
269 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
 
270 See supra Chapter IV. 
 
271 Schapiro, for example, not only critiques dualist approaches, but indicates that cooperative federalism 
does not adequately engage conflicts. Schapiro, supra note 128, at 283–85. 
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conflict in favor of state-level regulation, it still faced the complexities of scale raised by 
the state waiver dispute.  As he ordered the reconsideration of the waiver, President 
Obama himself noted that Washington’s “refusal to lead risks the creation of a confusing 
and patchwork set of standards that hurts the environment and the auto industry.”272  
While he supports California and the other states moving ahead, he must grapple with the 
scalar dimensions of “the best way forward,” which “will help us create incentives to 
develop new energy that will make us less dependent on oil that endangers our security, 
our economy, and our planet.”273    
The waiver dispute raises critical questions about the structure of our 
transnational regulatory model for climate governance. Even if we accept the complexity 
described in Chapter IV of international-domestic, local-state-federal, and public-private 
in the context of climate change litigation, we still do not have definitive answers about 
an appropriate scalar approach.  For example, when problems have international 
dimensions, should we presume a top-down model in which states primarily participate 
through their interaction with the federal government? If multiscalar regulatory concerns 
like climate change make a more inclusive model appropriate, what role should states 
have? When, if ever, is preemption appropriate? Is a systematic approach possible, or do 
these situations have to be resolved individually? And more specific to climate change, 
what are states’ most appropriate and effective regulatory roles, given their intermediate 
regulatory level?274  As Chapter VI suggests, if we treat states—like localities—as 
                                                
272 The White House Blog, From peril to progress, supra note 157. 
 
273 Id. 
 
274 For examples of recent scholarship grappling with these issues, see sources cited supra notes 130, 133.  
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embedded in multiscalar climate networks, a complex set of regulatory challenges 
emerges. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE INCLUSION OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN LOCAL LAND USE PLANNING: 
PEOPLE V. COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change 
“International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 585 (2009). 
 
Litigation over local climate regulation reflects the push-pull of smaller-scale 
efforts on emissions and further elucidates the complex scale-science-law interaction 
framed in Chapter IV by the work of Doremus and Sayre. As Sections 1 and 2 of this 
chapter introduce and the third case study explores in more depth, urban geographers 
have long-recognized that the very idea of “local” is complex, which is reflected in 
climate regulation at that scale. Both substantive and structural forces have made cities 
and counties critical sites for addressing the problem of climate change. In addition, as 
highlighted in the example of San Bernardino County, California,275 these questions of 
local regulation often involve both urban and rural dimensions, which makes a 
presumption of local as urban problematic at times.276  
Sections 3 and 4 analyze the way in which litigation interacts with local 
regulatory choices by considering the settlement in People v. County of San Bernardino. 
In parallel cases, California and several nongovernmental organizations sued San 
Bernardino County for failing to include greenhouse gas emissions in its urban growth 
                                                
275 For maps of San Bernardino County, see County of San Bernardino, San Bernardino County Maps, at 
http://www.sbcounty.gov/maps.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).  
 
276 IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 6; IPCC, MITIGATION, supra note 6. For an interesting analysis of the way 
in which legal rhetoric interacts with the rural, see generally Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 159 (2005). 
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plan.277 The landmark settlement that resulted from the action brought by the State of 
California represents an important compromise;278 it demonstrates how localities might 
address climate change and the potential for state governments to force greater action. 
The focus in this chapter is not on the significance of this settlement generally, 
which is addressed further in Chapter IX’s discussion of the post-settlement activity in 
San Bernardino County, but rather on how questions of scale are mediated through it. The 
core substantive question in both suits is whether a state environmental law can be used 
to compel local government to change the way in which it approaches urban growth. 
Within the perspectives expressed by both sides, as well as in the settlement itself, are 
views about localities as an appropriate scale for climate regulation.  
 
1. Scaling the Local 
Cities and counties are levels of governance that we typically talk about as 
“local.” However, these very categories of “local” and “regional” can be confusing. 
Although “local” conveys smallness, localities can be physically bigger than states.279 
Similarly, “regional” is a category that can occur at many different scales. A region can 
be a subset of a state, a group of states, or a group of countries, just to name a few 
variations. An extensive scholarly literature in geography and other disciplines 
                                                
277 See Petition for Writ of Mandate at 12, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, No. 
07 Civ. 293 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/Petition_(00011023).PDF [hereinafter Petition, Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity]; Petition for Writ of Mandate ¶ 5, People v. County of San Bernardino, No. 07 Civ. 329 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/ 
SanBernardino_complaint.pdf [hereinafter Petition, People]. 
 
278 See Confidential Settlement Agreement, supra note 24. 
 
279 See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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interrogates the appropriate structure of decision making within these variously scaled 
metropolitan regions. In the context of urban metropolitan areas in particular, 
geographers such as Peter Muller have traced the ways in urban regions have evolved 
into polycentric, multi-nodal complex systems in which suburban mini-cities and 
technopoles participate in global economic networks.280  The new governance scholars 
highlighted in Chapter II have also focused on the ways in which local knowledge can be 
integrated into complex, multiscalar processes.281 
Although other lawsuits over local policy choices reflect contestation over the 
scale of climate regulation more clearly,282 the San Bernardino County dispute provides a 
particularly interesting example due to the scale of that county and its emissions. San 
                                                
280 For discussion of the classic U.S. urban geography literature on this issue, see John R. Borchert, 
America’s Changing Metropolitan Regions, 62 ANNALS ASSOC. AM GEOG. 352, 352 (1985) (citing ROBERT 
E. DICKINSON, CITY REGION AND REGIONALISM (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); OTIS DUDLEY 
DUNCAN, ET AL., METROPOLIS AND REGION (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, for Resources for 
the Future, 1960); DICKINSON, CITY AND REGION (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964) & BEVERLY 
DUNCAN & STANLEY LIEBERSON, METROPOLIS AND REGION IN TRANSITION (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1970). Peter Muller has talked about eh complex spatial evolution of urban metropolitan 
regions as they have become polycentric participants in globalization.  See PETER O. MULLER, 
CONTEMPORARY SUBURBAN AMERICA (1981); Peter O. Muller, Transportation and Urban Form: Stages in 
the Spatial Evolution of the American Metropolis in THE GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 59 
(Susan Hanson & Genevieve Giuliano, eds) (2004); Peter O. Muller, The Suburban Transformation of the 
Globalizing American City, 551 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY POLITICAL & SOC. SCI. 44 (1997). For examples of 
this literature in law journals, see David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003) 
and Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002). 
 
281  J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman are integrating new governance with dynamic federalism and 
transgovernmental network theory in an effort to grapple with massive environmental problems like climate 
change. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Managing Massive Problems: Models and Strategies for 
Administrative Agencies (Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For broader 
compilations on new governance approaches and research directions, see generally LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
“New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous 
Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004); and Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). 
 
282 Similar dynamics, for example, exist in the briefs and Washington Supreme Court opinion in Okeson v. 
City of Seattle, 150 P.3d 556 (Wash. 2007), but an in-depth analysis of that case is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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Bernardino County embodies the peculiarity of legal scaling just discussed. Like other 
local governmental entities, it is simultaneously an administrative subunit of California 
and an independent policymaker,283 but as a matter of physical size, it spans 20,052 
square miles, an area larger than some states.284  
Despite its size, the County is also viewed—together with western Riverside, 
northern Los Angeles, southern Orange, and northern and southern San Diego counties—
as part of Southern California’s “exurban periphery.”285 The County has a rapidly 
growing population—up 17.7% between 1990 and 1999 by U.S. Census Bureau 
estimates—and is undergoing major demographic shifts, but also includes significant 
wilderness areas.286 Its aggressive pro-growth policies have not only been challenged by 
the State of California and NGOs through climate change suits under the California 
                                                
283 See Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. 
L. REV. 261, 303–05 (1987) (discussing the legal status of counties). 
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Metropolitan Water District Policies and Subsidies for Suburban Development, 1928–1996, 36 CAL. W. L. 
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growth of Latino and African-American populations, see Stuart Gabriel & Gary Painter, Pathways to 
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Environmental Quality Act (CEQA),287 but also have been countered by the city council 
of Redlands, one of twenty-four incorporated communities within its borders.288  Map 2 
portrays the county’s major land use patterns layered over its plan for future development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2. San Bernardino County, Current Land Use and General Plan for Development 
                                                
287 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21177 (West 2007). 
 
288 See Julie Hayward Biggs, No Drip, No Flush, No Growth: How Cities Can Control Growth Beyond 
Their Boundaries by Refusing to Extend Utility Services, 22 URB. LAW. 285, 288–95 (1990). 
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This scalar complexity illustrates a basic difficulty of trying to characterize the 
role that climate change litigation plays in urban responses to climate change. The 
litigation involves actors functioning at multiple levels of government disputing the way 
in which we should approach the problem of emissions regulation. And the actors 
themselves are often made up of smaller entities and form part of larger entities.289 San 
Bernardino County is certainly “local” as a legal matter, but the nuances of its 
geography—with its complex horizontal and vertical relationships and dimensions—
influence how we should think about its regulatory role. 
 
2. The Contours of Local Climate Choices 
Although they vary greatly in size and character, cities and counties, in their many 
manifestations, serve as particularly important sites for scalar contestation over climate 
change. Both substantive and structural factors underlie the critical role of localities. 
Substantively, localities are both major emitters and laboratories for resolving 
tensions between climate regulation and economic growth. Most nation-states are 
subdivided down to this local level, and although any individual city or county provides a 
relatively small percentage of global emissions, they cumulatively constitute a substantial 
share. For example, the hundreds of cities participating in the international effort Cities 
for Climate Protection, a predominantly horizontal effort, now represent a significant 
percentage of global greenhouse gas emissions.290  
                                                
289 See Osofsky, supra note 36. 
 
290 ICLEI Global, supra note 60. 
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Moreover, major urban areas, with their large populations, have a particularly 
important effect on total emissions, an effect that likely will grow due to the ongoing 
massive urbanization taking place around the world.291 As discussed in depth in the third 
case study in Chapters XI through XIII, the patterns of (1) urbanization within 
metropolitan regions identified by geographers such as Peter Muller and John Borchert 
and (2) suburban participation in not only multi-level economic, but also climate change 
mitigation networks reinforces the need for polycentric governance approaches.292 In 
addition, with respect to the impacts of climate change, as megacities continue to expand 
in hazard-prone areas, this urbanization increases the risks of property loss from climate 
change.293 
The pursuit of economic growth creates an important dilemma for local 
government. Because the economy at every scale is profoundly carbon-centered, 
                                                
291 Beyond any questions of how exactly land use changes impact climate change and the carbon cycle, 
compare INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, with Myles Allen et al., 
Scientific Challenges in the Attribution of Harm to Human Influence on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 
1374–75 (2007), urban sprawl and planning choices have been linked very directly to vehicle miles traveled 
and the resultant emissions. See sources cited supra note 25. For geographic and other interdisciplinary 
analyses of cities in a globalizing world, see NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE 
AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD (2004); CITIES TRANSFORMED: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Mark R. Montgomery et al. eds., 2003); GLOBAL NETWORKS, 
LINKED CITIES (Saskia Sassen ed., 2002); GLOBALIZING CITIES: A NEW SPATIAL ORDER? (Peter Marcuse & 
Ronald van Kempen eds., 2000); HEIDI H. HOBBS, CITY HALL GOES ABROAD: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF 
LOCAL POLITICS (1994); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2d ed. 2001); 
H. V. SAVITCH & PAUL KANTOR, CITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE (2002); RICHARD SENNETT, THE 
CONSCIENCE OF THE EYE: THE DESIGN AND SOCIAL LIFE OF CITIES (1990); SPACES OF GLOBALIZATION: 
REASSERTING THE POWER OF THE LOCAL, supra note 21; WORLD CITIES IN A WORLD-SYSTEM (Paul L. 
Knox & Peter J. Taylor eds., 1995). 
 
292 See infra Chapters XI–XIII. 
 
293 For a discussion over how urbanization relates to the costs of climate change in the context of insurance 
law, see Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of Large-Scale 
Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1805–07 (2007) and Christina 
Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse: Insurance Risk-Management 
Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 251 & 43A STAN. J. INT’L L. 
251 (2007). 
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economic growth often translates into more emissions.294 Cities and counties attempting 
to minimize emissions, therefore, face particular challenges in balancing those two goals. 
For example, as the first U.S. city with a comprehensive energy plan and the first to join 
international coalitions of cities on climate change, Portland, Oregon, serves as a model 
of green growth. Its emissions reduction efforts have been substantial, resulting in a 
12.5% per capita decrease in emissions since the early 1990s.295 However, Portland 
struggled to meet even its scaled back goal of emissions at ten percent below 1990 levels 
by 2010, in large part due to population growth.296 Although Portland’s per capita 
reductions probably have more significance for the global picture than its total 
emissions—particularly if immigrants come from higher emissions places—this example 
suggests the dangers of rapid economic growth not coupled with aggressive per capita 
reductions. If numerous urban areas grow rapidly without the kind of approach taken by 
Portland, the global impact could be enormous.297   Moreover, as analyzed in greater 
depth in Chapters XI through XIII, these efforts by major cities, especially in areas with 
less extensive regional planning than Portland, are often dwarfed by inaction by the 
suburbs that surround them and that increasingly dominate economic activity.298 
                                                
294 See IPCC, MITIGATION, supra note 6 (providing different emissions scenarios). For an example of 
visioning on the issue of a low carbon economy, see comments from the chief executive of Carbon Trust, a 
private company funded by the UK government. Tom Delay, The Low Carbon Economy, at 
http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/climatechange/policy/lce.htm. 
 
295 CITY OF PORTLAND & MULTNOMAH COUNTY, A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE CITY OF PORTLAND AND 
MULTNOMAH COUNTY LOCAL ACTION PLAN ON GLOBAL WARMING 1 (2005). 
 
296 Id. at 1–2; PORTLAND ENERGY OFFICE, CITY OF PORTLAND, CARBON DIOXIDE REDUCTION STRATEGY: 
SUCCESS AND SETBACKS 1 (2000). Although Portland originally committed to reducing emissions to twenty 
percent below 1990 levels by 2010, it scaled back to ten percent below 1990 levels in its 2010 Local Action 
Plan on Global Warming. Id. 
 
297 Urbanization makes this issue particularly concerning. See sources cited supra note 85. 
 
298 See infra Chapters XI–XII. 
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As a structural matter, substate entities play a significant role in the climate 
conversation because they are simultaneously subordinate to larger level government and 
sites for autonomy tied closely to individuals and community.299 Because cities and 
counties are administrative subunits of states, their climate choices often are influenced 
by relevant state policies.300 To the extent that local and state governments are not 
aligned in their approach to climate change, significant tension can result, as the case by 
California against San Bernardino County demonstrates. 
Local scales also are the levels that individuals experience most intimately. 
Because U.S. cities and counties have significant autonomy in how they govern, despite 
their administrative relationship with the state, they make decisions that shape profoundly 
the contours of their residents’ everyday lives.301 Residents may have more substantial 
involvement with the policies that result from choices of whether and how to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions locally than with larger scale legal frameworks, resulting in the 
mitigation opportunities in smaller suburban cities described in Chapters XI through 
XIII.302  As metropolitan regions continue to trend in ways that urban geographers have 
                                                
299 See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1857–60, 1887–92 (1994). 
 
300 Portland’s climate policy, for example, was deeply intertwined with Oregon’s state land-use laws of the 
1970s. See Timothy Grewe, Susan Anderson & Laurel Butman, Portland, Oregon: A Case Study in 
Sustainability, GOV’T FIN. REV., Feb. 2002, at 8, 9. 
 
301 See Ford, supra note 91. 
 
302 For an anthropological exploration of the way in which scale operates in political ecology, with a 
particular focus on the way in which political-economic and sociocultural forces intersect in localities, see 
POLITICAL ECOLOGY ACROSS SPACES, SCALES, AND SOCIAL GROUPS (Susan Paulson & Lisa L. Gezon eds., 
2005). For additional discussion of ecology, environmental management, and scale, see Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
189 (2002); Matthew McKinney, Craig Fitch & Will Harmon, Regionalism in the West: An Inventory and 
Assessment, 23 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 101 (2002); and Nathan F. Sayre, Ecological and 
Geographical Scale: Parallels and Potential for Integration, 29 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 276, 281 
(2005). 
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described towards polycentric economic nodes and complex clusters of socio-economic 
groupings, the need to focus locally both in terms of metropolitan regions and individual 
cities become important.303 
Together, these substantive and structural factors make urban governance 
questions a key policy area of climate regulation.304 Unsurprisingly, a wide range of 
perspectives—not just among academics but also among policymakers—exists on how to 
answer them. As the following section explores, these differences play out in litigation 
over substate climate choices in ways that reflect the complex scale-science-law 
intersection elucidated by Sayre and Doremus. 
 
3. Scalar Contestation over San Bernardino’s General Plan 
The legal dispute over San Bernardino County’s approach to climate change 
began with a local planning process. On March 13, 2007, San Bernardino’s Board of 
Supervisors approved an update of its General Plan and certified its accompanying Final 
Environmental Impact Report (FEIR).305 The updated General Plan—which adopted 
goals and policies that will underlie future land use, growth, and transportation—
projected a sixty-four percent increase in population from 2000 to 2020.306 It noted in 
conjunction with the projection that “[c]onstant, and relatively high increases in 
                                                
303 See sources supra note 280. 
 
304 For scholarly analyses of the role of cities in transnational climate regulation, see sources cited supra 
note 148. 
 
305  COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, 2007 GENERAL PLAN (2007), available at http://www.co.san-
bernardino.ca.us/landuseservices/general_plan/Default.asp.  
 
306 Id. at VI-1. 
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population growth in the past, have resulted in urban development and increased demand 
for available land.”307  
The General Plan did not include the phrases “climate change,” “global 
warming,” or “greenhouse gas emissions.”308 The accompanying FEIR did address 
climate change, however, but used scientific uncertainty together with oblique scalar 
arguments to explain its lack of plans for specific steps on climate change emissions or 
impacts. For example, it acknowledged the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006309 as creating a statewide regulatory program, but explained that “[i]t is not yet clear 
how, or if, these future regulations would affect local governments or how they might 
influence local land use planning decisions.” 310  Similarly, after noting comments 
indicating that the Environmental Impact Assessment must include “quantified analysis 
of greenhouse gas emissions” and “specify mitigation measures,” it declined to provide 
these specifics on the ground that the California Air Resources Board has not yet given 
the County enough guidance.311 Although these arguments took the form of standard 
objections to action without regulatory guidance, they were being used to avoid any 
specific steps on emissions reduction. 
                                                
307 Id. 
 
308 I did a search of the 357-page document on October 10, 2007, using each of these terms and found no 
hits. 
 
309 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2757–65 (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 
(West 2008)). 
 
310 COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, 2006 GENERAL PLAN PROGRAM, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
REPORT 325  (2007), available at http://www.sbcounty.gov/ 
landuseservices/General%20Plan%20Update/Environmental%20Review/FEIR.pdf; see also id. at 322–30.  
 
311 Id. at 325–27. 
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In responding to comments on endangered species concerns, the FEIR made even 
clearer use of scientific uncertainty arguments to recommend against local action. It 
explained: 
The County does not dispute the scientific basis for global 
warming; however, as the commenter is well aware, the implications of 
global warming on common as well as special status-species are difficult 
to discern at best. Therefore, the General Plan cannot analyze the potential 
effects of climate change and global warming on rare, threatened, or 
endangered species as the best minds in science readily acknowledge that 
the impacts of global warming vary among taxa, benefiting some, while 
adversely effecting others. . . . [T]he County contends that the impacts 
and/or effects of global warming on local, state, or federally protected 
species can not be reasonably ascertained and are currently speculative.312 
 
As with the arguments about lack of guidance, the County was using scientific 
uncertainty to sidestep any obligation to take action. Thus, although the County claimed 
that it “will adhere to rules and guidelines currently in place at the local, state and federal 
level, and will also adhere to any future regulations regarding global warming resulting 
from the legislative approval of AB [Assembly Bill] 32,”313 it refused to create a well-
developed plan on greenhouse gas emissions and impacts as part of its General Plan 
without specifically directed mandates from other governmental entities operating at a 
larger scale. 
The Center for Biological Diversity, Sierra Club, and San Bernardino Valley 
Audubon Society—NGOs that interact with a range of local, state, national, and 
international actors—filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate under the CEQA on April 11, 
2007, which asked the superior court to provide a range of injunctive relief.314 The 
                                                
312 Id. at 607. 
 
313 Id. at 330; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599. 
 
314 Petition, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 71, at 22. 
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petition claimed that the County of San Bernardino failed (1) to disclose and analyze 
adequately the project’s impacts and mitigation measures and alternatives, (2) to support 
its Statement of Overriding Considerations with substantial evidence, (3) to recirculate 
the Environmental Impact Report (EIR), (4) to respond adequately to comments, and (5) 
to provide an adequate description of the existing environment.315 Two days later, the 
Attorney General of California filed a CEQA suit requesting similar relief, with a single 
cause of action: failure to comply with the CEQA and prejudicial abuse of discretion.316 
On August 21, 2007, the State and County entered into a settlement agreement 
that represented a significant compromise. The County agreed to amend its General Plan 
to add a policy of emissions reduction and a call for the adoption of a Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reduction Plan.317 Under the agreement, that plan would include an extensive 
inventory of sources and emissions and also reduction targets.318 In addition, the County 
agreed to conduct an environmental review of both the amendments and the reduction 
plan.319 The agreement included a timeline, however, that allowed the County to keep its 
original plan in place as it prepared these replacement plans and inventories.320 The 
Attorney General also agreed to assist the County to obtain funding for its emissions 
reduction efforts.321  
                                                
315 Id. at 11–22. 
 
316 Petition, People, supra note 71, at 9–12. 
 
317 Confidential Settlement Agreement, supra note 24, at 2–4. 
 
318 Id. 
 
319 Id. at 4. 
 
320 Id. 
 
321 Id. at 6. 
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Since then, the County has been taking steps to implement the settlement 
agreement, including hiring a consultant to develop its emissions reduction plan. The plan 
included bringing emissions down to 1990 levels and adopting mitigation measures to 
achieve that target. Moreover, after the County agreed to some additional environmental 
protection measures, the nongovernmental petitioners agreed to drop their CEQA 
action.322 
As described in more depth in Chapter IX, the County’s settlement-mandated 
steps took place in the context of a broader environmental initiative, Green County San 
Bernardino, which began during the same month as the settlement.323  That initiative 
includes not only county and regional efforts, but also an effort launched in June 2007—
in collaboration with Riverside County—to encourage greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions by cities within the County.324 
Both the petitions and the settlement reflect contestation over climate change as a 
locally regulable problem in light of the relevant existing science. The petitioners made 
“scaling down” arguments that the causes and impacts of climate change occur at a 
                                                
322 Imran Ghori, Challenge to Plan Dropped; San Bernardino County: Three Environmental Groups End 
Their Lawsuit Against the General Blueprint for Growth, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 18, 2007, at B01, 
available at http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/ PE_News_Local_H_settle18.31d902e.html; 
Email from Jonathan Evans, Staff Attorney, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, to author (Dec. 15, 2008, 16:43 
EST) (on file with author). 
 
323  Green County San Bernardino, About Green County, at http://www.sbcounty.gov/ 
greencountysb/about_gc.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). I have explored this initiative in more depth, as 
well as its implications for how we envision the local scale, in Scaling “Local”: The Implications of 
Greenhouse Gas Regulation in San Bernardino County, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 689 (2009). 
 
324 Green Valley Initiative, We Invite You to Join the Green Valley Initiative and Become a Green Valley 
City (Jurisdiction), at http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/content/ 
green_valley_initiative_cities/gvi_jurisdiction.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2009); Green Valley Initiative, 
Resolution No., at http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/content/ 
green_valley_initiative_cities/gvi_resolution.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2009); Green County San Bernardino, 
Green Valley Initiative Cities, at http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/ 
green_valley_initiative_cities.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). 
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county level. For example, the introduction to the NGOs’ petition noted: “Though not 
addressed by the EIR, the development authorized by the Project would contribute to 
climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases. Similarly, the County would 
be affected by climate change through, among other things, greater wildfire hazards, 
increasing temperatures, and worsening drought.”325 In addition, the Attorney General’s 
recital in the settlement agreement assumed that County emissions impact the problem of 
climate change:  
It is the Attorney General’s position that the General Plan EIR did 
not adequately analyze the adverse effects of implementation of the 
General Plan Update on air quality and climate change and did not adopt 
feasible mitigation measures to minimize the adverse effects of 
implementation of the General Plan Update on climate change and air 
quality . . . .326 
 
In both instances, petitioners described climate change as having a local regulatory 
dimension. 
In contrast, the County’s recital in the settlement agreement, like its statements in 
the FEIR, relied upon scientific uncertainty to claim that detailed discussion of climate 
change in the General Plan would be inappropriate and, in so doing, pushed against the 
need for targeted local action even as it compromised: 
It is the County’s position that the General Plan EIR, after 
providing substantial disclosure and analysis of greenhouse gas emission 
and climate change issues, and including a factual and reasoned 
determination, appropriately concluded that there is no available 
methodology for determining whether greenhouse gas emissions 
attributable to the General Plan Update are significant. Accordingly, it is 
the County’s position that the County correctly determined, based on 
                                                
325 Petition, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 71, at 2. 
 
326 Confidential Settlement Agreement, supra note 24, at 1. 
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substantial evidence, that further discussion in the General Plan EIR of 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change would be speculative . . . .327 
 
Although this recital does not explicitly “scale up” in the sense of arguing that 
some other level of government could regulate climate change more effectively, the 
County’s reasoning is being used to assert that climate change is too uncertain for local 
regulation. 
 
4. Implications of Local Scalar Contestation 
This case and its resultant settlement represent a particularly interesting variation 
of the scalar battles over climate change. San Bernardino County likely would not have 
agreed to these steps without the petitions.328 Moreover, California Attorney General 
Jerry Brown indicated in a November 2007 speech to the California State Association of 
Counties that other California counties must address climate change or the State will sue 
them too.329 The settlement agreement, as both a direct regulatory and political tool, thus 
demonstrates how pressure from state government through the courts can result in 
localities taking emissions reductions steps they would not otherwise have taken.  
Litigation does not always result in greater public policy efforts on climate change, 
however. Although the San Bernardino County settlement represents litigation being used 
to force local regulation, other locally focused suits have been used to block regulation.330 
                                                
327 Id. 
 
328 See id. at 1–2. 
 
329 See Rob Luke, Brown Gives California Counties Green Tips to Dodge Lawsuits, LEGALNEWSLINE, Nov. 
13, 2007, at http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/ 
203948-brown-gives-cal.-counties-green-tips-to-dodge-lawsuits.  
 
330 See generally Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 P.3d 556, 558 (Wash. 2007) (“We hold that combating 
global warming is a general government purpose, albeit a meritorious one, and not a proprietary utility 
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In either variation, though, this litigation has an important influence on local policy, 
policy that is arguably playing a key role on the front line of emissions reduction.  
As importantly, the San Bernardino County settlement reinforces the notion that 
fitting local action within models of transnational climate governance is only becoming 
more pressing. If a state can use state law and its courts to force counties to address the 
problem of climate change, we somehow need to figure out how, if at all, these 
subnational dynamics should fit into our larger-scale visions of climate governance. 
Cities and counties have long participated in the dialogues over climate regulation, but 
lawsuits over local choices create more vertical and horizontal interactions among entities 
at different scales. In the process of these suits, the governance picture becomes more 
complicated than even the one posed by an international network of local entities 
interacting with an international treaty regime. 
In particular, the San Bernardino County dispute’s combination of scalar 
contestation and litigation as a forcing tool raises core questions about whether we should 
think of climate regulation only in traditional, top-down, treaty-based terms or somehow 
incorporate dynamics among these multiple actors at different levels of government.331 If 
we choose the latter version, how do we integrate regulation by San Bernardino County 
with that of other localities, states, nations, and groups of nations? When is it appropriate 
for a state to force a locality to regulate? When should private entities—whether 
individuals, NGOs, or corporations—be able to block or compel local regulatory efforts? 
                                                                                                                                            
purpose. Therefore, such mitigation expenses must be borne by general taxpayers rather than utility 
ratepayers. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Seattle.”). 
 
331 See generally Osofsky, supra note 14 (exploring various approaches to situating climate change 
litigation in international legal theory); sources cited supra note 148 (discussing the role of localities in 
climate regulation). 
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As explored in more depth in the third case study in Chapters XI through XIII of 
suburban climate change action and participation in multi-level climate change networks, 
viewing localities as embedded in multiscalar climate networks means engaging a 
difficult set of issues that lack straightforward resolution. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE DIAGONAL REGULATORY ROLE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
LITIGATION 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change 
“International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 585 (2009). 
 
This chapter interweaves two of the streams of scholarship highlighted in Chapter 
II in order to illustrate how an in-depth combining of geographic conceptions of scale 
with legal theory can provide insights into polycentric climate change governance.  
Specifically, it draws from geographer Kevin Cox’s scholarship on scale and networks 
and legal scholar Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process to explore the 
contours of and the possibilities for climate change litigation to play a constructive role in 
more effective multiscalar governance approaches. It begins by considering the dangers 
posed by “scaling up,” and the reasons for further multiscalar regulatory analysis. It then 
draws from these two approaches to develop a conceptual framework for understanding 
the diagonal regulatory role—across vertical and horizontal governance simultaneously—
that climate change litigation plays and argues for broader exploration of such diagonal 
strategies outside of the litigation context. 
In so doing, this chapter builds upon the overall conceptual framework introduced 
in Chapter II and the particular concerns around scale, science, and law—drawing from 
geographer Nathan Sayre and legal scholar Holly Doremus—explored throughout this 
part.332   By bringing together transnational legal process with Cox’s network-based 
conception of scale, this final chapter of the first case study constructs a conceptual 
                                                
332 For an extensive discussion of their work, see supra Chapter IV. 
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approach for understanding the rescaling role of this litigation and the diagonal 
interactions that result.  This approach helps to provide an alternative to the problematic 
dichotomies of domestic-international, local-state-federal, and public-private explored 
throughout this part.  Such a conceptual model provides the basis for thinking more 
broadly about when diagonal regulation is effective and how best to encourage it, which 
are the focus of the second and third case studies. 
 
1. The Dangers of “Too Big” Arguments 
Before turning to an exploration of litigation’s role in multiscalar governance of 
climate change and its broader implications for the structure of regulatory regimes, a 
basic issue needs further exploration: namely, why not scale up? Scholars have detailed 
the difficulties of smaller-scale regulation of this problem with many larger-scale 
dimensions,333 concerns that have been reinforced by those trying to prevent state and 
local regulatory actions.334 Given the messy and patchwork quality of “scaling down,” 
with its accompanying dangers of leakage, a long term multiscalar approach demands 
justification beyond gap filling the inadequacies of the U.S. federal government.  
This section attempts to supply such a justification by focusing on three primary 
concerns with a “scaled up” approach to climate regulation that does not make room for 
local, state, and, at times, even national action.335 In so doing, the section does not argue 
                                                
333 See sources cited supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 
334 These concerns are reflected, for example, in the scaling up arguments described in the cases supra 
Chapter IV–VI. 
 
335 I have explored variations on these concerns in less depth in a legislative context. See Hari M. Osofsky, 
Climate Change Legislation in Context, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 245 (2008). 
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that climate regulation should be “scaled down,” but rather that strategies should be 
multiscalar and, as such, include smaller scale efforts.  
First, many of these “too big” arguments do not seem to fit the scientific evidence 
very well. Characterizing climate change as solely an international and national 
regulatory problem fails to capture its complexity and the way in which it interacts with 
different levels of governance.336 Moreover, as discussed in detail in Chapters I and III, 
current regulatory efforts are not bringing the problem of climate change under control.337 
Although more effective multiscalar initiatives may also fail, the nuanced scales of the 
problem and the regulatory issues they pose suggest the value of openness towards 
strategies that treat the problem as multiscalar rather than simply large scale.338  
Second, these consistent arguments against smaller-scale regulation risk 
eliminating possible ways to bring emissions down. At the moment, it is far from certain 
that the political will exists at “higher” levels of governance—even under the Obama 
Administration—to go as far as these smaller-scale efforts do, and so they quite literally 
are giving us reductions that we would not have otherwise. California’s waiver request 
and its larger regulatory context exemplify efforts by many states to go farther than the 
federal government. In ordering the EPA to reconsider the waiver denial, President 
Obama stated that “the federal government must work with, not against, states to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.”339 Although President Obama has repeatedly committed to 
                                                
336 See supra Chapter III. 
 
337 See supra Chapters I & III. 
 
338 For scholarship exploring the value of multiscalar strategies for regulating climate change, see sources 
cited supra notes 37, 130, 133, and 138. 
 
339 See The White House Blog, From peril to progress, supra note 157. 
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ambitious plans on climate change, and, as noted above, Obama himself raised concerns 
about patchwork regulatory approaches when ordering the waiver reconsideration, some 
localities and states are still ahead of the federal government.340 
More importantly for the long term, even if we could create the ideal treaty 
regime with accompanying rigorous national polices, a predominantly larger-scale 
approach may not be able to address the details effectively and provide the 
innovativeness of these smaller-scale efforts. For example, cities are generally more 
competent than larger-scale government at deciding how streets in their localities should 
be organized to limit vehicle miles traveled, and more aware of the nuances of the local 
environment.341 If regulatory strategies do not incorporate these kinds of competencies, 
they will be less effective at reducing emissions.   
Finally, a rigid “scaling up” risks blocking creative, holistic regulatory solutions 
to this problem. As noted in Chapter III, climate change is simultaneously individual, 
local, state, national, international, and everything in between, and law must find a way 
of flexibly moving among those levels of governance. Climate change litigation may help 
to motivate that kind of innovation and to create emissions reduction and responses to 
impacts that might not have occurred otherwise. But if these “too big” arguments 
consistently prevail, such litigation could become a way of blocking smaller-scale 
regulation and forcing us into a less effective approach to the problem.342 
                                                
340 See id.  
 
341 For an analysis of the locally specific aspects of climate policy, see sources cited supra note 37. 
 
342 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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None of these arguments for the importance of smaller-scale regulation 
presupposes bottom-up lawmaking.343 A top-down approach could be multiscalar, for 
example, by imposing mandates that allow for flexible smaller-scale implementation. 
Such a configuration, like many other integrative approaches, might address some of the 
leakage concerns raised with respect to smaller-scale regulation.344  
But the above arguments do suggest the importance of exploring what effective 
multiscalar governance might look like in more depth. Such an exploration will have 
many dimensions due to multiple branches and levels of government, as well as a myriad 
of nongovernmental actors, engaging the problem of climate change. Because litigation 
involves scalar battles,345 this analysis should include the rescaling effects of litigation 
and their proper place in a multiscalar regime.346 
 
2. A Transnational Legal Process Narrative of Rescaling Through Climate Change 
Litigation 
Transnational legal process provides a powerful lens for understanding the way in 
which litigation in forums at different levels of governance around the world form part of 
                                                
343 For a discussion of bottom-up lawmaking in the climate change context, see Levit, supra note 37, and 
Osofsky & Levit, supra note 9. 
 
344 The EPA program to encourage state climate plans in the late 1990s embodies this phenomenon. See 
infra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 
345 See supra Chapters IV–VI. 
 
346 For an analysis of the continuing role for nuisance suits even if a more rigorous federal regime develops, 
see, for example, Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change, supra note 133. See 
generally Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate 
Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827 (2008) (arguing for the value of public nuisance climate change suits as a 
type of judicial carbon tax). More broadly, Alexandra Klass has explored the continuing importance of 
nuisance suits as a complement to environmental statutes. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and 
Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545 (2007) (arguing for the complementary 
regulatory role of state common law in environmental protection efforts).  
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climate regulation. In particular, it focuses on the way in which a range of actors in a 
variety of interactions help internalize norms transnationally. Such an analysis fits 
together well with both new governance and dynamic federalism approaches because it 
recognizes the nuanced interactions among a range of actors at different levels of 
government.347 This section analyzes how transnational legal process applies to climate 
change litigation in general, and then explores particular ways in which the theory helps 
to explain the rescaling dynamics in these cases. 
 
 
a. Transnational Legal Process and Climate Change Litigation 
Transnational legal process applies especially well to climate change litigation 
because it focuses on the legal implications of interactions that cut across many of the 
traditional international law divides. Harold Hongju Koh summarizes the core elements 
of the theory:  
Transnational legal process has four distinctive features. First, it is 
nontraditional: it breaks down two traditional dichotomies that have 
historically dominated the study of international law: between domestic 
and international, public and private. Second, it is nonstatist: the actors in 
this process are not just, or even primarily, nation-states, but include 
nonstate actors as well. Third, transnational legal process is dynamic, not 
static. Transnational law transforms, mutates, and percolates up and down, 
from the public to the private, from the domestic to the international level 
and back down again. Fourth and finally, it is normative. From this 
process of interaction, new rules of law emerge, which are interpreted, 
internalized, and enforced, thus beginning the process all over again. Thus, 
the concept embraces not just the descriptive workings of a process, but 
the normativity of that process. It focuses not simply upon how 
international interaction among transnational actors shapes law, but also 
on how law shapes and guides future interactions: in short, how law 
influences why nations obey.348 
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348 Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 18, at 184. 
 
 139 
 
The impact of climate change litigation can be explained through this four-part 
analysis. First, the cases constitute a public-private regulatory dialogue. As I explained in 
Chapter IV, whether the suits involve disputes over the extent of governmental 
regulation—like the three case examples described in the previous chapters—or directly 
target major corporate emitters, they all thus far have constituted a state-corporate 
regulatory interaction around greenhouse gas emissions.349 For example, many of the 
cases revolve around motor vehicle or power plant emissions, with some focusing on how 
different levels of government regulate those emissions and others suing those emitters 
directly under public nuisance and other theories.350 
Second, climate change litigation is dominated by non-nation-state actors. 
Although some cases have been brought against the national level of government of 
different countries, and national-level courts have resolved some of the disputes, a wide 
range of other actors—from individuals to NGOs to subnational governments—have 
served as petitioners and respondents.351 This type of litigation thus fits the nonstatist 
model of transnational legal process. 
Third, as I described in depth in The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: 
Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance, this litigation is multiscalar, 
multibranch, and multiactor.352 Cases and their legal/policy interactions, exemplified in 
                                                
349 See, e.g., Osofsky, supra note 36 (analyzing these dynamics in depth through a review of climate 
change litigation at different levels of government). 
 
350 See id. 
 
351 See id. Scholars have discussed the role of a wide range of actors in many different international legal 
contexts. See sources supra Chapter II. For a thoughtful analysis of international organizations, see, for 
example, JOSÉ  E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2006). 
 
352 See Osofsky, supra note 36. 
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the three disputes discussed in this part, move up and down levels of governance and 
form part of dynamic regulatory interactions. 353  In so doing, these suits create 
transnational litigative spaces in which “interaction, interpretation, and internalization” 
take place.354 
Finally, climate change litigation is often explicitly normative in its goals and 
impacts. At the informal end of the spectrum, Sheila Watt-Cloutier, then Chair of the 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, acknowledged the likely limited formal impact of the 
petition that the Inuit filed against the United States in the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, but framed the case as a valuable opening of dialogue about human 
rights and climate change with the United States.355 At the formal end, arguably the most 
successful case to date, Massachusetts v. EPA, which resulted in a Supreme Court 
decision against the EPA for its handling of motor vehicle emissions regulations, played a 
significant role in the heightened U.S. policy dialogue and put pressure on the Bush 
administration well beyond the case’s rather limited regulatory impact.356  
Moreover, collectively this litigation serves as a conversation that moves from the 
local to the international, and from branch to branch of government, while including a 
wide range of public and private actors.357 These interactions allow for a process in which 
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354 Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture, supra note 18, at 339; Osofsky, supra note 36, at 1852. 
 
355 See Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Presentation at the Eleventh 
Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Dec. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=318&Lang=En. I have analyzed the implications of this 
framing in Osofsky, supra note 37, at 209–24 and Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond 
Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007). 
 
356 One’s theoretical perspective likely impacts how one might frame that impact, however. See Osofsky, 
supra note 14, at 577. 
 
357 Osofsky, supra note 36. 
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norms emerge, and then are translated and internalized, creating pressure on nation-
states—and other key actors—to take steps on climate change.  
The George W. Bush Administration, for example, evolved somewhat in its 
willingness to engage the problem more seriously over its final couple of years, a period 
that intersected with a higher profile for this type of litigation. Although President Bush 
and his administration avoided taking binding steps, such as in the decision by the EPA 
under his administration to respond to Massachusetts v. EPA months later by requesting 
public comment,358 the tone shifted. President Bush acknowledged the problem in his 
State of the Union address for the first time in 2008359 and his administration agreed to 
the December 2007 Bali Action Plan, albeit only after massive public pressure,360 and to 
the 2008 G-8 Declaration on Environment and Climate Change.361 While the litigation 
only constitutes and is constituted by some portion of the shifting political and cultural 
dynamics on the issue, it has served and continues to serve as an important component of 
norm building and dialogue.  
 
b. Rescaling Through Norm Internalization 
The focus of this part, however, is not on climate change litigation in general, but 
rather on the rescaling processes that take place through it. A transnational legal process 
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359 George W. Bush, U.S. President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2008), available at 
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analysis provides insight into rescaling by breaking down the interpretation, 
internalization, and enforcement of norms. In so doing, it highlights the elements of the 
dynamic processes involved in these battles over and determinations regarding regulatory 
scale. 
In the three case studies discussed at length in this part, the key actors interpret 
both the problem itself and the appropriate regulatory scale accompanying it. For instance, 
those opposed to regulation in Massachusetts v. EPA consistently argued for the large 
scale of the problem, while those supporting regulation emphasized its state and local 
dimensions.362 In the second example, the smaller-scale actor, California, provided 
extensive discussion of why climate change impacts the individual state and the 
difference its proposed regulatory action would make. 363  San Bernardino County 
explained that while it does not contest the scientific basis for climate change, too much 
uncertainty exists about the effects on local, state, or federally protected species to take 
regulatory action.364 These claims, as well as many others detailed in the preceding 
chapters and viewed through the lens of the scholarship of Sayre and Doremus, provide 
an assessment of climate science and climate change as a regulatory problem that 
grounds the contested scalar analysis.365  
This interpretive behavior provides the basis for and reinforces internalization. 
For instance, the arguments of states advocating greater regulation are consistent across 
multiple lawsuits, congressional action by their representatives, and internal 
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policymaking.366 As the states reinforced one another and maintained the pressure, the 
Bush administration increasingly was pushed to take action to defend its scalar argument. 
In his denial of the state waiver, for example, Administrator Johnson even acknowledged 
new federal standards emerging from this interaction.367   
Through the process of interpretation and internalization, a new multiscalar 
enforcement pattern emerges that differs from the one that preceded the litigation. At 
times, that result is relatively straightforward. Under the watchful eye of a California 
state court, San Bernardino County has been developing a more specific greenhouse gas 
emissions monitoring and reduction plan, and the California executive is assisting the 
County in that process.368 Often, however, such enforcement occurs through a mix of 
formal and informal channels. The state waiver dispute has not simply involved the EPA 
under two presidents and the state of California, but many actors in all three branches of 
the federal government and multiple states as well.  The waiver denial received 
significant media attention, including coverage of the 2008 presidential campaign as 
now-President Obama pledged to reverse the decision.369 
Transnational legal process, and its narrative of these rescaling dynamics, is 
necessarily messy. Because this approach attempts to capture a nuanced regulatory dance, 
it dissects and interprets pieces and the whole simultaneously. This ambitious conceptual 
work provides transnational legal process with its analytical power and its challenge. 
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3. A Geographic Network Narrative of Rescaling Through Climate Change Litigation 
The geography literature on scale provides a complementary narrative for 
understanding the dynamics and regulatory impact of this litigation. In order to achieve 
more depth of analysis, this section focuses in particular on the work of geographer 
Kevin Cox and his network conception of scale. Like the preceding section, this one 
begins by using his conceptual approach to frame climate change litigation in general and 
then focuses in particular on the rescaling aspects of the litigation discussed above. This 
section argues that Cox’s approach to scale provides a mechanism for understanding the 
dynamics at a particular level of governance and interaction among levels of governance, 
both of which are critical to unpacking courtroom battles over appropriate regulatory 
levels. Through this dual focus, the section provides a helpful supplement to the 
transnational legal process analysis of the litigation’s scalar dimensions. 
Moreover, like transnational legal process, Cox’s analysis fits well within 
multiple legal and interdisciplinary literatures discussed in Chapter II by unpacking the 
sociolegal spaces of scalar struggles. His approach helps to illuminate the nuanced 
dynamics that both scholarly approaches analyze by adding further geographic 
dimensions to their accounts.370 Cox’s analysis also complements other interdisciplinary 
network theory scholarship, such as the literature drawing from transgovernmental 
network theory.371 This chapter focuses on Cox’s work in particular, however, because of 
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371 See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 18–23 (2004) (proposing a model of 
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its geographic dimensions; his integration of concepts of sociolegal space and scale 
provide insights into the dynamics that pervade climate change litigation.  
 
a. Geographic Network and Climate Change Litigation 
Cox’s conception of scale provides a helpful lens through which to view climate 
change litigation because of its unpacking of intra- and inter-level spatial networks. His 
article, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: 
Looking for Local Politics, envisions core local functions interacting across multiscalar 
networks by introducing what he terms “spaces of dependence” and “spaces of 
engagement.”372  
As noted in Chapter II, Cox views “[s]paces of dependence [as] defined by those 
more-or-less localized social relations upon which we depend for the realization of 
essential interests and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere; they define place-
specific conditions for our material well being and sense of significance.”373 In the 
context of climate change litigation, such spaces include the way in which we structure 
our personal and professional lives on a day-to-day basis. For example, how far do 
members of our household drive to work, child care, the grocery store, and entertainment? 
How does the regulatory structure where we live impact those choices?374 
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Spaces of engagement, on the other hand, are “the space[s] in which the politics 
of securing a space of dependence unfolds.”375 In the context of climate change litigation 
in particular, these multiscalar spaces might include political institutions, courts, the 
popular press, and community gatherings. Most critically for understanding the complex 
scales and rescaling role of litigation, Cox describes how spaces of dependence and 
engagement interact: “People, firms, state agencies, etc., organize in order to secure the 
conditions for the continued existence of their spaces of dependence but in so doing they 
have to engage with other centers of social power: local government, the national press, 
perhaps the international press, for example.”376  The three disputes described in the 
previous chapters are replete with these sorts of interactions. 
In those disputes, a range of actors use the court system together with political 
institutions and public pressure to attempt to establish the extent of regulation which they 
deem appropriate at a particular level of governance. In the first, the diverse actors on 
both sides of the lawsuit reinforced the range of governmental and nongovernmental 
interests in federal greenhouse gas regulation.377  In the second, the EPA used regulation 
by another federal agency to justify its waiver denial, while California mustered support 
from other states, Congress, and even presidential candidates.378  In the third example, 
California and San Bernardino County—in a case that interacts with one filed by 
NGOs—both relied upon scientific evidence and multiscalar regulatory structures to 
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dispute whether state environmental law necessitates local climate regulation. 379  
Although the regulation at issue in each case resides at a particular level of governance—
county and state, respectively—the dynamics surrounding that decision involve 
multiscalar politics that play out through a messy array of interacting spaces of 
dependence and engagement. 
 
b. Rescaling Through Networks 
 Cox’s conception is not simply one of dynamically interacting spaces, however. 
Rather, he argues that the relationship among spaces of dependence and spaces of 
engagement can be best understood by viewing the spatial structure of scale as one 
comprised of networks. These multiscalar interactions do not just provide arenas for 
contestation, but frame networks through which battles over appropriate regulatory 
approaches take place.380  
In the context of climate change litigation, Cox’s argument suggests that we 
should treat these disputes as occurring across intricate formal and informal networks, 
instead of simply characterizing each individual dispute as a debate among actors from 
multiple levels over what should take place at a particular regulatory level. In other words, 
these cases are not simply about the appropriateness of more specific climate regulation 
in San Bernardino County or of California’s or the EPA’s approaches to motor vehicle 
emissions, but constitute one movement in a dance among deeply intertwined actors who 
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together shape the contours of climate regulation. The rescaling process taking place in 
climate change litigation transforms and is transformed by these dynamic interactions. 
 A key element in this narrative of climate change litigation is the interaction 
between space and scale,381 both deeply contested concepts in the geography literature.382 
Cox’s network approach to scale becomes a conceptual mechanism for bringing together 
the sociolegal spaces created through intra- and interscalar interactions in these cases. 
Space shapes scale and scale shapes space simultaneously, thereby reconstituting the 
network in which these interactions take place. Or, in plainer language, the dynamics 
among interested actors at multiple levels in the disputes shape spaces that help to 
determine emissions choices at multiple scales. What car one drives and how far one 
drives it interacts with these lawsuits because the litigation helps to shape what 
regulations at which levels of government are in place and our political and cultural 
conceptions of such regulations. At the same time, the existing framework of spaces that 
these actors inhabit shape the scalar presumptions and resolution of these kinds of 
disputes.  
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 A geographic network approach to conceptualizing the scalar dynamics of this 
litigation adds to the transnational legal process story by teasing out the dynamics of 
space and scale more clearly. It illuminates the scalar-spatial networks through which the 
process of interpretation, internalization, and enforcement takes place. The next section 
builds upon these two accounts by considering a diagonal regulatory narrative that draws 
from both of them. 
 
4. A Combined Diagonal Regulatory Narrative 
Scholars are increasingly turning to the term “diagonal” to describe phenomena 
that cut across traditional regulatory orderings in one way or another.383 This chapter uses 
the term in the context of multiscalar governance to refer to a particular type of 
regulatory interactions that cut across both horizontal (same level) and vertical (multiple 
levels) orderings simultaneously. For example, when several U.S. states collaborate with 
the European Union on a climate initiative, that constitutes a diagonal effort. A coalition 
of cities working on climate change is simply horizontal, however, and an EPA mandate 
to a state or local government is merely vertical.  This usage parallels the one introduced 
by Daniel Farber, and expanded upon by Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin, and Joseph Frueh, 
of “diagonal federalism” in the context of climate change regulation.384 Their engagement 
of simultaneous vertical and horizontal interactions provides helpful insight into the 
realities of and future possibilities for climate regulation. I prefer the term “diagonal 
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regulation” to “diagonal federalism” for my purposes in this chapter, however, because it 
encompasses a broader range of actors and levels of government more readily. 
This section focuses on the diagonal elements of climate change litigation and the 
implications of those elements for transnational regulatory governance of the problem. It 
introduces diagonal analysis as an intertwining of transnational legal process and 
geographic network-based conceptions of scale and considers the value of such an 
approach in the context of scalar contestation over climate regulation. 
 
a. Climate Change Litigation as Diagonal Dialogue 
The diagonal regulatory analysis in this chapter interweaves the dissection of the 
norm internalization process in transnational legal process with the exposition of 
multiscalar dynamics in Cox’s conception of scale as networks. A combination of these 
approaches shows that as each regulatory level decides how to approach climate change, 
it simultaneously confronts forces unique to that level and engages with horizontal and 
vertical networks. Interpretation, internalization, and enforcement take place through 
these multiscalar spaces interacting and being reconstituted. 
The combined diagonal approach could be interpolated from either of the theories 
individually. Transnational legal process is already a multiscalar analysis,385 and Cox’s 
conception of scale recognizes ongoing dynamic interactions. 386  Putting these two 
approaches together, however, ensures that the subtleties of each theory—unpacking of 
process and of space/scale—are fully addressed in the analysis. This integrated approach 
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engages both the norm internalization process and spaces of dependence and engagement 
by focusing on movement across vertical and horizontal axes and the resulting impact on 
regulatory spaces. In so doing, it shares commonalities with other interdisciplinary 
approaches using network theory. But as noted above, it focuses on integrating Cox’s 
approach, in particular, due to his delineation of scale and spatiality.387  
Moreover, although what I term a “diagonal” regulatory approach draws from 
transnational legal process and Cox’s version of geographic conceptions of scale, it also 
could be categorized within the new governance, regulatory institutions, global legal 
pluralism, polycentric governance, dynamic federalism, and other polycentric analyses 
highlighted in Chapter II. Diagonal regulatory thinking shares in common with these 
conceptual streams an emphasis on complex, multiactor interactions that take place in a 
variety of formulations.388 Its contribution to these analyses is its merged unpacking of 
process, space, and scale and the questions that such an approach raises about how 
multiscalar regulatory strategies can function most effectively. In so doing, a diagonal 
approach helps to capture the fluidity and complexity that effective climate change 
regulation requires. 
Climate change litigation provides a good starting place for exploring diagonal 
regulation because it generally involves activity across both horizontal and vertical 
dimensions.389 This section builds upon that analysis by focusing more specifically on the 
rescaling taking place in these interactions and its implications for how we situate this 
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litigation in transnational regulatory governance of climate change. These suits operate 
within the sticky frameworks of law and litigation as they interact with an intricate web 
of spatio-temporal spaces and relationships. The diagonal dynamics are often 
simultaneously bottom-up and top-down as they shift the scale and structure of regulatory 
spaces. 
For example, San Bernardino County’s development of its General Plan, a core 
local function that it can do better than any other decision maker, becomes integrated 
with transnational spaces engaging the problem of climate change through the People v. 
San Bernardino County lawsuit. More specifically, California’s and several NGOs’ use 
of state law and courts to force the County to engage climate change more deeply in local 
regulation situates the suit within politico-legal debates over the appropriate role of 
localities in “international” climate governance, as well as the role of California localities 
in the overall state strategy to address emissions.390  
As a formal matter, the litigation serves as a mechanism for greater vertical 
integration, but does so by involving multiple branches of government, the horizontal 
piece. Beyond the limited formal boundaries of this lawsuit, a wide range of 
nongovernmental and governmental actors, such as Attorney General Brown’s speech to 
California counties and the concerned NGOs that also sued, interact with and reconstitute 
existing social and legal regulatory spaces at multiple and overlapping levels of 
government. The dispute thus functions as a multifaceted diagonal conversation and helps 
to reinforce the crucial—but controversial—role that states and localities play in climate 
regulation. 
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Similarly, the state waiver dispute, at its core, presents the executive branches of 
multiple states—most prominently, California—fighting the EPA over the ability to 
implement state-level legislation. In addition, the other two branches of the federal 
government become involved in the dispute after the waiver denial.391 The case, as a 
formal matter, is thus vertical through the interaction between the state and federal levels 
of government and horizontal in its multibranch dimensions at each level, as well as 
through the multiple states involved. 
Like with the San Bernardino County settlement, the formal diagonal quality of 
the California-EPA dispute over regulatory scale connects it into national debates over 
the international role that the United States does and should play in addressing climate 
change. Throughout the process of interpretation, internalization, and enforcement in the 
dynamics surrounding the waiver dispute, spaces for regulatory behavior at both state and 
federal levels impact and are impacted by the conflict. These spaces, in turn, interact with 
those at larger and smaller levels of government through the involvement of numerous 
governmental and nongovernmental actors.   
As these scalar contests play out in the judicial branch, the vertical, horizontal, 
and diagonal pressure they create may influence policy dialogues at international and 
local levels—as well as those at every level in between—and encourage greater diagonal 
integration. For example, as noted previously, San Bernardino County likely would not 
have agreed to these steps without these petitions, and California continues to push all of 
its counties aggressively to regulate their greenhouse gas emissions.392 This impact opens 
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up broader questions about the scale of regulation and diagonal interactions outside of the 
litigation context. The next section begins an exploration of these issues in order to frame 
Part III’s analysis of the value and limits of diagonal regulatory approaches in the context 
of U.S. “federal” climate change regulation.  
 
b. Broader Regulatory Implications 
A basic normative perspective on climate change underlies this chapter’s analysis 
and assessment of what is appropriate and effective. Namely, as discussed in depth in 
Chapter III, climate change presents a serious multiscalar regulatory problem that current 
approaches are failing to get under control.393 Based on this assessment, the chapter seeks 
regulatory approaches that will address the problem more effectively and raises concerns 
about “too big” arguments preventing or limiting needed efforts at multiple scales. 
Because litigation, as a formal matter, generally involves diagonal forces and impacts, it 
serves as a tool for norm internalization, either in the direction of more or less multiscalar 
regulation. 
However, litigation is not the only type of diagonal mechanism available. 
Regulatory arrangements—whether cooperative or conflictual—can have simultaneous 
horizontal and vertical elements without the involvement of courts. But comparatively 
few of the current U.S. regulatory approaches formally have this diagonal quality. Many 
instances exist of horizontal cooperation in which states or cities, sometimes even across 
international borders, form a coalition. Some of these initiatives have a vertical 
dimension in the sense that they create a larger-scale entity; for example, California is 
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collaborating with six other U.S. states and three Canadian provinces on a Western 
Climate Initiative.394 Even with this somewhat diagonal quality, though, their primary 
character is horizontal because the main dynamics are among entities at the same 
regulatory level. 
Similarly, a wide array of predominantly vertical efforts exist, some of which take 
the form of traditional top-down efforts to foster smaller-scale activity. For example, 
towards the end of President Bill Clinton’s administration, the EPA offered states funding 
to develop climate regulation plans.395 This instance has horizontal dimensions, in that 
the EPA made the offer to multiple states, but it is predominantly vertical. Here, the states 
are not behaving as a coalition, but rather are being individually incentivized by the EPA; 
the top-down quality of the action reduces the horizontal dimension.  
Vertical efforts can also be bottom-up, such as when a state requests federal 
action or a city requests state action. The California waiver case, if it did not have the 
horizontal elements of multiple states and branches, exemplifies this variation.396 The key 
question regarding whether an effort is vertical is not the direction of vertical movement, 
then, but its dominance. As with the primarily horizontal efforts, vertical ones show little 
simultaneous activity across the other axis. The efforts are multiscalar but without strong 
activity across individual levels. 
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The transnational legal process and geographic network conception of scale 
approaches, from which the chapter’s diagonal model draws, both suggest that informal 
diagonals likely arise regardless of whether or not they are formally structured.397 As a 
range of actors interact with and restructure sociolegal spaces across scales, this process 
moves across horizontals and verticals in multiple directions. Because many entities that 
are not formally part of structured initiatives interact with these actors, even efforts that 
are neither horizontal nor vertical in their formal conception often interact across both 
axes. For example, as noted by Administrator Johnson, California’s efforts on climate 
change, even when completely under state authority, influence the behavior of other 
states and the federal government.398 A snapshot of current efforts, even with their 
limited formal diagonal quality, thus would show an ever-evolving array of vertical, 
horizontal, and diagonal interactions.399   
The relative paucity of formal diagonal approaches with full integration across 
both axes—as compared to initiatives that are neither horizontal nor vertical or to ones 
that are predominantly one or the other—raises many difficult questions. Why is climate 
regulation not more cross-cutting? Should it be? When are diagonal approaches more 
effective than other approaches? How should diagonal strategies be structured to avoid 
unnecessary complications? The nature of the regulatory dilemmas that climate change 
                                                
397 See supra Sections 2 & 3. 
 
398 See Waiver Denial, supra note 28. 
 
399 Many scholars have grappled with how to characterize these messy arrays and explore their regulatory 
implications. For example, Tony Arnold analyzes “patch dynamics” in the context of land use regulation. 
Arnold, supra note 22, at 490. Ruhl and Salzman favor adaptive management models that build out of 
concepts of panarchy. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 281. This Article acknowledges the fluidity and 
complexity highlighted by Arnold, Ruhl, and Salzman while attempting to contribute through its focus on 
exploration of diagonal regulatory approaches. 
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poses—its multiscalar character and the ways in which it cuts across traditional 
categories—suggest that diagonal structures may be desirable. But the details of 
implementation, grounded in these conceptual questions, are critical, especially as the 
Obama Administration develops a more extensive federal regulatory approach. 
These issues are particularly hard to resolve because of the transnational character 
of climate change. In arguing for the value of smaller-scale regulatory initiatives, this 
chapter fully acknowledges that climate change is also “international.” This part’s case 
studies raise core questions about how to locate smaller-scale efforts among the dominant, 
top-down treaty-based approaches. Former San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, despite 
his leadership on the issue, did not merit official status in international negotiations.400 
Should that change, or can mayors and their cities be represented adequately by the 
United States? More broadly, how can a nation-state-based dialogue effectively 
incorporate smaller-scale efforts in crafting a regulatory framework, especially when 
these smaller-scale efforts include the little suburban cities that are the focus of the next 
part? 
The diagonal regulatory role of litigation is messy, as exemplified in this part’s 
case examples, especially when its informal aspects are taken into account.  An in-depth 
exploration of the direct and indirect regulatory impacts of litigation beyond its scalar 
role is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the subject of an additional research 
project. 401  The complexity of the dynamics in litigation reflects the underlying 
                                                
400 Then-Mayor Newsom discussed this problem in answering a question I posed about diagonal regulatory 
initiatives. Gavin Newsom, Mayor of San Francisco, Remarks following his Keynote Address at the 
University of California Hastings College of the Law Conference: Surviving Climate Change: Adaptation 
and Innovation (Apr. 4, 2008) (notes on file with author). 
 
401 Jacqueline Peel and I are pursuing an extensive comparative study of the direct and indirect impacts of 
U.S. and Australian climate change litigation, which builds upon the work of this dissertation.  JACQUELINE 
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complexity of the governance problem posed by climate change, as it interacts with so 
much of our social and legal structure at multiple levels. Moreover, because climate 
change is not alone in the multiscalar regulatory dilemmas it poses, further 
conceptualization of these dynamics might help us grapple with a wide array of vexing 
policy problems. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This part focuses on issues of regulatory scale and, in the process, highlights 
current battlegrounds and their implications. It argues for the importance of exploring 
diagonal approaches in strategies for addressing emissions, impacts, and adaptation. As 
important as this engagement of scale is, however, climate change does not simply 
implicate multiple levels and branches of governance. It also cuts across the ways in 
which we box law and, more broadly, academic disciplines. 
This cross-cutting quality provides an additional regulatory challenge, because 
lawyers and judges often tend to be uncomfortable with more holistic, interdisciplinary 
thinking, especially when it involves technical information or scientific data.  In Chapter 
IV, I highlighted this discomfort in some of the interchanges during the Supreme Court 
oral argument in Massachusetts v. EPA. 402  For instance, Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
comment—likely in jest—that he does not want to deal with the problem because he is 
                                                                                                                                            
PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, TRANSITION TO A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE: THE ROLE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
LITIGATION IN SHAPING OUR REGULATORY PATH (forthcoming 2014, Cambridge University Press) 
(supported by $250,000 grant from Australian Research Council). 
 
402 See supra Chapter IV. 
 
 159 
not a scientist merely exemplifies a dominant undercurrent. 403  Similar themes of 
scientific uncertainty emerge in cases examined in this part, as well as throughout climate 
litigation.404 
Any effort to take formal diagonal regulation seriously in this context must deal 
with the complex interaction of scale, science, and law that the work of Sayre and 
Doremus helps to elucidate. The problem of greater uncertainty at smaller spatial and 
temporal scales405 will continue to play a dominant role in conversations about what type 
of regulation is appropriate at smaller regulatory levels. As the legal community 
increasingly engages emissions and their impacts, my hope is that we can move past the 
“too big” arguments and unhelpful dichotomies and recognize climate change as a 
multiscalar problem that needs multiscalar regulatory approaches. Although both the 
problem and its regulatory implications pose overwhelming conceptual and practical 
difficulties, we need to approach these issues creatively and explore how we can structure 
law and policy across scales most effectively. Thinking diagonally should form a part of 
that ongoing conversation.  The next two case studies explore how regulatory efforts 
could do so more effectively at federal and local scales in the United States. 
 
                                                
403 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 
WL 3431932; Chapter IV supra. 
 
404 See supra Chapter IV–VI. These problems of scale and science emerge in a wide range of environmental 
regulatory problems. See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, Clean-Water Land Use: Connecting Scale and 
Function, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 291 (2006) (providing an interesting analysis of these issues in a 
watershed context). 
 
405 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
COMPLEXITIES OF OBAMA ADMINISTRATION CLIMATE CHANGE 
POLICY 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and 
Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALABAMA L. REV. 237 
(2011). 
 
But for the sake of our children and our future, we must do more 
to combat climate change. Now, it’s true that no single event makes a 
trend. But the fact is the 12 hottest years on record have all come in the 
last 15. Heat waves, droughts, wildfires, floods -- all are now more 
frequent and more intense. We can choose to believe that Superstorm 
Sandy, and the most severe drought in decades, and the worst wildfires 
some states have ever seen were all just a freak coincidence. Or we can 
choose to believe in the overwhelming judgment of science -- and act 
before it’s too late. 
Now, the good news is we can make meaningful progress on this 
issue while driving strong economic growth. I urge this Congress to get 
together, pursue a bipartisan, market-based solution to climate change, 
like the one John McCain and Joe Lieberman worked on together a few 
years ago. But if Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations, I 
will. I will direct my Cabinet to come up with executive actions we can 
take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution, prepare our communities 
for the consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more 
sustainable sources of energy.406 
 
This excerpt from President Obama’s 2013 State of the Union Address highlights 
both his commitment to progress on climate change and the complexity of his 
administration achieving its goals.  In its second term, the Obama Administration 
continues to face daunting obstacles to its efforts to address climate change. At an 
international level, as discussed in Chapters I and III, major uncertainty exists about 
whether a significant agreement including major emitters can emerge from the United 
                                                
406 White House, The 2013 State of the Union, Feb. 12, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-
union-2013.  
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process.407 Cap-and-
trade legislation was declared dead even before the 2010 mid-term elections, leaving the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during President Obama’s first term in the 
unenviable position of deciding how comprehensively to regulate greenhouse gases under 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) through its endangerment finding while its actions are 
challenged in both the courts and Congress.408 Even when climate change legislation 
looked more likely in the initial months of the Obama Administration, polls underscored 
a lack of public support to make major emissions reductions in the current economic 
climate.409 In the face of the dim prospects for achieving the reductions needed in time to 
prevent the worst predicted impacts, increasingly serious conversations regarding the use 
                                                
407 See Copenhagen Accord of Dec. 18, 2009, Decision -/CP.15, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2011); 
Guarav Singh, China, India, Brazil Commit to Make Copenhagen Accord Deadline, BLOOMBERG, (Jan. 24, 
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601090&sid=alXpNdEdnAV4; India, China Won’t 
Sign Copenhagen Accord, THE HINDU, (Jan., 23, 2010), available at 
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article93870.ece?homepage=true; Arthur Max, Obama Brokers 
Climate Deal, But Cannot Satisfy All, USA TODAY, (Dec. 19, 2009), 
http://www.usatoday.com/weather/climate/globalwarming/2009-12-18-climate-conference-friday_N.htm; 
Andrew C. Revkin & John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/earth/20accord.html?_r=1&emc=eta1; 
Cesare Romano & Elizabeth Burleson, The Cancún Climate Conference, 15 ASIL INSIGHT 1, Jan. 21, 2011. 
 
408 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the 
Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66495 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1); John M. Broder, 
Greenhouse Gases Imperil Health, EPA Announces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at A18, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/science/earth/08epa.html?_r=1&emc=eta1.  
  
409 See Gerald F. Seib, WSJ/NBC Poll: Divided on Warming Threat, Clear on Man’s Role, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 18, 2009, 7:59 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/capitaljournal/2009/12/18/wsjnbc-poll-divided-on-
warming-threat-clear-on-mans-role/tab/article/ (“A slight majority of Americans—54%—says global 
warming exists and some action should be taken. That compres [sic] with 41% who say that more needs to 
be learned before acting, or that worries are unwarranted. At the beginning of 2007, by contrast, 64% 
thought warming existed and warranted action, while 33% said more needed to be known before acting.”); 
Andrew C. Revkin, Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2009) 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/globalwarming/index.html?scp=1&sq=public%20polls%
20for%20emissions%20reductions&st=cse (“Passionate activists at both ends of the discourse are pushing 
ever harder for or against rapid action, while polls show the public locked durably in three camps—with 
roughly a fifth of American voters eager for action, a similar proportion aggressively rejecting projections 
of catastrophe and most people tuned out or confused.”); accord Ben Geman, Polls clash over public 
support for making emissions reductions, THE HILL (Dec. 23, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-
wire/677-e2-wire/73473-polls-clash-over-support-for-emissions-limits.  
 
 162 
of geoengineering to reverse climate change are taking place—conversations which raise 
major concerns about humanity’s ability to intervene in the global ecosystem without 
terrible unintended consequences.410 
Amid those much-publicized challenges, there lurks a structural issue that is 
arguably as fundamental to effective climate change policy as progress on the treaty 
regime or national-level legislation. Namely, the Obama Administration’s federal efforts 
to address climate change interact with decisions made at multiple jurisdictional levels by 
a wide variety of governmental and nongovernmental actors. As Chapter III and the first 
case study explore, emissions, impacts, and adaptation pose regulatory problems that 
intersect with every level of government, from the most local to the most global.411  To be 
most effective, federal policy should thoughtfully engage the complex scalar geography 
of this problem and regulatory efforts to address it. 
This part builds on the previous one by proposing that the Obama Administration 
can address this structural challenge better in its domestic climate change and clean 
energy initiatives if it takes the “diagonal” quality of its regulatory interactions into 
                                                
410 See, e.g., JASON J. BLACKSTOCK ET AL., NOVIM, CLIMATE ENGINEERING RESPONSES TO CLIMATE 
EMERGENCIES V (2009), available at http:// arxiv.org/ pdf/ 0907.5140; THE ROYAL SOCIETY, 
GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY (2009); BJØRNAR EGEDE-
NISSEN & HENRY DAVID VENEMA, DESPERATE TIMES, DESPERATE MEASURES: ADVANCING THE 
GEOENGINEERING DEBATE AT THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (2009); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE 
NATIONAL ACADEMIES, GEOLOGICAL AND GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (2006); Albert C. Lin, Geoengineering 
Governance, 8 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP Art. 2 (2009); David W. Schnare, Climate Change and the 
Uncomfortable Middle Ground: The Geoengineering and “No Regrets” Policy Alternative (2008), 
available at http://www.thomasjeffersoninst.org/pdf/articles/Schnare_speech.pdf; 2009 ESI/MITEI/CGCS 
Symposium: Engineering a Cooler Earth: Can We Do It? Should We Try?, 
http://web.mit.edu/esi/symposia/symposium-2009/symposium2009.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2011); 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Geoengineering: A Revolutionary Approach to 
Climate Change (June 3, 2008), http://www.aei.org/video/100925 (follow link for “Play Full Video”) (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 
411 See supra Chapter III. 
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account. Diagonal approaches, as introduced in Chapter VII, bring together the insights 
of geographer Kevin Cox with those of legal scholar Harold Koh by interwining a 
network approach to scale that recognizes each scale as built from a mix of multiscalar 
interactions with an understanding of the process of transnational norm development. 
These strategies incorporate key public and private actors at different levels of 
government (the vertical piece) and within each level of government (the horizontal piece) 
simultaneously in order to create needed crosscutting interactions.  
This part takes this conceptual approach forward in the context of U.S. federal-
level approaches by bringing Cox’s network-based conception of scale together with the 
legal diagonal federalism literature discussed in Chapter II; it interweaves conceptual 
approaches from geography and legal theory to propose a taxonomy for operationalizing 
diagonal regulation in a U.S. federal context and to suggest how it might be applied to the 
Obama Administration’s climate change policy. The part provides an in-depth 
examination of the Obama Administration’s approach to the reduction of motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions to analyze the nuances of current crosscutting initiatives and to 
provide a model for rethinking their appropriateness and effectiveness. It argues that the 
structural differences between strategies aimed at what cars we drive and those aimed at 
how we drive those cars, in addition to ongoing litigation, provide opportunities for 
further policy innovation. 
This part focuses on combining Cox’s conception of scale with legal approaches 
to federalism because within the United States, the federalist structure of the government 
provides for interaction across governmental levels. As a result, the challenge facing the 
Obama Administration is how to approach these international-federal-state-local 
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interactions in a fashion that leads to the most effective climate policy. Even a single 
climate change policy area—such as the example of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
from passenger cars on which the part focuses—contains complex interactions among 
governmental and nongovernmental entities. In the more traditional state-federal context, 
for instance, as discussed in Chapter V, conflicts have arisen over who should set tailpipe 
emissions standards, with auto companies pushing for a uniform national standard and 
some states, led by California, asserting their right under the CAA to exceed national 
standards. The Obama Administration attempted to resolve this conflict by granting 
California’s waiver request and by harmonizing state and federal standards so that they 
converge by 2012.412 However, the relevant governmental action on this issue ranges 
from local and even sublocal land use planning decisions413 to U.S. partnerships with 
                                                
412 For the U.S. EPA’s denial of California’s waiver request under the Bush administration, see Letter from 
Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Dec. 
19, 2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1514_epa-letter.pdf [hereinafter 
“Waiver Denial Letter”]. For California’s Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
following the denial, see Petition for Review of Decision of the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, California v. EPA, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 2008), available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1514_epapetition-1.pdf [hereinafter “Petition for Review”]. 
For the Obama Administration’s granting of the waiver request, see Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, EPA Grants California GHG Waiver (June 30, 2009), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/5e448236de5fb36985257
5e500568e1b!OpenDocument. For the Obama Administration’s fuel economy standards, see Notice of 
Upcoming Joint Rulemaking to Establish Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 
24,007 (May 22, 2009); see also President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Fuel Efficiency Standards 
in the Rose Garden (May 19, 2009), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the_ press_ office/Remarks-
by-the-President-on-national-fuel-efficiency-standards/.  
 
413 For an exploration of how local land-use planning impacts vehicular mass transit, see Antonio M. Bento 
et al., The Impact of Urban Spatial Structure on Travel Demand in the United States, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, WPS 3007 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/04/23/000094946_030404042628
57/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). For a report proposing a new model of 
transportation finance, which takes into account changing approaches to climate change, see NATIONAL 
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING COMMISSION, PAYING OUR WAY: A NEW 
FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSPORTATION FINANCE (Feb. 26, 2009), available at 
http://financecommission.dot.gov/Documents/NSTIF_Commission_Final_Report_Mar09FNL.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2011). For a discussion of the role that the sublocal and individual plays, see infra note 564 
and accompanying text. 
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individual countries and groups of countries on clean transportation.414 This part argues 
that understanding these diverse interactions through the lens of diagonal federalism—
that is, an approach to federalism that builds from Chapter VII’s interweaving of 
geographic network-based conceptions of scale and transnational legal process—provides 
insight into how they might be structured more effectively. 
This opening chapter of the part provides the context for the part’s conceptual 
approach by providing an assessment of the Obama Administration’s approach to climate 
change and energy law and policy thus far in light of its precommitments and ongoing 
partisan political battles. Chapter IX then builds upon this assessment by engaging the 
difficulty of crafting needed crosscutting policy approaches. That chapter draws from 
Cox’s and diagonal federalism scholarship to introduce a four-part taxonomy to assist 
scholars and policymakers with developing and assessing these approaches.  It then 
applies the taxonomy to the Obama Administration’s approach to the regulation of motor 
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions regulation, with an emphasis on the differences 
between policy approaches to what cars we drive and to how we drive them. These 
differences raise questions, which Chapter X addresses, about how the Obama 
Administration can be most effective in crafting future diagonal approaches to the 
reduction of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions. That chapter explores possibilities 
for the Obama Administration both to pair large-scale, vertical, top-down approaches 
with ones that have opposite tendencies along those dimensions and to use litigation to 
foster multidimensional interactions. The part concludes by considering the broader 
                                                
414 See, e.g., Int’l Council on Clean Transp., Athens Resolution (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http:// 
www.theicct.org/ pubs/ Athens_ resolution.pdf; Joint Statement by the United States and the Republic of 
China on Clean Energy, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 927 (Nov. 17, 2009). 
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implications of this taxonomy. It argues that the taxonomy can serve as a tool not only for 
practical policy analysis, but also for reconceptualizing scholarly approaches.  
 
1. The Obama Administration’s Climate Change Commitments 
Since his first campaign, President Obama articulated an ambitious agenda for 
climate change and energy issues, and his Administration has made substantial progress 
in realizing those commitments.415 However, as discussed in the sections that follow, the 
Obama Administration’s accomplishments are largely concentrated in the actions of 
multiple federal administrative agencies due to the obstacles it has faced with respect to 
both legislation and international negotiations. The major exceptions to this rule are the 
energy and green growth measures in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (ARRA), which have been a major component of the Obama Administration’s 
accomplishments on these issues to date.416 Moreover, although the Administration has 
worked closely with key states and localities in many instances, a number of its crucial 
policies take the form of a fairly traditional, top-down mandate or incentive structure. 
The Obama Administration’s core commitments with respect to climate change 
and energy have, from the start, focused on supporting a transformation to a greener 
economy grounded in formal legal measures. For example, President Obama’s State of 
the Union addresses have consistently touted clean energy initiatives as vehicles for 
innovation, economic growth, and job creation.417 His 2013 one was no exception, with 
                                                
415 See infra notes 35–36. 
 
416 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 134 (2009). 
 
417 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State 
of the Union (Jan. 27, 2010) in DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 55 at 5. [hereinafter 2010 State of the Union]; The 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address, United 
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extensive discussion of energy transition after his call for action on climate change.418  
Substantively, that transformation primarily focuses on changing motor vehicle 
technology and usage patterns, energy sources and efficiency, and the types of jobs which 
drive the economy. In moving towards its substantive goals through legal action, the 
Obama Administration’s work has included extensive agency action under the ARRA, 
CAA, and Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA); failed efforts to pass a 
cap-and-trade bill in Congress; and active participation and leadership in international 
climate negotiations that have yet to lead to adequate commitments.419  
The Obama Administration has made substantial progress on all of these 
objectives, although formal legal change outside of its control has been more elusive. 
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson’s January 12, 2010, memorandum on her first year 
reflected this progress and the Administration’s continuing commitment to these issues.  
It also foreshadowed ongoing challenges with which that agency continues to grapple. In 
including “[t]aking action on climate change” among her seven key themes to focus the 
EPA’s work, she stated: 
Last year saw historic progress in the fight against climate change, with a 
range of greenhouse gas reduction initiatives. We must continue this critical 
effort and ensure compliance with the law. We will continue to support the 
President and Congress in enacting clean energy and climate legislation. 
Using the Clean Air Act, we will finalize our mobile source rules and provide 
a framework for continued improvements in that sector. We will build on the 
success of ENERGY STAR to expand cost-saving energy conservation and 
efficiency programs. And we will continue to develop common-sense 
                                                                                                                                            
States Capitol, Washington, D.C., Jan. 25, 2011 [hereinafter 2011 State of the Union], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.  
 
418 White House, The 2013 State of the Union, Feb. 12, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-
union-2013. 
 
419 See Energy & Environment, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/energy-and-
environment (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
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solutions for reducing GHG emissions from large stationary sources like 
power plants. In all of this, we must also recognize that climate change will 
affect other parts of our core mission, such as protecting air and water quality, 
and we must include those considerations in our future plans.420 
 
Administrator Jackson’s six other key themes, many of which have significant overlap 
with the EPA’s efforts on climate change, included improving air quality; insuring the 
safety of chemicals; cleaning up our communities; protecting America’s waters; 
expanding the conversation on environmentalism and working for environmental justice; 
and building strong state and tribal partnerships.421 
This chapter builds from Administrator Jackson’s summary of her agency’s 
efforts to provide a more in-depth review of the primary elements of the Obama 
Administration’s efforts on its core climate change and energy commitments and their 
evolution over time. It does not attempt to list comprehensively every single 
administration initiative, but rather to give a sense of its major commitments, 
accomplishments, and challenges. Although the push for cap-and-trade legislation failed, 
the other aspects of the Obama Administration’s climate change policy that 
Administrator Jackson highlighted have continued to move forward.  
The remainder of this chapter explores these complexities.  It first situates the 
Obama Administration’s work amid efforts to address climate change that predate his 
administration. It then turns to the Obama Administration’s domestic commitments and 
efforts in substantive areas detailed above. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
                                                
420 See Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, EPA to all EPA Employees (Jan. 12, 2010), available 
at http://blog.epa.gov/administrator/2010/01/12/seven-priorities-for-epas-future/.  
 
421 See id. 
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legal progress and obstacles, including an assessment of its international and subnational 
efforts and the resulting challenges of the legal scale that the Obama Administration faces. 
 
2. Historical Context for the Obama Administration’s Climate Change and Energy 
Initiatives 
 
U.S. efforts at clean air regulation began in 1955 with the Air Pollution Control 
Act,422 which was the precursor to the CAA of 1963 and its subsequent variations.423 The 
CAA, together with the Energy Policy Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA)424 and other 
clean air legislation,425 has provided the statutory framework for agency action on many 
key greenhouse gas emissions issues, particularly transportation and energy. Although 
prior to the Massachusetts v. EPA case discussed in Chapter IV,426 greenhouse gases 
were not explicitly included in the regulations promulgated under these laws,427 many of 
these regulations impacted such emissions. For example, the corporate average fuel 
                                                
422 See Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006)). 
 
423 See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401–7671q (2006)). 
 
424 See Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, §§ 501–512, 89 Stat. 871, 901–16 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (2006)). 
 
425 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, §§ 201–09, 79 Stat. 
992, 992–96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590 (2006)); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. 
No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006)). 
 
426 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 
427 See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Denies Petition to Regulate Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Motor Vehicles (Aug. 28, 2003), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/fb36d84bf0a1390c8525701c005e4918/694c8f3b7c16ff6085256d
900065fdad!OpenDocument.  
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economy (CAFE) standards mandated fuel economy in vehicles and, as a result, 
influenced the extent of their emissions.428 
In addition to these air pollution control efforts relevant to climate change, the 
United States has had a statutory regime explicitly focused on climate change since 1978. 
That year, the National Climate Program Act mandated that the President establish a 
program to “assist the Nation and the world to understand and respond to natural and 
man-induced climate processes and their implications.”429 Pursuant to that law, President 
Carter commissioned a National Research Council report, which concluded that “[i]f 
carbon dioxide continues to increase, the study group finds no reason to doubt that 
climate changes will result and no reason to believe that these changes will be 
negligible. . . . A wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too late.”430 
In 1987, the Global Climate Protection Act attempted to translate this effort into 
“coordinated national policy” and U.S. leadership in international efforts to address 
climate change.431 However, the Act’s goals have yet to be achieved. Numerous bills to 
address climate change nationally, including the most recent cap-and-trade ones, have 
stalled in the U.S. Senate, and the country’s pre-Obama leadership on climate change was 
limited by both the Legislative and Executive branches at critical junctures.432 Although 
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432 The one relatively comprehensive climate change cap-and-trade bill to pass in the House, the American 
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the United States is party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and President Clinton’s Administration participated actively in the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution indicating its 
sense that the United States should not enter into the Kyoto Protocol because it did not 
apply to developing major emitters such as China and India.433 As a result, President 
Clinton did not submit the protocol to the Senate for ratification.434 
Under President George W. Bush’s leadership, the nation backtracked on the 
issue both domestically and internationally. His Administration repeatedly refused to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under existing environmental laws and prevented 
leader states from moving ahead with their own regulation of greenhouse gas motor 
vehicles emissions.435 The 2007 EISA, with its many provisions related to climate change, 
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such as stricter CAFE standards that will require automakers to bring fleet-wide gas 
mileage to thirty-five miles per gallon (mpg) by 2020, constitutes the most significant 
step taken under the Bush Administration to move federal climate change regulation 
forward. 436  Internationally, in 2002, President Bush announced the United States’ 
decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and made limited additional commitments on 
climate change.437 As detailed in the subsequent sections, the Obama Administration’s 
campaign pledges on climate change and energy and its steps thus far on this issue 
constitute an effort to reverse those policies and to move the United States towards 
comprehensive domestic action and international leadership. 
 
3. Motor Vehicles Design and Use 
President Obama’s commitments regarding motor vehicles consistently have 
focused on what cars we drive and the fuels that they use, as well as broader efforts at 
transportation policy and its impact on how we drive those cars. With respect to what cars 
we drive, he pledged in his first campaign to raise fuel economy standards by four 
percent each year and to double the current fuel economy standards within eighteen 
years.438 He planned to work with Congress to ensure that all new vehicles will have flex-
fuel capability by the end of his first term and to invest in advanced vehicle technology 
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436 See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, 1499 (2007). 
 
437 For President Bush’s announcement of the United States decision not to ratify Kyoto, see President 
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438 See Blueprint For Change, OBAMA FOR AMERICA, http:// www.barackobama.com/ pdf/ Obama 
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AMERICA, http://obama.3cdn.net/4465b108758abf7a42_a3jmvyfa5.pdf.  
 
 173 
that uses lightweight materials and new engines.439 He also proposed to increase the 
number of hybrids on the road to one million by 2015 and to require that future federal 
government vehicles be hybrids.440 To support this transition, he stated that he would 
provide $4 billion in retooling tax credits and loan guarantees for domestic automakers 
and that he would lift the cap of $60,000 per manufacturer on buyer tax credits for ultra-
efficient vehicles.441 With respect to fuels, President Obama said that he would require 
the development of sixty billion gallons of advanced biofuels by 2030 and establish a 
National Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) to help with the introduction of 
nonpetroleum fuels.442 Finally, he promised to revise the transportation funding process 
both to encourage states and localities to consider smart growth and energy conservation 
and to recommit federal resources to public mass transportation projects.443 
President Obama began to make good on those campaign promises in his first 
week in office with memoranda to federal agencies on fuel efficiency standards and on 
California’s request for a CAA waiver, which the U.S. EPA ultimately granted.444 The 
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U.S. EPA has since issued an endangerment finding and promulgated significant 
greenhouse gas motor vehicles regulation under that finding in response to the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA and its judicial resolution of the scalar battles 
described in Chapter IV.445 The Administration’s most significant accomplishment with 
respect to motor vehicles and climate change thus far is its National Program for 
emissions and fuel economy standards for new vehicles, under which the EPA and 
Department of Transportation promulgated a series joint rules on fuel economy and 
tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions that cover both light and heavy vehicles, with more 
stringent standards over time.446  
Under this plan, which emerged from the Administration’s efforts to forge a 
compromise between automakers447 and California,448 manufacturers over time will be 
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allowed “to build a single light-duty national fleet that would satisfy all requirements 
under both programs and would provide significant reductions in both greenhouse gas 
emissions and oil consumption.”449 The EPA regulations still focus on tailpipe emissions 
pursuant to the CAA, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
regulations take the form of CAFE standards under the EISA and EPCA. But they are 
coordinated for the first time out of an understanding that “[t]he close relationship 
between emissions of CO2—the most prevalent greenhouse gas emitted by motor 
vehicles—and fuel consumption, means that the technologies to control CO2 emissions 
and to improve fuel economy overlap to a great degree.”450 Both agencies will measure 
compliance based on fleet average performance calculated at the end of each model 
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year.451 The government will then issue credits to manufacturers which exceed the fleet 
average CO2 or CAFE standard and debits to those which fail to meet the standard.452 
Manufacturers will be able to use those credits to offset past or future debits, to transfer 
those credits among the vehicles in its fleet, or to trade/sell them to other companies.453  
The Obama Administration has built upon his initial May 2010 rulemaking with 
frequent new rulemaking efforts to address post-2017 model years of light vehicles and 
emissions from medium and heavy vehicles. For example, in September 2010, the EPA 
and NHTSA issued a Notice of Intent to begin establishing standards for fuel economy 
and greenhouse gas emissions for 2017–25 model year light vehicles, which it updated 
through a supplemental notice in December 2010. 454  In January 2011, the EPA 
announced, together with the U.S. Department of Transportation and California, further 
unification of national and California approaches through a single timeframe for 
proposing those 2017–25 standards.455 The two agencies complemented this progress on 
cars and light trucks with a final rule announced in October 2010 and corrected in 
December 2010 for medium and heavy duty vehicles. Its Heavy Duty National Program 
establishes fuel economy and greenhouse emissions standards that it claims have the 
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potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by nearly 250 million metric tons over the 
life of vehicles sold from 2014 to 2018.456  
The Obama Administration has supplemented this mandate program with a 
variety of financial incentives administered through multiple administrative agencies. 
Under the ARRA, he established the Clean Cities Alternative Fuel and Advanced 
Technology Vehicles Pilot Program, which invests $300 million dollars in state and local 
government efforts to expand their fleets of fuel-efficient vehicles.457 The Act also 
funded a $2 billion grant program to encourage individuals to build batteries for plug-in 
hybrids,458 and $187 million (with an additional private cost share of 50%) towards nine 
projects aimed at improving fuel efficiency in heavy duty trucks and passenger vehicles 
which estimate that they will create over 500 jobs initially and over 6,000 jobs by 
2015.459 In addition, the DOE is providing up to $5.5 million in ARRA funding to 
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support the X PRIZE Foundation’s competition in which teams design energy efficiency 
vehicles.460  
The Obama Administration plans to continue to build on these investments and 
move towards its goal of having one million electric vehicles on the road by 2015. On 
January 26, 2011, the day after President Obama’s recommitment to his clean energy 
goals in the State of the Union address, Vice President Biden announced a new, three-part 
technology vehicle plan that will include support for U.S. electric vehicle manufacturing 
and adoption. The plan includes replacing the existing tax credit with a point-of-sale 
consumer rebate, more investments in research and development, and a competitive grant 
program to encourage communities to establish the infrastructure needed to support 
electric vehicles.461 With respect to fuels, the EPA issued regulations that strengthened 
the renewable fuel standard originally enacted in 2007. These regulations increase the 
volume of renewable fuels required to be blended into the nation’s gas supply, include 
diesel fuels, and establish greenhouse gas thresholds for renewable fuel sources to be 
included.462 President Obama also established a Biofuels Interagency Working Group to 
develop and implement new biofuels technologies 463 and set aside $786 million in 
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Recovery funds for biofuels research and development.464  The Administration has 
begun dispersing those funds, such as to two biofuels consortia in January 2010 to 
support their work on algae-based and other advanced biofuels.465  
Regarding transportation policy more broadly, the Obama Administration 
awarded $8.78 billion in ARRA funds to transit improvements.466 It provided $100 
million of those funds to forty-three subnational transit agencies to support use of cutting-
edge environmental technologies.467 The projects funded include Alabama’s replacement 
of gasoline and diesel buses with electric hybrids, Massachusetts’ construction of wind 
energy turbines, and Vancouver, Washington’s installation of solar panels at transit 
facilities.468 The Administration committed another $8 billion in funds under ARRA and 
an additional $1 billion per year for five years to create high-speed rail lines 
interconnecting U.S. cities. 469  To ensure that this rail project results in jobs, the 
Administration obtained commitments from more than thirty domestic and foreign rail 
manufacturers and suppliers that they will establish or expand operations in the United 
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States if they are chosen by states or groups to construct these rail lines.470 The 
Administration also established a Livability Initiative, which is administered jointly by 
the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), and the EPA.471 In its first round of financial incentives under this 
initiative in December 2009, the Administration announced the availability of $280 
million to support urban circulator projects such as buses, bus facilities, and streetcars.472 
 
4. Energy Production and Consumption 
President Obama’s work with respect to energy production and consumption have 
focused since the start on a two-pronged strategy: (1) improvements in efficiency and 
infrastructure coupled with (2) development of cleaner energy technologies. Regarding 
his first goal, he pledged during his first campaign to reduce electricity demand 15% by 
2020 through improving the efficiency of new buildings by 50% and of existing buildings 
by 25% (with even more ambitious targets for federal buildings).473 He stated a longer-
term goal of all new buildings being carbon neutral by 2030.474 To help states and 
localities achieve greater building efficiency, he proposed establishing a competitive 
grant and federal match program to create incentives for building codes with greater 
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efficiency requirements and increasing federal funds to support the weatherization of at 
least one million low-income households per year. In addition to these building 
improvements, President Obama also committed to overhauling appliance efficiency 
standards.475  
With respect to infrastructure, President Obama promised to pursue a 
transformation of the national utility grid in partnership with states and utilities “to enable 
a tremendous increase in renewable generation and accommodate 21st century energy 
requirements, such as reliability, smart metering and distributed storage,” with a 
particular focus on “the most vulnerable and congested urban and rural areas where 
significant renewable energy sources are located.”476 He proposed to accomplish this in 
part by flipping the incentives for utilities from increasing total energy consumption to 
improving energy efficiency. In addition, he announced plans to establish a Grid 
Modernization Commission to facilitate adoption of Smart Grid practices across the 
country, supported through a DOE Smart Grid Investment Matching Grant Program that 
would reimburse one‐fourth of qualifying Smart Grid investments, conduct deployment 
programs, and create demonstration projects.477  
The Obama Administration has made significant progress on these efficiency 
goals. The ARRA provided $5 billion for low-income weatherization programs 
(including $1,500 tax breaks), $4.5 billion to green federal buildings, and $6.3 billion for 
state and local renewable energy and energy efficiency efforts, which included the $3.2 
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billion Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG) Program.478 The 
Department of Energy announced in January 2011 that states were at the half-way point 
of meeting the Obama Administration’s goals for weatherizing low-income homes, with 
over 300,000 of these homes weatherized thus far. These households are reducing their 
energy consumption by 35% and saving $400/year on their heading bills. The Obama 
Administration claimed that the weatherization of 300,000 homes will save $161 million 
in energy costs during the first year. The Act also included an $11 billion investment to 
update the energy grid.479  
On the administrative front, the DOE has issued final rules to increase efficiency 
standards for more than twenty household and commercial products, including kitchen 
and laundry appliances, water heaters, and light bulbs, and has proposed rules on 
residential refrigerators and freezers.480 The Government Services Administration (GSA) 
has also established the GreenGov Supply Chain Partnership, in which participating 
suppliers pledge to report greenhouse gas emissions with the goal of reducing waste and 
pollution in the federal supply chain.481 
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With respect to the second goal of developing cleaner technologies, President 
Obama pledged during his first campaign to invest $150 billion over ten years to support 
advanced energy technologies and to double federal science and research funding for 
clean energy projects.482 He also proposed the establishment of a Clean Technologies 
Venture Capital Fund that would partner with existing investment funds and the National 
Laboratories to help move promising technologies from the lab to commercial production. 
In addition, his plan included establishing a federal grant program that would allocate $1 
billion in federal money per year to the states to support local manufacturers’ efforts to 
modernize and produce new advanced clean technology.483  
President Obama’s campaign commitments in this area emphasized renewable 
energy in particular. He committed to establishing a renewable portfolio standard that 
would require 10% of U.S. electricity consumption to be derived from renewable 
sources—such as solar, wind, and geothermal—by 2012, increasing to 25% by 2025, 
which he planned to achieve in part by extending the federal Production Tax Credit for 
five years.484 He also pledged that at least 30% of the federal government’s electricity 
will come from renewable sources by 2020.485 In addition, he committed to incentivizing 
private sector investment in zero-carbon coal facilities through proposed DOE public-
                                                
482 Some of this investment focuses on motor vehicles and fuels, but it also includes a significant focus on 
energy production and consumption involving power plants. See New Energy for America, supra note 36; 
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483 See New Energy for America, supra note 36. 
 
484 See id. 
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private partnerships to develop five commercial scale coal plants using carbon capture 
and sequestration technology.486  
The Obama Administration has made significant progress on cleaner technology 
development, primarily through the ARRA paired with DOE efforts, and President 
Obama recommitted to these goals in his 2011 State of the Union address’s proposal that 
80% of the nation’s energy come from clean sources by 2035.487 The ARRA includes a 
ten-year, $75 billion commitment to make the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit 
permanent, and an approximately $75 billion investment in renewables through allowing 
wind producers to access the investment tax credit.488 The Act also provides for $39 
billion in energy investments at the DOE and $20 billion in tax incentives for clean 
energy. These investments include (1) the establishment of an advanced research agency 
for energy, which will be modeled after the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
which developed the Internet; (2) support for Energy Frontier Research Centers, which 
are working to develop improved energy storage, super-efficient engines, and cheaper 
solar cells; (3) funds for the above-discussed support for battery development; and 
(4) provision of $1.2 billion towards research infrastructure in the DOE’s national labs.489 
                                                
486 See id.; New Energy for America, supra note 36. 
 
487 2011 State of the Union, supra note 417. 
 
488 See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Investments in Clean Energy and New Technology (Mar. 23, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-The-President-on-
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Release, The White House, Remarks by the Vice President at an Event Highlighting Off Shore Wind Power 
and the Administration’s Commitment to Building a Clean, Domestic Energy Policy for the 21st Century at 
The University of Delaware in Newark, Delaware (May 4, 2009), 
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489 See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Investing in Our Clean Energy Future (Mar. 23, 2009), 
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In addition, the Department of Agriculture is working with dairy farmers on a manure-to-
energy initiative.490 President Obama’s proposed 2012 budget aims to build on these 
efforts, with its commitment to over $8 billion clean energy research and development.491 
The DOI and DOE are working collaboratively to create an offshore wind 
industry capable of producing 20% of the nation’s energy and to support the growth of 
other renewable energy production. The Department of Interior (DOI) is engaging in a 
major initiative on the production, development, and delivery of renewable energy 
pursuant to a Secretarial order. This initiative includes the establishment of an energy and 
climate change task force which is working through each of the bureaus to identify 
specific zones on public lands appropriate for large-scale production of solar, wind, 
geothermal, and biomass energy and the expediting of renewable energy project 
permitting.492 The DOI is also focused on expanding renewable energy development on 
the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf in partnership with relevant states, localities, and tribal 
governments, exploring carbon storage and sequestration possibilities, and crafting a 
coordinated strategy to address climate change impacts on land, water, wildlife, cultural 
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heritage, and tribal resources.493 The DOI has approved the controversial offshore wind 
farm off the coast of Cape Cod, nine commercial-scale solar energy projects on solar 
lands, and other wind and geothermal projects. The DOE and DOE are also in the process 
of identifying public land suited for large-scale solar energy production, and establishing 
right-of-way authorization for private developers to allow solar projects to proceed on 
them.494 
The Obama Administration is pairing these efforts to foster efficiency and 
renewable energy development with CAA mandates that push major industrial emitters to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. His 2013 State of the Union Address reinforced 
this emphasis: 
I’m also issuing a new goal for America: Let’s cut in half the energy 
wasted by our homes and businesses over the next 20 years. We'll work 
with the states to do it. Those states with the best ideas to create jobs and 
lower energy bills by constructing more efficient buildings will receive 
federal support to help make that happen.495 
                                                
493 See Press Release, Dep’t of Interior, President Obama, Secretary Salazar Announce Framework for 
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The multi-scalar quality of this goal is striking and reinforces the relevance of geographic 
conceptions of scale in this context.  Although it is a federal-level goal from the president 
for the country, it focuses on state implementation and individual-level action. 
President Obama’s efforts to reach these goals, even administratively, at times 
have faced political hurdles.  For example, in February 2010, in response to political 
pressure regarding the economic impact of planned mandates, the EPA modified its plans 
to slow down this process, but maintained a clear commitment to moving ahead. 
Administrator Jackson indicated that while no stationary source would be required to get 
a CAA permit for its greenhouse gas emissions in 2010, the EPA would begin to phase in 
this permitting for large stationary sources in 2011 and for the smallest sources after 
2016.496 In May 2010, the EPA began this process by issuing a final rule that establishes 
threshold greenhouse gas permit requirements for new and existing power plants, 
refineries, and other major industrial emitters under the New Source Review Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration and Title V. These thresholds help to ensure that only the 
most significant emitters, which produce 70% of stationary source greenhouse gas 
emissions, are covered under the rule; they tailor the permitting process to make it 
appropriate for greenhouse gases and to prevent overburdening smaller emitters and state 
regulator.497 The EPA engaged in additional rulemaking in December 2010 to refine 
these requirements further and account for the varying regulatory conditions in different 
                                                
496 See Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Administrator, to Hon. Jay D. Rockefeller, IV, U.S. Senator (Feb. 
22, 2010), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/climate-change/documents/post-
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states.498 It also announced a settlement of two additional climate change lawsuits that is 
resulting in the EPA’s schedule for promulgating National Source Performance Standards 
for greenhouse gas emissions by power plans and refineries.499 
 
5. Green Jobs  
Beyond proposing investments in green industry that aim to add jobs to the 
economy, President Obama’s campaign made specific pledges regarding training and 
transition programs aimed at green jobs. 500  He promised to incorporate green 
technologies training, including advanced manufacturing and weatherization training, 
into federal workforce training programs. He also proposed green jobs programs focused 
on disconnected and disadvantaged youth and on Veterans.501 The Green Job Corps 
would provide participating youth with service projects focused on improving the energy 
conservation of homes and other buildings in their communities, involve private sector 
employers and unions in establishing apprenticeship opportunities, and work with the 
proposed Energy Corps to help participants find post-program jobs.502 The Green Vet 
Initiative would provide counseling and job placement, as well as work with industry 
partners to create career opportunities and educational programs in this area.503  
                                                
498 U.S. EPA, Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gas Emissions—Final Rules, Fact Sheet, Dec. 23, 
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President Obama continues to promote job creation through clean energy, 
including in his State of the Union addresses, and has worked to operationalize that 
commitment.504 The White House announced in January 2010, for instance, that ARRA’s 
clean energy provisions have already saved or created 63,000 jobs.505 Much debate (often 
partisan) is taking place about how successful job creation has been and the limits on the 
Obama Administration’s capacity to create clean energy jobs without greater 
Congressional support. However, a February 2011 report that breaks down and totals 
“green job” creation by sector estimates that 997,000 total jobs had been created by these 
ARRA initatives by the end of 2010.506. 
Under ARRA, the Obama Administration has invested $600 million in these 
green job training programs,507 including Department of Labor grants of $150 million 
through a Pathways Out of Poverty effort targeting disadvantaged populations, of which 
nearly $55 million specifically targeted underserved communities and $28 million 
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focused on communities impacted by auto industry restructuring.508 These jobs provide 
opportunities for skilled laborers to install efficient heating and cooling systems and 
windows, to retrofit homes to make them more energy efficient, and to build and install 
solar panels, wind turbines, and other clean energy technology.509 The weatherization 
programs in particular are employing 15,000 workers nation-wide.510 
In addition, on January 8, 2010, President Obama announced a clean 
manufacturing initiative, which awards $2.3 billion in tax credits to U.S. manufacturers 
of clean energy technologies such as wind turbines, solar panels, and innovative batteries. 
He predicted that this initiative would generate 17,000 jobs directly, and tens of 
thousands additional jobs through the roughly $5 billion more that the Administration 
plans to leverage in the private sector investments.511 
Finally, a number of federal agencies have been directly involved in the creation 
of jobs connected to the Obama Administration’s climate change initiatives. For example, 
the GSA sustainability initiative hired 500 business and created jobs in all 50 states.512 
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The Department of Commerce aims to create jobs in clean energy and technology by 
eliminating export barriers, accelerating patent applications, and providing grants to 
support renewable energy, energy efficiency, and environmentally sound building 
projects.513 
 
6. Legal Progress through and Limitations of Current Approaches 
As the above sections make clear, President Obama has accomplished a great deal 
in his first term on climate change and energy through a combination of ARRA funding 
measures and administrative action. In addition to the agency efforts described above, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, which is an agency structured to be bipartisan and 
independent but which is often influenced by the Administration appointing its 
commissioners, voted in January 2010 to provide public companies with interpretive 
guidance on disclosing the business and legal impact of climate change as part of their 
mandatory disclosures.514  
However, the Obama Administration’s progress has been limited significantly by 
his inability to achieve two major legislative and treaty goals. On the legislative front, 
President Obama pledged during his first campaign to support an economy-wide cap-and-
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trade system to reduce carbon emissions by 80% by 2050.515 Although his Administration 
has made many efforts to get this legislation through since taking office, the failure to 
achieve that goal shifted the focus largely to executive branch administrative action 
paired with less controversial broader energy legislation.516 
Regarding international efforts, President Obama’s first campaign promised to 
reverse the Bush Administration’s approach, and specifically to reengage with the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change efforts and to invigorate the Major 
Economies effort. He also proposed the creation of a Global Energy Forum comprised of 
the world’s most significant developed and developing energy consuming nations, 
following the G8+5 model, to complement the UNFCCC process.517 He further proposed 
domestic efforts to assist with global emissions reduction, such as the establishment of a 
DOE Technology Transfer Program focused on exporting energy efficient technologies to 
developing countries and greater emphasis on sustainable forest management.518 
The Obama Administration thus far has constructively engaged with the 
UNFCCC process, as promised, but unfortunately, its leadership has not resulted in 
significant progress in the negotiations. While President Obama’s efforts at the 
Copenhagen meeting helped lead to the Copenhagen Accord, which averted major failure, 
the state parties only took note of the accord, rather than adopting it, and the agreement’s 
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voluntary commitments represent a quite limited step forward.519 Those limitations have 
been highlighted by commitments under the Accord which are generally contingent on 
action by other nations, and in the case of the United States, also contingent on federal 
legislation passing.520 Moreover, when Yvo de Boer resigned in February 2010 as 
Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC following the Copenhagen negotiations, a move that 
reportedly arose from his frustrations with the slow pace and difficulties of nation-state 
negotiations, he highlighted his belief that “while governments provide the necessary 
policy framework, the real solutions must come from business.”521 The United States also 
participated constructively in the Cancun, Durban, and Doha negotiations, where many 
fewer heads of state were present, but those negotiations—as discussed in Chapter III—
have not yet resulted in binding commitments to adequate mitigation.522  
The Obama Administration has made additional progress, however, through other 
international efforts. In July 2009, President Obama convened the Major Economies 
Forum on Energy and Climate, as promised, which resulted in a declaration of shared 
values and goals.523 President Obama also met with the G-8 in July 2009 to address the 
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“interlinked challenges of the economic crisis, trade, climate change, and 
development.”524 In addition, the United States spearheaded a September 2009 agreement 
among the G-20 countries to phase out fossil fuel subsidies, which the partially 
overlapping Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries also agreed to in 
November 2009.525 In November 2010, the G-20 countries recommitted to that phase out, 
which some of them have already begun taking steps to achieve.526 
The Obama Administration also has been involved in numerous multilateral 
efforts on more specific issues, such as the greening of motor vehicles on which this 
Article focuses. These targeted efforts, many of which predate the Obama Administration, 
function separately from, but in tandem with, the international climate regime and other 
international agreements on climate change. For example, the United States has long 
engaged in information exchange through a number of multilateral initiatives under the 
International Energy Agency, an international organization that serves as an energy 
advisor to twenty-eight member countries, and has implemented agreements on advanced 
fuel cells, advanced materials for transportation, advanced motor fuels, and hybrid and 
electric vehicles.527 Similarly, the United States participates in the International Council 
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on Clean Transportation (ICCT), which was formed in 2010 and includes thirty 
regulators and policymakers from the ten largest motor vehicle markets, together 
representing 85% of the world’s total new car and truck sales. In January 2010, the ICCT 
passed the Athens Resolution, a document that focused not only on motor vehicle 
technology, but also on changing the ways in which vehicles are used, with a specific 
focus on land use planning.528 In March 2011, the United States joined the International 
Renewable Energy Agency, which works to promote increased adoption and 
development of renewable energy technologies.529 
This North-American region also made new agreements on climate change during 
President Obama’s first term. In April 2009, the Fifth Summit of the Americas 
established the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, which encourages multi-
country initiatives on these issues. The United States has contributed over $60 million to 
this partnership thus far.530 The United States, Canada, and Mexico then issued the North 
American Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change and Clean Energy in August 2009. 
This tri-lateral agreement includes exchanging information on mitigation and adaptation, 
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creating common goals, and collaborating in the development of low-carbon energy 
infrastructure and multi-level adaptation planning.531  
The Obama Administration has supplemented these multilateral regional 
agreements with bilateral agreements with Mexico and Canada. In April 2009, President 
Obama agreed upon a Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change with 
Mexico which focuses upon “renewable energy, energy efficiency, adaptation, market 
mechanisms, forestry and land use, green jobs, low carbon energy technology 
development and capacity building.”532 The framework also builds upon cooperation in 
the border region by promoting efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt 
to the impact of climate change locally.533 In addition, it works to “strengthen the 
reliability and flow of cross border electricity grids and [to facilitate] the ability of 
neighboring border states to work together to strengthen energy trade.” 534 The United 
States and Canada established the U.S.-Canada Clean Energy Dialogue in February 2009, 
which focuses on developing more efficient cross-border energy networks, expanding 
clean energy research and development, and developing and deploying carbon capture 
and storage technology.535 
                                                
531 See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, North American Leaders’ Declaration on 
Climate Change and Clean Energy (Aug. 10, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ press_ 
office/North-American-Leaders-Declaration-on-Climate-Change-and-Clean-Energy/.  
 
532 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Mexico Announce Bilateral Framework 
on Clean Energy and Climate Change, Apr. 16, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ press_ 
office/US-Mexico-Announce-Bilateral-Framework-on-Clean-Energy-and-Climate-Change/.  
 
533 See id. 
 
534 Id. 
 
535 See Steven Chu, U.S. Secretary of Energy & Peter Kent, Canada Minister of the Environment, U.S. – 
Canada Clean Energy Dialogue Second Report to the President of the United States of American and the 
Prime Minister of Canada (2011), available at 
http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/CED_Report_to_Leaders.pdf. 
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The United States has entered additional bilateral climate change and clean 
energy agreements under President Obama with developing country major emitters. For 
example, in November 2009, the United States and China launched a U.S.-China Electric 
Vehicles Initiative, which includes demonstration projects in more than twelve cities. In 
January 2011, Presidents Obama and Hu Jintao announced plans for a $150 million joint 
research center on clean energy.536 The United States and India established a Green 
Partnership in November 2009, which provides for greater bilateral cooperation on clean 
energy, climate change, and food security. The partnership also strengthens and expands 
the country’s preexisting U.S.-India Partnership to Advance Clean Energy, which among 
other initiatives, includes a public-private effort between U.S. and Indian companies to 
improve commercial building efficiency.537 In November 2010, the United States and 
Indonesia expanded their partnership to address climate change and energy issues, with 
commitments to collaborating on renewable energy development, climate change 
monitoring, adaptation, and mitigation. As part of these commitments, the United States 
committed $136 million to reducing deforestation threats and promoting marine 
ecosystem adaptation.538 In addition to making progress with these developing country 
                                                
536  See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-China Clean Energy 
Announcements (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-clean-
energy-announcements; US-China Clean Energy Cooperation: From Laboratory to Livable Cities, Jan. 18, 
2011, available at http://blog.energy.gov/blog/2011/01/18/us-china-energy-cooperation-laboratory-livable-
cities; U.S. Dept. of Energy, U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation: A Progress Report by the U.S. 
Department of Energy, Jan. 2011, available at 
http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/USChinaCleanEnergy.PDF.  
 
537 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S.-India Green 
Partnership to Address Energy Security, Climate Change, and Food Security, Nov. 24, 2009, available at 
http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/faq.aspx; Fact Sheet on U.S.-India Partnership on Clean 
Energy, Energy Security, and Climate Change, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/india-
factsheets/Fact_Sheet_on_U.S.-India_Partnership_on_Clean_Energy_Energy_Security.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2011). 
 
538 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Indonesia Partnership on 
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major emitters, the United States signed a March 2011 memorandum of understanding 
with Poland regarding collaboration on clean energy technology.539 
Although the Obama Administration’s relationships with smaller-scale entities, 
like cities, states, regions, and tribes, have gone more smoothly than its legislative and 
UNFCCC treaty efforts, they also pose significant challenges for comprehensive climate 
change policy. The Obama Administration has established innovative cooperative 
interactions with states and cities, as well as key corporate actors, to make policy 
progress. The process it used to craft the National Program on motor vehicles greenhouse 
gas emissions is emblematic of this approach; the Administration engaged both 
subnational actors and relevant corporations in its decision-making process and, through 
that inclusion, reached a compromise standard.540 The EPA likewise has created a clean 
energy leadership group, which includes key state regulators and corporate executives, to 
develop a National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency. That group is identifying barriers 
to energy efficiency and working to remove them, with the goal of cost-effective energy 
efficiency by 2025.541  President Obama’s 2013 State of the Union Address only 
reinforces the role of subnational actors in his approach to efficiency.542 
                                                                                                                                            
Climate Change and Clean Energy (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2010/November/20101109180315su0. 9502 614.html.  
 
539 See Press Release, Dep’t of State Office of the Spokesman, Unites States–Poland Memorandum of 
Understand on Cooperation in Clean and Efficient Energy (Mar. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/03/157600.htm. 
 
540 See Waiver Denial Letter, supra note 412 and accompanying text. 
 
541  See National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/suca/resources.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 
542 White House, The 2013 State of the Union, Feb. 12, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-
union-2013. 
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Although these efforts represent an important inclusion of key public and private 
actors, their results often take the form of traditional, top-down mandates with greater 
buy-in. For example, in the motor vehicles context, the National Program, while 
developed in an innovative fashion, contains mandates that these actors have to follow.543 
Similarly, cities, states, and tribes have participated in the Obama Administration’s 
dynamic green growth incentive programs largely through trying to get their proposals 
accepted so that the money flows to them.544 Moreover, the extensive efforts by national 
and international coalitions of localities, states, and provinces are often not integrated into 
those of the nation-states. As noted above, for example, subnational governments, 
including many in the United States, met at Copenhagen, but separately from the main 
meetings that President Obama and his federal representatives attended, forming 
agreements that were not coordinated with the Copenhagen Accord.545 Within the United 
States, smaller-scale coalitions abound, particularly with respect to land use planning 
aimed at reducing emissions from motor vehicles and from energy production and 
consumption, but their efforts often remain separate from the Obama Administration’s 
national-level initiatives described above.546  
                                                
543 See supra note 412 and accompanying text. 
 
544 For information on block grants to smaller-scale governments, see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.eecbg.energy.gov/ 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2011); see also Evan Lehmann, Cities Rush to Turn “Green” with 3.2 Billion of 
Federal Green, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/06/02/02climatewire-cities-rush-to-turn-green-with-32-billion-of-
84057.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 
545 See supra Chapter I.  Chapter XIII discusses these networks in more depth. 
 
546 For examples of the many municipal initiatives taking place, see the compilation provided by Columbia 
Law School, Municipal Climate Change Laws Resource Center, CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/centers/climatechange/resources/municipal. 
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The complex interactions between and among governments around the world at 
an international level, other branches of government at a national level, and multiple 
governmental entities at subnational levels—all of which also interact with 
nongovernmental organizations, corporations, international organizations, and private 
individuals—pose an ongoing governance challenge for the Obama Administration.547 It 
has effectively used the entities under its control, as well as the recovery-focused 
legislation that made it through Congress early in its administration, but its overall 
progress on the problem depends on its ongoing strategies for dealing with these many 
interested actors. Although some of these strategies will simply involve navigating 
difficult politics, as evidenced in his first term, the Administration also needs a more 
effective ongoing approach for addressing these complexities of multiscalar governance. 
Chapters IX and X build upon the conceptual ideas introduced in Chapter VII to explore 
these issues in depth.  
 
 
                                                
547 I traced these dilemmas of scale in Chapters I to III. For a thoughtful legal scholarly exploration of 
complex scale issues that arise with respect to international and transnational environmental problems more 
broadly, which includes analysis of climate change as a global-global problem, see Bradley Karkkainen, 
Marine Ecosystem Management & a ”Post-Sovereign” Transboundary Governance, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L 
L.J. 113 (2004). 
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CHAPTER IX 
A TAXONOMY OF MULTI-DIMENSIONAL DYNAMICS IN FEDERAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE APPROACHES 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and 
Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALABAMA L. REV. 237 
(2011). 
 
This chapter proposes a taxonomy for operationalizing the diagonal conceptual 
approach introduced in Chapter VII in the U.S. federal context that pairs geographer 
Kevin Cox’s network approach to scale with the diagonal federalism scholarship 
introduced in Chapter II.548  This taxonomy serves as a mechanism for understanding and 
crafting diagonal regulatory approaches as strategies to engage the multiscalar nature of 
the federal climate change law and policy described in Chapter VIII. 549  These 
crosscutting strategies take a wide variety of forms, and this taxonomy provides a lens 
through which this variation among approaches over time can be better understood. 
Specifically, the chapter draws from these conceptual approaches550 to consider four 
dimensions in which diagonal regulation can vary, the first two of which are spatial and 
second two of which are cross-cutting: (1) vertical (interactions across levels of 
governance); (2) horizontal (interactions within levels of governance); (3) direction of 
hierarchy (top-down v. bottom-up); and (4) cooperativeness (cooperation v. conflict). It 
looks at the nature, as well as advantages and disadvantages, of approaches that are 
skewed with respect to one or more of these dimensions. 
                                                
548 See supra Chapters II & VII. 
 
549 See supra Chapter VIII. 
 
550 See supra Chapter II. 
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The chapter focuses on these particular dimensions as core ways in which 
diagonal approaches converge and diverge. Each of these dimensions contains elements 
of Cox’s network conception of scale, but also can be tied to streams of diagonal 
federalism theory.  The first dimension captures the way in which climate change law 
spans interacting levels of government, and provides an opportunity for considering the 
varying roles that entities at different levels play in Cox’s model.  The second dimension 
focuses on interactions within a jurisdictional level—in this case the federal one—in 
order to provide a more complete understanding of the spatial dynamics.  As analyzed in 
the discussion of the second dimension, these first two dimensions together frame the 
spatial aspects of diagonal interactions; mapping them reveals how horizontal interactions 
within and among spaces of dependence and/or vertical interactions within and among 
spaces of engagement predominate many regulatory schemes.  
The second two dimensions build upon this spatial framework to consider two 
critical cross-cutting aspects of the diagonal dynamics.  The third dimension, direction of 
hierarchy, considers the extent to which the smaller-scale or larger-scale actors drive the 
dynamics among spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement. Finally, the fourth 
dimension, cooperativeness, analyzes the mix of cooperative and conflictual behavior 
taking place within existing diagonal regulatory schemes as they navigate scalar 
networks.551 
In highlighting these four dimensions of diagonal regulatory approaches, the 
taxonomy contributes to a law and geography understanding of climate change regulation; 
specifically, it serves as a tool for mapping changing multi-scalar dynamics over time. 
                                                
551 See Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking 
for Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1 (1998). 
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Such a map is first and foremost quite literal. One can spatialize diagonal dynamics by 
plotting the interactions and their evolution on a four-dimensional grid which includes the 
above elements. But the taxonomy also provides a more conceptual map of crosscutting 
regulation by identifying overlapping but distinct categories that interact to create 
diagonal strategies. This framing moves beyond simply acknowledging simultaneous 
vertical and horizontal dynamics to treating those dynamics as multidimensional.552  
In so doing, the taxonomy builds upon the previous chapters of the dissertation.553 
Those chapters argue for climate change as a multiscalar regulatory problem and analyze 
climate change litigation as debating the appropriate scale for regulation. Based on the 
consistent dynamics in that litigation, Chapter VII draws from transnational legal 
process554 and geographic network theory,555 with additional grounding in dynamic 
federalism556 and new governance theory,557 to begin to sketch a vision for diagonal 
                                                
552 I have explored the complexities of what “space” means in previous work, but an in-depth analysis of 
space beyond the scalar context is beyond the scope of this dissertation. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, The 
Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from Property and Criminal Law, 53 VILL. L. REV. 117 
(2008). For examples of the geography literature analyzing the concept of “space,” see DOREEN B. 
MASSEY, FOR SPACE 62–104 (2005); YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE 6 
(1977); Helen Couclelis, Location, Place, Region, and Space, in GEOGRAPHY’S INNER WORLDS: 
PERVASIVE THEMES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN GEOGRAPHY 215, 215 (Ronald F. Abler et al. eds., 
1992); Michael R. Curry, On Space and Spatial Practice in Contemporary Geography, in CONCEPTS IN 
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 3, 3–32 (Carville Earle et al. eds., 1996). 
 
553 See Osofsky, “Is Climate Change International”?, supra note 5. 
 
554 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745 (2006); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 
106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). 
 
555 See Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking 
for Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1 (1998). For analyses of Cox’s approach, see Katherine T. Jones, 
Scale as Epistemology, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 25 (1998); Dennis R. Judd, The Case of the Missing Scales: A 
Commentary on Cox, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 29 (1998); Michael Peter Smith, Looking for the Global Spaces 
in Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 35 (1998); Kevin R. Cox, Representation and Power in the Politics 
of Scale, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 41 (1998); Lynn A. Staeheli, Globalization and the Scales of Citizenship, 19 
GEOGRAPHY RES. F. 60 (1999). 
 
556 For further discussion of dynamic federalism, see infra notes 153–59, 172–73, 197–201, 222–282 & 
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regulatory thinking which integrates the complex set of scales and actors that effective 
climate regulation demands.558  
This chapter builds upon that analysis by exploring what it would take to 
operationalize diagonal approaches in the U.S. federal context. In particular, this chapter 
grounds Chapter VII’s conceptualization of diagonal regulation in the U.S. dynamic 
federalism literature more deeply because that scholarship is a primary site for U.S. legal 
scholars and policymakers to debate issues of scalar matching and multi-level governance. 
The chapter’s multidimensional approach provides a fuller framework and practical 
application, which together have the potential to help scholars and policymakers think 
through these problems better.  The taxonomy provides a mechanism for rethinking 
current approaches and assessing whether they are structured in an appropriate fashion.   
The taxonomy also has broader conceptual value in helping to reframe the 
environmental federalism literature, a topic which is beyond the primary scope of this 
dissertation. Namely, as discussed in the Chapter X, the four dimensions of the taxonomy 
                                                                                                                                            
268–69. 
 
557 J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman are integrating new governance with dynamic federalism and 
transgovernmental network theory in an environmental context. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate 
Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 
CAL. L. REV. 59 (2010). For broader new governance analyses, see LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE 
EU AND US (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., Hart Publ’g 2006); Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New 
Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda 
for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004). 
 
558 The discourse over how the European Union does and should apply principles of subsidiarity to climate 
change regulation contains significant parallels to discussion over environmental federalism in the United 
States. A full exposition of subsidiarity and climate change is beyond the scope of this paper. For a 
comparative analysis of U.S. and E.U. approaches to climate change, see Jutta Brunée, Europe, the United 
States, and the Global Climate Regime: All Together Now?, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2008); cf. 
Michael G. Faure & Jason Scott Johnston, The Law and Economics of Environmental Federalism: Europe 
and the United States Compared, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 205 (2009); Alfred R. Light, Environmental 
Federalism in the United States and the European Union: A Harmonic Convergence?, 15 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 321 (2002). 
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also represent four areas of debate within the federalism literature.  Breaking down the 
scholarly debates in this way provides a means for assessing them and reconstituting 
them.559 I have applied this approach in other substantive contexts, such as in the 
aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, to unpack the complexities of mutli-
level governance and propose ways forward.560 
For the purposes of this part, I argue that the taxonomy can serve as a tool for the 
Obama Administration to rethink its multiscalar regulatory approaches to climate change 
and energy. To that end, this chapter and the one that follows use the example of motor 
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions regulation to demonstrate how the taxonomy can assist 
in breaking down regulatory interactions in order to map possibilities for future policy 
steps. This chapter, in particular, builds upon Chapter VIII’s overview of the Obama 
Administration’s approach to climate change and energy policy by focusing on one of 
that policy’s three prongs—motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions reduction—and 
situating the Administration’s initiatives in the broader context of smaller-scale and 
nongovernmental efforts. This chapter argues that current approaches to what cars we 
drive align differently within the four dimensions than do current approaches to how we 
drive those cars. These differences provide opportunities to evaluate the appropriateness 
of current and potential diagonal approaches, an evaluation that is the focus of Chapter X.  
 
                                                
559 See infra Chapter X. 
 
560 Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLORIDA 
L. REV 1077 (2011). 
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1. Vertical 
Existing diagonal approaches to motor vehicle emissions regulation tend to skew 
towards larger or smaller jurisdictional levels and actors. International- or national-level 
interactions dominate some regulatory arrangements, while others include more 
subnational actors. The Obama Administration’s efforts to improve upon motor vehicle 
technology and fuels (what cars we drive) tend to involve predominantly larger 
jurisdictional levels. For example, the Obama Administration’s National Program to 
address greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy in new vehicles through joint agency 
rulemaking is predominantly larger level (federal), although it exists in coordination with 
state motor vehicle emissions regulations, specifically aiming to harmonize over time 
with California’s more stringent approach. 561  In contrast, although its broader 
transportation policy is also generated at the federal level, the Obama Administration’s 
initiatives form a much smaller portion of efforts to address the way in which cars are 
driven. State and local land use planning dominate those efforts. Specifically, coalitions 
of states and cities focused on reducing vehicle miles traveled through local land use 
planning work primarily at smaller jurisdictional levels, but are in dialogue with federal 
vehicle miles traveled reduction efforts, especially through lobbying the federal 
government and responding to its financial incentive programs.562 
                                                
561 See Letter from Mary D. Nichols, Chairman of the Cal. Air Resources Bd., to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA 
Admin., and Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp. (May 18, 2009), available at http:// www.epa.gov/ 
otaq/ climate/ regulations/ air-resources-board.pdf; Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., 
to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Admin., and Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp. (May 18, 2009), available at 
http:// www.epa.gov/ otaq/ climate/ regulations/ calif-gov.pdf; Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Att’y 
Gen. of Cal., to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Admin., and Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp. (May 18, 2009), 
available at http:// www.epa.gov/ otaq/ climate/ regulations/ calif-atty-general.pdf. See also supra note 455 
and accompanying text. 
 
562 For example, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, which is collaborating among its members on climate 
change and transportation, is also urging the federal government, specifically the President and Congress, 
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Dynamic environmental federalism scholarship analyzes a number of issues that 
arise in this vertical dimension. Some of this literature focuses on how to incorporate the 
smallest or largest levels of governance into the traditional federal-state conversation. In 
the climate change context, the conversation about smaller levels of governance typically 
focuses on how subnational entities, such as cities or states, should be integrated into 
national and international management of the problem. Kirsten Engel, David Hodas, 
Alice Kaswan, and Barry Rabe, for instance, are among the scholars who have explored 
questions of state and local climate change regulation as part of dynamic federalism 
analyses.563 Sarah Krakoff has looked at even smaller levels of informal governance, 
considering sublocal activities. Michael Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus, and Jonathan 
Gilligan have had an even smaller focus, on multiscalar regulatory actions directed at 
individuals and households.564 The conversation about larger levels of governance, on the 
other hand, generally analyzes how federalism schemes should take globalization into 
                                                                                                                                            
to empower localities, presumably through legislative and administrative provisions, to help determine 
federal energy resource allocation. Manuel A. (Manny) Diaz, President, United States Conference of 
Mayors, National Action Agenda on Environment and Energy for the Next President of the United States 
(Oct. 2, 2008), available at http:// www.usmayors.org/ maf/ documents/ 2009 0105-Environment.pdf 
[hereinafter Open Letter]. 
 
563 For some of this work in particular, see, e.g., Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: 
What is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say 
About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006) [hereinafter Engel, State and 
Local]; David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce 
Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835 (2008); David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global 
Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53 (2003); 
Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253 (2009) [hereinafter 
Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities]; Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global 
Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (2007); 
BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLICY 1–37 (2003); Barry G. Rabe, North American Federalism and Climate Change Policy: 
American State and Canadian Provincial Policy Development, 14 WIDENER L.J. 121, 128–51 (2004). For 
an interesting compilation of pieces on federalism and local government, see DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN 
AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY (Martha Derthick ed., 1999). 
 
564 See Sarah Krakoff, Environmental Law, Tragedy and Community (draft manuscript on file with author); 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus, & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-
Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2008). 
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account. Tseming Yang and Robert Percival, as well as Robert Ahdieh and those in the 
intersystemic governance stream discussed in Chapter II, among many others, have 
grappled with these questions in different variations.565  
Some scholars have also examined a wider range of vertical interactions. For 
instance, Judith Resnik’s work has analyzed the way in which the local and international 
interact in a climate change federalism model.566 Douglas Kysar and Bernadette Meyler 
have used California’s internationalist approach to climate change as a lens through 
which to examine constitutional limits on state foreign affairs activities.567 Dan Farber 
has argued for a bifurcated approach to the constitutional authority of states to allow for 
more effective multiscalar climate change regulation,568 and Richard Stewart has argued 
for a plural architecture for climate regulation that allows for multiple regulatory 
systems.569  
                                                
565 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from 
Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 
863 (2006); Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of 
Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of 
Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009); see also Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a 
Shrinking World: The Interaction of Science and Technology with International Law, 88 KY. L.J. 809 
(2000). 
 
566 See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006) [hereinafter Resnik, Law’s Migration]; Judith Resnik, 
Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and 
Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 709, 727–28 (2008). The 
American Society of International Law also had a broader panel on this topic in 2008. See Robert B. 
Ahdieh et al., When Subnational Meets International: The Politics and Place of Cities, States, and 
Provinces in the World, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 339 (2008). 
 
567 See Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621 (2008). 
 
568 See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879 (2008). 
 
569 See Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural 
Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008). 
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When paired with Cox’s approach to scale, this scholarship makes the important 
contribution of reinforcing the way in which an expanded scalar dialogue, which ranges 
from the individual to the international, enriches the federalism conversation, especially 
for problems like climate change that interact at every level. Cox explains that each 
individual scale can be understood through interactions not only within that scale but 
among scales.  This stream of dynamic federalism scholarship helps to identify the 
specifics of those interactions in the legal context.   
The Obama Administration’s process for developing its greenhouse gas motor 
vehicles emissions regulation involves the broad scalar range described in this area of 
dynamic environmental federalism scholarship. Although the Obama Administration’s 
efforts on motor vehicle emissions tend to be predominantly federal, the extent of the 
skew evolves over time through the Administration’s interactions with key actors at 
multiple scales. For instance, although Obama’s National Program is a predominantly 
large-scale effort to set motor vehicle tailpipe emissions, it emerged in the context of the 
dispute between the Bush Administration and the states wishing to follow California’s 
heightened emissions standards. These states have been the primary regulatory drivers 
with respect to motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions, and even with the harmonization 
under the Obama Administration’s plan. California and the states following its approach 
will exceed federal standards for a period of time. Thus, the standards will trend toward 
being primarily federal as the federal government and leader states harmonize over the 
next few years.570  
                                                
570 See supra note 455 and accompanying text. 
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Regulatory strategies focused on larger jurisdictional levels have the advantages 
of creating uniformity and of catering to widespread presumptions about the appropriate 
scale for climate regulation. As I have discussed in depth in the first case study on 
litigation, those seeking to block smaller-scale climate regulation often argue that climate 
change is a global problem requiring large-scale solutions.571 Diagonal approaches 
dominated by nation-states and international entities would be more likely to satisfy those 
who view that level of regulation as more appropriate, and, as a result, may face less 
opposition. The automobile manufacturers’ willingness to sign on to and to continue to 
support the further development of the Obama Administration’s National Program for 
motor vehicles emissions exemplifies this phenomenon, as they would prefer to have a 
uniform, national standard for their industry rather than state-by-state variation.572 
Moreover, additional larger-level-oriented efforts would fit the scale of the Obama 
Administration’s current and planned efforts on climate change, many of which focus 
federally or internationally. For instance, the Obama Administration’s efforts at climate 
change treaty negotiations, involvement in international agreements on green motor 
                                                
571 See Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 411; see also, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007) 
(arguing that “subnational state-level action is not the best way to combat global climate change”). 
 
572 See Press Release, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Automakers Comment on Notes of Intent to 
Propose 2017-2025 Fuel Economy/Greenhouse Gas Regulations (Oct. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.autoalliance.org/index.cfm?objectid=62A583D2-E399-11DF-A62C000C296BA163; Press 
Release, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Automakers and Federal Government Agree on Next Steps 
for Long-Term GHG/Fuel Economy Program (May 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.autoalliance.org/index.cfm?objectid=7B28B4AE-6764-11DF-A6D8000C296BA163  
(explaining that long-range regulations are important to manufacturers, as automobile development requires 
5-10 years of lead-time); Press Release, Association of Global Automakers, Stantion Calls for Coordinated 
Regulatory Processes to Encourage Efficiencies (Jan. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.globalautomakers.org/media/press-release/2011/01/stanton-calls-for-coordinated-regulatory-
processes-to-encourage-efficien. 
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vehicle technology and transportation, frequent presidential and agency actions, and 
support for legislation largely occur at the national or international level.573 
At the other end of the scale spectrum, as discussed in depth in Chapter VI and in 
the third case study in Chapters XI through XII, a number of U.S. states and cities have 
been well ahead of federal regulatory efforts, particularly during the Bush Administration 
but continuing on under the Obama Administration as well. Coalitions and networks exist 
to expand predominantly small-scale diagonal regulation that includes these states and 
cities as leaders, especially with respect to how motor vehicles are driven. Many states 
and localities have been collaborating nationally and internationally, which creates 
opportunities for them to connect their efforts to larger-scale actors in a more diagonal 
structure. 574  For instance, the U.S. Conference of Mayors has urged the federal 
                                                
573 For a discussion of the scale of current Obama Administration efforts, see supra Chapter VIII. 
 
574 See, e.g., ICLEI Global, About CCP, http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=811 (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) 
(describing an international collaboration of cities on climate change). For a discussion of local climate 
initiatives, see, e.g., Carolyn Kousky & Stephen H. Schneider, Global Climate Policy: Will Cities Lead the 
Way?, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 11 (2003); Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: 
Reflections on the New Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393, 402–04 (2007); 
Resnik, Law’s Migration, supra note 566, at 1627–33; Resnik, Civin & Frueh, supra note 566. See also 
Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to 
Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369 (2006); Donald A. 
Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the 
Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United 
States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175 (1996); Ann E. Carlson, Implementing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Caps: A Case Study of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1479 
(2008); Engel, State and Local, supra note 563; Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions 
for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes 
and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004); Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change 
Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 181 (2007); Osofsky, Is Climate Change 
“International”?, supra note 411; Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational Corporate 
Responsibility: Mapping the Role of Subnational Climate Change Litigation, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL 
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 143 (2007); Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local 
Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409 (2008); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors 
in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008); Katherine 
Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global Commons: Genesis and the Urban Politics 
of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACHES 72 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/ papers. cfm? abstract_ id= 1267314; Laura Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: 
Think Locally, Act Globally, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 46 (2004); William Andreen et al., Cooperative 
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government to “empower local elected officials, especially in metropolitan areas, to make 
the decisions on how federal transportation resources are invested, a shift this [sic] is 
especially crucial to change energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions in this 
sector.”575 
The existence of active governmental initiatives at smaller jurisdictional levels, 
however, also poses a challenge for the Obama Administration. As the Administration 
augments national and international efforts, questions have and will consistently arise 
about whether these new developments should preempt state and local law and policy.576 
Although thus far the Obama Administration appears to recognize the value of limiting 
preemption577 and supporting ongoing smaller-scale efforts—such as in the President’s 
rapid steps to have the EPA reconsider and then reverse California’s CAA waiver denial 
while harmonizing federal and California motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions 
standards578—President Obama himself has acknowledged a concern about the piecemeal 
nature of the smaller-scale regulation implemented prior to effective federal action in that 
context.579 Unless the Administration makes conscious decisions to connect collaborative 
                                                                                                                                            
Federalism and Climate Change: Why Federal, State, and Local Governments Must Continue to Partner, 
CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (May 29, 2008), 
http://progressiveregulation.org/articles/Cooperative_Federalism_and_Climate_Change.pdf; Kaswan, 
Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, supra note 563. 
 
575 Open Letter, supra note 562. Such pushes have also taken place in the clean energy context. See, e.g., 
Position Paper, Clean Energy States Alliance, Economic Stimulus and a Federal/State Clean Energy 
Partnership (Jan. 2009), at 1–3, http://www.cleanenergystates.org/Publications/CESA_federal_state_clean_ 
energy_ recommendation_ 1.08.09.pdf.  
  
576 See infra note 637 and accompanying text for an analysis of preemption in the context of climate 
change. 
 
577 See infra note 6165 and accompanying text. 
 
578 See supra notes 444 & 561 and accompanying text. 
 
579 For example, when announcing the reconsideration of the CAA waiver denial, President Obama stated: 
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efforts among cities, counties, and states into its larger-scale efforts through a mix of 
rulemaking, issuing executive orders, and supporting legislation, additional opportunities 
for predominantly small-scale diagonal regulation may be lost. Such a loss would prevent 
crosscutting regulation from gaining fully from the locally-specific knowledge and 
innovation being produced at smaller scales.580 Proposals in Chapter X focusing on 
incorporating coalitions of smaller-scale actors more deeply into the crafting of financial 
incentives for greener vehicle technology and use aim to address this concern.581 
 
2. Horizontal 
 
This dimension of the taxonomy focuses on horizontal interactions taking place 
within a jurisdictional level.  As Cox’s model illustrates, these horizontal interactions 
play a critical role in comprising each scale and form part of multi-scalar interactions.  
However, because the focus of this chapter is on understanding diagonal interactions 
locused at the federal level, this section does not consider the horizontal dimension in 
                                                                                                                                            
[T]he federal government must work with, not against, states to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. California has shown bold and bipartisan leadership through its effort to forge 21st 
century standards, and over a dozen states have followed its lead. But instead of serving as a 
partner, Washington stood in their way. This refusal to lead risks the creation of a confusing 
and patchwork set of standards that hurts the environment and the auto industry. 
  The days of Washington dragging its heels are over. My administration will not 
deny facts, we will be guided by them. We cannot afford to pass the buck or push the burden 
onto the states. And that’s why I’m directing the Environmental Protection Agency to 
immediately review the denial of the California waiver request and determine the best way 
forward. This will help us create incentives to develop new energy that will make us less 
dependent on oil that endangers our security, our economy, and our planet. 
President Barack Obama, Remarks on Jobs, Energy Independence, and Climate Change in the East Room 
of the White House (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/Fromperil 
toprogress/.  
 
580 For examples of the nuances of local efforts at climate regulation in Portland and Tulsa, see Osofsky & 
Levit, supra note 574. 
 
581 See infra Chapters XI–XIII. 
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isolation.  Rather, it analyzes how the horizontal and vertical interact to form diagonal 
dynamics. 
Diagonal regulatory approaches tend to diverge not only in terms of how large- or 
small-scale their emphasis is, but also in the extent to which they focus on 
interconnecting key actors at a particular regulatory level (through Cox’s spaces of 
dependence) or on creating interactions across levels (though Cox’s spaces of 
engagement). Predominantly horizontal regulation primarily involves collaboration 
within one or more levels, whereas predominantly vertical regulation focuses on 
interaction among levels, with minimal activity at any particular level. These categories 
may at times overlap with the predominantly small- or large-scale approaches discussed 
in the vertical dimension, as they might be either top or bottom heavy. But their focus is 
on which axis of the diagonal dominates rather than on which level of government 
dominates; for example, a predominantly horizontal coalition of entities working on 
climate change could be comprised of localities, states, or nations. 
Dynamic federalism scholarship engages this dimension through in-depth 
analyses of the vertical and horizontal aspects of regulatory interactions. Since federalism 
concerns itself with questions of relationships among different levels of government, all 
federalism scholarship tends to be vertical in some sense. However, more dynamic 
approaches generally question traditional models of vertical relationships and argue for a 
more nuanced characterization of dynamics that may vary over time. J.B. Ruhl and James 
Salzman, for example, have developed an adaptive management model for complex 
environmental problems that brings dynamic federalism together with transgovernmental 
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network and new governance theory.582 Horizontal federalism scholarship, which often 
contrasts itself with more traditional vertical federalism approaches, primarily involves 
analysis of the role that coalitions of subnational actors play in environmental regulation. 
For example, Noah Hall has explored the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin 
Compact among eight Great Lakes states through a horizontal federalism lens, arguing 
that their cooperative horizontal federalism approach allows for flexibility while avoiding 
a race to the bottom.583  Together, this stream of federalism scholarship reveals the 
nuances of legal interactions across Cox’s spaces of engagement and dependence, and the 
ways in which law helps to structure those spaces. 
Motor vehicle emissions regulation reflects this range of scholarly discussion 
through the ways in which its horizontal and vertical configurations vary in different 
contexts. Predominantly horizontal efforts tend to arise out of a group of entities 
operating at a particular level that form a larger-scale coalition. The Obama 
Administration’s initiatives on motor vehicle emissions that have significant horizontal 
dimensions involve other nation-states and the federal and state levels of U.S. 
government, but in different patterns. At the federal level, the Obama Administration 
interacts with other nation-states in international treaty negotiations, other multilateral 
forums, and bilateral negotiations, as described in Chapter VIII. While few of these 
negotiations have motor vehicle emissions as their primary focus, those emissions are 
considered in these supranational negotiations as one of the main sources of the U.S. 
                                                
582 See Ruhl & Salzman, Whittling Away, supra note 557. 
 
583 See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the Great 
Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006). For a thoughtful analysis of the nuances of horizontal 
federalism and its interaction with vertical federalism in a broader substantive context, see Allan Erbsen, 
Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008). 
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greenhouse gas emissions being discussed.584 The Administration’s main horizontal 
interactions within the United States involve responding to judicial mandates, particularly 
Massachusetts v. EPA,585 and participating in the legislative process, including both its 
failed efforts to pass cap-and-trade legislation and its ongoing efforts to support clean 
energy.586 Its state-level efforts mix the two axes, as it works vertically to collaborate 
with horizontal coalitions of leader states on issues such as tailpipe emissions and miles-
per-gallon standards. 
However, an analysis of the horizontal axis centered on Obama Administration 
initiatives would be incomplete because smaller-scale entities are leading a wide range of 
other horizontal efforts, many of which focus on how cars are driven and involve the 
Obama Administration’s efforts on motor vehicles less directly. Climate Communities, “a 
national coalition of cities and counties that is educating federal policymakers about the 
essential role of local governments in addressing climate change and promoting a strong 
local–federal partnership to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,”587 exemplifies this 
phenomenon. While the national coalition is not itself a regulator, Climate Communities 
is comprised of numerous regulatory entities with authority at smaller jurisdictional 
levels. Its “Blueprint for President Obama and [the] 111th Congress,” produced together 
with the national branch of ICLEI (an international entity also known as Local 
Governments for Sustainability) at the start of the Obama Administration, for instance, 
                                                
584 See supra Chapter VIII. 
 
585 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 
586 See supra Chapter VIII. 
 
587 Press Release, Climate Communities, Climate Communities’ Successes and Upcoming Activities, 
available at http://climatecommunities.us/documents/successes_upcoming_activities.pdf (last visited Jan. 
10, 2011). 
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envisioned a transformation of the U.S. national transportation strategy through both 
increasing federal resources and supporting local initiatives, including vehicle miles 
traveled reduction efforts.588 Although the creation of this national-level entity and its 
efforts to influence policy at that level gives the collaboration a vertical dimension, it is 
dominated by interactions among the local governments.589  
The Transportation and Climate Initiative, launched in October 2010 by eleven 
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states and the District of Columbia and facilitated by the 
Georgetown Climate Center, a non-partisan center based at Georgetown Law, represents 
another variation of small-scale-driven horizontal collaboration. This initiative involves 
collaboration among state-level agency heads “to improve the efficiency of the 
transportation system, reduce roadway congestion, update public transport, address the 
challenges of vehicles miles traveled, reduce air pollution and energy use, and ensure that 
long-term development is sustainable and enhances quality of life in communities within 
their jurisdiction.”590 The initiative’s strategic work plan explains that it will innovate 
through its comprehensive examination of energy use across all segments of the 
transportation sector in order to “develop a comprehensive agenda for cost effectively 
reducing energy use to deliver greenhouse gas emissions reductions as well as economic 
                                                
588 Climate Communities & ICLEI USA, Empowering Local Government Climate Action: Blueprint for 
President Obama and the 111th Congress, http://climatecommunities.us/documents/blueprint.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 
589 See Climate Communities Brochure, http:// climate communities.us/ documents/ brochure.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2011); see also Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 411. 
 
590 See The Transportation & Climate Initiative of the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States, Strategic 
Workplan for the Transportation and Climate Initiative (TCI): An Agenda for Action, Oct. 2010, available 
at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/transportation/files/TCI-workplan.PDF  [hereinafter TCI Strategic 
Workplan]. 
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benefits within the region.”591 The group aims to make progress within each state, across 
the region, and through partnerships with relevant federal agencies. The Initiative thus 
grows out of horizontal relationships among state agency leaders, but aims to interact 
with and help to shape policy at multiple levels. 
The efforts of Climate Communities and of the Transportation and Climate 
Initiative are predominantly horizontal and involve predominantly small-scale actors in 
their multi-level advocacy, but larger-scale, predominantly horizontal efforts on climate 
change beyond those of the federal government also exist. The local, state, and provincial 
efforts announced at the Copenhagen meeting, and addressed in depth in Chapter XIII, 
are international-level horizontal agreements among subnational entities at different 
levels of government.592 Larger-scale variations upon this model beyond traditional treaty 
negotiations include nation-states collaborating with corporations at an international level, 
such as through the ongoing U.S. involvement in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate.593  
The primary advantage of predominantly horizontal regulatory strategies is that 
they build upon commonalities in governance at particular levels of government. They 
can use existing coalitions of entities at one governmental level, and then add a vertical 
dimension into those collaborations. The above-described Climate Communities and 
Transportation and Climate Initiative represent possible small-scale variations upon this 
model; Climate Communities uses a coalition of localities to create a national entity and 
                                                
591 See id. 
 
592 See infra Chapter XIII. 
 
593 See ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON CLEAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE, 
http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
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the Transportation and Climate Initiative includes state-agency heads from eleven 
Northeastern and mid-Atlantic states and the District of Columbia in coordinated state 
and region-level planning.594  
However, this ease of creation is offset by the limited vertical interaction that 
predominantly horizontal approaches involve. Because their vertical dimensions 
primarily arise from horizontal relationships, these diagonal regulatory efforts may not 
create the level of multiscalar interaction needed to help entities at different levels of 
government collaborate. For example, Climate Communities operates through high-level 
interaction among cities and counties, but it primarily engages other levels of government 
in its advocacy initiatives;595 its efforts would need to be paired with other predominantly 
horizontal or vertical approaches to create a scheme with more overall integration that 
would have the capacity to address climate change more completely. Similarly, the 
Transportation and Climate Initiative acknowledges in its strategic plan the need to 
collaborate with federal agencies and stay abreast of federal legislative developments.596 
Predominantly vertical regulatory strategies can also arise out of already existing 
regulatory arrangements. For example, in the United States, the federalist system creates 
vertical arrangements among federal, state, and local governments. These 
arrangements—which, as discussed in the following section, can include a mix of top-
down and bottom-up interactions—often become implicated in the climate change 
context. Under the Clinton Administration, for instance, the EPA created a program to 
                                                
594 See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. 
 
595 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
 
596 See TCI Strategic Workplan, supra note 180. 
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fund states developing climate regulation plans.597 Under the Bush Administration, 
California requested a CAA waiver—the denial of which became symbolic of an 
approach to climate policy that the Obama Administration swiftly repudiated by granting 
the waiver—to pursue more stringent state-level regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse 
gas emissions. 598  The current Obama Administration approaches to motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions regulation generally have vertical dimensions, and range from 
regulations that are predominantly vertical to those that are more mixed vertical-
horizontal. The Administration’s DOE block grant program for states, territories, tribes, 
and localities exemplifies the largely vertical approach because it gives financial 
incentives to smaller-scale governmental entities, whereas its National Program, as 
described above, includes a significant horizontal dimension through the involvement of 
coalitions of states.599  
Like the predominantly horizontal strategies, predominantly vertical ones are easy 
to create, but risk insufficient interaction on the other—in this case, horizontal—axis. For 
example, the DOE block grant program promotes smaller-scale action, but does so in 
collaboration with specific participating governments rather than with the broader, 
existing state and local coalitions. 600  In order to be fully crosscutting, regulatory 
approaches should both build upon and foster interconnections within levels of 
                                                
597 See Adaptation Planning—What U.S. States and Localities are Doing, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/State_Adaptation_Planning_02_11_08.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 
598 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2008); EPA Notice of Opportunity for Public 
Hearing and Comment, 72 Fed. Reg. 21260 (Apr. 30, 2007); Waiver Denial Letter, supra note 412; Petition 
for Review, supra note 412; Press Release, EPA Grants California GHG Waiver, supra note 444. 
 
599 DOE Block Grant Program, supra note 478. 
 
600 See id. 
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government. For the Obama Administration to maximize interaction among key climate 
actors—which, this Article contends, makes overall climate regulation more cohesive and 
effective—it should formalize efforts to incorporate the other axis, either directly or 
through pairing predominantly horizontal with predominantly vertical programs. As 
described in more depth in Chapter X, for example, the Obama Administration has many 
opportunities in the context of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions regulation to 
involve smaller-scale government actors in deciding how to frame and distribute financial 
incentives.601 Such involvement ensures that those receiving funding to innovate also 
help to shape and coordinate those efforts to support the innovation, which creates a 
greater alignment between the federal and smaller-scale programs that has the potential to 
augment efficiency and effectiveness. 
Moreover, the role and scale of horizontal interactions varies depending on 
whether one focuses on what cars we drive or how we drive them. Although horizontal 
coalitions of smaller-scale entities push for progress on both fronts, and have had a 
significant policy impact, the smaller-scale entities have more control over the second 
category because of the way in which regulatory authority is divided. The federal 
government is charged with implementation of the federal statutes that provide the basis 
for much of the technology-oriented motor vehicles emissions regulation, while state and 
local governments play a primary role in the land-use planning decisions that shape how 
people use their vehicles. For example, after participating in the process of crafting the 
National Program, the smaller-scale entities will ultimately be bound by its federal-level 
                                                
601 See infra Chapters XI–XIII. 
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standards, which apply vertically. 602  In contrast, even when in dialogue with or 
incentivized by the Obama Administration, states and localities still largely control the 
smaller-scale land-use planning and transportation initiatives which influence the way in 
which people use their cars.603 As discussed in depth in Chapter X, these skews impact 
where the opportunities exist for the Obama Administration to pursue additional diagonal 
initiatives. 
 
3. Direction of Hierarchy 
Because any diagonal scheme includes different levels of government, questions 
of hierarchy arise. The key focus for this dimension of diagonal regulation is the direction 
(from up-to-down or down-to-up) of the vertical component of the regulatory approach. 
Predominantly top-down approaches involve dictates from larger-scale entities to 
smaller-scale entities, whereas predominantly bottom-up approaches are driven by the 
subnational dictates. As with the first two categories, approaches to what vehicles we 
drive skew differently in this dimension than approaches to how we drive them—namely, 
the former tend to be much more top-down and the latter tend to be much more bottom-
up, although both have top-down and bottom-up elements in the Obama Administration 
approach and other approaches. For example, mandates from the EPA604 or block grants 
from the DOE605 would typically be predominantly top-down, vertical, and large-scale in 
                                                
602 See supra notes 41–50 and accompanying text. 
 
603 See supra notes 164, 169–70 & 177–81 and accompanying text and infra notes 207–18 and 
accompanying text. 
 
604 See supra note 597 and accompanying text. 
 
605 See supra notes 75 & 599 and accompanying text. 
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whichever administration implements them, whereas Climate Communities’ efforts606 are 
predominantly bottom-up, horizontal, and small-scale.  
In grappling with this third dimension of hierarchy, dynamic federalism 
scholarship analyzes the need for both top-down and bottom-up dynamics in evolving, 
complex environmental regulatory contexts, which pairs well with Cox’s model of intra- 
and inter-scalar interaction. For instance, Daniel Esty and William Buzbee, among others, 
have both argued for nuanced models of federal-state interaction that allow for policy 
approaches to vary based on contextual needs.607 Ann Carlson’s work on iterative 
federalism has looked at the interplay between state and federal actors in a series of 
relationships and argued that in the context of Clean Air Act waivers, the vertical 
regulatory direction varies over time in an iterative fashion.608 Tony Arnold has explored 
the complex top-down and bottom-up dynamics that frame land-use planning in the 
United States.609 In another variation outside of the environmental context, Robert 
Schapiro uses the metaphor of polyphony from music to argue that an interactive model 
of federalism, with ever shifting state-federal dynamics, should supplant the traditional 
dualist model.610 
                                                
606 See supra notes 587–589 and accompanying text. 
 
607 See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005); 
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 49–56 (2003) [hereinafter Buzbee, Regulatory Commons]; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing 
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996). 
 
608 See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009). 
 
609 See Craig Anthony Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441 (2007). 
 
610 See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 92–120 (2009). 
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Scholars have also highlighted the opposite advantages and disadvantages of top-
down and bottom-up regulatory strategies. Top-down approaches, such as setting a 
national-level motor vehicle emissions standard, have the benefit of avoiding divergence 
at smaller-scales, a much-discussed concern with bottom-up approaches.611 Specifically, 
they prevent piecemeal strategies that can cause leakage—movement from jurisdictions 
with more stringent regulations to jurisdictions with more lax regulations—and set clear 
expectations for corporations and others that have interests which crosscut 
jurisdictions.612 Also, as with the large-scale efforts, top-down approaches comport with 
traditional expectations about how a complex problem like climate change should be 
regulated.613 Beyond their immediate benefits, these advantages together help make such 
approaches more politically viable. 
Conversely, top-down approaches, unless carefully structured, risk stifling the 
innovation and local knowledge that localities and states can provide. Even as the federal 
government moves swiftly under the Obama Administration to address climate change, 
its size prevents direct integration of the nuances and competencies of subnational 
regulations. Bottom-up efforts capture more easily the many divergences that are needed 
for smaller-scale actors to respond to local conditions without the rigidity and constraint 
that often accompany top-down mandates.614  
                                                
611 See Wiener, supra note 571. 
 
612 See id. 
 
613 See supra note 571 and accompanying text. 
 
614 See Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 411; Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change 
Legislation in Context, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 245 (2008). 
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One of the primary ways in which the federal government addresses issues of 
hierarchy is through its approach to preemption. President Obama’s May 2009 
memorandum to heads of executive departments and agencies reinforced that his 
Administration is departing significantly from the Bush Administration regarding 
preemption.615 The memorandum established that preemption had to be justified and that 
preambles to regulation should not attempt to establish preemption without 
accompanying regulatory language.616 This general approach to preemption creates more 
room for and protection of bottom-up regulatory efforts.  
However, even with its policy on preemption, the Obama Administration still 
faces questions about when preemption is appropriate and when to delegate more of its 
authority. For example, a number of current motor vehicle emissions reduction initiatives 
by smaller-scale governments, especially coalitions of localities, push the federal 
government to delegate more authority to cities and counties and to provide additional 
funding for locally-driven efforts.617 Moreover, these initiatives take place in the broader 
context of the iterative process that has led to the converging California and federal 
standards for tailpipe emissions and fuel efficiency.618 While the Obama Administration 
                                                
615 See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 24693 (May, 20, 
2009). 
 
616 See id. 
 
617 For the example of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, see supra notes 562 and 575. For the example of 
Climate Communities, see supra notes 587–589. Both the National League of Cities and the Association of 
Metropolitan Planning Organizations have made similar statements. For the former, see The Future of Our 
Hometowns and the Nation: At Issue: Infrastructure, available at 
http://www.nlc.org/ASSETS/54FECF4146254696AA20BB36C3C660F0/Infrastructure%20Policy%20Brie 
f%20-%20Updated%202909.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2011); for the latter, see Summary Report, MPO Peer 
Workshop on Planning for Climate Change, Mar. 6–7, 2008, available at 
http://www.ampo.org/assets/library/171_workshopclimatechgseattle.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 
618 See Carlson, Iterative Federalism, supra note 608. See also supra notes 444–456 and accompanying 
text. 
 226 
has been responsive to the need for local development of transportation solutions through 
its ARRA financial incentives programs, the federal government still controls that 
allocation of funds, rather than making the distribution in collaboration with coalitions of 
localities working on these issues.619  
Either top-down or bottom-up efforts, if carefully structured, can avoid the above 
pitfalls. Some top-down mandates include adequate flexibility to allow for smaller-scale 
innovation and tailoring, and some bottom-up efforts are sufficiently coordinated to 
address many of the critiques. For example, tandem top-down and bottom-up approaches, 
such as the Obama Administration’s simultaneous efforts on fuel standards and the CAA 
waiver, can incorporate both types of benefits. The key, either way, is an awareness of 
these benefits and limitations so that they can be addressed in an overall regulatory 
scheme. As discussed in more depth in Chapter X, the Obama Administration should 
consider additional opportunities for building more movement in this dimension into its 
traditionally structured top-down programs by bringing smaller-scale governmental 
coalitions into more of its transportation decision-making. 
 
4. Cooperativeness 
Finally, diagonal regulatory strategies are not necessarily cooperative. Chapters 
IV through 7 of this dissertation trace the way in which lawsuits over climate regulation, 
for instance, serve as forces of diagonal integration.620 Chapter VI’s example of the 
dispute over San Bernardino County’s approach to climate change and developments 
                                                
619 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 
620 See Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 411. 
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since that settlement demonstrate particularly the mix of cooperation and conflict that 
encourages the land-use planning decisions needed to bring down greenhouse gas 
emissions, including those from motor vehicles. 621  As discussed in that chapter, 
California and several nongovernmental organizations used California Environmental 
Quality Act claims to force San Bernardino County to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
more explicitly.622 As the County settled the case in August 2007 in an agreement that 
included developing an emissions reduction plan,623 it launched “Green County San 
Bernardino,” a multiscalar environmental effort involving of individuals, companies, 
cities, other local government entities, and a neighboring county.624 “Green Valley 
Cities” is a cooperative venture with Riverside County to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions through flexible local implementation; participating entities include not only 
cities, but also water districts and the Joint Powers Authority of a realigned Riverside 
County Air Force base.625  
                                                
621 See id. 
 
622 See Petition for Writ of Mandate at 12, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, 
(Super. Ct. San Bernadino County 2007) (No. 07 Civ. 293), available at 
http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/Petition_(00011023).PDF; Petition for Writ of Mandate at ¶ 5, 
People v. County of San Bernardino, (Super. Ct. San Bernadino County 2007) (No. 07 Civ. 329), available 
at http://ag.ca.gov/global warming/pdf/San Bernardino_complaint.pdf. 
 
623 See Confidential Settlement Agreement, People v. County of San Bernardino (Super. Ct. San Bernadino 
County 2007) (No. 07 Civ. 329), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/press/2007-08-
21_San_Bernardino_settlement_agreement.pdf; Imran Ghori, Lawsuit Against San Bernardino County 
General Plan Dropped, THE PRESS ENTERPRISE, Dec. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE_News_Local_H_settle18.31d902e.html; Email from 
Jonathan Evans, Staff Attorney, Center for Biological Diversity, to Hari M. Osofsky, Associate Professor, 
Washington and Lee University School of Law (Dec. 15, 2008, 16:43:00 EST) (on file with author). 
 
624 See Press Release, Biane Unveils “Green County San Bernardino” Programs (Aug. 27, 2007) available 
at http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/content/press_releases/20070827_bosd2_green_county.pdf; 
Green County San Bernardino, http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/about_ gc.aspx (last visited Jan. 
10, 2011). 
 
625 See GREEN VALLEY INITIATIVE JURISDICTION, 
http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/content/green_valley_initiative_cities/gvi_jurisdiction.pdf (last 
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These collaborations include initiatives to promote green transportation in San 
Bernardino County. The County’s website advertises some preexisting initiatives, such as 
a two-decades-old commuter services program which rewards county employees for 
coordinating alternative commuting arrangements and a fleet management program 
focused on transitioning the county to alternative-fuel vehicles.626 But the website also 
focuses on efforts by car companies to install solar panels on their warehouses and 
provides resources to companies on telecommuting and to residents on alternative 
commuting, bicycle paths, and clean cars.627 The County supports these alternatives 
tangibly through collaboration with other Southern California counties in programs such 
as CommuteSmart.info, which helps to connect commuters to ride-sharing options, 
provides free rides home for stuck ride-sharers, and advertises rebates and incentives for 
those who share rides.628 Thus, over time, a conflictual relationship between the county 
and the state has helped to produce a number of cooperative relationships among the 
county and other local governmental entities which include greening transportation 
further.  
                                                                                                                                            
visited Jan. 10, 2011); GREEN VALLEY INITIATIVE RESOLUTION, http:// 
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Jan. 10, 2011); GREEN VALLEY INITIATIVE CITIES, 
http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/green_valley_initiative_cities.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). I 
have analyzed the implications of these developments for our conceptions of “local” in Hari M. Osofsky, 
Scaling “Local”: The Implications of Greenhouse Gas Regulation in San Bernardino County, 30 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 689 (2009). 
 
626 See GREEN COUNTY SAN BERNARDINO, COMMUTER SERVICES, 
http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/county_projects/commuter_services.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 
2011); GREEN COUNTY SAN BERNARDINO, GREEN FLEET, 
http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/county_projects/transportation_accomplishments.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2011). 
 
627 For these links, see GREEN COUNTY SAN BERNARDINO, 
http://www.sbcounty.gov/greencountysb/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 
628 See COMMUTESMART.INFO, http://www.commutesmart.info/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
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Cooperativeness, like the other dimensions, serves as just one factor in a 
regulatory scheme, and may vary at different stages as actors interact through multiple 
spaces of dependence and engagement and reshape those spaces over time. As I have 
described in depth in Chapter V, California’s waiver request and the EPA’s denial have 
formed a part of conflicts over the appropriate role of states in motor vehicle emissions 
regulation.629 However, the Obama Administration EPA’s reconsideration of both the 
granting of the waiver and the results thereof, in tandem with harmonization efforts with 
respect to fuel economy standards, have created a cooperative diagonal scheme.630 Recent 
federalism scholarship explores the complex mix of cooperation and conflict that arises in 
a variety of contexts, including with respect to climate change.631 
Cooperative federalism’s greatest advantage as a basis for climate change 
regulation is its ability to create coordinated multiscalar action in which each actor 
provides its unique contribution. A number of scholars and policymakers have taken and 
continue to take significant steps to sketch a framework for cooperative action. They are 
exploring the nuances of how collaboration might work among specific entities in 
particular policy areas. This analysis makes clear that cooperative approaches, if crafted 
well, incentivize action while making room for innovation. For instance, a Center for 
Progressive Reform study by William Andreen and others shows how localities, states, 
and the federal government can work together on this problem.632 Alice Kaswan has also 
                                                
629 See Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 411. See also supra notes 444–456 and 
accompanying text. 
 
630 See supra note 412 and accompanying text. 
 
631 See infra notes 632–637. 
 
632 See Andreen, et. al., supra note 574. 
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published an interesting cooperative federalism proposal bringing together these three 
levels of government, and Holly Doremus and W. Michael Hanemann have argued that 
the Clean Air Act provides a cooperative federalism model that could be used in crafting 
effective climate change legislation. 633  Some dynamic environmental approaches 
combine cooperative federalism with other theories. For example, Brad Karkkainen’s 
analysis of information-forcing environmental regulation brings together cooperative 
federalism and new governance approaches to consider how “[p]roperly structured, 
penalty default rules might be used to induce meaningful participation in locally devolved, 
place-based, collaborative, public-private hybrid, new governance institutions, aimed at 
integrated, adaptive, experimentalist management of watersheds and other 
institutions.” 634  This particular combination of cooperative federalism and new 
governance approaches allows for innovative structures that encompass the 
multidimensionality of these problems. 
However, other dynamic federalism scholars have questioned the extent to which 
cooperative models can capture the disagreement over climate change policy choices, and 
as a result, a stream of scholarship focusing on uncooperative federalism has emerged. 
This scholarship includes those directly terming their model “uncooperative,” such as 
Karen Bridges, Kirk Junker, and Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken.635 But the 
                                                
633 See Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Legislation: The Value of State 
Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791 (2008); Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, 
Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework is Useful for 
Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 (2008). 
 
634 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 
888 (2006). 
 
635 See Kirk W. Junker, Conventional Wisdom, De-emption and Uncooperative Federalism in International 
Environmental Agreements, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 93 (2004–05); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather 
K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Karen Bridges, Note, Uncooperative 
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literature also contains work like that of Ann Carlson and Robert Schapiro, which 
incorporates conflict in the dynamics they highlight.636 In addition, some scholars, such 
as William Buzbee, Ann Carlson, Robert Glicksman and Richard Levy, Alexandra Klass, 
and Bejamin Sovacool have looked at these questions of cooperation and conflict in a 
preemption context, arguing for the important complementary role that state and local 
efforts and state court common law litigation play in the broader environmental 
regulatory picture.637 Overall, this scholarship dealing with the limits of cooperative 
models explores the way in which disagreement over time should be brought into a 
federalist regulatory scheme.  
This scholarship on conflict within federalism highlights two potential difficulties 
facing cooperative schemes. First, conflict exists and often plays out across Cox’s 
multiscalar networks. As Robert Schapiro has noted, cooperative schemes may struggle 
at times to address differences adequately and to include all relevant actors.638 Certainly, 
                                                                                                                                            
Federalism: The Struggle over Subsistence and Sovereignty in Alaska Continues, 19 PUB. LAND & 
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in the U.S. climate change context, states vary greatly in how they want to approach the 
problem, as represented by the states on both sides of Massachusetts v. EPA.639  
Second, and at least as importantly, conflict has value in reordering spaces of 
dependence and engagement and, in the process, reshaping scalar arrangements in needed 
ways. Regulatory schemes that include opportunities for dissent, such as through citizen 
suit provisions, can potentially incorporate divergent views more effectively, as well as 
make sure that pressure remains on policymakers to think through tough issues.640 In two 
high-profile examples of conflict over motor vehicle emissions regulation discussed in 
Chapters IV and V—Massachusetts v. EPA and the California CAA waiver dispute—the 
change in presidential administration during their ultimate resolution helped to shape 
more rigorous national approaches. These approaches will continue to evolve as the 
Obama Administration develops its regulatory scheme more fully over time in 
collaboration with California and automobile companies and attempts to navigate the 
intense partisan politics of climate change.641 However, as these examples illustrate, the 
Obama Administration will often need a mix of cooperation and conflict over time to 
achieve effective multiscalar climate regulation; the conflict helps to air differences and 
to create pressure for action, while the cooperation allows for coordination and 
collaboration. 
                                                
639 549 U.S. 497 (2007). I discuss the dynamics among actors in the suit in more depth in Chapter IV. 
 
640 See Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 411; Hari M. Osofsky, Conclusion: 
Adjudicating Climate Change across Scales, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 375 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009); Schapiro, 
Interactive Federalism, supra note 638, at 283–85. 
 
641 See supra note 412 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, an effective diagonal strategy could be developed further through a 
combination of approaches that vary across the four dimensions. The key to creating the 
needed cross-cutting interactions is to ensure that incentives for that variety exist in a 
situationally appropriate fashion which effectively use and refashion available spaces of 
dependence and engagement. Chapter X examines what those incentives might be in the 
context of the Obama Administration’s approach to motor vehicles regulation. It builds 
upon this chapter’s assessment of dynamics in each of these dimensions to examine 
future possibilities for diagonal strategies in this area. 
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CHAPTER X 
POSSIBILITIES FOR RESCALING OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
TRANSPORTATION POLICY 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and 
Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALABAMA L. REV. 237 
(2011), and Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate 
Change Regulation: Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 447 
(2012). 
 
This chapter analyzes the implications of the taxonomy’s application to motor 
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions regulation for the Obama Administration’s future 
policy choices and proposes areas for rescaling. As noted previously, motor vehicle 
emissions regulation has two core pieces: what we drive and how we drive. Existing 
diagonal regulatory approaches focusing on what we drive tend to be more large-scale, 
vertical, and top-down with a mixture of cooperation and conflict, whereas those focusing 
on how we drive tend to be the opposite: more small-scale, horizontal, and bottom-up. 
This difference likely reflects a divergence in how we envision these two 
regulatory projects, mainly because of the balance of corporate versus individual 
involvement needed for their implementation and because of the grounding of the latter 
one in smaller-scale land-use planning. Many of the regulations that impact what cars we 
drive directly affect the auto industry, and so the industry pushes for the larger-scale 
uniformity which it finds economically advantageous and efficient. Many of the 
regulations that impact consumer choices directly, but the auto industry more indirectly—
such as the way city streets are organized or carpool incentives—tend to rely more on 
smaller-scale decision-making and local specifics. While the bifurcation is not complete 
because top-down programs rely upon diverse smaller-scale implementation and smaller-
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scale government has helped drive federal-level mandates, the existing motor vehicle 
regulation tends to have this divergence when viewed through the lens of the taxonomy. 
These tendencies point the way for future diagonal strategies, which this chapter explores 
by analyzing approaches to what cars we drive, how we drive them, and motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions litigation.  
 
1. Technology-Driven Standards and Incentives (Or, What Cars We Drive) 
With regard to what we drive, the Obama Administration’s approach primarily 
takes the form of top-down, national-level mandates and top-down, multiscalar financial 
incentives programs paired with international cooperation. Its National Program forces 
companies to invest in greener cars by setting combined emissions and efficiency 
standards that ramp up over time but is endorsed by these companies out of their desire 
for national uniformity.642 The various financial incentives programs, which have been 
significantly funded through ARRA, help foster corporate and smaller-scale 
governmental development of the technology needed to meet those standards in ways that 
fit specific contexts.643 
However, as discussed in depth in Chapters VIII and IX, these overall tendencies 
contain nuance. Neither its mandates nor its financial incentives are fully top-down 
because they involve opportunities for bottom-up input and involvement. For example, 
the Clean Air Act waiver system has allowed both coalitions of states to help drive more 
stringent federal standards and individual companies, cities, states, and tribes to develop 
                                                
642 See supra notes 44 & 162. 
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the specific programs which the federal government funds.644 In addition, the larger 
international context in which the mandates and incentives take place helps to shape them, 
which results in another large-scale, horizontal component of the dynamics. As the 
United States collaborates with other key countries on motor vehicles, fuel technology, 
and transportation strategy, its national policies are influenced by the approaches and 
commitments of its nation-state collaborators.645 For example, the collaboration between 
the United States and China on electric vehicles is spurring demonstration projects in a 
number of cities.646 
Given this complex, but clearly skewed, backdrop that the taxonomy illuminates, 
this chapter queries whether this imbalance is appropriate. These skews have their 
advantages, as the prior chaper’s analysis illuminates. Large-scale, vertical, top-down 
approaches comport with many people’s understanding of climate change as a large-scale 
problem, help to create certainty for corporations that allows for planning and efficient 
business choices, and prevent leakage among jurisdictions. Appropriate technology for 
vehicles and fuels should arguably be relatively uniform across jurisdictions, given the 
national and international markets for these products.647 
With full recognition of those advantages of current skews, this chapter argues for 
the value of achieving more balance by involving smaller-scale actors in federal decision-
making processes. It proposes methods for involvement which would achieve the benefits 
of locally specific knowledge and innovation without undermining the advantages of the 
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current skews. Even in the technology context, locally specific resources, needs, and 
politics make some approaches more viable than others. For example, solar only works 
well in places which have enough sun, and wind power only works well in places which 
have enough wind. An electric car is most viable in states willing to invest in enough 
charging stations, and biofuels will be available without the monetary and emissions 
costs of transporting them in places where they are grown. Moreover, the specific people 
with the knowledge and skills to develop particular innovations, whether scientifically or 
in practical implementation, will vary from place to place.648 If there are ways to create 
large-scale certainty and consistency, but take the smaller-scale variation into account, 
our policies can gain fuller advantages in each dimension. 
First and foremost, a major part of achieving this balance in the future is 
maintaining balancing efforts which already exist. To that end, the Obama 
Administration will need to decide how committed it is to preserving existing diagonals 
in the face of increasing preemption pressure. The Obama Administration has already 
constrained preemption in the Executive Branch through the President’s May 2009 
memorandum. 649  As the National Program continues to develop, the Obama 
Administration has managed to maintain a cooperative rather than preemptive approach 
to obtaining uniformity. However, before climate change legislation failed, pressure 
existed, particularly from affected companies, to make comprehensive federal climate 
                                                
648 For a discussion of potential alternative vehicle technologies and their benefits and limitations, see 
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change legislation highly preemptive.650 To the extent that some form of climate change 
or, more likely, clean energy legislation becomes politically viable, hard choices will 
again emerge about how preemptive those statutes should be. Advocates of significant 
preemption not only cite the need for corporate certainty and efficiency, but also argue 
that under an emerging cooperative comprehensive regime, significant opportunities for 
divergence are no longer needed.651  
Those favoring more limited preemption, on the other hand, typically focus on the 
historically and currently important role that provisions like the CAA waiver play in 
helping to drive stronger federal regulatory efforts.652 Analyzing these efforts through the 
lens of the taxonomy reinforces the argument against preemption by demonstrating the 
ways in which these provisions allow for shifting skews in each dimension over time. 
Specifically, the shifts in skews over time create the iterative process that Ann Carlson 
has described in this context, which has helped to drive stronger federal regulation.653 
This diagonal-enhancing quality of these provisions helps to make the overall regulatory 
approach more crosscutting and flexible, and the Obama Administration should not give 
in to pressure to make a comprehensive national program rigidly top-down. 
Second, and in more of a shift from the status quo, the Obama Administration 
should explore options for greater involvement by smaller-scale government coalitions in 
                                                
650 See, e.g., Voinovich Throws Curveball at Senators’ Plan to Limit GHG Regs in Climate Bill, ENV’T & 
ENERGY DAILY (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/04/22/22climatewire-sen-voinovich-
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the development of its financial incentives programs. While the current programs allow 
each individual, smaller-scale government to develop a locally specific, innovative plan, 
they often do not provide sufficient opportunity for smaller-scale, horizontal 
collaboration and conflict to shape the overall contours of what it approves and how these 
projects develop over time. The Obama Administration’s current traditional structure in 
most of its decisions regarding green motor vehicles technology—namely, the federal 
government assessing smaller-scale applications and approving some of them—only 
allows for those collaborative moments informally, or through specific efforts to connect 
related programs.654  
Accordingly, the Obama Administration should expand upon its current models to 
build more programs that involve innovative collaboration. For example, its approaches 
to crafting national programs in the motor vehicle and clean energy contexts—in which it 
brought together key subnational and corporate actors—might also work well with 
respect to financial incentives. The Administration might also expand upon these models 
by better including national organizations of smaller-scale governments in the 
decisionmaking process. These entities—which have collective interests and so are 
unlikely to lobby for particular local projects—could be more involved in shaping the 
contours of financial incentives programs and the funding decisions that those programs 
entail.655 The Administration has created the beginnings of such an approach in the 
DOE’s Clean Cities program, where the federal government is working with smaller-
scale coalitions around the country, but even this project does not seem to integrate those 
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coalitions into national-level decision-making.656 This integration would not only make 
efforts to address what cars we drive less skewed within the taxonomy’s dimensions, but 
also create a funding and policymaking scheme that more effectively incorporates 
smaller-scale perspectives. Such perspectives are particularly useful in assessing the on-
the-ground viability of specific technology and the types of consumer incentives which 
would be most effective in particular locales—assessments that should be incorporated 
into what the Obama Administration chooses to incentivize.  
These suggestions regarding preemption and inclusiveness demonstrate the role 
that the taxonomy can play in shaping future policy regarding technology-driven 
approaches. While the taxonomy does not dictate any particular policy strategy, it does 
indicate where diagonal approaches skew. Although the Obama Administration may 
decide at times that such skews are appropriate, an awareness of them can help to 
motivate a more balanced approach overall. Specifically, since approaches to what cars 
we drive tend to be skewed so heavily, particularly with respect to the first three 
dimensions—they are largely large-scale, vertical, and top-down—the Obama 
Administration should be particularly alert to the repercussions of policy changes on 
those skews. It should give careful scrutiny to proposed preemption of current 
opportunities for smaller-scale divergence and seek ways of better involving smaller-
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scale coalitions’ perspectives in its financial incentives for alternative vehicles 
technology. 
 
2. Land-Use and Transportation Planning (Or, How We Drive Our Cars) 
With respect to how we drive, policy efforts have opposite skews from the ones in 
the context of what we drive. Specifically, although the Obama Administration, by virtue 
of its positionality, still primarily uses top-down mandates and financial incentives, the 
bulk of legal efforts regarding how we drive are generated and controlled by smaller-
scale government due to the structure of land-use planning law in the United States. In 
practical terms, this structure means that many of the most important diagonal regulatory 
efforts regarding how we drive in our communities are not those connected with the 
Obama Administration’s federal programs, but rather small-scale, bottom-up, horizontal 
initiatives among state and local governments.657 
As with the previous regulatory category, these trends contain nuance because 
efforts to influence how we drive have different emphases at larger and smaller 
jurisdiction levels. The Obama Administration’s large-scale, vertical, top-down efforts, as 
described above in Chapter VIII, focus primarily on reworking national transportation 
policy and infrastructure and on incentivizing innovative state and local programs. For 
example, the Obama Administration is aiming to link more cities through high speed rail, 
is funding state and local transit agency’s efforts to use alternative energy technology, 
and is supporting urban circulator projects.658 In contrast, state and local governmental 
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efforts generally focus on planning issues and changing cultural expectations. For 
instance, governments at these smaller jurisdictional levels often work to make urban 
growth plans more sustainable and to promote and fund creative ride-sharing 
programs.659 The primary manner in which these sets of policies come together is through 
efforts to implement federal transportation policy at state and local levels, which, under 
the Obama Administration, comes substantially through ARRA funded programs.660 
The overall skews in this policy area toward the smaller-scale, horizontal, and 
bottom-up have their advantages. They ensure that the levels of government with the 
greatest competence to address the policies that most affect how people use their cars—
often, land use and planning issues—are able to make the individualized choices which 
will work in their respective jurisdictions. As Janet Levit and I have explored, Portland 
and Tulsa both are making strides on reducing emissions, but how that translates in their 
local contexts differs greatly.661  The dissertation’s third case study on suburban climate 
change efforts also reflects the need to acknowledge local variation.662 
However, as in the technology context, this chapter argues for the value of greater 
balance and integration. Large-scale efforts, like the ones in which the Obama 
Administration is engaged, help to address the national-level infrastructure concerns and 
create coordination among local efforts. Moreover, the federal funds are an important part 
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of what allows localities to innovate.663 Further development along both of these lines 
would help to advance efforts to change the ways in which people use their cars. 
More so than in the technology context, the federal government shares the 
national and international stage with horizontal coalitions of subnational governments. 
Those entities also work to coordinate efforts among localities and states, as evidenced by 
agreements among cities, states, and provinces around the world at UNFCCC 
negotiations and those among localities and states in the United States.664 These dual 
large-scale efforts suggest possibilities for the Obama Administration’s future diagonal 
strategies, which the coalitions themselves have been requesting: collaborate with them 
more closely, so that there is better integration between the Administration’s federal 
efforts and the coalitions’ smaller-scale efforts.665  
This integration may take a variety of forms. Specifically, in expanding such 
partnerships, the Obama Administration will have options in how much it wants to defer 
to smaller-scale governmental authorities and coalitions. The Administration may decide 
that in some instances, more deference is warranted and that in others, it prefers the status 
quo power balance. However, even if it does not change the balance of power at all 
through greater delegation, the Obama Administration has an opportunity to create policy 
integration with respect to how we drive that does not currently exist. As a practical 
matter, this greater integration would not be difficult to achieve. The Obama 
Administration has already been giving funds to localities that on many fronts line up 
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with requests of coalitions like Climate Communities, although the greater financial 
pressure it continues to face has translated into a failure to include requests in the 2011 or 
2012 budgets for DOE’s Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants or the EPA’s 
Climate Showcase Communities program, both of which include green transportation 
funding.666 Federal agencies also already work with states, cities, and tribes on these 
initiatives and consult informally with them a great deal. The Obama Administration 
could build on all of these existing efforts by creating more opportunities to bring 
together relevant agencies and subnational coalitions both to help frame how funds are 
structured and distributed and to plan next steps. 
Such vertical integration among key governmental entities at different levels—
even if it only involved more informal consultation—would mirror the kind of horizontal 
integration that the Obama Administration has done by creating the National Program 
and merging EPA and DOT efforts.667 Namely, it would bring together entities with 
overlapping policy projects into more collaborative relationships than currently exist. In 
creating such integration, the Administration would shift the land-use planning and 
cultural aspects of motor vehicle greenhouse gas regulation from one in which bifurcated 
skews exist—with the Administration’s efforts skewing one way and smaller-scale efforts 
skewing the other—to one with more balance within each dimension. As discussed above, 
                                                
666 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 APPENDIX (2011); CLIMATE COMMUNITIES, 
http://climatecommunities.us/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011); Climate Showcase Communities Grants, UNITED 
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY STATE AND LOCAL CLIMATE AND ENERGY PROGRAM, 
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/local/showcase/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011); DOE Block Grant 
Program, supra note 478. 
 
667 See supra Chapter IX. 
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this balance will help make the federal government a more supportive and integrated 
partner in local land-use planning efforts intended to reduce vehicle miles traveled. 
As with technology-driven standards, the taxonomy can be used in this context as 
a tool to suggest many different policy approaches. The key contribution it makes is in 
organizing that conversation. By demonstrating the ways in which current approaches 
skew within the four dimensions, it can increase the Obama Administration’s sensitivity 
to how it might create greater overall integration and be more responsive to coalitions of 
leader states and localities. 
 
3. The Ongoing Role of Litigation 
Finally, with respect to both types of regulation, the Obama Administration will 
continue to confront the question of when lawsuits should be allowed. Climate change 
litigation targets both government regulations and corporate emissions, and as discussed 
in Chapter VII, serves as a mechanism for greater diagonal interaction. Litigation can 
serve as a game-changer by shifting the skews within each of the dimensions. In my view, 
this diagonal quality of litigation means that it is a valuable tool to aid in the Obama 
Administration’s efforts to reduce motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions; litigation 
needs to be built into regulatory schemes the Obama Administration is creating to allow 
for different perspectives to be brought into the regulatory process.668 
The Obama Administration currently interacts with the regulatory role of 
litigation in two main contexts. First, and especially because Congress has failed to pass 
major climate change legislation, more general environmental statutes have become a 
                                                
668 See supra Chapter VII. 
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major locus in the policy dialogue over climate change policy. In the motor vehicle 
emissions context, the litigation over motor vehicles greenhouse gas emissions discussed 
in Chapter IV and V has played and continues to play a critical role in helping to frame 
approaches; it has provided leader states and cities with a mechanism for pushing for 
more stringent regulatory standards and more skeptical ones with a mechanism for 
pushing against those standards. The CAA petition and waiver processes specifically 
have resulted in an EPA endangerment finding and have helped to provide the basis for 
the National Program.669 In contrast, lawsuits filed against the EPA’s endangerment 
finding served to express concerns about regulating climate change through that 
mechanism.670  
Even if comprehensive climate change legislation or significant clean energy 
legislation were to pass, the CAA will likely remain a critical mechanism for motor 
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions regulation (assuming that legislative and judicial 
efforts to block that regulation continue to fail). The processes established by the CAA 
that provide the basis for litigation serve as an important way in which smaller-scale, 
horizontal coalitions can provide bottom-up input. The Supreme Court even 
acknowledged this type of administrative, statutorily-based litigation as an appropriate 
path for challenging the EPA’s approach in its 2011 decision in American Electric Power 
                                                
669 See id. at 616–30. 
 
670 See, e.g., Petition to Review of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Virginia ex rel Cuccinelli v. EPA (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), available at 
http://www.oag.state.va.us/LEGAL_LEGIS/CourtFilings/Comm%20v%20EPA%20-
%20Pet%20to%20Review%202_16_10.pdf; see also Holly Doremus, Lining up for Endangerment 
Litigation, LEGAL PLANET: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY BLOG (Feb. 20, 2010), 
http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2010/02/20/lining-up-for-endangerment-litigation/; supra Chapters IV–
VII. 
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Co. v. Connecticut [AEP].671 Litigation has played a important role both in giving the 
Obama Administration the needed regulatory authority to address motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions through the CAA and in illuminating the various views which 
public and private entities have on what course such regulation should take.  
Second, with respect to the comprehensive climate change and energy regulation 
that failed to pass in Congress, heated debates focused on the extent to which this 
legislation should both contain mechanisms for litigation and preempt other litigation. 
The CAA provides a model for why this legislation, if it ever becomes more politically 
viable, needs to contain some mechanisms for interested smaller-scale governments, 
nongovernmental organizations, and individuals to challenge policy choices.672 Such 
mechanisms make the statute more balanced within the four dimensions by providing a 
way for smaller-scale entities to work together horizontally and provide a bottom-up 
challenge to largely federal-level, vertical, top-down decisions. As the CAA context 
illustrates, these challenges may not always push in the direction of more stringent 
regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions. However, this input from both 
directions can help the Obama Administration to craft more broadly acceptable policy 
that moves the dialogue forward. 
These mechanisms in both existing and potential statutes are particularly important 
due to the Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric Power v. Connecticut.  As 
noted above, in June 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided its second case involving 
                                                
671 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011). 
 
672 For examples of other scholarship arguing that the CAA provides a model for shaping climate change 
legislation, see Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 633; William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and 
Disappointments: Lessons for Climate Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 33 (2010). 
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climate change and, in the process, reinforced the country’s current regulatory path. The 
core of the AEP decision focuses on the relationship between federal regulatory authority 
under the Clean Air Act and common law public nuisance. The U.S. Supreme Court 
holds that “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal 
common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired 
power plants.”673 AEP bases its unanimous displacement decision on Massachusetts’s 
finding that carbon dioxide emissions qualify as air pollution under the Clean Air Act.674 
AEP interprets that finding as establishing Congress’s delegation to the EPA of “whether 
and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; the delegation is what 
displaces federal common law.”675    
 In the process of explaining its displacement holding, the Court in AEP makes 
two interrelated points that will shape the path of efforts to address climate change at a 
federal level in the United States. It precludes federal common law nuisance actions as a 
mechanism for challenging EPA’s approach to climate change regulation—even if EPA 
declines to regulate—so long as EPA has regulatory authority.676 At the same time, the 
Court reinforces the appropriateness of regulatory suits challenging the EPA: “If the 
plaintiffs in this case are dissatisfied with the outcome of the EPA’s forthcoming 
rulemaking, their resource under federal law is to seek Court of Appeals review, and 
ultimately, to petition for certiorari in the Court.”677 This combination suggests that the 
                                                
673 No. 10–174, 564 U.S. __, slip opinion at 10 (June 20, 2011). 
 
674 See Jonathan H. Adler, A Tale of Two Climate Cases, YALE L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2011). 
 
675 564 U.S. __, slip opinion at 12. 
 
676 Id. 
 
677 Id., slip opinion at 13. 
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Court remains open to climate change litigation’s continuing role in determining the 
course of federal regulation so long as that litigation has a statutory focus. 
 In addition to reinforcing the appropriateness of litigation over federal regulatory 
approaches, AEP puts pressure on Congress to leave the current regime under the Clean 
Air Act in place. The opinion explicitly does not reach whether a federal common law 
nuisance action would be allowed if Congress decided that EPA could no longer regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions. The opinion thus limits federal common law as a “parallel 
track” for challenging EPA’s regulatory decisions but leaves that track potentially open if 
Congress passes legislation that overrides Massachusetts.678   
The Court’s view of climate change litigation in AEP ensures that courts will 
remain an important regulatory battleground in the United States for the Obama 
Administration. The Court not only endorses the appropriateness of suits over the EPA’s 
approach to regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, but also allows this 
exploding area of litigation to continue—for the most part—along its current trajectory. 
The increasing investment by law firms, governmental entities, and nongovernmental 
organizations in climate change litigation practice likely will proceed apace after AEP. 
This aspect of the outcome is good news from the perspective of encouraging diagonal 
interaction; as displayed in Massachusetts, AEP, and the myriad of cases before lower 
courts, litigation provides a way for key stakeholders to address conflicts over the way 
forward.679   
                                                
678 Id., slip opinion at 9, 15–16. 
 
679 See supra Chapter IV–VII. 
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However, some of the unanswered questions and closed pathways after AEP raise 
questions about the extent to which citizens will be able to use litigation to challenge 
corporate decisionmaking and to achieve redress for those harmed by climate change. 
Maxine Burkett argues that the Court’s decision to narrow possibilities for federal 
common law nuisance actions raises serious justice concerns because it eliminates an 
option for those injured by climate change to obtain corrective justice from major 
emitters.680 While regulatory suits, if they result in greater restrictions on greenhouse gas 
emissions, help to limit the impacts of climate change, they provide limited opportunities 
for victims to obtain redress. Notwithstanding the many procedural and substantive 
concerns raised by climate change nuisance suits that Michael Gerrard has highlighted—
issues that have not yet been addressed for the most part because of the barriers these 
cases have faced at early stages—these suits do focus on the connection between emitters 
and victims in a way that regulatory suits generally do not.681   
The decision by the Court to constrain this avenue for potential justice has 
implications for the U.S. federal regulatory approach. Namely, unless the Court’s 
decision in AEP is accompanied by greater assistance for climate change victims in the 
regulatory framework, its emphasis on the agency pathway risks exacerbating the climate 
justice problem by providing fewer ways for victims to obtain redress. But addressing 
climate justice within a federal regulatory framework, even assuming there is adequate 
political support for such an approach, raises a host of complex concerns. To the extent 
                                                
680 See Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 Yale L.J. Online 115 (2011), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/burkett.html.  
 
681 See Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 135 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/gerrard.html.  
 
 251 
that climate justice involves helping people with few resources adapt to climate change, 
the federal adaptation program in collaboration with smaller scale adaptation efforts 
provide relatively uncontroversial mechanisms for addressing inequality.682   
However, if a vision of climate justice also includes compensation for harm that 
goes beyond adaptation assistance (e.g., the Inuit being unable to use their ancestral lands 
in line with their traditional practices),683 integrating such compensation into a regulatory 
scheme, particularly if it includes a corrective justice component of funding or other 
assistance from major emitters,684 will likely be far more complex and politically 
contentious. As litigation continues to shape the federal regulatory path in the various 
ways that Chapters IV through VII describe, important questions remain for the Obama 
                                                
682 For the current U.S. federal approach to adaptation, see the White House, Council on Environmental 
Quality, Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation. For U.S. state and local 
approaches, see Adaptation Planning—What U.S. States and Localities are Doing, PEW CENTER ON 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http:// www.pewclimate.org/ doc Uploads/ State_ Adaptation_ Planning_ 02_ 
11_ 08.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).  For an analysis of federalism dilemmas in U.S. adaptation planning, 
see Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective on Federalism 
Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159 (2010). 
 
683 U.S. and Canadian Inuit filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission, which was rejected, 
claiming that U.S. climate change policy violated their rights. See Letter from the Organization of 
American States to Sheila Watt-Cloutier, et al. regarding Petition No. P-1413–05, 1 February 2007 (on file 
with the author); Letter from Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Martin Wagner, and Daniel Magraw to Santiago 
Cantón, Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 15 January 2007 (on file with 
the author); Letter from the Organization of American States to Sheila Watt-Cloutier, et al. regarding 
Petition No. P-1413–05, 16 November 2006 (on file with the author); see also Jane George, ICC Climate 
Change Petition Rejected, Nunatsiaq News, 15 December 2006, available at 
www.nunatsiaq.com/news/nunavut/61215_02.html; Jonathan Spicer, Hearing to Probe Climate Change 
and Inuit Rights, Reuters UK, 21 February 2007, available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN204267120070221; Presentation by Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference Eleventh Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Montreal, 7 December 2005, www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=318&Lang=En; see also 
Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007). In the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a pending 
climate change federal common law nuisance case involving indigenous peoples rights is on appeal after 
the district court dismissed the case on justiciability grounds. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 873–76 (N.D. Cal. 2009). This appeal is impacted by the AEP decision. 
 
684 See Burkett, supra note 680. 
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Administration about how to help those most vulnerable to climate change through 
domestic law and what role litigation should play in resolving those questions. Major 
emitters’ choices are intertwined with those of climate change victims, but these linkages 
are hard to address directly through either mitigation or adaptation programs. As courts 
continue to interact with legislatively created statutes to create the basis for key aspects of 
the Obama Administration’s regulatory approach climate change, the United States needs 
to find better ways to address these fundamental fairness concerns. 
Overall, then, in the context of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions regulation, 
thinking in diagonal federalist terms and applying Chapter IX’s law and geography 
taxonomy helps to provide a basis for rethinking regulatory approaches and considering 
how strategies can be more crosscutting. The taxonomy can be used as a relatively 
politically neutral tool for getting at the scale problem that bedevils efforts to get at 
climate change in general, and motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions in particular. 
While this approach will not solve all of the Obama Administration’s challenges, and 
others might choose to apply it differently than this part does, it provides an organized 
framework for identifying gaps and possibilities.  
 
4. Concluding Reflections on the Value of Multidimensional Approaches in the U.S. 
Federal Context  
 
Even with an Administration committed to progress on this issue, the crosscutting 
regulatory problem posed by climate change is daunting. This dissertation argues that a 
diagonal federalism approach can help make the Obama Administration’s ongoing efforts 
to address climate change more effective, even if it cannot make the problem itself less 
complex. As the example of motor vehicle emissions regulation demonstrates, the 
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structure of regulatory approaches even within a relatively narrow subject area varies 
significantly across subissues. An application of the taxonomy across other components 
of the Obama Administration’s climate change policy, such as clean energy and green 
jobs, can both reveal where skews within dimensions are located and help to frame 
conversations about future directions for policy. 
At times, the Administration may deem skews appropriate, particularly in areas 
where it thinks that federal-level, top-down mandate approaches are preferable. However, 
even in those areas, as revealed in the motor vehicles example, opportunities abound for 
creating more interconnection and adding approaches that skew the other way within 
each dimension. Regardless, conducting such an analysis allows for more informed 
decision-making as the Obama Administration navigates complexities of scale. 
Beyond its practical value in the climate change law and policy context, this 
multidimensional approach also has the potential to assist in a needed reframing of the 
environmental federalism literature. Robert Percival explains that environmental 
federalism debates have traditionally centered on how federal versus state authority 
should be allocated.685 In recent years, however, numerous scholars have attempted to 
                                                
685 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995). For example, an extensive environmental federalism dialogue in the mid-1990s 
focused on whether federal or state environmental regulation was more likely to lead to a race to the 
bottom. Compare Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It 
“To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (arguing for federal environmental regulation as valuable), 
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) (same), Joshua D. 
Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental 
Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997) (same), and Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and 
the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental 
Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67 (1996) (same), with Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, 
Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 
14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996) (presenting the downside of extensive federal environmental 
regulation), Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (same), Richard 
L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 
MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) (same), and Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International 
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move beyond this model towards more dynamic ones introduced in Chapter II. Kirsten 
Engel describes this evolution in Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law. Engel explains that such models view the federal government and 
states as alternative sources of regulatory authority that interact over time, and argues that 
these approaches address environmental problems more effectively and are truer to the 
process of policymaking contemplated by our constitutional structure.686  
While all of these dynamic approaches to environmental federalism engage core 
issues raised by a wide range of key actors interacting at multiple levels of government, 
alternate streams in this literature focus on different aspects of what these interactions 
entail. As the analysis in Chapter VIII reinforces, the taxonomy highlights major 
dimensions in which these scholarly discussions take place. Although some articles 
engage more than one of the dimensions, the taxonomy’s framework provides a helpful 
way of organizing these crosscutting ideas.687 
This capacity of the taxonomy to organize environmental federalism debates 
raises conceptual issues, which my future scholarship will engage in depth. First and 
                                                                                                                                            
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) (same). 
 
686 See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY 
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M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 
107 (2004). See also SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM, supra note 610; Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical 
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 879–83 (2006); Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 637, at 
1549–50; Buzbee, Regulatory Commons, supra note 607, at 49–51; Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering 
States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1328–32 (2004); 
Resnik, Law’s Migration, supra note 574; Resnik, Civin & Frueh, supra note 566. See generally Schapiro, 
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federalism. See Symposium, Interactive Federalism: Filling the Gaps?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1 (2006); 
Symposium, The New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decentered World, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007). 
 
687 For examples of the ways in which environmental federalism debates take place in each dimension, see 
supra notes 153–59, 172–73, 197–201 & 222–27. 
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most fundamentally, this multidimensional analysis reveals that the environmental 
federalism literature itself has a particular geography that influences which issues are 
covered and how they are discussed. Most environmental federalism scholarship, even in 
the more dynamic approaches, presumes the ability to treat each level of government as a 
clearly delineated space is generally limited. As a result, analyses focus on each level’s 
appropriate domain and interaction with other levels in each of the four dimensions.688  
While such an approach might be appropriate, the geography and ecology 
literatures contain multiple possibilities for understanding these scales and their 
interaction with one another. As noted in Chapter II, Neil Brenner has summarized a 
number of the definitions of scale which geographers use689 and Nathan Sayre has 
highlighted additional concepts which ecologists bring to an understanding of scale.690 
Current environmental federalism analyses generally focus on Brenner’s first definition; 
the scholarship maps the levels interacting as enclosed spaces and describes and 
prescribes their dynamic interactions. 691  The existence of these many alternative 
possibilities to the understanding of scale in the environmental federalism literature opens 
interesting research questions about how different definitions might change the current 
scholarly debates.  
                                                
688 The environmental federalism approaches described in Chapter IX reflect this conception of scale. See 
supra notes 153–59, 172–73, 197–201 & 222–27. 
 
689 NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATES SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD 9 
(2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
690 Nathan F. Sayre, Ecological and Geographical Scale: Parallels and Potential for Integration, 29 (3) 
PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 276, 281 (2005). 
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Second, within the confines of the map provided by the taxonomy and its four 
dimensions, analyses provide different perspectives on what skews are appropriate when. 
Scholars debate the comparative value of large- and small-scale climate change 
regulation; focus on vertical or horizontal dimensions of interactions; propose top-down, 
bottom-up, or mixed hierarchical schemes; and emphasize conflict or cooperation in the 
regulatory interactions.692 Just as these skews provide opportunities for reflection in the 
policy context, they also assist a rethinking of the scholarly literature. My future work 
will consider how to evaluate the debates over the appropriateness of skews and ask when 
different approaches might be balanced or combined.  
Specifically, as this chapter highlighted, certain contexts, such as motor vehicles’ 
technological development versus usage, lend themselves more towards particular skews 
in the dimensions. Even if adding balance is often desirable, as analyzed in this chapter, 
those skews often are grounded in real differences between those contexts.693 Thinking 
multidimensionally about the environmental federalism debates similarly allows for a 
comparison of the contexts upon which scholarship focuses and enables an assessment of 
where true compatibilities and incompatibilities lie.  
Finally, both of these inquiries lead to a third inquiry, which brings together 
policy with conceptual analysis. Specifically, both the practical and conceptual 
applications of the taxonomy reopen questions about the value and limitations of such 
typologies and the best ways of constructing and assessing them. Thinking 
multidimensionally provides possibilities for deconstruction and reconstruction, but 
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requires continuous reassessment to make sure that such typologies are using the most 
effective and appropriate dimensions and applying them appropriately. 
This part focuses on vertical and horizontal dimensions of regulatory dynamics, as 
well as direction of hierarchy and cooperativeness, because these factors represent the 
primary ways in which multidimensional regulation in this context varies over time. 
While other dimensions are relevant to the analysis, the ones which I considered adding 
do not have this quality. For example, change over time is a defining feature of these 
regulatory dynamics and I considered adding time as a dimension.694 However, motor 
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions regulation does not skew towards short- versus long-
term or fast versus slow in the same way that it does in the four dimensions that I used.  
It is possible that in additional contexts, other dimensions might function more 
effectively as organizing principles. Even if that is the case, the value of thinking 
multidimensionally remains similar. By breaking down regulatory and conceptual choices 
into their elements and considering the benefits and limitations of skews, 
multidimensional federalism approaches improve the understanding of complex problems 
and dynamics. Such an enhanced understanding provides the basis for more effective 
policy and conceptual choices.  
  
                                                
694 Discussions with J.B. Ruhl provided helpful insights into how time might enter my analysis. 
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCEPTUALIZING SUBURBAN ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change 
Efforts: Possibilities for Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, 
National, and International Networks, 22 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 35 (2012). 
 
[S]o far, climate action has extended slowly to suburbia.  Central 
cities in smart growth states have taken on climate change, but vast swaths 
of metropolitan suburbia continue to reproduce a political geography of 
local free-riding.695 
 
The suburbs contain more than half of the U.S. population, an even 
higher percentage of voters, and an overwhelming majority of elites.  The 
perceived power of the supposed suburban monolith shapes American 
domestic policy and politics but, in truth, this power is fragmented . . . .  
Many suburbs and older satellite cities are beginning to experience rapid 
social changes, particularly in their school systems, but they lack the local 
resources to deal with those changes.  Some places are more troubled than 
the central cities they surround.  Another large and important group of 
fast-growing communities lacks adequate local resources for schools and 
infrastructure.  Finally, a smaller, more affluent group of cities enjoys all 
the benefits of a regional economy without having to pay the costs.696 
 
As international negotiations and U.S. federal efforts continue to fail to produce an 
adequate response to climate change,697 a growing number of cities—including many 
small suburban cities—are playing critical roles in multi-level efforts to address climate 
change.  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lisa Jackson noted 
in a January 2012 presentation that “those local efforts are where the action is right 
                                                
695 Yonn Dierwechter, Metropolitan Geographies of US Climate Action: Cities, Suburbs, and the Local 
Divide in Global Responsibilities, 12 J. ENVTL. POL’Y & PLAN. 59, 79 (2010). 
 
696  MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 28–29 (Brookings 
Institution Press 2002). 
 
697 For an assessment of the emissions gap published at the time of the 2011 Durban COP, see U.N. ENV’T 
PROGRAMME, BRIDGING THE EMISSIONS GAP: A UNEP SYNTHESIS REPORT (Joseph Alcamo, et al. eds., 
2011), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_bridging_gap.pdf.  
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now.”698  Especially as global and national trends towards urbanization continue,699 cities 
are becoming increasingly important sites for mitigation and adaptation.  Their local land 
use planning helps to determine per capita emissions and preparedness for changes in the 
physical environment. 700   Moreover, leader cities are often ahead of their national 
governments.  These cities form ever-stronger intersecting, multi-level networks in which 
they make voluntary pledges to reduce emissions and through which they pressure 
national governments.701   
However, as discussed in at several points in previous chapters, the piecemeal nature 
of these urban efforts to address climate change constrains their overall impact.  In the 
United States, for example, 1,054 mayors, representing a total population of over 
88,920,962 citizens, have joined the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (Mayors 
Agreement) in which they pledge to meet what the U.S. commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol would have been: reducing emissions to seven percent below 1990 levels by 
2012.702  While this number is impressive against the current political backdrop in which 
                                                
698 Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Presentation at the University of Minnesota, Jan. 17, 
2012, available at http://mediamill.cla.umn.edu/mediamill/display/144205 (notes from talk on file with 
author). 
 
699 For analyses of the complexities of urbanization and environmental management, see Robert H. Freilich 
& S. Mark White, Transportation Congestion and Growth Management: Comprehensive Approaches to 
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the U.S. political leaders cannot agree on a coherent pathway forward, these mayors 
represent only about 5% of U.S. cities and 28% of the total U.S. population.703  The vast 
majority of cities and people are not participating in the Mayors Agreement.  Even if a 
number of cities have not joined the Agreement for political reasons but are still taking 
significant mitigation reduction steps, a problematic gap in the Mayors Agreement’s 
coverage remains.  
Suburbs play a critical role in the U.S. capacity to address this gap.  They contain the 
majority of population and emissions in metropolitan areas and most of them have not 
joined the Mayors Agreement.704  As discussed in Section 1, a rich scholarly literature 
across many disciplines documents that, in comparison to their central cities, suburbs are 
aggregate free loaders, which serve as a barrier to urban efforts to address climate 
change.705  Suburbs as a whole sprawl more, have a higher per capita carbon footprint, and 
are less likely to take action on climate change, a trio of concerns that are intertwined with 
inequality and segregation.706  These problems have led many to call for larger scale 
governmental mandates—especially state and metropolitan regional ones at times in 
                                                
703 The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that as of September 16, 2012, the United States had a total 
population of 312,562,990 people.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ (last visited Sept. 16, 
2012).  In 2008, these people lived in roughly 35,350 places (aggregating many different types of local 
government).  County Subdivision Types and Numbers for States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the Island Areas: 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/geoareas/cousubtable.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).  For analysis of the 
percentage of the population living in municipal and urban areas, see Local Governments by Type and State: 
2012 (preliminary), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Aug. 30, 2012, available at 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/2012/formatted_prelim_counts_23jul2012_2.pdf, (noting that 
municipalities account for 19,522 of the 35,886 sub-county units); 2010 Census Urban Areas FAQs, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, June 21, 2012, http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/uafaq.html (noting that “urban 
areas,” which are defined as an area containing more than 2,500 residents, represent over 249 million 
people in the U.S., 80.7% of the population). 
 
704 See List of Participating Mayors, supra note 702. 
 
705 See infra Chapter XI, Section 1. 
 
706 See id. 
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conjunction with national level action—to force suburbs to reduce their emissions and to 
address the difficulties of metropolitan regions more broadly.707   
These analyses, while validly characterizing suburbs in the aggregate and often 
proposing laudatory policies, have two significant limitations.  First, they do not engage 
fully the diversity of the cities within suburbs.  Geographers such as Peter Muller have 
long-documented the complex spatiality of the urban form within Automobile Era 
metropolitan regions; U.S. cities have evolved over the course of the twentieth and 
beginning of the twenty-first century from a monocentric form to a polycentric one, with 
suburbs that contain mature urban centers that participate in global economic markets and 
networks.708  Moreover, as discussed in depth in Chapter XII, first ring stressed cities have 
different needs and mitigation pathways than do the first and second ring developed job 
centers or the faster-growing developing job centers and bedroom communities in the 
second and third ring and beyond.  While mandates could force action by all cities, 
understanding how an individual suburban city’s positionality affects appropriate action 
could help guide models targeted to different types of suburbs.  
Second, the U.S. Congress and many state legislatures are not likely to pass 
legislation mandating local emissions reductions or even more comprehensive land use 
planning in the near term.  Although making a case for this legislation is important to 
envisioning functional multi-level approaches, we also need strategies for making progress 
on suburban emissions in the absence of top-down, forcing action.  
                                                
707 Id. 
 
708 PETER O. MULLER, CONTEMPORARY SUBURBAN AMERICA 6-8 (1981); Peter O. Muller, Transportation 
and Urban Form: Stages in the Spatial Evolution of the American Metropolis in THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
URBAN TRANSPORTATION 59, 80–83 (Susan Hanson & Genevieve Giuliano, eds) (2004); Peter O. Muller, 
The Suburban Transformation of the Globalizing American City, 551 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY POLITICAL & 
SOC. SCI. 44, 57 (1997). 
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This third case study, comprised of Chapters XI through XIII, responds to these 
concerns by taking a new approach to thinking about suburbs and climate change 
mitigation to provide a “local-level” example of operationalizing polycentric climate 
change governance.  This final case study is polycentric in its approach at multiple scales; 
it shows how ostensibly local action is intertwined with multi-level networks and how the 
polycentricity of localities themselves requires new strategies. In contrast to the 
conventional critique of suburbs, it considers how individual suburbs working within their 
local government powers can and do play a constructive role in climate change mitigation.  
While acknowledging the need for more action on climate change at international, 
national, and state levels, and regional ones in between, this case study explores how 
different types of suburbs, as they participate in multi-level networks, can provide models 
for suburban action and serve as part of efforts to address climate change which 
complement the treaty regime.  Using a diverse group of suburbs in the Twin Cities 
metropolitan region making innovative climate change and sustainability efforts as a case 
example, it analyzes pathways for small, nimble governments to: (1) learn from other 
localities and find cost-effective approaches to reducing emissions, and (2) serve as a 
constructive influence on national and international efforts to address climate change.   
This chapter develops the conceptual approach of this case study by interweaving the 
geographic conceptions of scale and polycentric governance theories articulated in 
Chapter II that frame the overall dissertation with urban geography and urban studies 
scholarship that has particular application in this context. It focuses in particular four 
streams of scholarship, which, when combined in novel ways, provide a basis for 
understanding suburban action on climate change, both within each individual city and in 
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interaction with multi-level networks.   
First, an ever-growing scholarly and policy literature explores the role that cities can 
and should play in responding to the problem of climate change.  Some of this literature 
addresses suburbs, but mostly in the aggregate, as a part of the metro that has a greater 
carbon footprint, sprawls, and engages less with multi-level networks.709   
Second, a rich and rapidly developing literature in geography, urban studies, and law 
dissects the way in which suburbs are changing and the differences among individual 
suburbs.  While this literature has addressed sustainability to some extent, it has not 
considered how different types of suburbs might respond to climate change.710   
Third, scholars in geography—including both urban geographers and scale 
theorists—and other disciplines have explored the way in which cities form and interact 
with networks.  Some of this scholarship has focused on climate change networks among 
localities in particular and their interaction with U.S. federalism, including potential 
domestic mechanisms, but it has not separated out suburbs.711   
Fourth, a broader stream of scholarship referenced in Chapter II, which is not focused 
on cities in particular, has called for pluralist or polycentric approaches to climate change 
governance.  This literature, however, has not yet provided in-depth analysis of 
mechanisms for integrating multi-level efforts by cities or smaller city suburbs into a 
governance scheme.712  
This chapter intertwines these streams of scholarship to frame this case study’s 
                                                
709 For a discussion of this literature, see infra Chapter XI, Section 1. 
 
710 For a discussion of this literature, see id. 
 
711 For a discussion of this literature, see infra Chapter XI, Section 2. 
 
712 For a discussion of this literature, see infra Chapter XI, Section 2. 
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conceptual approach.  Section 1 provides an overview of the current scholarly discourse 
on cities, suburbs, and climate change, and explains how the geography and 
interdisciplinary literature on the complex evolution and demography of suburbs could 
complement it to frame Chapter XII’s analysis of exemplar Twin Cities suburbs.  Section 
2 brings together scholarship on networks and multi-level governance with the literature 
on pluralist, polycentric climate change governance to ground Chapter XIII’s examination 
of the current and potential role of climate change networks in the suburban context.  
Section 3 concludes by introducing the Twin Cities case study—including the broader 
context of the Twin Cities’ spatial evolution that urban geographers and legal scholars 
have analyzed—that forms the focus of the two chapters that follow. 
 
1. Local Climate Change Action and Suburban Demographics 
As localities increasingly take actions within their power to mitigate (and also adapt), 
academics and policymaking institutes have considered the appropriate role of local action 
in addressing climate change.  For example, Growing Cooler: Evidence on Urban 
Development and Climate Change, a 2008 book by Reid Ewing, Keith Bartholomew, 
Steve Winkelman, Jerry Walters, and Don Chen, provides a comprehensive analysis of 
how to bring down vehicle miles traveled in urban areas.713  Alice Kaswan’s 2009 article, 
Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, analyzes the mitigation role of local action on 
land use, transportation, buildings, and energy consumption and the ways in which federal 
                                                
713 See REID EWING ET AL., GROWING COOLER: THE EVIDENCE ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 27–31, 35–36 (Urban Land Institute eds. 2008). 
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legislation could support that local role.714  Katherine Trisolini’s 2010 article, All Hands 
on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change 
Regulation, details a wide range of local powers relevant to mitigation including buildings 
and energy efficiency, zoning and land use power, waste and garbage, and local 
proprietary functions and proposes a bi-directional coordination model.715  Kirsten Engel 
has written several pieces which complement these analyses of what cities can and should 
do to address climate change by exploring what motivates them to act.716  Michael Burger, 
in his article Empowering Local Autonomy and Encouraging Experimentation in Climate 
Change Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime, has considered how Charles 
Tiebout’s arguments for the value of inter-local competition interact with local 
decisionmaking to take action on climate change.717 
This literature provides an important context for understanding how actions by small 
suburban cities compare to what is possible under their authority.  However, to the extent 
that leader cities’ actions are analyzed in depth in this literature, case examples tend to 
center on large localities with minimal focus on the variety of little cities that comprise 
their suburbs and the actions that these cities are taking.  For example, Heike Schroeder 
and Harriet Bulkeley produced an interesting comparison of actions by London and Los 
                                                
714 See Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 280–83, 296 
(2009). 
 
715 See Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional 
Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 735, 743–45 (2010). 
 
716 See, e.g., Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local 
Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental 
Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1023–25 (2006). 
 
717 Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy and Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change 
Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11161, 11164–65 
(2009). 
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Angeles.718  Melissa Powers produced a thoughtful study that compares the efforts of 
several major U.S. municipalities.719  I have had a similar focus in my own scholarship, 
such as when Janet Levit and I compared actions by Portland and Tulsa and when I 
analyzed the role of a lawsuit by California in shaping the efforts of the physically 
massive San Bernardino County.720 
While some of this scholarship considers how suburbs fit into metropolitan efforts to 
reduce emissions, it tends to treat the suburbs as an undifferentiated mass to be contrasted 
with the center city.721  This literature critiques their unsustainable land-use patterns, 
which result in their comparatively large carbon footprints 722  and perpetuate racial 
                                                
718 See Heike Schroeder & Harriet Bulkeley, Global Cities and the Governance of Climate Change: What is 
the Role of Law in Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313, 351–59 (2009); see also David Dodman, Blaming 
Cities for Climate Change? An Analysis of Urban Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories, 21 ENV’T & 
URBANIZATION 185, 189, Table 2 (2009) (comparing greenhouse gas emissions of 11 cities in Europe, 
North America, South America, and Asia). 
 
719 See Melissa Powers, U.S. Municipal Climate Plans: What Role Will Cities Play in Climate Change 
Mitigation?, in LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER 
LOCALITIES 69 (Benjamin J. Richardson, ed. 2012). 
 
720 See Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 
Va. J. Int’l L. 585, 610–15 (2008–2009) [hereinafter Osofsky, Climate Change]; Hari M. Osofsky, Scaling 
“Local”: The Implications of Greenhouse Gas Regulation in San Bernardino County, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 
689 (2009) [hereinafter Osofsky, Scaling “Local”]; Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of 
Networks: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L. 409, 414–15 (2007–2008). 
 
721 See, e.g., EWING ET AL., supra note 713, at 67–73 (exploring ways in which compact development can 
reduce vehicle miles traveled, with specific examples of suburban efforts included); Edna Sussman et al., 
Climate Change Adaptation: Fostering Progress through Law and Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 
109–10 (2010) (discussing efforts by New York suburbs on smart growth, California regional planning, and 
their implications for adaptation); Dan Tarlock, Fat and Fried: Linking Land Use Law, the Risks of Obesity, 
and Climate Change, 3 PITT. J. ENVTL PUB. HEALTH L. 31 (2009) (examining how land use strategies could 
work in both cities and suburbs); Trisolini, supra note 715, at 716 (noting that many of the cities adopting 
Smart Code were suburbs and exurbs in the South).  Although there have long been more nuanced analyses 
of suburbs, see, e.g., Darcy Seaver, Conference Explores Older Suburbs as Regional Pivot Points, THE 
FREE LIBRARY, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Conference+Explores+Older+Suburbs+as+Regional+Pivot+Points.-
a054032273 (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (a 1999 conference at the University of Minnesota on first ring 
suburbs), these are rarely incorporated into the legal literature on suburbs and climate change. 
 
722 For examples of the literature on cities, suburbs and sustainable land use, see John R. Nolon, The Land 
Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy: Shifting Ground to Mitigate Climate Change, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3 & n.16, 8–9 (2009) (citing EWING ET AL., supra note 20) (relying on Ewing’s article’s 
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segregation.723  These analyses are dominated by discussion of controversies over how to 
address sprawl or approach smart growth.724 
An emerging interdisciplinary literature on metropolitan emission patterns and 
                                                                                                                                            
claim that Chicago citizens drive less than 21,000 miles, compared with nearly 30,000 in suburban Chicago 
County, and emit 80% fewer tons of carbon dioxide per household than suburbanites in the surrounding 
county, and further exploring strategies urban areas can use to reduce their carbon footprint); J.B. Ruhl, 
Taming the Suburban Amoeba in the Ecosystem Age: Some Do’s and Don’ts, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 61, 
75, 78–86 (1998) (using contested suburban development in Austin, Texas as a starting point for proposing 
ten principles for law’s role in sustainable suburban development); Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and 
Land Use Planning: Greening State and Local Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate 
Change Challenges and Preserve Resources for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 121, 124–25 (2009) (exploring a variety of approaches that state and local governments can take to 
increase sustainability and mitigate climate change). 
 
723 For examples of articles looking at the nexus of suburbs, racial segregation, and climate change, see 
Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253 (2009) (exploring 
the land use measures that might address city-suburb divide and reduce vehicle miles traveled, barriers to 
doing so, the role for federal measures, and the need to integrate the socio-economic and environmental 
concerns in local land use planning); James A. Kushner, Affordable Housing as Infrastructure in the Time 
of Global Warming, 42/43 URB. LAW. 179, 182, 197–200 (2011) (presenting a vision of smart growth that 
would address climate change and segregation simultaneously); Bekah Mandell, Racial Reification and 
Global Warming: A Truly Inconvenient Truth, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 289, 304–05, 335–43 (2008) 
(exploring the way in which city-suburb segregation contributes to climate change); Florence Wagman 
Roisman, Sustainable Development in the Suburbs and Their Cities: The Environmental and Financial 
Imperatives of Racial, Ethnic, and Economic Inclusion, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87 (1998) (exploring the 
role of racial and ethnic segregation in undermining sustainability). 
 
724 For a few interesting examples from the voluminous literature on sprawl, see William W. Buzbee, 
Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (1999) 
(exploring the multi-level governance challenges of addressing sprawl and the potential role for conditional 
federal funding in ameliorating it); Reid Ewing & Fang Rong, The Impact of Urban Form on U.S. 
Residential Energy Use, 19 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 1 (2008) (analyzing the way in which urban form 
impacts residential energy use); Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, 
Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155 (2007); Christian Iaione, The Tragedy of Urban Roads: 
Saving Cities from Choking, Calling on Citizens to Combat Climate Change, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889 
(2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs?, 116 YALE L.J. 589 (2007) (reviewing 
recent books about debates over urban growth restrictions); Alexandra Lampert, California’s Fight Against 
Global Warming: Finally Getting Smart about Sprawl?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 193 (2009) (describing 
California’s Senate Bill 375 as a small step forward); Mary D. Nichols, Sustainable Communities for a 
Sustainable State: California’s Efforts to Curb Sprawl and Cut Global Warming Emissions, 12 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 185 (2010) (discussing California’s Senate Bill 375 as an example of metro-regional land use 
planning approaches); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems 
in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2010) (discussing complexity 
of understanding and addressing sprawl).  See also Mary D. Nichols, Sustainable Communities for a 
Sustainable State: California’s Efforts to Curb Sprawl and Cut Global Warming Emissions, 12 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 185 (2010) (discussing California’s Senate Bill 375 as an example of metro-regional land use 
planning approaches); Alexandra Lampert, California’s Fight Against Global Warming: Finally Getting 
Smart about Sprawl?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 193 (2009) (describing California’s Senate Bill 375 as a 
small step forward). 
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reduction strategies takes a similar approach; often with great spatial sophistication, it 
maps broad emissions patterns in the suburbs that generally do not differentiate among the 
varying types of little cities that comprise them.725  One of the more nuanced of such 
analyses by Yonn Dierwechter, for example, engages in sophisticated mapping of local 
climate change action in six major metropolitan regions to explore the patterns of climate 
change action and what motivates behavior. 726   Using participation in the Mayors 
Agreement as a proxy and situating itself in the broader context that only about 5% of 
cities nationwide participate in this agreement, it finds that substantial climate change 
action in the central cities did not spread adequately into the suburbs, and argues for larger 
scale mandates to address “a massive implementation gap.”727  However, its analysis 
consideres neither the characteristics of the suburbs taking action nor how climate change 
action varied across the different types of cities that make up a metropolitan region.728  
Similarly, a policy brief by Edward Glaeser and Matthew Kahn compares emissions 
                                                
725 For examples of metropolitan-focused analyses in climate change mitigation, see Marilyn A. Brown et 
al., Shrinking the Carbon Footprint of Metropolitan America, in BLUEPRINT FOR AM. PROSPERITY 6–11 
(Brookings Inst. Metro. Policy Program, D.C. May 2008) (arguing that federal policy leadership is needed 
to complement state and local efforts on metropolitan emissions); PATRICK M. CONDON ET AL., URBAN 
PLANNING TOOLS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: POL’Y FOCUS REP. 20–42 (Lincoln Inst. of Land 
Policy, Cambridge, Mass 2009) (exploring, illustrated through case studies, the ways various modeling 
tools can help in the planning process to reduce carbon footprints of new development); Dierwechter, supra 
note 695 (considering city-suburb dynamics of six U.S. metropolitan regions, but without detailed 
comparison of the individual suburban cities); Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew Kahn, The Greenness of 
Cities, in POL’Y BRIEFS (Rappaport Inst. & Taubman Ctr., Cambridge Mass. Mar. 2008) (exploring 
variations in metropolitan emissions patterns across metropolitan areas and the differences between city-
suburb dynamics).  For an example of a study focusing purely on suburban action, see Sarah E. Knuth, 
Addressing Place in Climate Change Mitigation: Reducing Emissions in a Suburban Landscape, 30 
APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 518, 520 (2010) (providing a case study of efforts to develop a climate change 
mitigation plan in a wealthy suburban county). 
 
726 Dierwechter, supra note 695, at 66–67. 
 
727 Id. at 60, 80.  
 
728 See id. 
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patterns across metropolitan areas.729  The brief explores the differences between city-
suburb emission dynamics in older East Coast cities like Boston (suburban emissions 
higher than in central cities but leveling off after 10 miles) and the West Coast city of Los 
Angeles (suburban emissions lower than in the central city).730  But their interesting 
mapping did not differentiate among the suburban cities by urban type.731 
The basis for a more detailed look inside suburbs engaging in climate change action 
exists, however, because of the urban geography and interdisciplinary literature exploring 
the nuances of the cities that make up suburbs and their relationship to metropolitan 
regions.  Urban geographer Peter Muller, for example, has written for decades about the 
polycentricity of metropolitan regions and the evolving spatial form of the suburbs that 
comprise them.  He has described the ways in which suburban development roughly tracks 
transportation technology development from the Walking-Horsecar Era through the 1880s, 
to the Electric Streetcar Era through 1920, to the Recreational Automobile Era through 
1945, to the modern Freeway Era.732  He further explains that the Freeway Era has 
resulted in five growth stages of the suburbs: (1) bedroom community; (2) independence; 
(3) catalytic growth; (4) high rise/technology; and (5) mature urban centers.733  Moreover, 
within that complex spatiality, the demography of suburbs has been evolving.  Audrey 
Singer, Susan Hardwick, and Caroline Brettell, for example, have analyzed evolving 
                                                
729 See Glaeser & Kahn, supra note 725, at 1–3, 7–8. 
 
730 See id. 
 
731 See id. 
 
732 See MULLER, supra note 708, at 26–49. 
 
733 See Muller, Transportation and the Urban Form, supra note 708, at 80-81. 
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patterns of immigrant incorporation in U.S. suburbs.734   
Most significant for this case study, Myron Orfield, sometimes in collaboration with 
Thomas Luce, has been an important pioneer in spatial-legal analysis of the components 
of the diverse suburban landscape that Muller describes.  Using GIS technology together 
with demographic data, Orfield has produced detailed maps that provide a clearer 
understanding of the very different types of suburbs that make up major U.S. cities.735  
Based on this data, Orfield has classified the different types of suburbs that surround 
center cities into several categories: stressed, developed job centers, affluent residential, 
developing job centers, and bedroom developing.736  Chapter XII’s analysis in the context 
of the Twin Cities metropolitan region models how this data can be brought together with 
an examination of climate change efforts within particular suburban cities to provide a 
more nuanced analysis of where possibilities for suburban action lie.737 
 
2. Locating Suburbs in Multi-Level Networks and Pluralist/Polycentric Governance 
Approaches 
An analysis on suburban climate action focused simply on the actions of particular 
leader suburbs and their demography would be incomplete, however, without an 
exploration of their interaction with multi-level networks and legal action.  Local action in 
climate change takes place in a broader context of debates over international, national, and 
state action.  An extensive scholarly literature across geography, law, and other disciplines 
                                                
734 TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GATEWAYS: IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (Audrey 
Singer et al. eds., 2008). 
 
735 See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 696, maps 1-1, 2-1.  
 
736 See id. at 46–48. 
 
737 See infra Chapter XII. 
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explores the role of networks in governance.  Much of this discourse occurs in relatively 
isolated streams. A stream at the intersection of urban studies and geography examines 
transnational interactions among world cities and their implications, at times in interaction 
with the geography scale literature introduced in Chapter II.  Saskia Sassen, for example, 
has explored the ways in which economic globalization and the emergence of new 
information and communication technologies have made world cities key nodes for cross-
border networks and resource concentration.738  Muller’s above-described work on the 
evolving spatiality of urban regions draws heavily from Sassen’s work in part of his 
analysis of how suburbs participate in urban globalization.739  Related scholarship by 
Kevin Cox in the geography scale literature—which undergirds the conceptual approach 
of the prior two case studies in Chapters IV through X—considers whether different 
governmental levels are themselves networks, with Cox arguing that local spaces are 
comprised both of core local interactions and multi-level ones.740   
                                                
738 See Saskia Sassen, Locating Cities on Global Circuits, in GLOBAL NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES 1, 28–31 
(Saskia Sassen ed., 2002).  For additional analyses of the role of cities in a globalizing world, see NEIL 
BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD (Oxford 
University Press eds. 2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CITIES TRANSFORMED: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Mark R. Montgomery et al. eds., 2003); GLOBALIZING 
CITIES: A NEW SPATIAL ORDER? (Peter Marcuse & Ronald van Kempen eds., 2000); HEIDI H. HOBBS, CITY 
HALL GOES ABROAD: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LOCAL POLITICS (1994); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL 
CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2d ed. 2001); H. V. SAVITCH & PAUL KANTOR, CITIES IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AMERICA 
AND WESTERN EUROPE (2002); RICHARD SENNETT, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE EYE: THE DESIGN AND SOCIAL 
LIFE OF CITIES (1990); SPACES OF GLOBALIZATION: REASSERTING THE POWER OF THE LOCAL (Kevin R. 
Cox ed., 1997); WORLD CITIES IN A WORLD-SYSTEM (Paul L. Knox & Peter J. Taylor eds., 1995); Gerald E. 
Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1 (2006). 
 
739 Muller, Transportation and the Urban Form, supra note 708. 
 
740 See Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking 
for Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1, 2 (1998).  For other scholarship interacting with Cox’s approach, 
see Katherine T. Jones, Scale as Epistemology, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 25 (1998); Dennis R. Judd, The Case 
of the Missing Scales: A Commentary on Cox, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 29 (1998); Michael Peter Smith, 
Looking for the Global Spaces in Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 35 (1998); Lynn A. Staeheli, 
Globalization and the Scales of Citizenship, 19 GEOGRAPHY RES. F. 60 (1999).  For Cox’s response to 
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In the legal literature, scholarship at the intersection of international law, international 
relations, and transgovernmentalism, examines relationships among a range of 
governmental and nongovernmental entities and the ways in which they shape 
international governance.  Anne-Marie Slaughter’s A New World Order, for instance, 
provides a vision of an international and transnational system, comprised of vertical and 
horizontal networks of governmental officials interacting with each other and with 
disaggregated international organizations.741  At the law and anthropology intersection, 
Annelise Riles has examined the operation of multi-level networks in the context of Fijian 
activists and bureaucrats preparing for and then participating in the United Nations Fourth 
World Conference on Women.742 While each of these accounts is distinct in its focus and 
orientation, a common thread running through these literatures is their analysis of the way 
in which interactions at multiple levels outside of the formal strictures of law formation 
help to constitute governance, whether we call it law or not, and the ever-more-important 
role of cities in those dynamics. 
Of most relevance to the current topic, legal scholarship has explored the potential 
governance role of multi-level subnational climate change networks.  Judith Resnik, 
Joshua Civin, and Joseph Frueh have examined the wide range of subnational networks 
working on climate change and argued that these networks could play a constructive role 
                                                                                                                                            
some of that scholarship, see Kevin R. Cox, Representation and Power in the Politics of Scale, 17 POL. 
GEOGRAPHY 41 (1998). 
 
741 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 18–23 (Princeton University Press eds. 2005). 
 
742 See ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000) (providing an anthropological account of 
networks which includes in depth engagement of sociolegal spaces at multiple levels). 
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in shaping federal policy.743  Janet Levit and I have considered the way in which bottom-
up networking among cities could contribute to international efforts to address climate 
change.744  I also have explored the role of transnational networks of cities, states, and 
provinces at the Copenhagen negotiations and queried how these networks could be 
integrated into the treaty process.745  These analyses provide pathways for thinking about 
the current and potential international and national legal significance of networks among 
cities working for climate change, either through formal legal reform or through expanded 
recognition of networks’ capacity to influence those formal processes. 
Another largely separate stream of scholarship about pluralist or polycentric climate 
change governance described in Chapter II complements this discourse about subnational 
climate change networks.  Although a rich scholarly literature has existed for a number of 
years on various aspects of multi-level climate change governance, Elinor Ostrom’s 2009 
World Bank Research Working Paper—quoted in the introductory chapter arguing for 
polycentric approaches to climate change—has helped spur greater interest in developing 
governance models that recognize the relevance of a wide range of formal and informal 
action beyond the confines of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.746  Ostrom’s analysis helps pave a way for better conceptualization of the role of 
                                                
743 See Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal 
Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 726–33, 764 (2008). 
 
744 Osofsky & Levit, supra note 720, at 412–14. 
 
745 See Hari M. Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States 
and Cities at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 64, 67 (2010) [hereinafter Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance]; 
cf. Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational 
Regulatory Governance, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1789, 1814–15 (2005) [hereinafter Osofsky, Transnational 
Regulatory Governance] (exploring climate change as a multi-scalar regulatory problem). 
 
746 See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change (World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), available at 
http://wdronline.worldbank.org/worldbank/a/nonwdrdetail/162.  For an example of scholarship building on 
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cities, even very small ones, in multi-level climate change governance because it treats the 
international treaty negotiations as just one piece of a complex puzzle.747  In particular, it 
focuses on the ways in which small-scale governments can help build the trust and 
commitment needed to overcome collective action failures, a function that arguably can be 
performed more effectively in the small cities of the suburbs than in the larger center cities 
where there are many more constituencies by virtue of their greater size.748 
As discussed in Chapter II, Ostrom’s polycentric model has much in common with 
pluralist approaches,749 which in turn have commonalities with the New Haven School,750 
in that they all treat a diverse set of activity as relevant to lawmaking.  Under such models, 
activities by multi-level networks of cities, some of which are suburbs, to spur more local, 
state, national, and international mitigation efforts can be considered as part of a 
                                                                                                                                            
this approach, see Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance, (European Univ. Inst. 
Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 2011/30, 2011), available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/17757. 
 
747 See id. at 35. 
 
748 See id. at 33–35. 
 
749 Global legal pluralism examines the multiple normative, and sometimes legal, communities operating in 
shared social space and the implications of having simultaneous valid orders.  For examples of this 
approach in a variety of substantive contexts, see Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. 
REV. 863 (2006); Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005); Diane Marie Amann, 
Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
29 PEPP. L. REV. 167 (2001); Elena A. Baylis, Parallel Courts in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1 (2007); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); William W. 
Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2004); Janet Koven Levit, A 
Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 125 (2005); Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and 
the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005).  I have examined pluralism in 
the context of climate change litigation in Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal 
Dialogue?, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 181 (2007). 
 
750 The New Haven School treats law as “a process of authoritative decision by which the members of a 
community clarify and secure their common interests.” 1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY, at xxi (1992); accord Myres 
S. McDougal et al., The World Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807, 810–
11 (1988).  For a discussion of the New Haven School’s goals, see LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra, at xxix. 
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lawmaking process that also includes the formal treaty processes and accompanying 
national legislation and regulation.751  Other streams of scholarship discussed in that 
chapter, like new governance, 752  regulatory institutions theory, 753  and adaptive 
management754 explore mechanisms for creating more inclusive, responsive, decentralized 
governance.  In the U.S. domestic law context, an extensive and rapidly growing dynamic 
federalism literature complements this scholarship through its analysis of how to structure 
appropriate and effective multi-level governance structures.755 This cluster of theories 
                                                
751 See supra ChapterII. 
 
752 For examples of new governance scholarship, see, LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US 
(Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in Legal 
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 
471–80 (2004); Orly Lobel, Surreply, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
498, 498–99 (2004); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371–76 (2004); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate 
Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 59, 106–07, 109–13 (2010). 
 
753 For examples of scholarship from the Regulatory Institutions Network at Australia National University, 
see Valerie Braithwaite, Ten Things You Need to Know About Regulation and Never Wanted to Ask, 
Regulatory Inst. Network, Occasional Paper No. 10, Austl., Dec. 2006, available at 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/67415/20080123-0746/ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/10thingswhole.pdf; 
Charlotte Wood et al., Applications of Responsive Regulatory Theory in Australia and Overseas, 
Regulatory Inst. Network, Occasional Paper No. 15, Austl., June 2010,  available at 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/67415/20110121-0705/ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/OccasionalPaper_15.pdf. 
 
754 Adaptive management, at times drawing from concepts of panarchy, see C.S. Holling et al., In Quest of 
a Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND 
NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 5 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002), explores how law and can be 
structured to allow for regulatory evolution in response to change.  See Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted 
Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 
171–72 (2010); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles 
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17–18 (2010); Michael Ilg, Complexity, 
Environment, and Equitable Competition: A Theory of Adaptive Rule Design, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 647, 650–
51 (2010); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
861, 884–88 (2006); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 424, 436–40 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 890–901 
(2008); Sandra Zellmer, Essay, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina World, 59 
FLA. L. REV. 599, 627–30 (2007). 
 
755 I have provided an extensive summary and synthesis of this literature in the context of climate change in 
Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 
62 ALA. L. REV. 237 (2011); see also Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 160 (2006). 
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forms the basis for the dissertation’s overall approach of hybridity, multi-scalar inclusion, 
and regulatory responsiveness, but specifically in this context help with an understanding 
of how this suburban action should fit into an overall climate change governance model. 
Together, these approaches provide fruitful ground for conceptualizing practical ways 
to leverage multi-level networks of cities—and leader suburbs participation in them—to 
make important incremental progress in mitigating climate change.  Building on my prior 
work on multi-level climate change and environmental governance, which draws from 
these diverse streams of theory introduced in Chapter II, and on the Twin Cities case 
study, Chapter XIII considers how the participation of small, suburban cities in multi-level 
networks can be used as a mechanism for spurring needed action on climate change, 
especially at a time when critical larger-scale processes remain stalled.  It analyzes the 
potential dual roles of these networks in fostering greater suburban participation and in 
influencing larger scale formal processes. 
 
3. Twin Cities Suburban Action as a Case Study 
The Twin Cities metropolitan region provides an interesting case study for 
considering suburban action on climate change because its central cities, Minneapolis and 
Saint Paul, have leading mitigation efforts and, at the state level, Minnesota has 
established a structured program to support urban sustainability efforts.756  Moreover, as 
discussed in more depth in the individual case examples, some of its suburbs—including 
ones that lean Republican—have been particularly innovative in their efforts to achieve 
rapid progress in greenhouse gas emissions reductions, at times even receiving national 
                                                
756 See MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).  
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recognition.  Together with the metropolitan region’s combination of fragmentation and 
significant regional governance, these climate change and sustainability efforts provide a 
rich context in which to analyze pathways for suburban emissions reduction.757   
As geographer John Borchert has explored in depth, the Twin Cities followed an 
urbanization pattern much like many of the other major metropolitan regions in the United 
States.  His Atlas of Minnesota Resources and Settlement, prepared for the Minnesota 
State Planning Agency with Donald Yaeger in 1968 explains that St. Paul, St. Anthony, 
and Minneapolis emerged due to their strategic locations for pioneer steamboat navigation 
and hydropower.  Prior to the post World War II Freeway Era described by Muller, the 
Twin Cities urban area expanded along rail and streetcar transportation routes.758  The 
widespread use of the automobile allowed for low-density settlement via paved roads to 
the countryside “over the high-amenity, rolling wooded, lake and moraine lands,” physical 
attributes that also limited population density.759  As the broader region transitioned from 
a natural resources based economy to one more oriented towards manufacturing and 
nationally-oriented services, the Twin Cities became “a ‘hinge’ area which combines 
access to the human resources of the region with access to the mid-western and national 
                                                
757 This dissertation acknowledges, however, that these very characteristics that make the example 
interesting may also constrain its broader applicability and replicability. For example, the dissertation does 
not attempt to tackle how these patterns compare to those of other regions in the United States that have 
less well-developed regional governments, cover larger physical areas, or contain central cities engaged in 
aggressive annexation.  These issues are all important ones that future research should explore.  A full 
national study is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but this initial look at one particularly innovative 
metropolitan region and the efforts of some of its suburbs helps to frame questions and potential strategies 
for a broader study.  I plan to conduct such a study as the 2013-14 Fesler-Lampert Chair in Urban and 
Regional Affairs at the University of Minnesota. 
 
758 JOHN R. BORCHERT & DONALD P. YAEGER, ATLAS OF MINNESOTA RESOURCES AND SETTLEMENT 187–
88 (1968) (prepared for Minnesota State Planning Agency). 
 
759 Id. at 188. 
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markets”;760 the Twin Cities experienced a significant population concentration in their 
metropolitan region—containing nearly half of Minnesota’s population and one quarter of 
the Upper Midwest’s population by a 1963 report—even as the population within that 
region decentralized.761  Borchert noted that in the forty year period preceding the 1980s, 
for example, the urban field—its urban circulation system defined by level of 
accessibility—of the Twin Cities increased from less than one thousand square miles to 
over fifteen thousand square miles.  This “expansion of the metropolitan circulation 
systems, with weak accompanying decentralization, has weakened the historic regional 
center—the monumental downtown of the central city.”762 
The present day Twin Cities show a maturation of these patterns.  Myron Orfield and 
Thomas Luce have documented in their in-depth study of the Twin Cities that the region 
contains 172 cities and 97 townships and ranks as the fifth most fragmented among the 
United States’ fifty largest metropolitan areas.763  Like most major metropolitan areas, 
jobs and population have decentralized significantly over the last thirty years, with current 
growth concentrated in the outer suburbs; from 1990 to 2004, Minneapolis grew at 1.3% 
and St. Paul grew at 3.0%, as compared to the region’s overall growth rate of 22.5%.764  
As this growth has occurred, suburban differentiation has taken place, with some suburbs, 
especially inner ones, increasingly reflecting the fiscal stresses and racial and poverty 
                                                
760 John R. Borchert & Russell B. Adams, Projected Urban Growth in the Upper Midwest: 1960-1975, 
URBAN REPORT NO. 8, at 24, Sept. 1964. 
 
761 Id. at 2; John R. Borchert, The Urbanization of the Upper Midwest: 1930-1960, URBAN REPORT NO. 2, 
at iii, 36–37, Feb. 1963. 
 
762 John R. Borchert, America’s Changing Metropolitan Regions, 62 ANNALS ASSOC. AM GEOG. 352, 368 
(1985). 
 
763 MYRON ORFIELD & THOMAS F. LUCE JR., REGION: PLANNING THE FUTURE OF THE TWIN CITIES 2 (2010). 
 
764 Id. at 14. 
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concentrations of the central cities, and other suburbs, especially outer ones, facing the 
complexities of rapid growth with inadequate infrastructure.765  Only a small percentage of 
the region’s suburban cities fit the traditional model of wealthy residents who commute 
into the central city.766   
 Map 3 of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Region by city category illustrates these 
complex spatialization patterns.  The distribution of the Twin Cities’ approximately 3.1 
million residents, as depicted in the map is: 24% in the two central cities, 23% in the 53 
stressed suburbs, 25% in the 58 developing job centers, 8% in the 112 bedroom 
developing communities, 19% in the 32 developed job centers, and 1% in the 12 affluent 
residential communities.767  These demographic patterns highlight the importance of the 
smaller cities that comprise the suburbs taking action on climate change to the success of 
metro-regional emissions reduction initiatives.  The two center cities, Minneapolis and St. 
Paul, have been national and international leaders on climate change since the early 1990s, 
joining International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) in 1992 and co-
founding its Cities for Climate Protection Campaign in 1993.768  Since pioneering one of 
the first local greenhouse gas emissions reduction plans in the country, they have 
consistently had aggressive reduction goals and received national recognition for their 
                                                
765 Id. at 43–49.  
 
766 Id. at 46.  
 
767 See id. at 2–3, 45. 
 
768 International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA, 
http://www.stpaul.gov/index.aspx?NID=464 (last visited Feb. 12, 2012); Climate Change Solutions: Twin 
Cities Trim Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/40000PQ6.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
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innovative efforts on climate change. 769   However, these significant initiatives by 
Minneapolis and St. Paul—even taking into account the suburban residents who work in 
those central cities—only address a small fraction of the metropolitan region’s emissions. 
 
Map 3. Cities in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Region by Category770 
                                                
769  See MINNEAPOLIS–SAINT PAUL URBAN CO2 PROJECT PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING 
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE CO2 EMISSIONS, SAVE TAXES, AND SAVE RESOURCES (Dec. 1993), available at 
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@citycoordinator/documents/webcontent/convert_284
899.pdf; International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, supra note 768; Minneapolis Climate 
Action Plan, CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, http://www.minneapolismn.gov/sustainability/climate/index.htm (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2012). 
 
770 ORFIELD & LUCE JR., supra note 763, at 44 (reproduced with the permission of Myron Orfield). 
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The Twin Cities’ suburbs also serve as an interesting example for examining 
possibilities for climate change mitigation because of the Twin Cities’ unusually well-
developed regional governance structures.771 Minnesota’s experiment in metropolitan 
regional governance in its most significant urban area began in 1967, when its legislature 
established the Met Council to meet new federal requirements for regional governance.772 
The Met Council was intended to build upon decades of ad hoc collaboration among the 
cities and to address concerns over land use planning, wastewater coordination, and transit 
funding.773 Even before the Met Council’s formal creation, the regional planning efforts in 
the Twin Cities formed important part of state-wide land use planning approaches; for 
example, Borchert used regional governance in the Twin Cities as an example of why 
more regional planning was needed in Minnesota in his 1963 report.774 As of January 
2012, the Met Council listed 183 communities in its seven-county metro area.775   
The state legislature gradually expanded the Met Council’s powers over time, and the 
council has played and continues to play a significant role in regional planning, including 
growth management.776  Orfield and Luce argue that while the appointed Met Council has 
accomplished less than Portland’s elected regional governing body, in part due to 
                                                
771 See ORFIELD & LUCE JR., supra note 763, at 52–53. For another example of a well-developed 
metropolitan regional government, see GREATER NASHVILLE REGIONAL COUNCIL, https://www.gnrc.org/; 
METRO, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/ (Portland).  
 
772 See ORFIELD & LUCE JR., supra note 763, at 52–53. 
 
773 See ORFIELD & LUCE JR., supra note 763, at 52–80.  
 
774 Borchert, supra note 761, at 43. 
 
775 List of Community Profiles, METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, http://stats.metc.state.mn.us/profile/list.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2012). 
 
776 See id.  
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Oregon’s more-developed statewide comprehensive land use planning system, both 
Portland and the Twin Cities show less sprawl than would be expected at their level of 
fragmentation.777  These regional-level accomplishments, even if they could be augmented 
significantly following Portland’s model, provide a context in which appropriately 
focused, locally based initiatives on climate change could supplement regional mitigation 
efforts. 
Over the course of the last several years, a number of the Twin Cities suburbs have 
begun to join their center cities in local action on climate change.  This case study focuses 
on a subset of those suburbs that were the first twelve to join the Minnesota GreenStep 
Cities program in the Twin Cities metropolitan region.  Although this program focuses 
more broadly on sustainability, many of its earliest suburban participants are taking steps 
on climate change.  Examining these participants allows (1) identification of suburbs that 
have been willing to commit publicly to sustainability goals, which are often less 
politically controversial than climate change mitigation goals,778 and (2) consideration of 
what actions they are taking—whether as part of their Minnesota GreenStep Cities 
participation or separate from it—to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.779 
Minnesota Greenstep Cities emerged from the fall 2007 Minnesota Clean Energy 
                                                
777 See id. 
 
778 This ability to focus on less divisive framing is a potentially important concern in a political climate in 
which the Minnesota State Republicans ousted Public Utility Commission Chair Ellen Anderson in January 
2012 in part based on her past leadership as a Democratic state senator on renewable energy legislation.  
See Jim Ragsdale, Senate Republicans Oust Ellen Anderson as PUC Chair, STAR TRIBUNE, 
http://www.startribune.com/politics/blogs/138357554.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2012); Although the 
November 2012 election brought the Minnesota legislature back under Democratic control, Frederick Melo 
& Mary Jo Webster, Election 2012: Minnesota, by the Numbers, Was Nearly True Blue, PIONEER PRESS, 
Nov. 11, 2012, http://www.twincities.com/ci_21978013/election-2012-minnesota-by-numbers-was-nearly-
true (last visited Nov. 28, 2012), deep divisions remain in viewpoints about climate change. 
 
779 MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/aboutProgram.cfm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).  
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Resource Teams’ (CERTS) regional listening sessions around the state regarding 
community-based energy opportunities and the Next Generation Energy Act of 2007.780  
The legislature in 2008 directed the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), 
Department of Energy Resources, and CERTS to recommend voluntary actions which 
cities could take as part of a voluntary program to recognize “green star” sustainable 
cities.781  The resulting program, Minnesota GreenStep Cities, which launched in June 
2010, focuses on twenty-eight best practices and has three “steps” depending on how 
many best practices the participating city has taken;782 a guide explains how to get started 
and how to achieve each step.783  The Steering Committee—consisting of representatives 
from the MPCA, Great Plains Institute, CERTS, Urban Land Institute Minnesota, League 
of Minnesota Cities, Izaak-Walton League-Minnesota Division, and the Minnesota 
Department of Commerce-Division of Energy Resources—reviews the program 
annually.784  Businesses and other organizations can sponsor GreenStep Cities Awards and 
receive public recognition for their role in the program.785  The program is growing 
rapidly, with new cities continuing to join.786 
The twelve GreenStep Cities’ participants that are the focus of this case study 
                                                
780 Id. 
 
781 Id. 
 
782 Id. 
 
783 Id. 
 
784 Id.  
 
785 Id. 
 
786  Greenstep Cities List, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/allCities.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
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represent a diverse cross-section of Twin Cities suburbs, as summarized in Table 1.787   
Table 1. Characteristics of Twin Cities Metropolitan Region Greenstep Cities 
 Pop.788  
 
Pop. 
Change 
(1990-
2004)789 
Suburb 
Location790 
Community 
Type791 
 
Household 
Tax 
Capacity 
(2004)792 
Party Preference 
(by State Senate 
Dist.) (2006)793 
Apple Valley  49,084 +41.3–
75.6% 
3rd Ring (S) Developing Job 
Center 
$2,261–
$2,950 
Leaning R 
Volatile 
Cottage Grove 34,502 +22.5–
40.2% 
2nd Ring (SE) Bedroom 
Developing 
$2,007–
$2,254 
Leaning D 
Volatile 
Eagan 65,800 +22.5–
40.2% 
2nd Ring (S) Developed Job 
Center 
$2,261–
$2,950 
Leaning D 
Volatile 
Eden Prairie 60,797 +41.3–
75.6% 
2nd Ring 
(SW) 
Developed Job 
Center 
$3,006–
$3,992 
Leaning R 
Volatile 
Edina 47,941 +0.0–
11.5% 
1st Ring (SW) Developed Job 
Center 
$3,006–
$3,992 
Leaning R 
Volatile 
Falcon Heights 5,300 +0.0–
11.5% 
1st Ring (N) Stressed City $1,580–
$1,986 
Safe D 
Farmington 21,086 +78.6% 
or more 
3rd Ring (S) Developing Job 
Center 
$2,007–
$2,254 
Leaning R 
Volatile 
Hopkins 17,481 +0.0–
11.5% 
1st Ring (W) Stressed City $1,580–
$1,986 
Safe D 
Mahtomedi 7,563 +41.3–
75.6% 
2nd Ring 
(NE) 
Developing Job 
Center 
$2,261–
$2,950 
Leaning R Party 
Line 
Maplewood 38,018 +13.1–
22.3% 
1st Ring (NE) Developed Job 
Center 
$2,261–
$2,950 
Safe D 
Oakdale 27,378 +41.3–
75.6% 
2nd Ring (E) Developing Job 
Center 
$1,580–
$1,986 
Safe D 
St. Anthony 8,226 -34.5–-
0.2% 
1st Ring (N) Stressed City $794–$1,506 Leaning D Party 
Line 
 
While their self-selection into a voluntary program suggests that these cities are likely 
mitigating more actively than many other small cities in the region, and thus probably 
unrepresentative of suburban efforts more broadly, they have a wide range of population, 
recent growth, location, community type, household tax capacity, and party preference.  
                                                
787 See id. 
 
788 See id. (Click on each city for population count). 
 
789 ORFIELD & LUCE JR., supra note 763, at 15 map 1.2. 
 
790 These are rough classifications from a map of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Region.  See id. 
 
791 Id. at 44, map 1.17. 
 
792 Id. at 37, map 1.14.  The regional average tax capacity was $2,261.  See id. 
 
793 Id. at 277, map 7.2. 
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That diversity, paired with the similarities among the measures these cities are taking to 
address climate change and achieve sustainability, suggests that they may provide a 
helpful example of how leader, small city-suburbs can contribute to broader multi-level 
climate change efforts; the ways in which these local initiatives cross-cut party lines is 
particularly hopeful sign at this time of deep division in the United States.  Focusing on a 
statewide sustainability program, even though some leader cities—including the center 
cities—may not participate in the program because they are too far ahead,794 also provides 
a way to capture efforts by cities that may not opt in to the Mayors Agreement but are 
taking mitigation efforts under the rubric of sustainability. 
These twelve suburbs’ greenhouse gas mitigation efforts focus on steps entirely 
within their local control.  Although many of the measures that they are taking potentially 
pair constructively with regional-level policies to address sprawl and consequently reduce 
metropolitan vehicle miles traveled, these local initiatives do not center on the regional 
level or above.  Participating suburbs generally began their efforts on climate change and 
energy, often because of the persuasive efforts of one or a small group of politically active 
individuals who have the capacity to make a significant difference at that scale, well 
before the GreenStep Cities program commenced.  By the time these cities joined 
Greenstep Cities, many of them were already members of a number of other networks of 
cities operating at different scales.795  Chapters XII and XIII describe these suburban 
cities’ mitigation steps and participation in multi-level networks as the basis for analyzing 
how these networks might foster increased suburban action on climate change. 
                                                
794 Confidential interviews with people involved in cities active in other multi-level climate change and 
sustainability networks but not participating in GreenStep Cities (Fall 2011). 
 
795 See infra Chapter XIII.  
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CHAPTER XII 
MITIGATION STEPS BY LEADER TWIN CITIES SUBURBS 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change 
Efforts: Possibilities for Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, 
National, and International Networks, 22 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 35 (2012). 
 
This chapter uses the Twin Cities metropolitan region as a laboratory for considering 
how suburban positionality influences cities’ approaches to climate change. Its approach 
to analyzing this question pairs two streams of scholarship described in Chapter XI, (1) the 
interdisciplinary literature on climate change and cities and (2) the urban geography and 
interdisciplinary literature on suburbs. This chapter groups the twelve leader cities 
introduced at the end of Chapter XI by the type of suburb that they are—stressed city, 
developed job center, or developing job center/bedroom community—to examine the 
extent to which cities’ demographic characteristics shape the types of mitigation initiatives 
that they choose to pursue.   
The chapter concludes with some reflections, based on that grouping, of how 
differentiating among categories of suburbs might help to shape efforts to encourage 
mitigation in them.  While these suburban cities are all taking measures that comport with 
the types of appropriate local steps outlined in the scholarly literature on cities and climate 
change, the emphasis and form of these measures varies among the different kinds of 
cities.  This variation suggests strategies for framing the benefits of mitigation approaches 
in ways tailored to diverse local needs. 
 
1. Stressed Inner Suburbs 
Stressed inner suburbs, also referred to as “at-risk communities,” face many of the 
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difficulties of their center cities—poverty and social instability that put great pressure on 
limited resources—but often without center city resources. These cities include “older 
suburbs, satellite cities, and newer, lower density communities with relatively high 
poverty rates.”796  They often become poor faster than their center cities because they lack 
business districts as well as urban resources such as public infrastructure, cultural 
attractions, parks, and other amenities.797   
The Twin Cities’ stressed inner suburbs, including the three cities described below—
Falcon Heights, Hopkins, and St. Anthony—follow this pattern.  They all have below 
average household tax capacity and growth compared to the other suburbs, with St. 
Anthony poorer and growing more slowly than the other two.  Politically, they are the 
most liberal group of cities in this sample; like their center cities, they all lean or are 
solidly Democratic in their voting patterns.  As demonstrated in the details of their 
planning relevant to climate change mitigation, these suburbs’ greater economic stresses 
influence their approach to climate change and sustainability.  Their efforts have to be 
particularly sensitive to economics and up-front costs and often include an urban 
redevelopment component. 
 
a. Falcon Heights 
Falcon Heights, a city of just 5,578 people that votes Democratic, is a first ring 
suburb just north of Saint Paul which has been categorized as a stressed city.798  This city 
                                                
796 MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 36 (2002). 
 
797 Id. at 33–36. 
 
798 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1.  
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is unusual because it houses both the Minnesota State Fair and the University of 
Minnesota St. Paul campus in its 2.28 square miles.799  It is by far the smallest of the 
suburban cities that this case study discusses and particularly exemplifies how, at such a 
scale, even in a comparatively under-resourced suburb, the leadership of the mayor and 
key city council members can enable rapid, nimble efforts to take advantage of available 
state and federal funds and innovate.800  Over the course of just a few years, the city has 
made and met major commitments, often at very low cost or free through creative use of 
university and other local resources.   
In 2008, at the urging of the Mayor Peter Lindstrom and several city council members 
in support of initiatives by the city’s Environmental Commission, the Falcon Heights city 
council unanimously supported joining the Mayors’ Agreement, as well as having the 
Climate Change Corp—using retired engineers through the Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency—provide a free inventory of its carbon footprint.801  The city changed several of 
its zoning ordinances to allow for high density and mixed mixed-use zoning along its 
transportation corridors, implemented programs to promote walking, and increased the 
number of bike parking stations throughout the city.802  It also established a building 
                                                
799 FALCON HEIGHTS, http://www.ci.falcon-heights.mn.us/ (last visited May 18, 2011). 
 
800 Beth Mercer-Taylor, Member, Falcon Heights City Council, Presentation to Renewable Energy Class at 
the University of Minnesota (Feb. 7, 2011). 
 
801 Falcon Heights City Council Minutes 5/28/08, FALCON HEIGHTS, available at http://www.ci.falcon-
heights.mn.us/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={1F53A76A-3B66-4BE5-AF98-
19906858FCE2}&DE={5F9CE4F7-AABC-4865-A7E2-FBDA27F097B1 (last visited May 17, 2011). 
 
802 CITY OF FALCON HEIGHTS, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 71–86 (2009), available at http://archive.ci.falcon-
heights.mn.us/compplan2008/FalconHeights2030_CPUcorrected.pdf; CITY OF FALCON HEIGHTS NEW HIGH 
DENSITY MULTI-FAMILY/MIXED USE ZONING (2010), available at 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/viewFile.cfm?id=194 (depicting proposed zoning changes in the 
Comprehensive Plan); City of Falcon Heights Planning Commission Minutes (Aug. 24, 2010) (on file with 
author) (explaining the zoning changes). 
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permit fee rebate for energy star improvements.803   
In fall 2009, the University of Minnesota Sustainable Communities course prepared 
suggestions on developing a city sustainability program.804  In summer 2010, Falcon 
Heights implemented a streetscape project on the major thoroughfare Larpenteur Avenue 
that includes planting and landscaping, which highlights pedestrian and cyclist street 
uses.805  In October 2010, it completed a City Hall energy audit and efficiency upgrades, 
with the upfront capital costs to be paid back in under two years.806   
In February 2011, Falcon Heights implemented an Environmentally Preferable 
Purchasing Policy that complies with the EPA Comprehensive Procurement Guidelines.807  
In August 2011, based on data it had been collecting since 2007, Falcon Heights 
performed energy audits on two park shelters and installed motion-activated interior lights 
in response to the audit.808  Finally, Falcon Heights city council approved a 40kw solar 
array for the rooftop of its City Hall, which is currently being built with the support of the 
                                                
803  Falcon Heights Energy Rebate Program, FALCON HEIGHTS, http://www.ci.falcon-
heights.mn.us/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={569404F2-FC29-4662-A633-
19F52012CC3E}&DE={5FB80221-04AF-44BE-A8D2-350AC478DECC (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). 
 
804  See Student Work, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA SUSTAINABILITY STUDIES, 
http://sustainabilitystudies.umn.edu/SustainabilityStudiesMinor/StudentsWork/index.htm (last modified 
June 30, 2011); Bridget Rathsack et al., Falcon Heights Sustainability (unpublished student report), 
available at http://www.susteducation.umn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Falcon-Heights-
Sustainability.pdf. 
 
805 See Larpenteur Streetscape Project Begins, FALCON HEIGHTS (July 6, 2010), http://www.ci.falcon-
heights.mn.us/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7B78A505D2-DD94-41B6-88D7-
E6CD41853F1C%7D&DE=%7BDFD769E6-4023-4B2E-90A9-81CB002596F1%7D. 
 
806  See City of Falcon Heights, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2394738 (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). 
 
807 City of Falcon Heights Environmentally Preferable Purchasing Policy (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.falconheights.info/02-23-2011_fhcc_packet.pdf. 
 
808 City of Falcon Heights, supra note 806. 
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“Minnesota Made” program and other federal and state subsidies for renewable energy.809 
The city passed a January 2011 resolution joining the GreenStep Cities program, in 
which it is taking steps to achieve best practices with respect to public buildings, private 
buildings, comprehensive planning, higher density, complete green streets, mobility 
options, environmental purchasing, urban forests, green infrastructure, local air quality, 
benchmarks and community engagement, green business development, and local food.  It 
also is pursuing putting solar panels on its city hall through federal income tax credits, 
Xcel Energy rebates, private financing, and city lease payments.810  Falcon Heights 
reached Step 3 on June 10, 2012.811 
 
b. Hopkins 
Hopkins is a somewhat larger first ring suburb of 17,481 just west of Minneapolis 
that also has been categorized as a stressed city and consistently votes Democratic.812  It 
was recognized for its sustainability efforts as early as 2005; the Sierra Club designated 
the Excelsior Tech Center and Regency redevelopment project—which transformed an old 
torpedo factory into a mixed use community which incorporates residential, business, and 
                                                
809 See E-mail from Beth Mercer-Taylor, Member, Falcon Heights City Council, to Hari M. Osofsky, Assoc. 
Professor of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. (Mar. 1, 2012) (on file with author). 
 
810  See FALCON HEIGHTS, MINN., Resolution 11-01 (2011), available at http://www.ci.falcon-
heights.mn.us/vertical/Sites/%7BA88B3088-FA03-4D5D-9D04-
CCC9EF496399%7D/uploads/%7B4399331C-0D81-4A42-9934-EA324FCF40B8%7D.PDF (last visited 
May 17, 2011); Falcon Heights City Council Workshop, Mar. 2, 2011, available at 
http://www.falconheights.org/vertical/Sites/%7BA88B3088-FA03-4D5D-9D04-
CCC9EF496399%7D/uploads/%7B57FA6563-4C34-42B0-85A6-6B72250887FE%7D.PDF.  For 
additional steps Falcon Heights is taking, see Region 5 Climate Change: Municipalities, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/r5climatechange/municipalities.html (listing Falcon Heights as a new 
Community Climate Change Initiative Partner) (last updated Nov. 23, 2011). 
  
811 City of Falcon Heights, supra note 806. 
 
812 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1. 
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industrial development—as one of “America’s Best New Development Projects.”813  The 
city also installed solar-powered trail crossing signs in two locations in 2008.814 
In 2009, Hopkins’ efforts accelerated.  It formed a Green Team of city staff and began 
entering data into the B3 benchmarking database.815  The Green Team has used this data 
to guide projects which include: installing motion sensor lights at city facilities and 
efficient boilers in City Hall, setting thermostats at city facilities lower when not in use, 
and expanding public outreach on environment and energy issues.816  For example, the 
city upgraded its boilers because its City Hall was in the bottom third of the B3 energy 
performance rankings;817 the city expects to see a 25% reduction in heating costs because 
of the new boilers.818  
In 2010, Hopkins used state-level opportunities to advance its efforts.  The Minnesota 
Department of Natural Resources awarded the Depot Coffee House, a partially city-
managed coffee house and youth community engagement project which is located at the 
confluence of three bike trails, a $37,500 Solar Energy Legacy Grant to install solar panels 
                                                
813 SIERRA CLUB, BUILDING BETTER: A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S BEST NEW DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 2, 18 
(2005), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report05/buildingbetter.pdf. 
 
814  See City of Hopkins, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2394417 (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).   
 
815 See id. 
 
816 The Green Team, CITY OF HOPKINS, http://www.hopkinsmn.com/green/index.php (last visited Oct. 27, 
2011); see also CITY OF HOPKINS, HOPKINS IS GOING GREEN, available at 
http://www.hopkinsmn.com/council/pdf/going-green.pdf (describing Hopkins as “mindful of the 
environment”). 
 
817 See City of Hopkins, supra note 814. 
 
818  Hopkins Goes Green: City Hall Boiler Replacement, CITY OF HOPKINS, 
http://www.hopkinsmn.com/green/boiler-replacement.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
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which will also be used as a public outreach tool.819  Hopkins registered for GreenStep 
Cities on November 18, 2010 and reached Step 2 status by June 13, 2011.820  Hopkins also 
installed Dark-Sky compliant lighting in Cottageville Park in 2010.821   
Hopkins currently has several mixed-use redevelopment projects near its historic 
pedestrian-oriented downtown area, and plans to encourage more such redevelopment in 
conjunction with an adjacent proposed light rail station.822  In July 2011, the city adopted a 
mixed-use zoning ordinance that establishes three mixed-use areas coinciding with 
proposed light rail stops and development standards for them.823   
Hopkins also has a number of initiatives to reduce motor vehicle emissions.  Many of 
the city’s traffic signals are on fully actualized systems triggered by cameras or sensors to 
minimize idling whenever possible.824  The city is also converting traffic signals to LED 
                                                
819  THE DEPOT COFFEE HOUSE, DEPOT PARTNERS ANNUAL REPORT 2010 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.thedepotcoffeehouse.com/pdf/depot-annual-report-2010.pdf; Directions to the Depot, THE 
DEPOT COFFEE HOUSE, http://www.thedepotcoffeehouse.com/about/directions.html (last visited Oct. 26, 
2011); Frequently Asked Questions, THE DEPOT COFFEE HOUSE, 
http://www.thedepotcoffeehouse.com/about/faq.html (follow “How is the Depot Funded? (The Short 
Version)” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 26, 2011); Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., Solar Energy Legacy Grants 
FY2010 Funded Grants, 
http://files.dnr.state.mn.us/assistance/grants/recreation/pt_legacy/fy10solar_grants.pdf (revised Feb. 17, 
2010). 
 
820 City of Hopkins, supra note 814. 
 
821 Id. 
 
822  See Current Development, CITY OF HOPKINS, 
http://www.hopkinsmn.com/development/current/index.php (noting redevelopment of Fifth Avenue Flats 
and Marketplace & Main projects as mixed-use); Downtown Overlay District, CITY OF HOPKINS, 
http://www.hopkinsmn.com/development/downtown.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); SOUTHWEST 
TRANSITWAY, DOWNTOWN HOPKINS 8–13 (2009), available at 
http://www.hopkinsmn.com/transportation/pdf/lrt-downtown.pdf. 
 
823  HOPKINS, MINN., Ordinance No. 2011-1031 (2011), available at 
http://www.hopkinsmn.com/WebLink8/DocView.aspx?id=75283&dbid=1. 
 
824 City of Hopkins, supra note 814. 
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and hopes to have that process 90% complete by 2012.825  Its downtown Municipal 
Parking Ramp has two designated electric car stalls available for rent.826  With respect to 
the city vehicles, Hopkins monitors fleet fuel usage and cost and keeps a monthly 
maintenance schedule on each vehicle.827  The city has bicycle-based police patrols and 
building inspectors.828  
 
c. St. Anthony 
St. Anthony is a small first ring suburb—population of 8,226—located just north of 
Minneapolis that faces significant economic stresses.829  It has the lowest tax capacity and 
population growth rate of all the suburbs studied.830  It leans Democratic, but less strongly 
than the other two stressed suburbs described in this section.831  Like Hopkins, some of its 
earlier sustainability efforts involved mixed-use redevelopment.  In 2005, St. Anthony 
redeveloped the site of the blighted Apache Plaza Mall into a mixed-use area named Silver 
Lake Village that includes retail, restaurants, parks, sidewalks, and several types of 
housing.832  It also created an additional mixed-use area in the Kenzie Terrace area of the 
                                                
825 Id. 
 
826 Downtown Public Parking, CITY OF HOPKINS, http://www.hopkinsmn.com/transportation/parking.php 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2011). 
 
827 City of Hopkins, supra note 814. 
 
828 Id. 
 
829 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1. 
 
830 Id. 
 
831 See id.  
 
832  City of Saint Anthony, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2396471 (last visited Oct. 28, 2011); Tom Moran, 
Silver Lake Village Achieving a Collective Subconscious, LASERFICHE WEBLINK (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://web1-elkr.ci.elk-river.mn.us/weblink8/1/doc/84882/Page1.aspx (describing the history of the 
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city.833 
Like Falcon Heights, St. Anthony relied upon outside expertise in shaping its 
approach to clean energy.  In 2008, the consulting firm Sebasta Blomberg prepared a 
facility assessment report on energy use in all city buildings, which the city is using to 
guide energy efficiency improvements.834  St. Anthony also receives rebates from Xcel 
Energy for running its city wells off of a generator during peak electricity usage times.835  
The city has plans to work with Xcel to convert streetlights to LED when economically 
feasible, which the city anticipates will occur within two years.836  In addition, the city 
enters energy use data into the Minnesota B3 Benchmarking database.837 
St. Anthony has numerous initiatives to reduce vehicle emissions.  As part of its 
efforts to be a walkable, bikeable community, the city provides a bike trail map and 
recently received a grant to install bike racks at all city buildings.838  The city coordinates 
                                                                                                                                            
development); Edward Tombari, From Obsolete to Vibrant: Partnerships Help Create Vital Urban Living 
in Minnesota Suburb, LAND DEVELOPMENT (Nat’l Assoc. Home Builders, D.C.), Winter 2010, at 22. 
 
833  See Zoning & Street Address Map, CITY OF SAINT ANTHONY (2010), http://www.ci.saint-
anthony.mn.us/vertical/Sites/%7B5ED4AFB9-D450-4F68-BA29-
2600D3C2A620%7D/uploads/%7B72C78191-F238-42E0-B4AF-BBD31E6E6579%7D.PDF. 
 
834  CITY OF SAINT ANTHONY, CITY COUNCIL REGULAR MEETING MINUTES 3 (June 24, 2008), 
http://www.ci.saint-anthony.mn.us/vertical/Sites/%7B5ED4AFB9-D450-4F68-BA29-
2600D3C2A620%7D/uploads/%7B59D6125F-60FC-484E-99B0-3223E0E1B68E%7D.PDF. 
 
835 City of Saint Anthony, supra note 832.  
 
836 Id. 
 
837 Id. 
 
838  CITY OF SAINT ANTHONY, CITY COUNCIL REGULAR MEETING MINUTES 3 (May 24, 2011), 
http://www.ci.saint-anthony.mn.us/vertical/Sites/%7B5ED4AFB9-D450-4F68-BA29-
2600D3C2A620%7D/uploads/MinutesCC052411.pdf; City of Saint Anthony, supra note 832; SAINT 
ANTHONY VILLAGE, http://www.ci.saint-anthony.mn.us/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (“Our mission 
statement is to be a progressive and livable community, a walkable village, which is sustainable, safe and 
secure.”); Saint Anthony Village Bike Route, SAINT ANTHONY VILLAGE, http://www.ci.saint-
anthony.mn.us/vertical/Sites/%7B5ED4AFB9-D450-4F68-BA29-
2600D3C2A620%7D/uploads/%7B8DEE93AE-024A-4ED1-94E6-C52DF829A630%7D.PDF (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2011). 
 295 
with Metro Transit to improve transit options in the city and includes transit access as a 
major element of its Silver Lake Village development.839  St. Anthony has converted all of 
its traffic signals to LED bulbs and synchronized the signals on Silver Lake Road to 
reduce idling.840  The city uses solar powered LED technology for warning lights at school 
bus and fire truck approach sites.841  With respect to its own fleet, St. Anthony monitors 
fuel usage in vehicles, trains staff on efficient driving, uses bicycle police patrols in high-
density areas, and relies upon video conferencing to minimize vehicle trips.842  St. 
Anthony registered for GreenStep Cities on February 22, 2011 and reached Step 3 by June 
10, 2012.843  
 
2. Developed Job Centers  
Developed job centers are not simply relatively affluent bedroom communities within 
commuting distance of central cities, but rather have become important players in their 
regional economies.844  They have comparatively large tax bases but support less of the 
social costs of poverty than their central cities.  As a result, they suffer fewer of the 
stresses of the central cities and inner suburbs described above.845 
The four developed job centers participating in Greenstep Cities—Eagan, Eden 
                                                
839 City of Saint Anthony, supra note 832. 
 
840 Id. 
 
841 Id. 
 
842 Id. 
 
843 Id. 
 
844 See ORFIELD & LUCE JR., supra note 763, at 46. 
 
845 See id.; see also ORFIELD, supra note 696, at 44–46. 
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Prairie, Edina, and Maplewood—fit this profile.  They all have an above average tax base, 
with Eden Prairie and Edina having the highest tax base of the sample.  They vary in their 
growth rate, however, with the first-ring developed job centers growing more slowly than 
their second ring counterparts.  They are much more politically diverse and volatile than 
the inner stressed suburbs studied, with two tending Democratic and two tending 
Republican.  This diversity suggests some hope for the bipartisan character of potential 
mitigation measures in this critical group of established and affluent suburbs despite the 
general political divisiveness in the United States and Minnesota currently.846   
As detailed in depth below, these cities collectively have the most extensive programs 
in the sample.  Each of these developed job centers has made significant steps in the major 
areas in which cities can take action.  They all participate in the Mayors Agreement and 
have made commitments in the Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue.  Eden Prairie has 
even received national recognition from the Mayor’s Agreement in the small city 
category.847  In their assessment and implementation, these cities have been skillful at 
taking advantage of university and governmental resources, but also have the fiscal 
capacity to make up-front investments that will pay off over time.   
 
a. Eagan 
Eagan, with a population of 65,800, is the largest suburb in this study (only Eden 
Prairie, discussed next, is of similar size).848  It is a second-ring suburb south of the Twin 
                                                
846 See supra Table 1. 
 
847 See MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., TAKING LOCAL ACTION: MAYORS AND CLIMATE PROTECTION BEST 
PRACTICES 13 (2011), available at 
http://usmayors.org/79thAnnualMeeting/documents/BestPractices2011ClimateAwardWinners.pdf. 
  
848 See supra Table 1.  
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Cities that leans slightly Democratic and that has above average growth and tax capacity, 
but is not at the high end of either.849  Despite its very different size and positionality, it 
shares with Falcon Heights a story in which a few motivated individuals were able to 
catalyze rapid action.850  This description illustrates that phenomenon by focusing on the 
period from the Eagan City Council’s February 2010 creation of the Energy and 
Environment Commission to the present.  That Commission, which consists of seven 
residents that the City Council appoints, makes recommendations on energy sustainability 
and conservation strategies.851  The Commission has played an important role in fostering 
Eagan’s mitigation efforts, including its GreenStep accomplishments; Eagan registered as 
a GreenStep city on November 10, 2010, and reached Step Three on June 10, 2012.852   
Like Falcon Heights, Eagan took advantage of the local major university and its 
often-free resources, as well as governmental funding opportunities, to reduce the costs of 
its mitigation efforts.  The city had students in the University of Minnesota Sustainable 
Communities course compile an inventory of the city’s GreenStep Cities Best Practices.853  
In addition, Eagan used federal funding in the form of a DOE grant to install a geothermal 
heating system at the Eagan Ice Arena, which is projected during its first year to save the 
city $135,000 in energy and operational costs and reduce emissions equivalent to 124 
                                                
849 See id.  
 
850 See Amir Nadav, Member, Eagan Energy and Env’t Comm’n, Presentation at the University of 
Minnesota Climate Change and Clean Energy Capstone (Sept. 20, 2011) (notes on file with author).  
 
851  Advisory Energy & Environment Commission, CITY OF EAGAN, 
http://www.cityofeagan.com/live/article.aspx?id=41643 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
 
852  City of Eagan, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2394586 (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).  
 
853  Mary Jo Koplos, Eagan Achieves GreenStep City Status, EAGANPATCH (June 2, 2011), 
http://eagan.patch.com/articles/eagan-achieves-greenstep-city-status. 
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passenger cars.854  Eagan also received $657,000 in funds from the Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Block Grant program (EECBG) (which it supplemented with other 
leveraged funds and utility rebates totaling $1.2 million) to perform energy audits and 
upgrade several city buildings to increase energy efficiency.855 
Soon after creating the Commission, Eagan used its planning authority to reduce 
emissions.  In April 2010, Eagan adopted a Comprehensive Plan, which includes a revised 
Special Area Plan for the redevelopment of the area surrounding Cedar Avenue and 
Highway 13 to reflect the city’s goal to create a “viable mixed-use area that utilizes its 
highway visibility and accessibility, while maintaining compatible land use relationships 
with surrounding uses.”856  By January 2011, Eagan had complemented this effort with a 
traffic signal synchronization program on major roads; it installed two round-abouts and 
two flashing yellow left turn arrows to decrease idling time.857  All of the traffic signals in 
the city use LED lights.858  In January 2011, the city adopted a Trail Connection Policy 
through which private commercial property owners create trail linkages from city trails 
and sidewalks to commercial facilities in order to encourage non-vehicular travel.859 
                                                
854  December 11 Eagan Civic Arena Grand Re-Opening, CITY OF EAGAN, 
http://www.cityofeagan.com/live/news.aspx?cid=38588&id=41514 (last visited Sept. 25, 2012). 
 
855 City of Eagan, supra note 852. 
 
856  Cedar Grove Special Area Plan, CITY OF EAGAN, 
http://www.cityofeagan.com/live/article.aspx?id=40846 (last visited Sept. 27, 2011); Comprehensive Plan: 
Land Use Plan, CITY OF EAGAN, 
http://www.cityofeagan.com/upload/images/CommunityDevelopment/Planning/CompPlan2030/3%20-
%20Land%20Use_low.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011); Comprehensive Plan Update 2030, CITY OF EAGAN, 
http://www.cityofeagan.com/live/article.aspx?id=41050 (last visited Sept 25, 2012).  
 
857 City of Eagan, supra note 852. 
 
858 Id. 
 
859 See City of Eagan Community Trail System Connections to Commercial Areas Policy (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/viewFile.cfm?id=248. 
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These efforts continued throughout 2011.  In February, the city council adopted 2011-
12 goals, which include “[m]aintain[ing] a broad-based and comprehensive commitment 
to energy efficiency and environmental sustainability by adopting conservation and 
alternative energy strategies pursuing the use of local, non-polluting, renewable, and 
recycled resources, while encouraging residents and businesses to do likewise.”860  In 
May, Eagan began entering information into the Minnesota B3 database to track energy 
usage. 861   In September, Eagan enacted “Environmentally Preferable Purchasing 
Guidelines” to conserve natural resources and energy and lower overall costs to the city.862  
The City Council also passed a resolution committing to support Complete Streets 
principles of providing multi-modal transportation options in future transportation 
projects.863  It also approved the Energy and Environment Advisory Committee’s 2011–
2012 goals, which included achieving Step 3 in the Greenstep Cities program and more 
outreach and education to the residential and business communities.864 
Eagan took numerous steps in 2011 to update its facilities and fleet.  It replaced 
lighting fixtures, upgraded HVAC, and installed low-flow plumbing fixtures to improve 
                                                
860  City Council Goals 2011–2012, CITY OF EAGAN (Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://www.cityofeagan.com/live/article.aspx?id=47164. 
 
861 City of Eagan, supra note 852. 
 
862 City of Eagan Environmentally Preferable Purchasing Guidelines, CITY OF EAGAN (Sept. 6, 2011), 
available at http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/viewFile.cfm?id=618; Eagan Praised for Energy Best 
Practices, CITY OF EAGAN, 
http://www.cityofeagan.com/live/%28S%28iyll42j2qefqoc55rbuvqm45%29%29/news.aspx?cid=38588&id
=51458&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).  
 
863  EAGAN, MINN., Resolution No. 2011-11-43 (2011), available at 
http://www.mncompletestreets.org/gfx/Eagan%20Complete%20Streets%20Resolution.pdf. 
 
864  Council Action Report 9-6-11, CITY OF EAGAN (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.cityofeagan.com/live/event.aspx?id=47136; Mary Jo Koplos, Eagan Energy and Environment 
Commission Sets Goals for 2012, EAGANPATCH (Sept. 25, 2011), http://eagan.patch.com/articles/eagan-
energy-and-environment-commission-sets-goals-for-2012. 
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energy efficiency.865  In April 2011, Eagan opened the nation’s first Green Globe-certified 
fire station, which includes geothermal heating, natural and LED lighting, a solar-
reflective roof, several storm water runoff management features, and ash-wood planking 
that was removed from the site.866  Eagan’s South Water Treatment Facility’s $4.5 million 
renovation included the installation of more energy efficient water treatment 
technology.867  The city also replaced several fleet vehicles with more efficient models, 
tracks fuel usage, imposes a “no idling policy,” and uses bicycles for seasonal boulevard 
maintenance.868  In addition, Eagan documented five LEED Certified non-city-owned 
buildings: Eagan Place Professional Building, Lebanon Hills Visitor Center, Lockheed 
Martin, the Allan L. Schuman Corporation Ecolab Campus, and the United States Postal 
Service Bulk Mail Facility.869 
 
b. Eden Prairie 
Eden Prairie, a developed job center in the Twin Cities’ Western second ring which 
has grown rapidly over the last twenty years to a population of just over 60,000, has 
among the highest tax capacity in the sample and leans Republican.870  It also has received 
                                                
865  CITY OF EAGAN, CITY OF EAGAN 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 2, available at 
http://www.cityofeagan.com/upload/images/Newsletters/ExperienceEagan/ExperienceEaganmarchapril201
1fnl+%202010annual%20Rpt.pdf [hereinafter CITY OF EAGAN 2010 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 
866 Id.; see also “Code Green” Event Celebrates Progress Toward Green Globes-Certified Fire Station, 
CITY OF EAGAN, http://www.cityofeagan.com/live/news.aspx?cid=38588&id=41492 (last visited Sept. 27, 
2011) (outlining the features of the fire station). 
 
867 CITY OF EAGAN 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 865, at 2. 
 
868 City of Eagan, supra note 852. 
 
869 Id. 
 
870 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1.  
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national recognition for its efforts on climate change.  Mayor Nancy Tyra-Lukens was 
awarded an honorable mention at the 2011 U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Awards in the 
“small city” category for the city’s work on the 20-40-15 initiative.871  Eden Prairie’s 
successes exemplify what a more conservative, affluent suburb can achieve through 
commitment and concentrated efforts. 
The 20-40-15 initiative, which Eden Prairie began in 2006, calls for a 20% increase in 
city facility energy efficiency and a 40% increase in city vehicle fleet fuel efficiency by 
the year 2015.872  To meet the first goal, the city’s efforts include installing motion sensor 
lighting, indoor and outdoor LED lighting (most outdoor lights have been upgraded), LED 
stoplights (one-third of them have been upgraded thus far), and a City Center energy 
management system.873  To meet the second goal, the city’s actions have included adding 
several fuel-efficient vehicles to its fleet.874  The city also participates in programs by 
which it receives rebates from Centerpoint and Xcel Energy.875  Eden Prairie has made 
significant strides in its first five years of 20-40-15, reporting in June 2011 that it had 
reduced city facility energy consumption by over 8% and increased city fleet fuel 
                                                
871  MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., supra note 847; see also 20-40-15 Initiative, EDEN PRAIRIE, 
http://www.edenprairie.org/index.aspx?page=334 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (discussing implementation of 
the plan). 
 
872 20-40-15 Initiative, supra note 169. 
 
873  City of Eden Prairie, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2394614 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  
 
874  See id.; Life in the Prairie, CITY OF EDEN PRAIRIE (July 2010), 
http://www.edenprairie.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=816. 
  
875 City of Eden Prairie, supra note 873. 
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efficiency by 10%.876  
Eden Prairie joined GreenStep Cities on June 17, 2011877 after the city’s Conservation 
Commission recommended participation.  It uses its 20-40-15 program to achieve progress 
on those goals and reached Step 2 on June 10, 2012.878  In addition, Eden Prarie worked 
with SRF Consulting Group to create a 2007 Active Community Planning: Site Planning 
Guide, which assists its local government, property owners and developers with preparing 
development plans that incorporate density, walking/biking, quality physical design, and 
air and water quality concerns.879 
 
c. Edina 
Edina is a first ring Western suburb of 47,941 that has among the highest tax capacity 
in the sample and leans Republican.880  Like the other first ring suburbs, it has been 
growing much more slowly than the second and third ring suburbs in the sample.881  
However, its socioeconomic status places it in this developed job center group.882  Edina’s 
mitigation efforts also began in 2007, before the launch of Greenstep Cities, when it 
                                                
876 Press Release, Eden Prairie, Minn., Mayor Receives Honorable Mention for Eden Prairie Climate 
Protection Efforts (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.edenprairie.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=1022. 
 
877 City of Eden Prairie, supra note 873. 
 
878 See Rick Getschow, GreenStep Cities, CITY OF EDEN PRAIRIE BLOGS (June 21, 2011, 12:12 PM), 
http://edenprairieweblogs.org/rickgetschow/posts/152/. 
 
879 See City of Eden Prairie, DESIGN FOR HEALTH, http://designforhealth.net/cases/eden-prairie/; Email 
from Philipp Muesig, Minn. GreenStep Cities Coordinator, to Hari Osofsky, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. 
of Minn. Law School (Feb. 28, 2012) (on file with author). 
 
880 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1. 
 
881 See id.  
 
882 Id.  
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established an Energy and Environment Commission and became one of only two cities in 
the sample to join ICLEI, an international association of local governments working on 
sustainability.883  Edina’s Commission focuses on energy, recycling, solid waste, and air 
and water quality issues, and works in partnership with Xcel and CenterPoint Energy to 
promote residential energy efficiency programs.884  Edina registered for GreenStep Cities 
on March 1, 2011 and achieved Step Three status on June 10, 2012.885 
Edina has been a leader among the cities in this sample in data collection, beginning 
its compilation of benchmark data in 2007 with the ICLEI CACP software.886  It also was 
one of eighteen cities to join the Carbon Disclosure Project in 2008, which is a global 
platform for cities to disclose and compare GHG emissions data established in 
collaboration with ICLEI.887  In 2011, Edina followed Falcon Heights in partnering with 
the Urban Land Institute’s Regional Indicator Project to create benchmarking data for 
energy consumption in the city.888  Edina also has entered energy benchmark data into the 
                                                
883  Current Press Releases: City of Edina Joins ICLEI, CITY OF EDINA (Nov. 9, 2007), 
legacy.ci.edina.mn.us/PressReleases/L6-42_PressRelease_200711_6.htm. 
 
884  Energy & Environment Commission, CITY OF EDINA, 
http://legacy.ci.edina.mn.us/citycouncil/EnergyEnvironmentCommission.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
 
885  City of Edina, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2394621 (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).  
 
886 Id. 
 
887 See CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CDP CITIES 2011: REPORT ON C40 CITIES (2011), available at 
https://www.cdproject.net/Documents/CDP-Cities-2011-Report.pdf; see also CDP Cities, CARBON 
DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/cities (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (discussing the 
objectives of the program); CARBON SENSE, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT: CITIES PILOT PROJECT 2008 
(2008), available at https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/65_329_216_CDP-CitiesReport.pdf. 
 
888  SCOTT HEAL, OFFICE OF THE CITY MANAGER: FRIDAY REPORT (2011), available at 
http://legacy.ci.edina.mn.us/PDFs/Friday_Report/2011/April%2022.pdf; see also Council Minutes, CITY OF 
FALCON HEIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.falconheights.org/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={BD4063DB-2F67-4C85-A936-
EE69AF241ADC}&DE={C97D7810-8AB5-4C85-B778-CBBBC4170A71}) (approving Carbon Footprint 
Baseline Analysis Phase II). 
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B3 database and is having city buildings audited for energy use.889 
In addition, Edina has been a leader in helping create incentives for private buildings 
to invest in renewable energy and energy efficiency upgrades.  After the state passed 
enabling legislation in 2010, Edina became the first city in Minnesota to create a Property 
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program, which helps provide financing for these 
upgrades.890  Through collaboration with the national PACE program, the city’s Energy 
Commission, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, the Minnesota Solar Energy 
Industries Association, and the Minnesota Department of Commerce, Edina created its 
Emerald Energy Program at an implementation cost of only $11,400, which today can 
fund any qualifying commercial or industrial property in the City.891  On August 21, 2012, 
its City Council approved the state’s first energy efficiency PACE project, which supports 
a restaurant’s LED lighting replacement and exhaust control installations.892 
Edina, like many of the other cities, has focused on shifting people away from car 
use.  Edina’s transportation committee passed a resolution recommending that the city 
create a “Living Streets” plan based on complete streets concepts that would, among other 
aims, calm traffic and improve bicycle and pedestrian connectivity. 893   The city’s 
Comprehensive Bicycle Transportation Plan includes a goal of making bicycling a “useful 
                                                
889 City of Edina, supra note 885.  
 
890  Commercial Pace in Edina Minnesota, PACENOW, http://pacenow.org/about-pace/feature-c-pace-in-
edina/. 
  
891 See id; About Pace, PACENOW, http://pacenow.org/about-pace/. 
  
892 See Email from Philipp Muesig, Minn. GreenStep Cities Coordinator, to Hari Osofsky, Assoc. Professor 
of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law School (Aug 21, 2012) (on file with author).  
 
893  See Minutes of the Edina Transportation Commission, CITY OF EDINA (Apr. 21, 2011), 
http://legacy.ci.edina.mn.us/Pages/TransportationCommissionMeetingMinutes/20110421.htm; City of 
Edina, supra note 885. 
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transportation option in Edina.”894  
Edina has engaged in substantial community education and outreach.  In Fall 2011, 
Edina Community Education Services began holding classes on energy efficiency for 
residents taught by staff from the Center for Energy and the Environment; participants 
receive a discount on a Home Energy Squad visit.895  Edina also has created a marketing 
campaign to promote residential energy efficiency programs in conjunction with Xcel and 
CenterPoint Energy.896  
 
d. Maplewood 
Maplewood, a first ring suburb just to the North and East of Saint Paul with a 
population of 38,018, has slightly above average tax capacity, average growth, and votes 
Democratic.897  It is the earliest of this group to implement significant measures relevant 
to climate change mitigation, taking steps in 1994 to build the Maplewood Community 
Center in an energy efficient fashion.898  The city also made several energy efficiency 
upgrades to its facilities between 1998 and 2007.899  Like many of the other cities in the 
                                                
894  CITY OF EDINA, COMPREHENSIVE BICYCLE TRANSPORTATION PLAN 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.edinamn.gov/PlanningBikePlanReport.pdf. 
  
895 Archived Press Releases: Home Energy Awareness Class Offered Through Edina Community Education 
Services, CITY OF EDINA (Sept. 14, 2011), http://legacy.ci.edina.mn.us/PressReleases/L6-
42_PressRelease_20110914.htm. 
 
896 City of Edina, supra note 885.  
 
897 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1. 
 
898 See Energy, CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/index.aspx?nid=819 (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2011).  
 
899 See CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, MAPLEWOOD ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND CONSERVATION STRATEGY PLAN 
(2009), available at http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1411 (listing energy 
efficiency upgrades) [hereinafter MAPLEWOOD ENERGY STRATEGY]. 
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sample, Maplewood has established an institutional framework to support its efforts. 
Maplewood’s Environmental and Natural Resources Commission establishes 
environmental priorities for the city and advises the City Council and other commissions 
on environmental issues.900  Maplewood also has a Natural Resources Department with 
both an Environmental Planner and a Natural Resources Coordinator on staff, which also 
publishes a newsletter on sustainability.901  In 2008, the city established a Green Team of 
employees, focused on sustainability projects, to help it meet its Mayors Agreement 
commitments.902  In 2009, Maplewood adopted an Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Strategy that lays out goals and policies to decrease energy use within the city.903  
Maplewood registered for the GreenStep Cities program on January 24, 2011 and reached 
Step Two by June 13, 2011.904  
Like other leader suburbs, Maplewood has accessed university and government 
resources to forward its goals.  In 2008, students at the University of Minnesota prepared a 
series of reports for the city addressing sustainability issues, which included analysis of 
energy use in city facilities and a recommendation that Maplewood join the Minnesota 
                                                
900  Environmental & Natural Resource Commission, CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, 
http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/index.aspx?nid=256 (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). 
 
901  See Community Development, CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, 
http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/Directory.aspx?did=32 (last visited Oct. 28, 2011); Engaging Attitudes, 
MAPLEWOOD SEASONS (Maplewood Minn.), Summer 2008, at 1, 1, available at 
http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1645. 
 
902 Shann Finwall, Take the Energy Challenge, MAPLEWOOD SEASONS (City of Maplewood Minn.), Fall 
2009, at 1, 3, available at http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1257. 
 
903 MAPLEWOOD ENERGY STRATEGY, supra note 899. 
 
904  City of Maplewood, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2395846 (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).  
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GreenStar Cities Initiative, a precursor to the GreenStep program.905  In 2009, Maplewood 
used EECBG funding to replace boilers and upgrade HVAC at City Hall, install energy 
efficient lighting at the Community Center and Goodrich Park, and contribute to lighting 
upgrades at Maplewood Mall.906  In 2011, the city installed a 2,150 kWh solar panel 
system at the Maplewood Nature Center that was partially funded by a Solar Energy 
Legacy Grant from the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources.907 
A number of Maplewood’s efforts, such as some of those described above, have 
centered around reducing energy use in buildings, including the adoption of a model 
sustainable building renovation policy based on the International Green Construction 
Code.908  In 2007, Maplewood began entering energy use data into the Minnesota B3 
database and in 2008 completed energy audits of city buildings.909  To advance energy 
efficiency in private buildings, Maplewood collaborated with Xcel Energy on Community 
Energy Efficiency Sweep, which promotes energy-efficiency programs available to city 
residents and businesses.910  The city also encourages residents to participate in the 
Minnesota Energy Challenge and provides energy saving tips for residents in the 
                                                
905 DARIAN MOTAMED ET AL., SUSTAINABLE MAPLEWOOD 2050: GREEN WORKPLACE: ENERGY 22 (2008),  
available at http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=911; City of Maplewood, supra 
note 904.  
 
906 MAPLEWOOD ENERGY STRATEGY, supra note 899, at 15. 
 
907 Ann Hutchinson, Nature Center Solar Photovoltaic Project, MAPLEWOOD SEASONS (City of Maplewood 
Minn.), Fall 2011, at 3, available at http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=2079. 
 
908 City of Maplewood, supra note 904. 
 
909 Id.; MAPLEWOOD ENERGY STRATEGY, supra note 899. 
 
910 Yvonne Pfeifer, Energy Sweep, MAPLEWOOD SEASONS (City of Maplewood Minn.), Winter 2010/2011, 
at 1, available at http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1795. 
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Maplewood Seasons newsletter.911   
As part of its efforts to reduce energy use, Maplewood has actively promoted 
renewables.  In October 2011, Maplewood’s City Council adopted the Renewable Energy 
Ordinance, which creates permitting, installation, and operation standards for solar, wind, 
and geothermal energy installations in the city.912  The city has also extended its efforts on 
energy efficiency and renewables to purchasing.  In April 2011, Maplewood adopted an 
environmentally-friendly purchasing policy that addresses energy efficiency in new 
equipment purchases913 and states that “[w]hen energy is purchased, renewable or green 
sources are preferred.  These include solar power or photovoltaic, wind power, 
geothermal, and hydroelectric energy sources and do not include fossil fuels (coal, oil or 
natural gas).”914  
Finally, Maplewood has made numerous efforts to reduce vehicle emissions.  The city 
synchronized traffic signals to minimize idling along White Bear Avenue in the 
Maplewood Mall area.915  It has begun to develop a Living Streets policy to calm traffic, 
make streets more pedestrian and bicycle-friendly, and control runoff.916  It has worked 
with MetroTransit to expand the Maplewood Mall park-and-ride lot to expand transit 
                                                
911 See, e.g., Finwall, supra note 902; Dave Fischer, Easy Tips For Saving Energy in Your Home, 
MAPLEWOOD SEASONS (Maplewood, Minn.), Fall 2009, at 3, available at 
http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1257. 
  
912  MAPLEWOOD, MINN., Ordinance No. 914 (2011), available at 
http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=2219. 
 
913  Environmental Purchasing Policy, CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, § 4.4 (April 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=2192. 
 
914 Id. at § 4.4.3. 
 
915 City of Maplewood, supra note 904. 
 
916 Michael Thompson, Living Streets—A Vision for the Future, MAPLEWOOD SEASONS (City of Maplewood, 
Minn.) Spring 2011, at 2, available at http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1886. 
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use.917  Maplewood also has taken several steps to make its own vehicle fleet more 
efficient.  It performed an audit on the fleet to discern where efficiency improvements 
could be made, implemented a vehicle sharing policy, downsized the city fleet, and 
established bicycle police patrols.918  The city has monitored and continues to monitor fuel 
usage, has instituted a no-idling policy, and has transitioned from bio-diesel B2 to B5.919  
 
3. Developing Job Centers and Bedroom Developing Communities 
Developing job centers and bedroom developing communities are rapidly growing 
cities toward the edge of the metropolitan region that have roughly average tax 
capacity.920  The main difference between these two groups is that bedroom developing 
communities lack the job concentrations of developing job centers and are farther from the 
center cities.921  In both groups, tax capacity does not easily match the new costs resulting 
from high growth rates.922  From a climate change perspective, their growth rates present 
both a challenge and an opportunity.  They are evolving more rapidly than other categories 
of suburban cities and are consequently making choices that impact their carbon footprint.  
As a result, their land use and emissions patterns are often more malleable than those of 
more developed suburbs closer to the center cities.923  However, these edge cities also tend 
                                                
917 City of Maplewood, supra note 904. 
 
918 Scott Schultz, Sustainable Fleet Operations, MAPLEWOOD SEASONS (City of Maplewood, Minn.) Spring 
2011, at 3, available at http://www.ci.maplewood.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1886. 
  
919 Id.; City of Maplewood, supra note 904. 
 
920 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1.  
 
921 See ORFIELD & LUCE JR., supra note 763, at 45–49.  
 
922 See id. 
 
923 See id.  
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to sprawl and have limited resources to address these patterns.924 
The five Twin Cities metropolitan region developing job center and bedroom 
developing communities participating in Greenstep Cities—Apple Valley, Cottage Grove, 
Farmington, Mahtomedi, and Oakdale—fit this profile.  These cities’ populations all grew 
by over 40% between 1990 and 2004.925  With the exception of Oakdale, which has a 
lower tax capacity more similar to the stressed inner suburbs, they all have close to 
average tax capacity for the metropolitan region.926  Like the developed job center group, 
they are politically diverse and contested; three of the five lean Republican, one leans 
Democratic, and one is safely Democratic.927 
The extent of their mitigation efforts varies dramatically.  Some of the cities in this 
grouping located closer to the region’s core were comparatively early adopters of 
mitigating activities identified in the cities and climate change literature even, in the case 
of Oakdale, with comparatively limited resources.  However, one of the outer group, 
Farmington, has included efforts at land use concentration among its initiatives, a 
constructive way of addressing sprawl within a city that could be compatible with regional 
sprawl control efforts.  Although in some cases these cities accessed university and 
governmental resources to support their efforts, they did so less than cities in the other two 
categories discussed, despite the fact that these cities need such economic support more 
than the developed job centers.  This gap indicates a possible avenue for encouraging 
more action in these communities. 
                                                
924 See id.   
 
925 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1.  
 
926 Id.  
 
927 Id.   
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a. Apple Valley 
Apple Valley is a third-ring, southern suburb that has been growing rapidly, has 
above average tax capacity, and leans Republican.928  Like many of the other cities, it 
began addressing energy and sustainability issues relevant to mitigation well before 
joining the Greenstep Cities program and accesses federal government funding programs 
to help support its work.  The city’s “Better Energy and Sustainability Program” assists 
local homeowners and businesses in reducing energy use.929  In 2007, the city began 
collaborating with Dakota Electric and Center Point Energy to help businesses reduce 
energy use.930  Apple Valley also established a revolving loan fund, supported in part by 
the EECBG program, to help residents in decrease their energy use, and works on energy 
efficiency intiatives.931 
Apple Valley joined GreenStep Cities on June 10, 2011 and achieved Step 2 on June 
10, 2012.932  By August 5, 2011, the city had completed energy efficiency audits and 
improvements on several city buildings with the support of EECBG funding.933  The city 
also reported that Liquor Store #3 and the Hayes Community Center are Green Globes 
                                                
928 Id.  
 
929  See Better Energy and Sustainability, CITY OF APPLE VALLEY, http://www.ci.apple-
valley.mn.us/index.aspx?NID=335 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 
930  Better Energy for Business, CITY OF APPLE VALLEY, http://www.ci.apple-
valley.mn.us/index.aspx?NID=339 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 
931  Better Energy Grant Projects, CITY OF APPLE VALLEY, http://www.ci.apple-
valley.mn.us/index.aspx?NID=340 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 
932  City of Apple Valley, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2393967 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 
933 Id. 
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certified and started entering energy usage of city buildings in the Minnesota B3 
database.934 
 
b. Cottage Grove 
Cottage Grove is a second-ring, southeastern suburb of 34,502 that has average 
household tax capacity, above-average growth, and leans Democratic.935  Cottage Grove 
registered for GreenStep Cities on March 1, 2011, and achieved Step 1 on June 13, 2012, 
but does not participate in any of the other multi-level climate-change networks studied.936  
Its initiatives relevant to mitigation are among the least extensive in the sample group, 
mostly centering around its new city hall building which will also house its public safety 
department.  In April 2011, Xcel Energy’s Energy Design Assistance Program provided 
the city with an energy assessment for this building which outlines several options for 
energy efficiency measures.937  The City Council approved a package of $99,000 in 
energy efficiency improvements and expects them to save the city up to $35,000 annually 
in energy costs.938 
   
                                                
934 Id. 
 
935 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1.   
 
936  City of Cottage Grove, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2393644 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 
937 THE WEIDT GROUP, ENERGY ANALYSIS FOR THE COTTAGE GROVE PUBLIC SAFETY/CITY HALL (2011), 
available at http://docs.cottage-grove.org/WebLink8/DocView.aspx?id=179955&dbid=0. 
 
938 Jon Avise, ‘Green’ Elements in Cottage Grove City Hall Project Could Trim Energy Costs, S. WASH. 
CNTY. BULL. (May 11, 2011), http://www.swcbulletin.com/event/article/id/18207. 
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c. Farmington 
Farmington is a third-ring, southern suburb that has had the most rapid growth rate of 
the suburbs studied and that leans Republican.  It began its climate change efforts in 
2006.939  Farmington registered as a GreenStep City on May 23, 2011 and reached Step 2 
status by June 10, 2012.940  Its six years of efforts illustrate some of the possibilities for 
progress by cities at the rapidly growing edge of metropolitan regions. 
In 2006, Farmington established a “Green Team” of city employees tasked with 
implementing practices and programs that conserve energy and reduce waste.941  The 
team’s recent projects include adding recycling bins at city facilities and conducting 
outreach on CFL and LED light bulb use and disposal.942  The city also promotes the 
Minnesota Energy Challenge as an energy efficiency resource for its residents943 and has 
fuel monitoring and maintenance programs to optimize the city vehicle fleet’s fuel 
efficiency.944  In addition to its efforts on energy, Farmington has taken steps to encourage 
efficient city growth and infill development in its downtown area.  It located its city hall 
downtown, a location that provides walking and biking access to the facility for many 
                                                
939 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1. 
 
940  City of Farmington, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2394747 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 
941  See The Green Team, CITY OF FARMINGTON, 
http://www.ci.farmington.mn.us/AboutFarmington/Green/GreenTeam.html (follow “How the Green Team 
Began” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 
942 See id. 
 
943 See Save Money, Stay Comfortable This Winter, THE BRIDGE (City of Farmington, Minn.), Jan./Feb. 
2011, at 8, available at 
http://www.ci.farmington.mn.us/Communications/TheBridge/The%20BridgeJanFeb2011.pdf.  
 
944 City of Farmington, supra note 940. 
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residents, and implemented bike police patrols in the downtown area.945  
 
d. Mahtomedi 
Mahtomedi is a small, rapidly growing, second-ring, northeastern suburb, that has an 
above average tax capacity, a population of 7,563 residents, and leans Republican.946  Like 
those of a number of the other suburbs, Mahtomedi’s efforts have been supported by an 
environmental commission and outside support from the university.947  Mahtomedi created 
the Environmental Commission in 2008, which with its focus on sustainability, waste, 
energy, and natural resource issues in the city has helped to guide many of its actions 
relevant to climate change mitigation.948  For example, the Commission successfully 
recommended that the City Council pass a Wind Energy Ordinance, advised the city on its 
recently constructed public-works building’s inclusion of energy efficiency mechanisms, 
and publishes a “Green Talk” newsletter which discusses community environmental issues 
and gives energy saving tips. 949   Complementing the Commission’s efforts, the 
Mahtomedi Area Green Initiative—a community organization that promotes renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, and sustainability—installed a wind turbine at the Mahtomedi 
                                                
945 See id. 
 
946 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1. 
 
947  City of Mahtomedi, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2395818 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).  
 
948  Mahtomedi Environmental Commission, MAHTOMEDI, 
http://mahtomedi.govoffice.com/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={6B53F51C-C6B3-45DB-85B4-
7B0AFC91C072} (last visited Nov. 27, 2011); What is the Environmental Commission and What Do They 
Do?, GREEN TALK (Mahtomedi, Minn.), Spring 2011, at 1, available at 
http://mahtomedi.govoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7BB983F313-8CF2-4BB7-8CFD-
8AC05AAF37F6%7D/uploads/%7B7E4E9BC1-0DED-446A-AC94-AC208EACABE6%7D.PDF. 
 
949 Marnie McInnis, City of Mahtomedi Sustainability Plan 7–8 (2011) (on file with author). 
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Athletic Fields, which helps the Mahtomedi Public Schools’ energy profile.950  Mahtomedi 
registered as a GreenStep City on November 16, 2010 and was awarded Step 1 recognition 
on June 13, 2011.951 
Benchmarking and assessment, often with outside help, play an important role in 
Mahtomedi’s efforts.  In 2009, the city had an energy audit performed on the city hall and 
fire station buildings.952  It also monitors those two buildings and its public works building 
by entering benchmarking data into the Minnesota B3 database.953  Like several of the 
other cities in the sample, Mahtomedi received assistance from University of Minnesota 
students in 2010 in developing its Sustainability Plan based on the GreenStep Cities 
model.954  Between September 2010 and August 2011, the city received additional cost-
effective assistance by hosting a Minnesota GreenCorps member who helped the city with 
its GreenStep Cities program, a spring environmental fair, implementation of energy 
saving measures in response to a May 2009 ICLEI carbon footprint analysis,955 and the 
                                                
950 About, MAHTOMEDI AREA GREEN INITIATIVE, http://mahtomedigreen.org/?page_id=33 (last visited Sept. 
1, 2012); The Zephyr Wind Turbine, GREEN TALK (City of Mahtomedi, Minn.), Fall 2011, at 1, available at 
http://mahtomedi.govoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7BB983F313-8CF2-4BB7-8CFD-
8AC05AAF37F6%7D/uploads/Green_Talk_Fall_2011.pdf. 
 
951 City of Mahtomedi, supra note 947. 
 
952  XCEL ENERGY, MAHTOMEDI ENERGY ASSESSMENT 1 (2009), available at 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/viewFile.cfm?id=32. 
 
953 McInnis, supra note 949, at 7. 
 
954  Sustainability Plan, GREEN TALK (City of Mahtomedi, Minn.), Spring 2010, at 1, available at 
http://mahtomedi.govoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7BB983F313-8CF2-4BB7-8CFD-
8AC05AAF37F6%7D/uploads/%7B1D7957F3-AA7F-469F-A6EC-D14E7FDDC964%7D.PDF; JOE 
BARTEN ET AL., CITY OF MAHTOMEDI SUSTAINABILITY PLAN, available at 
http://www.susteducation.umn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Mahtomedi-Sustainability.pdf. 
 
955 MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, MINNESOTA GREENCORPS PROJECT SUMMARIES: PROGRAM YEAR 
2010–2011, at 15 (2011), available at http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/download-
document.html?gid=17595; City of Mahtomedi Host Site for Greencorps Member¸ GREEN TALK (City of 
Mahtomedi, Minn.), Winter 2011, at 1, available at 
http://mahtomedi.govoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7BB983F313-8CF2-4BB7-8CFD-
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drafting (with the city’s Environmental Commission) of the city’s Sustainability Plan.956  
The city has a goal of reducing its carbon emissions 10% by 2012 and 20% by 2020 from 
2001 levels.957  Mahtomedi also adopted an environmentally friendly purchasing policy.958 
 
e. Oakdale 
Oakdale is a rapidly growing second ring, eastern suburb of 27,378, that has below 
average tax capacity (similar to the much slower-growing stressed suburbs), and votes 
Democratic.959  Although it has limited resources, Oakdale was one of the earliest cities in 
the sample to take significant steps relevant to climate change mitigation and one of two 
cities in the sample to join ICLEI.  In 2001, Oakdale launched the Generation Green 
project, which began its energy efficiency and environmental efforts with a voluntary 
Commercial Building Program and has since expanded to support all of the city’s 
sustainability initiatives.960  The program has made substantial steps on its initial mission 
of reducing building energy consumption.  The city provides a 15% reduction in building 
permit costs to new or renovated building projects that exceed the Minnesota Energy Code 
by 20%, participate in Xcel Energy’s Energy Design Assistance program, and utilize other 
                                                                                                                                            
8AC05AAF37F6%7D/uploads/%7B9FCF599E-813A-4135-9AAC-91B21BBF384C%7D.PDF; McInnis, 
supra note 949. 
 
956 McInnis, supra note 949, at 8. 
 
957 Id. at 12. 
 
958 Id. at 7. 
 
959 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1.  
 
960  CITY OF OAKDALE, GENERATION GREEN PROGRAM, available at 
http://www.ci.oakdale.mn.us/vertical/Sites/{9D2ABE6F-4847-480E-9780-
B9885C59543F}/uploads/{E0DB8AA0-0066-4602-B706-D3819F62689D}.PDF (last visited Nov. 12, 
2012). 
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high performance strategies.961  It also reduces permit fees by 20% to 25% for LEED 
certified buildings, depending on the level of certification.962  Oakdale additionally 
established a Residential Home Energy Loan Program, which has evolved over time to 
provide increasingly beneficial terms for homeowners; its current iteration includes three-
year loans of up to $10,000 at 0% interest and an additional three years at 4.99% interest 
to residents for energy efficiency improvement projects.963   
Oakdale’s efforts extend to its own buildings.964  In 2008, Oakdale installed a white 
roof on City Hall estimated to provide $32,000 in energy savings over the life of the 
roof965 and plans to install photovoltaic solar panels to provide 12% of the building’s 
energy needs.966  It also added new energy-efficient HVAC equipment at City Hall for 
which it received $13,900 in XCEL rebates.967  In 2010, Oakdale installed a heat pump 
system at the Public Works facility that uses water from a nearby water treatment facility 
                                                
961  Generation Green Program, (City of Oakdale, Minn.), 
http://www.ci.oakdale.mn.us/vertical/Sites/%7B9D2ABE6F-4847-480E-9780-
B9885C59543F%7D/uploads/%7BE0DB8AA0-0066-4602-B706-D3819F62689D%7D.PDF (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2011).  
 
962 Id. 
 
963  CITY OF OAKDALE, RESIDENTIAL HOME ENERGY LOAN PROGRAM, 
http://www.ci.oakdale.mn.us/vertical/sites/%7B9D2ABE6F-4847-480E-9780-
B9885C59543F%7D/uploads/Flyer-RHELPenergyloan.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 
964  See CITY OF OAKDALE, GENERATION GREEN SUSTAINABILITY PLAN, 
http://www.ci.oakdale.mn.us/vertical/Sites/%7B9D2ABE6F-4847-480E-9780-
B9885C59543F%7D/uploads/Recycling-generationgreen.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) [hereinafter 
OAKDALE GENERATION GREEN SUSTAINABILITY PLAN].  
 
965 Id. at 6.  
 
966 Id. at 7–8; Patty Busse, Oakdale City Council Opts for Solar Panels at City Hall, but not Fire Stations, 
OAKDALE PATCH, (Oct. 26, 2011), http://oakdale.patch.com/articles/oakdale-city-council-opts-for-solar-
panels-at-city-hall-but-not-fire-stations. 
 
967  City of Oakdale, MINNESOTA GREENSTEP CITIES, 
http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_code=2395287 (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). 
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for heating and cooling.968   
In 2008, Oakdale joined ICLEI and committed to the ICLEI Cities for Climate 
protection milestones.969  Pursuant to those commitments, the city created a greenhouse 
gas emissions inventory and converted all nineteen streetlights to LED bulbs.970  The 
city’s Generation Green Sustainability Plan describes the city’s efforts to reduce its own 
greenhouse gas emissions as part of its ICLEI Cities for Climate Protection 
commitments.971  Its efforts include a strategy to achieve emissions reductions of 15% 
from city buildings, 25% from the city’s vehicle fleet, 2% from streetlights, and 10% from 
the city’s water distribution and treatment system from 2007 levels by 2015.972  Oakdale 
entered 2009 and 2010 energy use data into the Minnesota B3 benchmarking database.973  
Between 2007 and 2010, Oakdale’s energy use decreased by 2.11%.974  Oakdale registered 
for GreenStep Cities on April 6, 2011, and reached Step 1 by June 13, 2011.975  
Finally, Oakdale also pursued initiatives focused on reducing vehicle emissions.  In 
2008, the city collaborated with Metro Transit and Guardian Angels Church to expand an 
existing park-and-ride lot from a 200-vehicle capacity to a 435-vehicle capacity and to add 
                                                
968 Press Release, Congresswoman Betty McCollum, City Officials Tout Oakdale’s Energy Efficiency 
Improvements (Aug. 20, 2010), http://mccollum.house.gov/press-release/congresswoman-mccollum-city-
officials-tout-oakdale%E2%80%99s-energy-efficiency-improvements. 
 
969 OAKDALE GENERATION GREEN SUSTAINABILITY PLAN, supra note 262, at 5. 
 
970 Id. at 5–6, 9. 
 
971 Id. at 5–6. 
 
972 Id.  
 
973 Id. at 15.  
 
974  Patty Busse, Oakdale Cuts Energy Bill by $61,000, OAKDALE PATCH (Apr. 19, 2011), 
http://oakdale.patch.com/articles/oakdale-cuts-energy-bill-by-61000. 
 
975 City of Oakdale, supra note 967.  
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a crosswalk and bus shelter.976  With respect to its own fleet, the city performed a 2007 
inventory of fleet emissions that resulted in its replacing the city’s building inspector and 
code enforcement officer’s existing 12 MPG vehicles with 44 MPG hybrid vehicles.  
Oakdale estimated these changes would save $2,200 in fuel costs per year at 2007 
dollars.977  The police department is similarly phasing in Dodge Chargers to replace 
Chevy Tahoes to increase efficiency.978  
 
4. Accomplishments and Limitations of These Suburban Efforts 
These twelve suburbs’ efforts have a great deal in common with one another.  
Because they are all cities with the types of power granted to such units of government, 
they have similar areas in which they can impact mitigation.  Almost all of the cities 
studied made steps with respect to energy use in buildings and vehicle emissions.  The 
more ambitious of the group also used their zoning and land use powers, and created more 
comprehensive schemes for energy, environment, and sustainability.  Institutional 
structure seemed to make a difference in this respect.  Many of the cities that made the 
greatest strides had some sort of designated body helping to guide their efforts.  Cities that 
made the effort to obtain university and governmental resources also tended to perform 
more assessments, create overarching strategies, and engage in more projects. 
However, despite these commonalities, there were trends within each of the three 
groups that could assist targeted efforts to encourage participation by more cities and more 
                                                
976 Id. (Scroll to “Transportation” section; then scroll to “Action 6: Add/expand transit service, or promote 
car/bike sharing.” section; then follow “Click her for self-reported city details” hyperlink).  
 
977 Id. (Scroll to “Efficient City Fleets,” section; then scroll to Action 2; then follow “Click her for self-
reported city details” hyperlink).  
 
978 Id.  
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action by participating cities.  The differences did not seem to follow political affiliation in 
this group, contrary to what the divided discourse in the United States and Minnesota 
might suggest.  Nor did resource constraints seem to dictate what was possible; although 
the richest group for the most part had the most extensive plans, many of the cities with 
the least tax capacity had more developed programs than some of the cities with average 
tax capacity.  Rather, to the extent that these suburbs are representative (which is difficult 
to know with certainty in a small sample size—I plan to complement this dissertation’s 
qualitative analysis of particular cities with a future broader study), their approaches 
suggest potential leverage points.   
For each type of city, climate change mitigation efforts should be tied to other core 
needs whenever possible.  So, for stressed inner suburbs, measures which help them 
address poverty, aging infrastructure, and redevelopment needs and assist their accessing 
university and governmental resources may be particularly appropriate and well-received.  
Developed job centers have the capacity to access external resources and provide up-front 
costs.  The challenge there may be having them look to models, such as the ones described 
in Chapter XIII, and recognize them as in the local interest if they are not already doing 
so.  In this group, as in the prior one, the diversity of politics among the sample cities 
could be helpful; in this time of political divergence, having cities that lean towards the 
same political party reach out to each other and share their experiences might support 
more extensive future mitigation efforts.  Developing job centers and bedroom 
communities need more encouragement than the others to build upon their current efforts, 
use locally available free resources, and expand beyond building and vehicles initiatives to 
land use  
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and planning measures that can help shape their development in economically beneficial 
but less carbon intensive ways. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY MULTI-LEVEL NETWORKS IN INCREASING 
SUBURBAN ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change 
Efforts: Possibilities for Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, 
National, and International Networks, 22 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 35 (2012). 
 
The sample cities described in Chapter XII provide promising examples of what is 
possible for different types of suburbs and how differentiated analysis might help to shape 
strategies for including them as part of a pluralist, polycentric approach to addressing 
climate change.  But a core challenge remains: operationalizing the suburban capacity for 
mitigation at a time when international and national efforts at a comprehensive solution 
are stymied and few state governments are requiring their cities to take steps on climate 
change.979   
This chapter focuses on that challenge and considers the role that multi-level 
voluntary networks—paired with other existing regional, state, national, and international 
institutions—might play in broadening and deepening suburban participation and 
connecting suburban activity with larger-scale climate change negotiations.  As described 
in Chapter XI, this analysis is grounded in two conceptual stream: (1) network theory from 
geography and other disciplines, including Kevin Cox’s network-based conceputalization 
of scale that has animated the scalar analysis throughout the dissertation’s case studies, 
and urban geography scholarship on world cities and (2) the various streams of polycentric 
governance theory introduced in Chapter II.  Together, these theories provide a basis for 
thinking about the role of networks in polycentric, multi-scalar governance schemes, 
                                                
979 See supra Chapter XI. 
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which this chapter argues is crucial in this suburban climate change mitigation context. 
The chapter begins by examining the participation of the sample cities in state, 
regional, national, and international networks; the ways in which those networks are 
interacting; and how they might be used to encourage greater participation.  It then 
considers the extent to which these voluntary networks are integrated with formal 
governance approaches and opportunities for creating additional synergies.  It concludes 
by making proposals for next steps in both research and action.   
The analytical approach adopted here highlights two important aspects of developing 
effective pluralist, polycentric approaches.  First, simply having more efforts in different 
settings, especially if modeled for similarly situated suburbs, is itself a part of these 
strategies.  The emissions reductions, to the extent that they are meaningful and not simply 
a shifting of emissions, help achieve mitigation.980  Second, increasing linkages between 
this multiplicity of efforts provides opportunities for additional mitigation gains.  Not only 
can coordination (and perhaps even interaction) improve efficiency and eliminate 
redundancy, but it also provides opportunities for mutual pressure and learning.981  
Together, these two strategies can help create more of Cox’s multi-level spaces of 
engagement for local-scale climate change initiatives.  This chapter explores both of these 
aspects in the context of these suburbs’ involvement in multi-level networks and bases its 
proposals on them. 
 
                                                
980 See infra Chapter XIII, Section 2. 
 
981 See infra Section 3. 
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1. Possibilities for Encouraging Greater Suburban Participation Through Multi-Level 
Networks 
An important part of what helps the Twin Cities suburbs learn, and makes their 
successes replicable, is their participation in metropolitan, state, regional, national, and 
transnational networks of cities.  This section examines these cities’ participation in each 
of these networks, how the networks interact, and where possibilities for further action 
through them may lie.  In so doing, it reveals the complex spaces of dependence and 
engagement—to use Cox’s terminology—that are creating the scale of “local” climate 
change action.  Although each of the twelve cities, as explored in Chapter XII, is taking 
local governmental action under legal authority at that level, their interaction with 
networks at multiple scales helps to shape their action.  The limited ways in which these 
networks interact with each other and the low participation levels of these leader suburbs 
in some of these networks suggest ways in which these spaces are not being fully utilized 
and helps to frame the strategies proposed in Section 3. 
As detailed in Table 2 below, many of the studied GreenStep Cities participants have 
joined other state, regional, national, and international networks, with over half of them 
members of the Mayors Agreement.  The suburbs studied which participated in the 
Mayor’s Agreement recorded targets in the Copenhagen City Climate Reduction 
Catalogue of 7% below 1990 levels of carbon dioxide by 1990 in order to meet their 
commitment to meet or beat the reduction target that the United States would have had 
under the Kyoto Protocol.  Three of the cities studied—Edina, Mahtomedi, and Oakdale—
are also members of ICLEI, a transnational network of cities working on climate change. 
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Table 2. Participation in Multi-Level Networks by Twin Cities Metropolitan Region 
GreenStep Cities 
 
 Date Joined 
Greenstep 
Cities 
 
MN Energy 
Challenge 
Team  
(# Team 
Mems.)982 
EPA Region 5 
Community 
Climate Change 
Initiative 
Partner983 
Mayors Agreement on 
Climate Change984 
 
 
Copenhagen City Climate 
Catalogue (CO2 Reduction 
Target) 
ICLEI985 
 
 
Apple Valley  6/10/2011 367 As of July 2009 Mary Hamann-Roland 7% by 2012 (1990 baseline)986  
Cottage Grove 3/1/2011 118     
Eagan 11/10/2010 405  Mike Maguire 7% by 2012 (1990 baseline)987  
Eden Prairie 6/17/2011 224  Nancy Tyra-Lukens 7% by 2012 (1990 baseline)988  
Edina 3/1/2011 503  James Hovland 7% by 2012 (1990 baseline)989 2007 
Falcon Heights 1/13/2011 79 As of July 2009 Peter Lindstrom 7% by 2012 (1990 baseline)990  
Farmington 5/23/2011 125     
Hopkins 11/18/2010 118     
Mahtomedi 11/16/2010 58  Judson Marshall 7% by 2012 (1990 baseline)991 2008 
Maplewood 1/24/2011 134 Prior to July 2009 Diana Longrie 7% by 2012 (1990 baseline)992  
Oakdale 4/6/2011 188 As of July 2009   2008 
St. Anthony 2/22/2011 27     
                                                
982 City Teams, MINN. ENERGY CHALLENGE, http://www.mnenergychallenge.org/Teams/City-Teams.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2012). 
 
983 Region 5 Climate Change: Municipalities, supra note 810.    
 
984 List of Participating Mayors, supra note 702. 
 
985 Member List, ICLEI LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY USA, http://www.icleiusa.org/about-
iclei/members/member-list (last visited Sept. 27, 2011); List of Members (page 2 of 3), ICLEI LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY USA, http://www.icleiusa.org/about-iclei/members/members-2-3 (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2011).   
 
986 Community Summaries: Apple Valley, Minnesota, THE CITY CLIMATE CATALOGUE, http://www.climate-
catalogue.org//index.php?id=6917&cmd=shortlist&org_id=2454 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 
987  Community Summaries: Eagan, Minnesota, THE CITY CLIMATE CATALOGUE, http://www.climate-
catalogue.org//index.php?id=6917&cmd=shortlist&org_id=2462 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 
988 Community Summaries: Eden Prairie, Minnesota, THE CITY CLIMATE CATALOGUE, http://www.climate-
catalogue.org//index.php?id=6917&cmd=shortlist&org_id=2463 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 
989  Community Summaries: Edina, Minnesota, THE CITY CLIMATE CATALOGUE, http://www.climate-
catalogue.org//index.php?id=6917&cmd=shortlist&org_id=2464 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 
990  Community Summaries: Falcon Heights, Minnesota, THE CITY CLIMATE CATALOGUE, 
http://www.climate-catalogue.org//index.php?id=6917&cmd=shortlist&org_id=2465 (last visited Oct. 20, 
2011). 
 
991 Community Summaries: Mahtomedi, Minnesota, THE CITY CLIMATE CATALOGUE, http://www.climate-
catalogue.org//index.php?id=6917&cmd=shortlist&org_id=2472 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 
992 Community Summaries: Maplewood, Minnesota, THE CITY CLIMATE CATALOGUE, http://www.climate-
catalogue.org//index.php?id=6917&cmd=shortlist&org_id=2474 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
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Although all of these networks are voluntary, they provide these cities and others with 
opportunities to create community, see what is possible, and receive both support and 
pressure.  Overall, as explored in more depth in this section and the Appendix below, the 
group studied had higher levels of participation in these multi-level networks than the 
metropolitan region overall. These patterns suggest a clustering of network participation in 
cities committed to taking action on sustainability or climate change and the need to 
explore how these networks are and could be effective vehicles for enhancing 
participation.   
As Table 2 reflects, cities in all three categories of suburbs studied are active in 
statewide networks.  In addition to participating in Greenstep Cities, all of them have 
teams in the Minnesota Energy Challenge, in which cities (and other organizations) form 
teams of people that track energy savings; for cities, the teams are comprised of 
residents.993  Although the cities have significant variation in the number of residents 
participating, in every case it is a low percentage of the overall population in that city.994  
These patterns of participation are higher than those of the overall region—as detailed in 
the Appendix—but the region as a whole also has a pattern of greater participation in the 
statewide Minnesota Energy Challenge than other types of networks; 93 of the Met 
Council’s 183 communities have teams with at least ten members.995  In contrast, beyond 
the twelve cities studied in this case study, only five other cities from the metropolitan 
region—all suburbs—were members of Greenstep Cities as of January 2012, in part 
                                                
993  About the Challenge, MINN. ENERGY CHALLENGE, http://www.mnenergychallenge.org/About-the-
Challenge.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  
 
994 See supra Chapter XI, Table 1; see supra Chapter XII, Table 2.  
 
995 See infra Appendix; City Teams, supra note 982. 
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because some leader cities, including the center cities, appear to regard the program as too 
basic for them.996  However, these low numbers may be deceptive, since those additional 
five joined over a two-month period in late 2011 and early 2012, suggesting that this 
newer program has substantial growth potential.997 
Participation levels of these suburbs decline for the larger-scale networks that focus 
more explicitly on climate change.  Only four of the twelve cities studied are involved in 
the EPA Region 5 Community Climate Change Initiative partnership programs.  The EPA 
provides six free programs for cities involved in this initiative: Energy Star, WasteWise, 
Combined Heat and Power, Green Power Partnership, WaterSense, and Landfill Methane 
Outreach Program. 998   The EPA website explains that “partnership programs help 
communities address climate change while protecting human health and the environment, 
enhancing local economies, and reducing energy costs.  These programs also help meet 
commitments in the Mayors Agreement and other climate change programs.”999  The low 
participation levels across all three groups of cities suggests that even though the EPA 
explicitly connects these programs with accomplishing the goals of the Mayors 
Agreement, which many more of the cities have joined, these cities either find this 
program less valuable or are unaware of it.  This pattern persists across the metropolitan 
                                                
996 See Greenstep Cities List, supra note 786; confidential interviews with people involved in cities active in 
other multi-level climate change and sustainability networks but not participating in GreenStep Cities (Fall 
2011).   
 
997 See Greenstep Cities List, supra note 786; confidential interviews with people involved in cities active 
in other multi-level climate change and sustainability networks but not participating in GreenStep Cities 
(Fall 2011). 
 
998 Region 5 Climate Change: Municipalities, supra note 810. 
 
999 Id. 
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region, with only two cities beyond the group studied participating in this program.1000  
The biggest differentiation among the categories of suburbs studied comes with the 
national-level network, the Mayors Agreement.  This agreement, and its accompanying 
U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Center, emerged from a 2005 initiative by 
Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels, which was unanimously supported by the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors.1001  Participating cities not only commit to what the U.S. Kyoto Protocol 
emissions reductions would have been, but also have the opportunity to learn from the best 
practices models and receive national recognition (as Eden Prairie has).1002  While over 
half of the studied suburbs (seven of the twelve) are members of this agreement—a much 
higher level of participation than in the metro as a whole, which only has twenty-one total 
participants including the studied suburbs—all of the developed job centers studied are 
members of this agreement but a much lower percentage of the other two groups are (one 
stressed city and two developing job centers).1003   
This pattern of greater developed job center participation does not carry over, 
however, to the other fourteen metropolitan-area cities which have joined the Mayors 
Agreement; two are center cities (Minneapolis and Saint Paul), four are stressed cities 
(Brooklyn Center, Burnsville, Crystal, White Bear Lake), four are developed job centers 
(Golden Valley, Minnetonka, Oak Park Heights, Roseville), one is an affluent residential 
community (Sunfish Lake), and three are developing job centers (Inver Grove Heights, 
                                                
1000 See id. 
 
1001 About the Mayors Climate Protection Center, supra note 702. 
 
1002 Id. 
 
1003 See supra Table 2. 
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Rosemount, and Woodbury).1004  When the metropolitan region is viewed as a whole, 
combining the studied cities with the other cities, there are more developed job centers 
participating than any other group, but the difference is less marked than in the group 
discussed in depth in this case study.1005  On a percentage basis, though, the differences 
still look significant because there are far fewer developed job centers than developing job 
centers in the metropolitan region; a much higher percentage of developed job centers are 
participating than any other type of Twin Cities suburb.1006   
The greater participation of developed job centers in the Mayors Agreement among 
the studied group and, to some extent, among metropolitan region suburbs as a whole 
indicates that outreach to cities in the other two groupings potentially would be valuable to 
determine if there are barriers to joining, such as political concerns about framing efforts 
as climate change mitigation, or if these cities could be encouraged to take the additional 
step.  The developed job center participation might serve as a model for those cities with 
political concerns, as they are equally divided between leaning Democratic or 
Republican.1007  
Numerous international networks exist among local governments on climate change, 
including ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI);1008 agreements made in 
conjunction with the annual UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), such as pledges 
                                                
1004 See List of Participating Mayors, supra note 702; ORFIELD & LUCE JR., supra note 763, at 44 map 1.17. 
 
1005 See ORFIELD & LUCE JR., supra note 763, at 44 map 1.17. 
  
1006 See id.; List of Participating Mayors, supra note 702. 
 
1007 See supra Table 1. 
 
1008 About ICLEI, ICLEI GLOBAL, http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=about (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
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entered in the Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue,1009 the Mexico City Pact,1010 and the 
Durban Adaptation Charter for Local Government;1011 the World Mayors Council on 
Climate Change;1012 and the carbonn Cities Climate Registry.1013  However, the suburbs in 
this sample and the metropolitan region as a whole have only significantly participated in 
ICLEI and the Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue.  The main exception is Burnsville, 
whose Mayor was President of the U.S. Conference of Mayors at the time of the Mexico 
City Pact, and signed on behalf of both Burnsville and the U.S. Conference of Mayors.1014 
ICLEI, like Greenstep Cities, focuses on sustainability.  Since its founding in 1990, 
the association has grown to include participation from 1220 local government members 
from 70 different countries representing 569,885,000 people.1015  ICLEI has several 
different programs to achieve its sustainability goals, one of which is addressing climate 
change.  Its climate program has played a leading role in developing the agreements made 
during the COPs by fostering networks among local governments and supporting 
                                                
1009 List of Commitments, THE CITY CLIMATE CATALOGUE, http://www.climate-catalogue.org/ (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2012). 
 
1010 Signatories, THE MEXICO CITY PACT, http://www.mexicocitypact.org/en/the-mexico-city-pact-2/list-of-
cities/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
 
1011  Durban Adaptation Charter for Local Governments, 
http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Global/initiatives/LG_roadmap___COP_17_files/D
urban_Adaptation_Charter_5Dec.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
 
1012  Membership, WORLD MAYORS COUNCIL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org/members/members-list.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
 
1013 Reporting Cities, CARBONN CITIES CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://citiesclimateregistry.org/cities/reporting-
cities/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
 
1014 List of Cities that have signed the Global Cities Covenant on Climate (The Mexico City Pact), WORLD 
MAYORS SUMMIT ON CLIMATE MEX. CITY, http://www.wmsc2010.org/list-of-cities/ (last visited Jan. 30, 
2012).   
 
1015 About ICLEI, supra note 1008. 
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individual governments in their climate change efforts.1016  Fifteen Minnesota cities are 
members of ICLEI, including Minneapolis, Saint Paul, and several Twin Cities suburbs.  
Only one suburb from each of the three groupings studied has joined.1017  In the 
metropolitan region as a whole, five more cities are members: the two center cities, two 
developed job centers (Roseville and Golden Valley), and one developing job center 
(Woodbury).1018  Thus, overall, developed job centers are slightly overrepresented, but the 
sample size is very small.  
The Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue was created in conjunction with the 2009 
COP.  Participating cities record their targets and actions to share information with one 
another and to demonstrate the importance of local governments to the negotiating nation-
states.  Unlike the Mexico City Pact and Durban Adaptation Charter, which require 
signatories to make particular commitments, the Catalogue just serves as a clearinghouse 
for local governments to record their voluntary activities.  As Table 2 illustrates, the 
studied suburbs that participated in the Catalogue are Mayors Agreement signatories; their 
only commitments under the Catalogue are those that they are already making under the 
Mayors Agreement.1019  The other Twin Cities suburbs participating in the Mayors 
Agreement, with the exception of Crystal, follow an identical pattern.1020  The Catalogue 
helps translate these suburbs’ national-level commitments into international-level 
                                                
1016 ICLEI Climate Program, ICLEI GLOBAL, http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=800 (last visited Jan. 16, 
2012). 
 
1017 See supra Chapter XIII, Table 2 and accompanying notes 982–90. 
 
1018 See Member List, supra note 985; supra Chapter XIII, Table 2. 
 
1019 See supra Chapter XIII, Table 2 and accompanying notes 982–90. 
 
1020 See List of Commitments, supra note 1009; supra Chapter XIII, Table 2. 
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commitments, but those suburbs have not made additional international-level 
commitments at the COPs that followed.1021  Interestingly, while participation in the 
Mayors Agreement correlates perfectly with those making Copenhagen City Climate 
Catalogue commitments, it varies substantially from those participating in either the 
regional-level EPA partnership or the international-level ICLEI network, both among the 
studied group and the broader metropolitan region.1022  This difference suggests that 
suburbs willing to make commitments on climate change (as opposed to just 
sustainability) are participating unevenly in the possible networks that might support 
them, and that an opportunity might exist to introduce suburbs actively working on 
climate change to additional networks.  
Overall, these patterns of network participation indicate that state-level networks 
focused on sustainability and energy savings may serve as an important starting point for 
suburban mitigation and that climate change networks may not be politically unpalatable 
to moderately conservative suburbs.  However, participation in one network does not 
necessarily translate into participation in other networks and networks vary in the extent to 
which they result in new action rather than just a re-reporting of current action.  Suburbs 
already interested in taking action are more likely to join these networks,1023 making it 
sometimes difficult to discern the extent to which network participation resulted in new or 
more effective activities. 
Most promisingly, networks with specific action steps seem to motivate particular 
                                                
1021 See Signatories, supra note 1010; Durban Adaptation Charter for Local Governments, supra note 1011.   
 
1022 See List of Participating Mayors, supra note 702; Region 5 Climate Change: Municipalities, supra note 
810; List of Members (page 2 of 3), supra note 985; List of Commitments, supra note 1009. 
 
1023 See Confidential Presentation to Hari Osofsky’s Climate Change and Clean Energy Capstone (Fall 
2011) (notes on file with author). 
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action.  For example, Falcon Heights joined numerous networks in a short period of time 
when it committed to sustainability and climate change goals.1024  Although the networks 
did not cause it to commit to these goals, the frameworks provided by the networks, such 
as the steps of Greensteps Cities, helped organize its efforts and encouraged it to take 
particular actions.1025  Other cities have reported similar experiences.1026  The anecdotal 
evidence based on this small sample of cities suggests the need for further empirical work 
into how to motivate different types of suburbs to join additional networks and what 
makes networks most effective in spurring new or more effective mitigation steps in order 
to maximize cumulative suburban action.1027  Future studies might also consider how the 
motivations of different types of suburbs and center cities compare as they join networks, 
and how these varying motivations should impact the strategies of these networks. 
 
2. Possibilities for Integrating Multi-Level Networks with Formal Governance  
Viewing suburban action as part of a polycentric, pluralist approach to multi-scalar 
climate change governance does not necessarily have significant implications for formal 
international legal efforts to address climate change through international treaties.  The 
suburbs could simply serve as an important source of mitigation in the aggregate and 
through participation in networks that function wholly separately from the COP 
negotiations.  However, in reality, cities (including suburban ones) and the networks that 
                                                
1024 See infra Chapter XII.  
 
1025 See Mercer-Taylor, supra note 800. 
 
1026 See Confidential Presentation supra note 321.  
 
1027 I plan to pursue this work in a future project.  There are currently a number of efforts by researchers to 
assess the Greenstep Cities program and what it has achieved, but those are not focused primarily on 
climate change mitigation but rather on the program’s sustainability goals. 
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they form interact with the treaty negotiations in a variety of ways.  This section examines 
these interactions and considers how a governance model for climate change might 
incorporate them.   
The primary ways for smaller-scale governments to have a direct voice in UNFCCC 
negotiations are: (1) through their nation-state, by serving on their national negotiating 
team and influencing its positions and (2) as one of many civil society groups that observe 
the meetings (when not shut out as they were in Copenhagen in 2009) and provide input 
into negotiating texts.  Local representatives, particularly from major center cities, are at 
times directly involved in national negotiating teams,1028 but these teams are size-limited.  
Small suburban cities could never be fully included on them except through designated 
representatives and would have to compete with larger cities for a place in that group.  
However, cities have effectively had a voice in negotiations through this second 
avenue paired with efforts by multi-level networks—in which many of these suburbs 
participate—to influence national positions and international agreements through the 
commitments that local governments publicly make among themselves.  Transnational 
networks of localities have been working to change the substance of the agreements 
among nation-states at the COPs to have them include more recognition of the local 
role.1029  Since the 2007 COP in Bali established climate roadmap for nation-states, 
localities under the leadership of ICLEI and United Cities and Local Governments 
(UCLG) have attempted to advance a Local Government Climate Roadmap.  This effort, 
                                                
1028 See Newsom, supra note 400.  
 
1029 Press Release, ICLEI, Durban Outcomes: Nations Invest in Time, World Must Invest in Cities (Dec. 12, 
2011), 
http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Global/initiatives/LG_roadmap___COP_17_files/C
OP17_post_event_press_release_final_20111212.pdf. 
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which was originally designed to conclude by the Copenhagen COP, continued through 
the 2011 COP in Durban and beyond.  It aims to have references to local governments and 
subnational governments more broadly included in the texts of the agreements concluded 
under the UNFCCC.1030 
The agreements made at the 2011 COP in Durban reflect how far these efforts have 
come.  As ICLEI highlighted in its preliminary assessment, key agreements referenced 
local governments directly or made room for their participation as stakeholders.  The 
Durban outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under 
the Convention, for example, maintained the recognition of local governments that came 
out of Cancun COP and added several new references to them in the context of nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions, adaptation, and technology development and transfer.1031  
The Durban Platform did not explicitly reference local governments, but included a 
mechanism for observer organizations to provide input on both options and increase the 
level of ambition.1032  The Green Climate Fund launch similarly made reference to 
stakeholders and active observers at various points, and specifically includes subnational 
entities as among those which can be accredited as implementing entities receiving 
funding.1033  The Technology Executive Committee’s modalities and procedures include 
                                                
1030 See Local Government Climate Roadmap: From Copenhagen to Cancún to South Africa: COP15 - 
COP16 - COP17, UNITED CITIES AND LOCAL GOV’TS (UCLG) AND ICLEI (July 2010), 
http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/template/project_templates/climate-
roadmap/files/Communication_Material/Towards_COP16/Concept_towards_COP16_Final_8September20
10.pdf [hereinafter Local Government Climate Roadmap]. 
 
1031 See id.  
 
1032 See id. 
 
1033 See id.  
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the subnational level explicitly in their reference to engaging stakeholders. 1034  
Agreements regarding national adaptation plans and loss and damage all specifically 
reference multiple levels, at times using the terms “subnational” and “local.”1035  Finally, 
the Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board made decisions that continued 
efforts from the 2010 Cancun COP to make it easier for city-wide programs to 
participate.1036   While ICLEI indicates a number of places where clarification that 
stakeholders include localities would be helpful, the nation-state agreements increasingly 
recognize the plurality of relevant actors in addressing climate change within the limited 
participatory framework that international law treaties provide.1037   
While ICLEI and UCLG use their status as observers to influence the text, these 
efforts are augmented by the side meetings among localities (and other subnational 
governments) at the COPs.  As described above, these meetings have resulted in parallel 
agreements among localities at each of the last several COPs that were intended both to 
promote local action on mitigation and adaptation and to pressure nation-states to take 
more aggressive steps.  The Twin Cities suburbs participating in the Mayors Agreement 
and Copenhagen Catalogue exemplify this type of effort by the ways in which they 
publicly exceed U.S. commitments and use the Kyoto Protocol as a frame of reference in 
                                                
1034 See id.  
 
1035 See id. 
 
1036 See id.  
 
1037 See ICLEI-Local gov’t for sustainability, Durban must Urbanize Climate Agenda (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Global/initiatives/LG_roadmap___COP_17_files/L
GMA_Durban_DailyBriefing_DurbanOutcomes_LGs-Subnationals.pdf. 
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doing so.1038  At the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties, the Twin Cities suburbs 
making commitments were part of a much larger effort; mayors from around the world 
registered 3,251 climate targets in the Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue.1039  While the 
Twin Cities suburbs reduction targets pale in comparison to a leader center city like 
Portland, Oregon—10% by 2010, 80% by 2050—they are equivalent to those of one of its 
local center cities, St. Paul.1040   
Moreover, when viewed in the context of the limited nation-state commitments made 
during the formal negotiations at Copenhagen and at the COPs since then, these suburban 
targets in the Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue appear much more impressive.  The 
nation-states lacked consensus to pass an agreement at Copenhagen, but took note of the 
Copenhagen Accord.1041  Under that Accord, the United States set a 2020 emissions 
                                                
1038 See List of Participating Mayors, supra note 702; Region 5 Climate Change: Municipalities, supra note 
810; List of Members (page 2 of 3), supra note 985; List of Commitments, supra note 1009.   
 
1039  See Cities Act: Copenhagen Climate Communiqué, (Copenhagen Climate Summit for Mayors, 
Copenhagen, Den.), Dec. 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.kk.dk/Nyheder/2009/December/~/media/B5A397DC695C409983462723E31C995E.ashx (last 
visited May 18, 2011); List of Commitments, supra note 1009; Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance, supra 
note 745, at 65–66. 
 
1040 List of Commitments, supra note 1009.  Minneapolis’ commitments are harder to translate into 1990 
equivalents; although it uses a 2006 baseline, its substantial efforts prior to 2006 and efforts to address 
accuracy issues in its baseline make that a very different choice than the United States’ use of a 2005 
baseline.  Id.; CLIMATE CHANGE CORPS, MINNEAPOLIS CARBON FOOTPRINT PROJECT REPORT (2008), 
available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/ContentPages/4058400.pdf; CITY OF 
MINNEAPOLIS, SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE: 2005 ANNUAL REPORT ii (2005), available at  
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@citycoordinator/documents/webcontent/convert_270
332.pdf; JOHN BAILEY, LESSONS FROM THE PIONEERS: TACKLING GLOBAL WARMING AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
7 n.5 (2007) (“Minneapolis did develop a baseline GHG inventory in 1993 for the year 1988, but a recent 
examination led the city to reconsider its accuracy.  A new baseline analysis and current inventory are in 
the process of being developed.”).  Minneapolis has been recognized nationally for its cross-cutting efforts 
on climate change and sustainability, such as in the Mayors’ Climate Protection Summit’s 2007 Best 
Practices Guide.  MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., supra note 847.  
 
1041 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Fifteenth Sess., Dec. 7–18, 2009, Copenhagen, Den., Draft Decision -/CP 15: Proposal by the President, 
Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf; United Nations Framework 
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reductions target “[i]n the range of 17%, in conformity with anticipated U.S. energy and 
climate legislation,” using the less ambitious base year of 2005 (rather than the suburbs’ 
1990 base year); translated into a 1990 base year, that would be less than a 4% 
reduction.1042  In addition, the United States still has not passed such legislation and none 
looks likely in the near term.1043  Although the 2011 Durban COP resulted in an agreement 
to reach a universal binding agreement by 2015 paired with the creation of an ad hoc 
working group on the Durban Platform to develop a new protocol or other legal approach, 
only the Kyoto Protocol parties currently have specific, binding commitments to mitigate 
climate change.1044  While some of the Kyoto Protocol parties agreed to a second 
commitment period at the Durban COP, the United States continues to refrain from 
becoming a party and making such commitments.1045 
This contrast between small suburban commitments and U.S. commitments suggests 
both the contributions and limitations of these treaty interventions and example-setting 
                                                                                                                                            
Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php.  See also Arthur Max, Obama Brokers a 
Climate Deal, Doesn’t Satisfy All, DAILY RECORD (Morristown, N.J.), Dec. 19, 2009, at 1, 2009 WLNR 
25562965; Andrew C. Revkin & John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/earth/20accord.html. 
 
1042 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Appendix I - Quantified economy-wide emissions 
targets for 2020, Jan. 28, 2010, available at 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5264.php (citation omitted) (last visited May 
18, 2011).  The U.S. commitment would constitute only about a 3.45% reduction if a 1990 baseline were 
used.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–
2005, at 5 (2007), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/07ES.pdf. 
 
1043 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009), passed in 
the House but the Senate failed to pass equivalent legislation.  No such legislation is currently pending. 
 
1044 See Draft Decision -/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (Advance unedited version), Nov./Dec. 2011, 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_durbanplatform.pdf. 
   
1045  Draft Decision -/CMP.7, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol at its Sixteenth Session (Advance unedited 
version), Nov./Dec. 2011, 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/awgkp_outcome.pdf. 
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transnational local agreements in advancing climate change action.  Leader cities, even 
ones less far along like the Twin Cities’ suburbs highlighted in this Article, help their 
nation-states meet emissions reductions goals and pressure them to cooperate 
internationally while supporting each other’s local goals.  Perhaps in part because they are 
not making legally binding commitments to one another,1046 these cities make agreements 
with and commitments to other cities at international, national, regional, and state scales.  
The increasing recognition of localities and subnational governments in treaties reinforces 
localities’ growing role in both formal and informal visions of multi-level climate change 
governance.  
However, these activities by a range of leader cities that include suburbs also serve to 
reinforce a troubling big picture.  Other cities within the Twin Cities and beyond lag well 
behind the suburbs highlighted in this part (which vary in their level of action).1047  The 
collaboration among localities has not eliminated the many barriers to nation-state 
agreement or to localities being given a fuller place at the negotiating table.1048  Thus, 
while these suburbs’ efforts play an important role in responding to climate change and in 
encouraging other key actors to do the same, local climate change efforts remain 
constrained by the small percentage of cities participating and cities’ limited status under 
international law.  This mix of achievements and barriers provides the basis for the 
proposals advanced in the next section. 
                                                
1046 For a discussion of nation-states as the primary subjects and objects of international law, see IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287–88 (6th ed. 2003). 
 
1047 For concerns about leakage due to unequal local commitments, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, 
Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007). 
 
1048 For a summary of the state of international negotiations under the UNFCCC agreement after the 2010 
Cancun meeting, see Cesare Romano & Elizabeth Burleson, The Cancún Climate Conference, 15 ASIL 
INSIGHT 41, (2011).  
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3. Proposals for Increasing the Impact of Multi-Level Networks  
This section proposes two ways in which, based on this case study of these Twin 
Cities suburbs, multi-level networks could work more effectively with suburbs to achieve 
mitigation and adaptation goals.  First, it recommends that networks create more 
differentiated strategies and outreach which take into account the ways in which types of 
suburbs vary.  Second, it suggests that networks should encourage more cross-network 
participation in order to achieve their policy and governance goals. 
 
a. Differentiating Strategies Based on Type of Suburb 
As described in more depth in section 1, the networks studied provide cities with a 
toolkit of options for local or larger scale activities.1049  While these toolkits vary based on 
the network’s substantive focus (sustainability v. climate change) and on its goals, they 
generally do not differentiate greatly among cities.  For example, GreenStep Cities lists a 
set of possible actions, each associated with points, and cities can choose how to 
accumulate points to reach a step.1050  The Minnesota Energy Challenge gives individuals 
participating on teams, only some of which are locally-based (schools and neighborhoods 
can also provide teams), a myriad of options for making energy savings that can count 
towards their team’s total.1051  EPA Region 5 Community Climate Change Initiative 
partnership programs similarly give cities a choice of six programs in which they can 
                                                
1049 See supra Chapter XIII, Section 1.  
 
1050 See MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, supra note 756. 
 
1051 See About the Challenge, supra note 993. 
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participate.1052  The Mayors Agreement, beyond its requirement of a member commitment 
to specific greenhouse gas reduction goals, provides recognition of best practices 
differentiated by city size (large versus small) to give models to its members.1053  ICLEI’s 
climate program includes steps that cities can take on mitigation, adaptation, and 
advocacy, with expectations that member cities are engaging in particular practices.1054  
The Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue contains many options for participating cities to 
take and recognizes them with green checkmarks when they do.1055 
This toolkit approach has value because almost all cities have common characteristics 
that shape the categories of actions that would be appropriate.  By providing cities with 
many options in each category, models for how to make progress, and expectations that 
participation translates into particular steps, these networks can help a very diverse set of 
cities create individualized plans.  The suburbs studied in this case study reflect the 
appropriateness of this approach as they take steps in the major areas in which cities have 
authority and record their progress in these various networks.1056 
However, as Chapter XII’s examination of these cities based on the type of suburb 
indicates, small suburban cities appear to vary in their needs and possibilities for action 
based on the type of suburb that they are.  While a broader empirical study is needed to 
                                                
1052 Region 5 Climate Change: Municipalities, supra note 810. 
 
1053 See MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., supra note 847.  
 
1054 ICLEI Climate Program, ICLEI GLOBAL, http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=800 (last visited Jan. 22, 
2011). 
 
1055 See List of Commitments, supra note 1009. 
 
1056 See supra Chapter XII; supra Table 2. 
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provide a clearer sense of these patterns,1057 this initial qualitative examination suggests 
the value in differentiating further among suburbs and providing them with support and 
models based on their characteristics.  For example, networks could emphasize the 
interconnection between urban redevelopment and greenhouse gas emissions reduction for 
stressed inner suburbs, while focusing on city layout choices for the more rapidly growing 
outer suburbs.  They also could target suburbs that have not connected to particular types 
of free resources from governments and universities, which appear in this sample to vary 
significantly by category, and help them make those connections.1058 
This kind of differentiation would not require massive amounts of additional work for 
the existing networks, all of which have well-developed websites.  It simply would require 
adding to networks’ websites and brochures more differentiated models of how different 
types of suburbs have taken steps and locally-specific examples of resources available and 
ways in which other cities have used them.  In the Twin Cities context, with its rich 
opportunities for interconnection among the metropolitan cities due to its regional 
governance structure and statewide programs, adding this dimension to existing efforts 
would be relatively straightforward and within the powers of current networks.  For 
example, GreenStep Cities could complement its existing web resources for participants, 
which currently include best practices and model ordinances,1059 case examples from its 
different types of participating suburbs, and lists of locally-available financial and 
technical (including university) assistance.   
                                                
1057 I will be conducting this broader study as the 2013-14 Fesler-Lampert Chair in Urban and Regional 
Affairs at the University of Minnesota. 
 
1058 See supra Chapter XII. 
 
1059 See MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, supra note 756. 
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b. Greater Interconnection Among Voluntary Networks 
The networks studied in this chapter vary significantly in their substantive focus and 
scale of operations.  Some of them, like GreenStep Cities, are not even explicitly engaging 
climate change, but rather positively impact mitigation through their broader sustainability 
goals; they may be able to foster action in communities where the problem of climate 
change is more controversial.  Despite these differences, though, these networks are often 
trying to encourage cities to take very similar steps.  At times, the networks on climate 
change even explicitly interlink their activities, such as when the Mayors Agreement cities 
make uniform Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue Commitments or when the EPA 
Region 5 Community Climate Change Initiative partnership programs indicate that they 
will help cities meet their Mayors Agreement obligations.1060 
These twelve cities’ pattern of involvement in these networks and that of cities in the 
metropolitan region as a whole, however, suggests missed opportunities for greater 
synergy.  While, as in the case of the first proposal, additional empirical work would be 
valuable, the disconnections among the networks in this sample and the region seem to go 
well beyond the political volatility of climate change.  For example, many of the cities that 
have joined the Mayors Agreement are not participating in either the EPA Region 5 
initiative or ICLEI, despite their complementary resources and commitments.1061  This gap 
suggests an opportunity for networks to work together to encourage cities willing to take 
action on climate change to take full advantage of the resources available to them and 
                                                
1060 See supra Chapter XIII, Section 1. 
 
1061 See id. 
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become involved in new multi-level initiatives.  Like with the first suggestion, this 
recommendation would be relatively simple to implement: each network could advertise 
the other available networks to their members with explanations of the synergistic 
possibilities of participation in additional networks.  
Creating more common participation among these networks could also advance their 
more effective inclusion in international and national climate change governance, in line 
with pluralist, polycentric models.  At the international level, as ICLEI in partnership with 
UCLG simultaneously works to have localities and subnational governments included in 
treaties and make parallel commitments, it would be aided by having more small suburban 
members, given their critical role in addressing urban emissions.  Encouragement of cross-
participation by other networks could help to achieve this greater representation and more 
engagement of the particular issues faced by different types of suburbs.  Such an approach 
also would comport well with the calls for greater participation by localities in UNFCCC 
negotiations and implementation in line with conventions like the Aarhus Convention, 
which some UNFCCC parties have joined.1062   
At the U.S. national level, various models have been proposed for involving localities 
more in the formulation of the U.S. negotiating position and federal climate change law 
and policy.  For example, Resnik, Civin, and Frueh have suggested mechanisms for 
integrating these subnational coalitions into U.S. federal statutory law, such as advisory 
commissions and the input process under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.1063  
                                                
1062 See Svitlana Kravchenko, Procedural Rights as a Crucial Tool to Combat Climate Change, 38 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 613, 620 (2010).  I am exploring these participatory mechanisms in more depth in 
collaboration with Brad Karkkainen in a project on Climate Change, Inequality and International 
Lawmaking: New Governance Approaches to Addressing Abundance and Security, supported by a Univ. of 
Minn. Inst. for Advanced Study grant. 
 
1063 See Resnik, Civin & Frueh, supra note 566, at 779. 
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Similarly, Chapter X examines ways in which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
might involve subnational coalitions more in its process of distributing funds related to 
mitigation to state and local government, an approach that could also be used by other 
agencies and in the context of adaptation.1064  The citizens’ councils formed in Alaska in 
the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, which I have explored in my work on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, also provide a potential model for bringing smaller, suburban 
voices into the process more fully.  These councils involve a range of key stakeholders in 
developing recommendations that then have a formal channel into the core regulatory 
process, an approach which could be implemented through statute or by agencies in the 
climate change context.1065  Whether any of these models is used, or some other approach, 
creating more cross-cutting participation in networks would both strengthen the case for 
greater involvement and provide more effective representation of the diverse types of 
cities working on climate change. 
These twin strategies of differentiated outreach and network coordination also could 
be used to encourage participation in suburbs that have been slower to act.  As non-
participating suburban cities interact with one another in a variety of contexts, such as in 
                                                
1064 See supra Chapter X. 
 
1065 For a discussion of citizens’ councils, see Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077 (2011); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: 
Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout 
Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11041 (2010); Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution—The Kepone Incident and a Review of First Principles, 29 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 657, 700–01 (1995); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of 
Environmental Law: “The Whats”, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (citing e-mail from Zygmunt Plater, 
Professor, Bos. Coll. Law Sch., to William H. Rodgers, Professor, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law (Feb. 2, 
1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review)); George J. Busenberg, Regional Citizens’ 
Advisory Councils and Collaborative Environmental Management in the Marine Oil Trade in Alaska 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p41678_index.html (studying the 
two advisory council’s impacts on policy change); Introduction, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND REG’L CITIZENS’ 
ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.pwsrcac.org/about/index.html (last visited July 15, 2011). 
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the Twin Cities through its regional governance structure, they can learn about the 
economic and social benefits obtained by similar leader suburbs through their climate 
change and clean energy initiatives.  When a critical mass of involved citizens in those 
small cities become persuaded of the benefits of transitioning lightbulbs, taking energy-
efficiency measures, adding renewable energy to their portfolio (the Midwest has 
tremendous wind capacity and the Twin Cities are very sunny), or concentrating uses, 
these small cities often face fewer bureaucratic barriers to action than larger cities do and 
can act relatively quickly.  As these cities take these individual steps, they become more 
likely to join networks that give them support for their activities and to transition into 
leaders.  The Twin Cities example suggests that cities do not have to be politically liberal 
to make that transition because many of the initial steps they take on climate change are 
win-wins that do not have to be framed around the politically contentious issue of climate 
change.  Moreover, existing networks working together can reinforce the value of the 
smaller-scale efforts through award programs like the one that recognized Eden Prairie.1066 
In the final analysis, neither of this chapter’s proposals is adequate to address the 
massive barriers to climate action with which this dissertation started.  Even with these 
strategies, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of cities, large or small, will mitigate 
quickly enough to prevent our crossing the 450 parts per million carbon dioxide threshold 
that threatens major climate change and ever-louder calls for geoengineering.1067  These 
networks are voluntary and participation in them cannot force action the way top-down 
mandates would.   
                                                
1066 MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., supra note 847.  
 
1067 Johan Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472, 473 (2009). 
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But the example of these Twin Cities suburbs suggests that small, suburban cities 
should be an important area of focus in developing polycentric governance approaches.  
As more suburbs capture the low hanging fruit under their control, major metropolitan 
regions will come closer to reducing emissions at levels needed.  Center leader cities 
simply do not represent enough emissions unless joined by their smaller suburbs, which 
are often nimble enough to act quickly if brought on board.   
This case study also reinforces the multi-scalar quality of action at each scale along 
the lines of Kevin Cox’s network conception of scale.  Because these cities are deeply 
intertwined in multi-level networks, their “local” choices emerge from complex 
interactions across multiple scales.  As a consequence, continuing to reach out through 
networks, whether environmental or broader ones, which include small cities not yet 
taking similar action, and working towards better integration of those networks with 
formal international and national processes, contain promise for better mitigation.  They 
also create a framework for needed action and collaboration on adaptation that becomes 
more and more important as we fail to mitigate.  
Sprawling U.S. metropolitan regions pose daunting mitigation challenges, but their 
small cities also have the potential to make incremental change.  The proposed 
approaches, which could be implemented within existing networks and their limited 
resources, represent ways in which—based on the example of these Twin Cities suburbs—
networks might more effectively incorporate small suburban cities.  Such incorporation 
has the potential to create action that would not have happened otherwise, both in 
particular cities and in multi-level governance strategies. 
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CHAPTER XIV 
REENVISIONING THE SCALE OF CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE 
This chapter contains edited portions of Hari M. Osofsky, The Creation of the 
International Law of Climate Change Complexities of Sub-State Actors, in NON STATE 
ACTORS, SOFT LAW AND PROTECTIVE REGIMES 355 (Cecilia M. Bailliet, ed.) (2012, 
Cambridge University Press), and Hari M. Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance and 
Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and Cities at Copenhagen, 25 
MARYLAND J. INT’L L. 64 (2010). 
 
This dissertation began with a foundational problem.  Current strategies to address 
climate change are failing.  This reality has only been reinforced by recent news.  On 
May 9, 2013, two independent teams recorded that the mean carbon dioxide 
concentrations had crossed the 400 parts per million threshold, probably the first time this 
has occurred since the Pliocene Era, with its higher seas and warmer temperatures.1068  
Unless one is a skeptic in the face of the consensus science of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, humanity must do better or face a stark future.  My co-author 
Lesley McAllister and I recently chose to end our climate change casebook with two 
troubling scenarios for the future—major climate change and geoengineering—out of a 
sense that we are not currently on a path towards adequate mitigation.1069   
The core argument of this dissertation is that “doing better” requires 
geographically aware governance strategies.  It uses its three case studies to illustrate, in 
particular, the complexities of the individual scales involved in climate change regulation 
and their multi-scalar interaction.  This concluding chapter assesses the implications of 
                                                
1068 Robert Kunzig, Climate Milestone: Earth’s CO2 Level Passes 400 PPM, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC DAILY 
NEWS, May 9, 2013, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/05/130510-earth-co2-
milestone-400-ppm/.   
 
1069 HARI M. OSOFSKY & LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY (Elective Series) 
(2012, Aspen Publishers). 
 
 349 
those case studies for how geographic conceptions of scale might assist in structuring 
more effective climate change governance.  It considers how scale manifests in the case 
studies; the implications of this dissertation’s approach for how these case studies fit 
together with the treaty regime; and possibilities for achieving the core principles 
introduced in Chapter II of hybridity, multiscalar inclusion, and regulatory 
responsiveness. 
 
1. Geographic Scale and the Case Studies 
The three case studies all involve activity with regulatory significance at multiple 
scales.  Many of the key individuals and entities in each case study have multi-scalar 
identities or, at the very least, multi-scalar ties.  However, they differ in how those multi-
scalar dynamics are structured and what their regulatory implications are.  Several strands 
of the geographic literature conceptualizing scale, introduced in Chapter II, help to 
illuminate these commonalities and differences and the various possibilities for how the 
scalar dynamics in them might be viewed. 
First, each case study reinforced geographer Kevin Cox’s argument that 
individual scales are actually constituted through multi-scalar networks.1070  In the 
litigation context, although the regulation at issue often had a legally constituted level—
for example, the Clean Air Act is a federal law and San Bernardino County’s General 
Plan is a local one—their implementation was shaped through multi-level interactions 
both in the litigation itself and in the implementation of a decision or settlement.1071   
                                                
1070 Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, Or: Looking for 
Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1 (1998). 
 
1071 See supra Chapters IV–VII. 
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Similarly, while the Obama Administration’s regulation of transportation is ostensibly 
federal, the National Program was created through a series of conflictual and cooperative 
multi-scalar interactions and that federal policy consistently interacts with activity at 
other scales.1072  Although the decision-making in the suburbs is under local control, their 
decisions are being influenced by and influence multi-level networks.1073 
Second, a variety of rescaling processes are taking place in the case studies in 
ways that Nathan Sayre’s work at the intersection of geography and ecology help to 
illuminate.1074  The litigation context provides the most overt example of rescaling, as 
parties on opposing sides put forward competing scalar visions of climate change 
regulation.1075  However, even in the other two contexts, rescaling takes place due to 
network interactions.  In the federal transportation policy context, the Obama 
Administration is being influenced by these networks and must choose when to defer to 
them.1076  Local governments attempt to influence larger scales and, in turn, the context 
in which they operate through their multi-level networks.1077 
Third, the science-scale-law interface, which Sayre’s work paired with that of 
Holly Doremus helps to elucidate, influences these rescaling efforts in all three contexts.  
In this litigation context, like the rescaling itself, this interface is most explicitly engaged; 
litigants use characterizations of climate change science to make their scalar 
                                                
1072 See supra Chapters VIII–X. 
 
1073 See supra Chapters XI–XIII. 
 
1074 Nathan F. Sayre, Ecological and Geographical Scale: Parallels and Potential for Integration, 29 (3) 
PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 276, 281 (2005). 
 
1075 See supra Chapters IV–VII. 
 
1076 See supra Chapters VIII–X. 
 
1077 See supra Chapters XI–XIII. 
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arguments.1078  But as with the rescaling, views of science and technology undermine the 
approaches to federal policy and suburban mitigation.  Both contexts are influenced by a 
sense of what measures are appropriate for that scale in light of climate change science 
and available technology.1079 
Fourth, Julie Cidell’s insights about the complex scalar role of individuals are 
evident throughout the case studies.1080  Individuals bring, defend, and decide the 
lawsuits.1081  President Obama, other key federal decisionmakers, and the individuals 
driving the coalitions of smaller scale entities all influence scalar decisions and how 
multi-scalar interactions are structured. 1082   In the suburban context, the role of 
individuals is particularly evident because within small cities, one or two committed 
people can and are changing that suburb’s mitigation choices.1083 
Finally, as explored in more depth in the next section, one’s vision of the 
geography of scale—taking the options presented by Neil Brenner as a starting 
point1084—ends up influencing how one views the regulatory significance of the activity 
being described in the case studies.  If one moves beyond legal analysis’s usual focus on 
his first definition of scale, “a nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size,”1085 
                                                
1078 See supra Chapters IV–VII. 
 
1079 See supra Chapters VIII–XIII. 
 
1080 Julie Cidell, The Place of Individuals in the Politics of Scale, 38 AREA 196, 202 (2006).   
 
1081 See supra Chapters IV–VII. 
 
1082 See supra Chapters VIII–X. 
 
1083 See supra Chapters XI–XIII. 
 
1084 NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATES SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD 9 
(2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
1085 Id. 
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to his other definitions, a different understanding of the regulatory dynamics in these case 
studies emerges.  For example, if scale is also “the level of geographical resolution at 
which a given phenomenon is thought of, acted on or studied,” one must grapple with 
what thought and action is taking place at each level involved in the multi-scalar 
dynamics in all of the scale studies.  Viewing scale as “the geographical organizer and 
expression of collective social action” helps clarify the ways in which scales are 
constituting and being constituted by the dynamics of litigation, federal policymaking, 
and subnational interaction with multi-level networks.  Brenner’s fourth definition of 
scale as “the geographical resolution of contradictory processes of competition and 
cooperation” seems particularly apt in capturing the iterative dynamics in both the 
litigation and policymaking that lead to the changing outcomes over time. 
 
2. The Geography of Treaties, Smaller Scale Action, and Multi-Scalar Governance  
 
This Section builds from the previous one’s final insight to focus back on the key 
question of how the activity in the case studies should be understood as part of a multi-
scalar governance model.  Part of what makes this question hard to address is that one’s 
geographic view of multi-scalar governance and of individual scales foundationally 
shapes how one understands the condundrum with which this dissertation began: Beyond 
the failures of the treaty regime, there is a lot of activity—manifest in the three case 
studies—that a treaty-centered governance approach struggles to capture adequately. 
One’s geographic view influences whether one tries to fit each of the dissertation’s case 
studies into a governance model framed around treaties or into the more polycentric 
model conceptualized in Chapter II.  This section draws from the theory introduced in 
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Chapter II and developed throughout the dissertation to make the case for a more 
pluralist, polycentric vision not just of governance but also of governance theory; it 
interweaves theoretical approaches to international lawmaking with possible geographic 
conceptions of the nation-state to explore various interpretations of the regulatory 
significance of the case studies. 
 Specifically, this section asks how the multiscalar dynamics and strategies for 
progress explored in the case studies should fit together with the international treaty 
regime. It draws from my previous law and geography work to argue that different 
approaches to international legal theory, with their varying views on nation-states, shape 
the possible narratives of these case studies’ interaction with the formal treaty processes 
on climate change. It contends that an exploration of these partially conflicting theoretical 
perspectives assists in efforts to move forward towards more effective transnational 
climate governance.  
In my previous work on the geography of climate change litigation and 
agreements among subnational entities, I argue that international legal theory could be 
categorized based on the extent to which it views the nation-state as impenetrable and 
legitimate, and that these different categories of theory would have variant narratives of 
the international legal significance of Massachusetts v. EPA.1086 As part of that analysis, I 
grouped international legal theory into categories, three of which have particular salience 
for an understanding of these case studies: strict Westphalian, modified Westphalian, and 
pluralist. 1087  Strict Westphalians make the modernist territorial presumptions that 
                                                
1086  See Hari M Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II: Narratives of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573 (2008). 
 
1087 Id. at 578–79. 
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Alexander Murphy illuminates in his work on scale and territory;1088 they focus on the 
nation-state as the primary subject and object of international law and only consider 
nation-state behavior in narrating international lawmaking.1089 Modified Westphalians 
maintain the centrality of the nation-state but recognize a wide range of actors as relevant 
to the international lawmaking process.1090 Pluralists decenter the nation-state and argue 
that the international lawmaking narrative should include a broader set of activities and 
actors.1091 These three types of conceptual approaches cast the case studies’ relevance to 
climate change governance in a different light; exploring each approach’s potential 
narrative of their relevance provides a tool for understanding the significance of these 
agreements better. 
In so doing, this section aims to contribute to the scholarly dialogue regarding 
both international legal theory and climate change policy by modeling how a law and 
                                                
1088  Alexander B. Murphy, Territory’s Continuing Allure, __ ANNALS. ASSOC GEOG. 1, 2 (2012) 
(forthcoming). 
 
1089 For an exposition of that model, see Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II, 
supra note 1086 at 588–89. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287–88 
(6th ed. 2003); Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty 
Waiver”—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 382 (2005). 
 
1090 See Osofsky, supra note 37, at 589–90. For examples of the diverse conceptual approaches that 
arguably fall into the category of modified Westphalian scholarship, compare JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC 
A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005), with ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD 
ORDER 18–23 (2004) and Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process 
After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2004). 
 
1091 See Osofsky, supra note 37, at 589–90. For examples of pluralist approaches to international law, see 
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); Janet Koven Levit, A 
Bottom-Up Approach to International Law Making: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 
YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005).  For the New Haven School approach, see HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY, at xxi (1992); 
Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1991 
(1995); Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of 
Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1959); Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decisions, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1967); W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A 
Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101 (1981). 
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geography analysis of international lawmaking can allow for a reconceptualization of 
current strategies.  Certainly, a law and geography approach is not a prerequisite for 
innovative international legal theory; for example, the emerging body of global legal 
pluralism and new governance scholarship referenced in Chapter II makes a significant 
contribution, and generally does so without explicit reference to the discipline of 
geography. 1092   But thinking geographically helps to delineate more clearly the 
differences among the various perspectives on international law, and in particular, the 
ways in which their view of the nation-state shapes the legal and institutional possibilities 
for progress.   
 
a. The Enclosed Nation-State and Strict Westphalian View of the Case Studies 
Treating the nation-state as an enclosed space, as stricter Westphalian accounts 
tend to, means viewing it as a singular entity with clearly delineated boundaries and 
viewing its internal workings as generally irrelevant to its international law commitments.  
Such a view of the nation-state is generally intertwined with a strong belief in the notion 
of sovereign equality.  International law recognizes that, with very limited exceptions, 
states are sovereign over the space within them, which is treated as domestic and only 
relevant to international law as part of the national entity.  States can protect themselves 
against intrusions upon that enclosed space and generally can choose when to enter into 
                                                
1092 See supra Chapter II.  I have previously explored how drawing explicitly from the discipline of 
geography could contribute to New Haven School scholarship.  Hari M. Osofsky, A Law and Geography 
Perspective on the New Haven School, 32 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (2007). 
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consensual agreements with other states to abide by treaties and establish customary 
international law norms.1093  Figure 6 depicts this enclosed view. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Enclosed Nation-State 
Strict Westphalians would view climate change litigation, federal action, or 
agreements among subnational units as irrelevant to international law except for their 
contribution to national-level mitigation and adaptation as part of meeting treaty or other 
international obligations. Their story would begin and end with the international law 
efforts to address climate change. Lawsuits and federal- or subnational-level action would 
only relevant to the extent that they influence the U.S. or other nation-states’ negotiating 
positions or efforts to meet their obligations. Strict Westphalians would recognize that the 
many entities in these case studies represent a large percentage of global emissions, but 
would view their efforts as helping nation-states meet pledges under the Kyoto Protocol 
or Copenhagen Accord. In so doing, they would valorize the formal account with which 
this dissertation begins, and reject intuitions that there is more to the story.1094 
 
                                                
1093 See supra note 10. 
 
1094 For a discussion of strict Westphalian conceptual approaches, see Osofsky, supra note 37, at 591–94; 
Kelly, supra note 39, at 364–94. 
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b. The Permeable Nation-State and Modified Westphalian Views of the Case Studies 
But what if that portrayal of nation-state geography is inaccurate and incomplete?  
A number of scholars in different fields have grappled with this question.  For the 
purposes of this chapter, I focus on two such accounts that draw from geography and 
legal scholarship introduced in Chapter II, each of which challenges this narrative in 
different ways.1095  First, as discussed in Chapter II and above, geographer Julie Cidell 
has focused on the role of the individual in the creation of scale.  Her work demonstrates 
that our delineation into scalar levels—international, national, state, local, community, 
individual—should take into account that the individual is not simply the smallest level, 
but a part of every level.1096  This conception reminds us that the nation-state level is 
permeable because it is comprised of a myriad of individuals making choices.  Judith 
Resnik, a legal scholar whose work contributes to the dynamic federalism literature, has 
argued that international legal norms move across sovereign borders continuously and 
become part of internal, domestic understandings whether or not they are formally 
accepted.  She claims that battles over the use of international law in domestic courts, for 
example, miss the fact that international norms enter domestic decisions whether or not 
those decisions formally accept international law as relevant.1097  This account suggests 
                                                
1095 I have explored these accounts in my previous work on nation-state spaces.   See Hari M. Osofsky, The 
Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from Property and Criminal Law, 53 VILLANOVA L. REV. 117 
(2008); Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change and Environmental Justice: Reflections on Litigation over Oil 
Extraction and Rights Violations in Nigeria, 1 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 189 
(2010). 
 
1096 See Cidell, supra note 1080, at 202. 
 
1097  Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1627–33 (2006). 
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that nation-states are not enclosed, but rather that norms can permeate their borders 
regardless of formal legal hurdles, as depicted in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Permeable Nation-State 
Bringing together these two insights provides the basis for what I have termed a 
permeable model of the nation-state.  The basic account of what formally constitutes 
international law creation does not change, but the view of the nation-state within it does.  
The nation-state becomes a less monolithic entity, as international legal norms flow in 
and out of its borders and individuals (and other entities) within it shape its course.1098  
This change in viewpoint has significant implications for the narrative of international 
law creation generally and its relationship to climate change in particular.  The formal 
moment of international law creation becomes less central as one describes the myriad 
interactions and evolution of norms that precedes it and influences its implementation. 
 Modified Westphalians provide an example of such a permeable approach; they 
would retain the central focus on nation-states participating in a treaty-making process as 
the primary international law account regarding climate change. However, they would 
consider the case studies as a relevant part of the story of how these treaties are made. For 
instance, transnational legal process scholars—introduced in Chapter II and highlighted 
                                                
1098 See Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes, supra note 1095. 
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in Chapter VII—might focus on the way in which litigation and subnational coalitions 
contribute to a process of norm internalization that they view as undergirding 
international law; the interactions described in the case studies are part of processes of 
“interaction, interpretation, and internalization,” which help to establish transnational 
climate change norms and put pressure on nation-states to codify commitments in line 
with these norms in the treaty-making process. 1099  These accounts thus bring the 
litigation, the complexities of national policy, and subnational coalitions into the 
international lawmaking story in ways beyond their domestic relevance, but still focus on 
the ultimate international law as formal treaty agreements are reached. 
 
c. The Enmeshed Nation-State and Pluralist/Polycentric Views of the Case Studies 
Once one recognizes the nation-state as permeable, however, further questions 
arise about the traditional model of international law.  Namely, if the nation-state is 
constituted by individuals and entities and has borders that can be informally permeated, 
does the formal story also need to be changed?  Should a view of the nation-state as fully 
enmeshed with and constituted by a wide range of actors and entities in multiple arenas 
change the way in which international law is created?  In response to questions such as 
these, scholarship introduced in Chapter II on global legal pluralism, which owes an 
intellectual debt to the New Haven School, and on polycentric governance and new 
governance (among other potentially relevant literatures) begin to challenge the formal 
story.1100  Most significantly, this scholarship decenters the nation-state and allows for a 
                                                
1099 For an exposition of transnational legal process, see Koh, supra note 40, at 339. 
 
1100 See supra Chapter II. 
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broader conception of what might constitute law.  It provides the basis for a narrative of 
international law creation in which the complex dynamics described in the case studies 
might be integrated more with treaties among nation-states, as depicted in Figure 8 of the 
enmeshed nation-state.  As noted in the introduction, this narrative has framed my 
portrayal of the problem of climate change and the governance issues in each of the case 
studies. 
 
Figure 8. Enmeshed Nation-State 
Specifically, the scholars who take this type of approach would view these 
dynamics as playing a greater role in the international lawmaking process than would 
modified Westphalians.1101 For example, Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, who 
pioneered the New Haven School approach upon which many conceptions of global legal 
pluralism build, defined law as “a process of authoritative decision by which the 
members of a community clarify and secure their common interests.”1102  The agreements 
by subnational coalitions arguably would count as international lawmaking under such an 
approach, as the participating governments are sovereigns making collaborative decisions 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, which they have the power to implement in their 
                                                
1101 For an exploration of a pluralist perspective on California as an international lawmaker in the context of 
climate change litigation, see Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, supra note 
33, at 196–208. 
 
1102 LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 41, at xxi. 
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local contexts. The subnational governments make authoritative decisions about their 
individual approaches to land use planning and transportation and articulate their 
common interests in documents produced at the Conferences to the Parties. Although this 
articulation is not formally binding—the subnational governments would not suffer legal 
consequences from walking away—this process of clarifying and stating their common 
interests by the subnational governments would likely be adequate to form part of 
lawmaking in a pluralist account. These subnational efforts thus would each be pieces of 
overall transnational lawmaking on climate change. 
 
d. Why This Choice Matters  
As I have noted in my prior work, such categorization of scholarship becomes 
messy at the boundaries.  The distinction between modified Westphalians and pluralists, 
in particular, is often difficult to make because once one begins opening up the nation-
state and decentering it somewhat, the fullness of the decentering is sometimes unclear 
and may depend on circumstance.  In addition, some theories may have elements of more 
than one category.1103  This complexity of categorization applies to the three basic 
categories of nation-state enclosure articulated above as well.  If one recognizes the 
nation-state as at least somewhat permeable, the distinction between that permeability 
and full enmeshment may be hard to pinpoint.  But this messiness does not diminish the 
central point, which is that the geography of the nation-state—especially its level of 
enclosure—influences how one should conceptually approach the case studies’ 
                                                
1103 See id. 
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interaction with international law.  These conceptual differences translate into normative 
and practical possibilities for progress on climate change, which this section explores. 
 When our governance models focus too narrowly on treaties as the solution for 
climate change, we face two risks.  First, in theory, we could address the problem through 
a rigorous treaty regime with which nation-states comply through aggressive national-
level enforcement efforts; such enforcement might involve that involve mandates created 
through litigation or national-level requirements for critical subnational entities. 
However, such a solution is not politically realistic.  I fear that due to (1) the timelags 
between emissions and impacts and (2) deep inequalities between major emitters and 
those facing the most immediate severe impacts, by the time the international negotiators 
are willing to face up to the hard choices posed by this problem, the choices will be very 
stark indeed. Unless treaties realistically can solve climate change or, at the very least, 
make more significant progress in reducing emissions, a conceptual model that focuses 
on them as the core of climate change governance may fail to address the problem. 
Second, and more fundamentally, as argued in the introductory chapter, many of 
the efforts described in the case studies have importance to climate change governance 
that cannot be captured fully by reference to the treaty regime.  The complex scalar 
dynamics of the litigation, federal regulation, and networks of cities involve many 
different types of law and key actors interacting at multiple levels of governance.  They 
may well help the United States meet its voluntary emissions reductions pledges under 
the Copenhagen Accord, but that is only a piece of how they influence our ability to 
address climate change.  For example, as Jacqueline Peel and I are exploring in a broader 
research project on climate change litigation, these cases not only have direct regulatory 
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influences, but indirect ones on norms and values and on costs that are much more 
difficult to measure.  Treating climate change governance as polycentric allows for more 
complete understanding of how each piece of the complex puzzle interacts with other 
pieces to comprise or undermine an overall solution. 
Climate change will pose a daunting governance challenge regardless of one’s 
perspective on international law.  However, exploring approaches, such as global legal 
pluralism, polycentric governance, and new governance, which rely upon an enmeshed 
view of nation-state geography allow for creative policy-making that the current process, 
grounded in Westphalian strictures, may miss.  Such creativity is critical in the face of the 
potential risks we face if our solutions to climate change continue to fall short. 
 
3. Towards Hybridity, Multi-Scalar Inclusion, and Regulatory Responsiveness 
 The case studies do not simply illustrate the complex scalar dynamics at the heart of 
climate change governance.  They also provide a context in which to grapple with how to 
make progress on the three principles for effective and appropriate polycentric governance 
articulated through the streams of legal and interdisciplinary theory in Chapter II: 
hybridity, multi-scalar inclusion, and regulatory responsiveness.1104  This concluding 
section considers how the dissertation’s analysis might suggest ways forward with respect 
to each principle and open avenues for future research. 
With respect to hybridity, the case studies suggest that hybrid forms emerge not only 
in the ways in which formal institutions are constructed, but also through complex multi-
scalar interactions.  For instance, the litigation over climate change, with the interactions 
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and rescaling it creates, arguably constitutes a hybrid form of regulation.1105  Similarly, the 
interaction between formal legal action at national and local scales and informal networks 
at multiple scales in the latter two case studies arguably adds hybridity to regulation at a 
particular level.1106  These examples suggest that geographic conceptions of scale can be 
helpful in developing hybrid elements in multi-scalar governance because of the way in 
which they reveal the nuances of interaction and new possibilities for formal and informal 
hybridity. 
Similarly, regarding multi-scalar inclusion, the case studies indicate that interaction 
through litigation and multi-level networks provides possibilities for integrating multiple 
scales, particularly through iterative relationships over time.  However, these forms clearly 
have their limits.  For example, the conflictual nature of litigation does not always evolve 
into cooperation among its participants; the move from litigation to the National Program 
in the motor vehicles context is likely more the exception than the rule.  But in the types of 
litigation and regulatory results highlighted in the first and second case studies, litigation 
did result in new regulatory forms and interactions, often involving multi-level 
networks.1107  Similarly, the limited ways in which networks of cities are interacting 
across scales and acknowledging differentiation within the local scale creates possibilities 
for the development of new connections among multi-scalar networks proposed in Chapter 
XIII.1108  These not only could encourage greater suburban participation in climate change 
mitigation, but also create new multi-scalar linkages that foster greater inclusivity of key 
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actors. 
Finally, regarding regulatory responsiveness, the case studies are replete with 
examples of smaller-scale actors being nimble and responsive in ways that are often 
harder at larger scales.  The speed with which Falcon Heights and some of the other 
suburbs studied were able to develop climate change mitigation efforts and refine them 
suggests the promise of adaptability in small local contexts.1109  Litigation also serves as 
an important mechanism for fostering greater regulatory responsiveness, particularly in the 
first two case studies.  These cases and the threat of them not only help spur governmental 
officials to respond to climate change, but they also can provide cover for politically 
difficult action, such as the Obama Administration’s greenhouse gas emissions regulation 
under the Clean Air Act.1110   
  Although the case studies provide helpful insights for how to move forward in 
operationalizing the three principles, the above conclusions are necessarily jurisdictionally 
specific.  They help advance multi-scalar governance in the United States, but likely 
cannot be applied directly to other jurisdictions due to differences in legal systems and 
society.  As noted in the introductory chapter, this dissertation chose to focus its case 
studies within the United States in order to delve more deeply in its analysis and to 
provide insight into regulatory possibilities for a crucial nation-state that has made limited 
international commitments.  This relatively narrow geographic focus allowed for context-
specific exploration of hybridity, multiscalar inclusion, and regulatory responsiveness and 
of how they could form part of more effective U.S.-based polycentric climate change 
                                                
1109 See supra Chapter XII. 
 
1110 See supra Chapter IX–X. 
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governance.  It would be hard to provide insights into the United States or any other 
jurisdiction without this kind of detailed analysis. 
 However, if polycentric strategies are going to form a critical part of solving climate 
change, focusing on any one nation-state, even an important one like the United States, is 
not enough.  The type of law and geography analysis provided in this dissertation must be 
replicated in multiple jurisdictions to allow for a nuanced understanding of what strategies 
would work in that legal system and society.  Such studies will need to consider the 
possibilities provided by the specific type of legal system in that nation-state, as strategies 
will vary among common law, civil law, and Islamic law legal systems and those of 
nation-states like China—the largest emitter in the world—that mix elements of more than 
one type of legal system.  For example, litigation would likely have a much more limited 
capacity to rescale governance in a civil law system that gives courts a more constrained 
interpretive role.1111   
 Similarly, legal systems vary in the extent to which they have a federalist system 
distributing authority among their levels of governance, but it is important to differentiate 
between the law on the books and law in action in analyzing this variation and its 
multiscalar dynamics.  For instance, although China is formally a unitary state, Jingjing 
Liu has noted that “economic reform has brought significant decentralization of economic 
administration, and in many cases, Beijing has been unable to supervise effectively the 
exercise of local government power, leading to substantial de facto autonomy for local 
                                                
1111 For a comparison of common and civil law judicial approaches, see Charles H. Koch, Jr., The 
Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design As the Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 139 (2004). 
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governments in many areas of activities.” 1112   An analysis of how to approach 
polycentricity effectively in China would need to incorporate this complexity into its 
approach. 
 Even with these jurisdictional differences, this dissertation and its case studies suggest 
key types of inquiries that could be performed in many nation-states to expand upon its 
analysis.  First, many nation-states have climate change litigation, but it takes different 
forms and plays varying regulatory roles in each context.  While—as discussed in the first 
case study—there are a number of scholars around the world analyzing climate change 
litigation in different jurisdiction, few of them are focusing on its scalar role.  More 
research is needed to understand how climate change litigation is affecting the scale of 
regulation in jurisdictions beyond the United States.1113  Second, an enormous number of 
nation-states are regulating climate change in some form at a national level.   More 
research is needed along the lines of the second case study into the multiscalar aspects of 
their national-level regulation and to what extent approaches could incorporate key 
stakeholders at multiple levels more effectively.1114 Third, as discussed in the final case 
study, many nation-states have cities, states, and provinces that are active in multi-level 
climate change networks.  The kind of examination performed in that case study, which 
identifies cities by type and explores their participation in multi-level climate change 
                                                
1112 Jingjing Liu, Overview of the Chinese Legal System, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10885, 
10885 (2011).  For further analysis of the complexities of the modern Chinese legal system and its 
evolution, see STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999); 
Yuanyuan Shen, Conceptions and Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of Law Reform in 
Modern China, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 20-44 (Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman 
& R. Kent Guy, eds. 2000); William P. Alford & Fang Liufang, Legal Training and Education in the 1990s: 
An Overview and Assessment of China’s Needs 21 (1994); Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with 
Chinese Characteristics: China’s Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience, 24 TEMP. INT'L & 
COMP. L.J. 1 (2010). 
 
1113 See supra Chapters IV–VII. 
 
1114 See supra Chapters VIII–X. 
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networks, could be expanded to cities around world.1115 
 In the final analysis, although geographically aware, polycentric approaches require 
creative reconceptualization and careful crafting, such an effort is worthwhile. The current 
reliance on traditional Westphalian notions of international law is not solving the problem 
of climate change quickly enough. Perhaps alternative approaches will not either. Neither 
polycentric strategies nor nuanced scalar analysis is a panacea, and the approaches 
highlighted in the case studies have not prevented carbon dioxide concentrations from 
crossing over 400 parts per million in the atmosphere.  But given the urgency of the 
problem, some conceptual blockbusting is needed. In the context of this “super-wicked” 
problem, openness to more inclusive approaches puts more possibilities on the table. The 
polycentric governance approaches explored in this dissertation may not solve the problem 
of climate change, but they increase the hope of doing so. 
                                                
1115 See supra Chapters XI–XIII. 
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APPENDIX 
TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN REGION COMMUNITIES’ NETWORK 
PARTICIPATION, FROM CHAPTER XIII 
Community (7-County 
Metro Area)1116 
GreenStep 
Cities1117 
MN Energy 
Challenge 
Team (# 
Team 
Mems.)1118 
EPA Region 5 
Community 
Climate Change 
Initiative 
Partner1119 
Mayors Agreement on 
Climate Change1120  
Copenhagen City Climate 
Catalogue1121  
ICLEI1122  
Afton  23     
Andover  98     
Anoka  82     
Apple Valley 6/9/2011 367 2009 Mary Hamann-Roland 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Arden Hills  47     
Bayport  9     
Baytown       
Belle Plaine  16     
Belle Plaine Township       
Benton Township       
Bethel       
Birchwood   8     
Blaine  178     
Blakeley Township       
Bloomington  435     
Brooklyn Center  103  Tim Willson 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Brooklyn Park  222     
Burnsville 4/17/2012 277  Elizabeth Kautz 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Camden Township       
Carver  19     
                                                
1116 List of Community Profiles, supra note 775. 
 
1117 Greenstep Cities List, supra note supra note 786. 
 
1118 City Teams, supra note 982. 
 
1119 Region 5 Climate Change: Municipalities, supra note 810.    
 
1120 List of Participating Mayors, supra note 702. 
 
1121 List of Commitments, supra note 1009. 
 
1122 Member List, supra note 985. 
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Castle Rock Township       
Cedar Lake Township       
Centerville  8     
Champlin  100     
Chanhassen  89     
Chaska  85     
Circle Pines  44     
Coates       
Cologne  4     
Columbia Heights  58     
Columbus   4     
Coon Rapids  188     
Corcoran  19     
Cottage Grove 12/1/2010 118     
Credit River Township       
Crystal  104  ReNae Bowman   
Dahlgren Township       
Dayton  11     
Deephaven  14     
Dellwood  1     
Denmark Township       
Douglas  1     
Eagan 8/17/2010 405  Mike Maguire 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
East Bethel  9     
Eden Prairie 6/14/2011 224  Nancy Tyra-Lukens 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Edina 1/18/2011 503  James Hovland 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline) 2007 
Elko New Market  2     
Empire Township       
Eureka Township       
Excelsior  30     
Falcon Heights 1/12/2011 79 2009 Peter Lindstrom 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Farmington 5/2/2011 125     
Forest Lake  89     
Fridley  199     
Gem Lake  2     
Golden Valley  167  Linda Loomis 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline) 2009 
Grant  5     
Greenfield  5     
Greenvale       
Greenvale Township       
Greenwood  3     
 371 
Grey Cloud Island 
Township 
      
Ham Lake   32     
Hamburg  3     
Hampton  4     
Hampton Township       
Hancock  2     
Hassan       
Hastings  67     
Helena Township       
Hilltop       
Hollywood Township       
Hopkins 11/1/2010 118     
Hugo  57     
Independence  12     
Inver Grove Heights  233  George Tourville 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Jackson Township  9     
Jordan  22     
Lake Elmo 5/14/2012 38     
Lake St. Croix Beach  1     
Lakeland  30     
Lakeland Shores       
Laketown Township       
Lakeville  185     
Landfall  2     
Lauderdale  12     
Lexington  9     
Lilydale  3     
Lino Lakes  58     
Linwood Township       
Little Canada  33     
Long Lake  41     
Loretto  20     
Louisville Township       
Mahtomedi 10/5/2010 58  Judson Marshall 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline) 2008 
Maple Grove  224     
Maple Plain  45     
Maplewood 12/13/2010 134 Prior to 2009 Diana Longrie 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Marine on St. Croix  10     
Marshan Township       
May Township       
Mayer  6     
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Medicine Lake  1     
Medina  16     
Mendota  4     
Mendota Heights  80     
Miesville  1     
Minneapolis  9519  R.T. Rybak 12% by 2012; 20% by 2020; 
80% by 2050 (2006 Baseline) 
1992 
Minnetonka  305  Janis Callison 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Minnetonka Beach  1     
Minnetrista  8     
Mound  41     
Mounds View  64     
New Brighton  146     
New Germany       
New Hope  86     
New Market Township       
New Trier       
Newport  19     
Nininger Township       
North Oaks  29     
North St. Paul 7/3/2012 32     
Norwood Young America  3     
Nowthen       
Oak Grove  16     
Oak Park Heights  2  David Beudet 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Oakdale 3/8/2011 188 2009   2008 
Orono  34     
Osseo  26     
Pine Springs  2     
Plymouth  340     
Prior Lake  494     
Ramsey  131     
Randolph  5     
Randolph Township       
Ravenna Township       
Richfield 1/10/2012 240     
Robbinsdale  129     
Rogers 12/13/2011 27     
Rosemount 12/20/2011 1454  William Droste 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Roseville  293 2009 Craig Klausing 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline) 2006 
San Franscisco Township       
Sand Creek Township       
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Savage  148     
Scandia  9     
Sciota Township       
Shakopee  129     
Shoreview  146     
Shorewood 6/27/2011 34     
South St. Paul  65     
Spring Lake Park  14     
Spring Lake Township       
Spring Park  1     
St. Anthony 2/8/2011 27     
St. Bonifacious  9     
St. Francis  13     
St. Lawrence Township       
St. Louis Park 6/4/2012 476     
St. Marys Point       
St. Paul  2806 Prior to 2009 Chris Coleman 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline) 1992 
St. Paul Park  18     
Stillwater  225     
Stillwater Township       
Sunfish Lake  9  Molly Park 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
Tonka Bay  6     
Vadnais Heights  48     
Vermillion       
Vermillion Township       
Victoria 1/9/2012 23     
Waconia  19     
Waconia Township       
Waterford Township       
Watertown  12     
Watertown Township       
Wayzata  49     
West Lakeland Township       
West St. Paul  64     
White Bear Lake 12/13/2011 142  Paul Auger 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline)  
White Bear Township       
Willernie  2     
Woodbury  257  William Hargis 7% by 2012 (1990 Baseline) 2011 
Woodland       
Young America 
Township 
  3         
Totals: 183 22 133 6 21 20 8 
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